JUDGMENT : C.K. Thakker, J. 1. Both the above appeals arise out of two orders, interim in nature, passed by the learned Single Judge. The appellant-original respondent No. 1-Amreli District Central Coop. Bank Limited {"Appellant Bank" for short} filed these two appeals for two reliefs viz., firstly, to revoke order of "Rule" issued by the learned Single Judge and secondly, to vacate interim relief granted by the learned Single Judge. The respondents are the employees appointed by the appellant-Bank. They have approached this Court by invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by filing two petitions, being Special Civil Application Nos. 5552 of 1997 and 5573 of 1997. The learned Single Judge entertained them by issuing "Rule". He also granted interim relief mandatory in nature, directing the appellant-Bank to reinstate the petitioners in service. The order was passed on July 30, 1997 and the rule was made returnable on 5th August, 1997. We are told at the bar that now the matters are kept for hearing on 8th August, 1997. 2. Mr. B.M Mangukia, learned counsel for appellant contended that the appellant cannot be said to be "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and, hence, petitions could not have been entertained by the learned Judge. He submitted that the point is concluded by various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as of this Court. Reliance was placed on following decisions; (i) Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India & Others, AIR 1979 SC 1628 ; (ii) Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors., AIR 1981 SC 487 ; (iii) Chander Mohan Khanna v. The National Council of Educational Research & Training and Others, AIR 1992 SC 76 ; (iv) Bipinchandra J. Soni v. Gujarat State Cooperative Cotton Federation & Others; 1986 GLH 258 ; 3. Relying upon various tests laid down in Ajay Hasia {supra}, it was submitted that by no stretch of imagination the appellant can be said to be "State" under Article 12. If the appellant is not State, no petition would lie. This point goes to the root of the matter, and hence, the learned Single Judge ought not to have entertained the petitions. 4. In the alternative, it was also submitted that as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija & Ors. v. The Collector, Thane, Maharashtra & Ors. This point goes to the root of the matter, and hence, the learned Single Judge ought not to have entertained the petitions. 4. In the alternative, it was also submitted that as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija & Ors. v. The Collector, Thane, Maharashtra & Ors. AIR 1991 SC 1893 , it was not open to the learned Single Judge to ignore a decision and/or take a contrary view. We are governed by the theory of precedent and even if the learned Single Judge was of the view that the law laid down by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Bipinchandra Jugaldas Soni (supra) does not lay down correct law, the only course open to him is to refer the matter to a larger Bench. The learned Single Judge by entertaining the petitions and by passing interim orders had committed an error of law, which requires to be interfered with by this Court. 5. It was further submitted that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the appellant is "State", and petitions would be maintainable, the learned Single Judge ought not to have entertained them on the ground that alternative and equally efficacious remedy is available to the petitioners. For the said purpose, reliance was placed on Gujarat State Cooperative Land Development Bank Limited v. P.R Mankad & Anr., 1979 (20) GLR 701 (SC). 6. It was also argued that the learned Single Judge has not given sufficient opportunity to the Appellant. Mr. Mangukia submitted that on behalf of appellant-Bank, time was sought for completion of pleading, which was not granted by the learned Single Judge and "Rule" was issued. By not granting time, the learned Single Judge has committed an error and thereby prejudice has been caused to the appellant and on that ground also, the order of "Rule" is required to be recalled. 7. Finally, it was submitted that when the services of petitioners were already terminated, by way of mandatory interim relief, the appellant-Bank ought not to have been directed to restate the employees. 8. Mr. Jayant Patel, learned counsel for respondent (Original petitioners), on the other hand, supported the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 7. Finally, it was submitted that when the services of petitioners were already terminated, by way of mandatory interim relief, the appellant-Bank ought not to have been directed to restate the employees. 8. Mr. Jayant Patel, learned counsel for respondent (Original petitioners), on the other hand, supported the order passed by the learned Single Judge. He submitted that after judgment in Bipinchandra Jugaldas Soni (supra) a number of cases have been decided by a Single Judge as well as by a Division Bench and Cooperative Societies have been held to be "State" under Article 12, Some Letters Patent Appeals are also pending. In these circumstances, by admitting the matter and issuing "Rule" it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge has committed an error of law. 9. Mr. Patel also submitted that the contention raised on the basis of Sundarja Kanayalal Bhathija's case by Mr. Mangukia would not help the appellant in the instant case inasmuch as the learned Single Judge has merely issued "Rule". No final decision has been arrived at and it is always open to the learned Single Judge to issue Rule if he deems fit that the matters require consideration. When such an action is taken, no exception can be made against such an order passed by the learned Single Judge. 10. Regarding alternative remedy, he submitted that according to the case of the petitioners, they were appointed on permanent basis and by a stroke of pen, services of all permanent employees have been terminated and taking into consideration that aspect, the learned Single Judge has entertained the petitions and granted interim relief which cannot be said to be arbitrary, unreasonable and it does not require interference at interim stage. He submitted that in fact, the petitioners wanted much more time which was also not granted and the matters have been fixed for final hearing. On the part of the petitioners they are prepared and they would go on with the matters. 11. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the Letters Patent Appeal do no require admission. So far as issuance of "Rule" is concerned, ordinarily an appellate Court may not interfere with such order. When a Single Judge feels that a particular matter requires consideration and issues "rule" normally such an order would not be interfered with by a Division Bench at that stage. So far as issuance of "Rule" is concerned, ordinarily an appellate Court may not interfere with such order. When a Single Judge feels that a particular matter requires consideration and issues "rule" normally such an order would not be interfered with by a Division Bench at that stage. Hence, without expressing any opinion one way of the other as to whether the appellant can be said to be "State" or not, we are of the view that by issuing "Rule", the learned Single Judge has not committed an error of law. We may not be understood to have held that the appellant can be said to be "State" and the petitions are maintainable. As and when the matters will be heard by the learned Single Judge, it is open to the parties to raise all contentions and the learned Single Judge will decide the same in accordance with law. 12. So far as interim relief is concerned, it is true that normally ad interim relief of mandatory direction is not granted by the Court but it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the facts and circumstances of the case, if it is the case of the petitioners that they were permanent employees and that their services have been terminated abruptly without following due process of law and the learned Single Judge prima facie was satisfied that mandatory relief was called for such a relief can be granted. Likewise, where a Division Bench is satisfied that such a relief was not called for, an appropriate order can be passed but in the light of peculiar facts and circumstances when such a relief is granted, we do not think that even that order requires any interference. We, however, do not express any opinion on merits and as and when the matters will be taken up for final hearing, the learned Single Judge will pass appropriate orders. 13. For the foregoing reasons, these Letters Patent Appeals deserves to be dismissed, and accordingly, dismissed. No order on Civil Applications. 14. We may observe that if ad-interim relief is continued for more than a month, i.e. by 1st September, 1997, and that delay is not referable to appellant Bank, it is open to the Appellant-Bank to file appropriate application for vacation and/or modification of the order. Appeals dismissed.