Judgment :- 1. Tenant is the revision petitioner, who is the second respondent in the eviction petition. 2. At the time of initiation of eviction proceedings, there was only one respondent, i.e., the brother of the revision petitioner. Subsequently, when an objection was raised by first respondent stating that the eviction petition is bad for non-joinder, revision petitioner was also added as an additional party. 3. Material averments stated in the eviction petition may be summarised thus:— First respondent herein is the owner of the building scheduled to the eviction petition. Originally, second respondents father Veerasamy Chettiar was a tenant under him, and, after the death of Veerasamy Chettiar, second respondent continued as a tenant in the building on a monthly rent of Rs. 250/-. He is running a printing press in the building in question under the name and style of ‘Sri Vetrivel Press’. It is said that from 1975 onwards, landlord was demanding the second respondent to vacate the building since the same was required for his personal occupation for conducting his own grain business. At that time, tenant refused to vacate the building, and in July, 1986, the matter was referred to the local Panchayatdars for arriving at a settlement. A settlement was arrived at whereby the tenant agreed to vacate the premises after expiry of three years. A muchalika was prepared and both the landlord and tenant subscribed their signatures to the same. After the expiry of the period, again, the tenant refused to vacate the building, and another three years period was also granted, and even after the expiry of that period also, a further extension of another three years was granted, and finally by November 1985, the entire periods granted by the landlord expired. 4. It is further averred in the petition that the landlord is running a grain business in a rented premises and, therefore, he wanted the schedule building for his own occupation. When such a demand was made, the tenant filed O.S. No. 86 of 1986 before District Munsifs Court, Salem and obtained an interim order restraining the landlord from dispossessing him without having recourse to law. It is the case of the landlord that once the term has expired, the occupation of the premises by the tenant becomes wrongful, and he is bound to surrender vacant possession of the same. It is the case of the landlord that once the term has expired, the occupation of the premises by the tenant becomes wrongful, and he is bound to surrender vacant possession of the same. It is further averred that the last payment of rent was on 18.12.1985, and, on the date of eviction petition, more than seven months rent was in arrears. To prevent the landlord from seeking eviction on the ground of default, tenant, without any bona fides, has invoked the provisions of Sec. 8(5) of the Act, and has filed R.C.O.P. No. 85 of 1986 and sought permission to deposit rent in Court. Under the above circumstances landlord sought for eviction of the tenant on two grounds, namely. (1) that he has committed wilful default in payment of rent; and (2) that he requires the buildings bona fide for his own occupation. The eviction petition was filed on 28.3.1986. 5. In the counter-statement filed by Kirubakaran (first respondent in the eviction petition), he contended that in January, 1986, landlord demanded exorbitant rent on 10.1.1986 and, therefore, refused to receive the rent, and on 15.1.1986, i.e. , five days after such refusal, tenant sent a sum of Rs. 750/- being rents due for the months of Ippasi, Karthigai and Margali, through the money order. The same was refused to be accepted. Again, the subsequent rent was also sent through money order, and it corresponded to the months of Thai and Maasi. The same was also refused to be accepted. On 16.4.1986, a notice was issued by the tenant to the landlord, asking him to name a bank wherein he can deposit the rent to the landlords account. No reply was received from landlord. Therefore, tenant filed R.C.O.P. No. 85 of 1986, seeking permission of the Rent Controller to deposit the rent in Court. The said petition was allowed on 16.10.1986. According to the respondent, he has deposited all the rent that is payable to the landlord. He has further said that it was only due to the conduct of the landlord, he could not pay the rent. He has also said that once the Rent Controller has accepted his case under Sec. 8(5) of the Act, the landlord has no cause of action to proceed with the case. The claim for bona fide own occupation was also disputed by the tenant. 6. He has also said that once the Rent Controller has accepted his case under Sec. 8(5) of the Act, the landlord has no cause of action to proceed with the case. The claim for bona fide own occupation was also disputed by the tenant. 6. After impleadment of the second respondent, he also filed a counter similar to the one filed by first respondent (tenant) already on record. 7. Rent Controller, after taking evidence, came to the conclusion that the landlord is entitled to get possession on both the grounds. He found that the tenant has committed wilful default in payment of rent. Proceedings under Sec. 8(5) of the Act will not help him from the penal consequence of eviction. He further found that the building is required bona fide by the landlord for his own occupation. 8. Aggrieved by the order of eviction, revision petitioner herein preferred R.C.A. 31 of 1991 before the Appellate Authority, before whom, additional evidence was also sought to be adduced. The same was allowed and Ex. B.9 and B.10. were marked by way of additional evidence in appeal. 9. The Appellate Authority reconsidered the entire case and came to the conclusion that the tenant is not liable to be evicted on the ground of bona fide own occupation, but the contention that the tenant is not a wilful defaulter was not accepted by the Appellate Authority also. The result was, the order of eviction was confirmed, but the ground of eviction was confined to wilful default in payment of rent. The order of eviction by the Appellate Authority is now challenged in this Revision. 10. Ex. A.1. and A.10. are the two rental arrangements entered into between the previous landlord and the predecessor of the revision petitioner, and the present landlord with the predecessor of the revision petitioner. When there is a written document evidencing the rental arrangement, in which the terms and conditions have been put down in writing, parties are strictly governed by the same. In Ex. A10, tenant has agreed that he will pay rent every month regularly, on or before the 5th of the succeeding month. Landlord has filed Ex. A2 to A9 to show that it was never the habit of the tenant to pay rent in time. All along the rent was paid only in a lump. Under Ex. A2. a sum of Rs. 2,000/- is paid. Ex. Landlord has filed Ex. A2 to A9 to show that it was never the habit of the tenant to pay rent in time. All along the rent was paid only in a lump. Under Ex. A2. a sum of Rs. 2,000/- is paid. Ex. A3 evidences payment of Rs. 1,500/-. Ex. A4 is for payment of Rs. 2,250/-. On 13.11.1984, a sum of Rs. 1,250/- has been paid. Ex. A6 evidences payment of Rs. 1,000/-. Ex. A7 is a receipt for Rs. 1,500/-. It is dated 24.8 1985. On the same date, under Ex. A8 another sum of Rs. 1,750/- has been paid. Ex. A9 dated 17.12.1985 is for payment of Rs. 750/-. So from these exhibits, it is clear that it was the habit of the tenant to pay rent not in time. But the landlord used to receive the same, not on the basis of any arrangement or any subsequent agreement. Ex. A20 is dated 17.12.1985 for the month of Ippasi. 11. It is the case of the tenant that on 10.1.1986, he tendered rent for three months, namely, Ippasi, Karthigai and Margali. But, it is seen that rent for the month of Ippasi was already paid under Ex. A20. But the landlord refused to receive the rental arrears and, therefore, a sum of Rs. 750/- was sent by money order on 15.1.1986, and the same was also refused to be accepted. Further, the subsequent rent was also tendered under Ex. B4, but the same too was refused to be accepted. It was thereafter, tenant issued a notice under Ex. B5 dated 16.4.1986, directing the landlord to inform the bank in which the amount could be deposited. There was no reply from the landlord, and RCOP. No. 85 of 1986 was filed by tenant on 17.5.1986. Tenant filed the Lodgment Schedule on 26-6-1986. Chalan was issued on 23.7.1986, and the amount was deposited on 28 7.1986. It is the case of the tenant that once the landlord has refused to accept the rent, and he has complied with all the formalities under Sec. 8(5) of the Act, he cannot be termed as ‘defaulter’. How far the said submission is correct, is to be considered. If the proceedings initiated by tenant under Sec. 8 of the Rent Control Act are not in accordance with law, then he cannot escape from the liability of being evicted. How far the said submission is correct, is to be considered. If the proceedings initiated by tenant under Sec. 8 of the Rent Control Act are not in accordance with law, then he cannot escape from the liability of being evicted. What are the ingredients that are necessary for the purpose of Sec. 8 of the Act? Under Sec. 10 of the Rent Control Act, landlord is entitled to get eviction on certain grounds. One such ground is that the tenant has committed default in payment of rent, and if the same is proved to be wilful, eviction is ordered. Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 10 of the Rent Control Act says as to when a tenant is deemed to have committed default. It says that when the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of a building, within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable, he is deemed to have committed default. In this case, there is a written agreement of tenancy, namely, Ex. A10. It says that every months rent has to be paid on or before the 5th of the succeeding month. Under Sec. 10(2)(i) of the Act, he will be a defaulter on the 20th of the succeeding month, i.e. , on the expiry of the 15 days fixed for payment. Admittedly, rent was not tendered as per the agreement of tenancy. Even according to the own showing of the tenant, two months rent was in arrears as on 10.1.1986, even though a sum of Rs. 750/- was tendered, corresponding to three months. The previous conduct of the tenant also shows that he never paid rent on the due date. It is the further case of the tenant that when the amount was tendered, landlord refused to accept the same, and the amount was sent by money order for those three months. The same was refused to be accepted. Subsequent rent which accrued thereafter was also sent by money order and the same was also refused to be accepted and it was thereafter Ex. B5 notice was issued. Sec. 8 of the Rent Control Act will have to be read along with Sec. 10 of the Act. The same was refused to be accepted. Subsequent rent which accrued thereafter was also sent by money order and the same was also refused to be accepted and it was thereafter Ex. B5 notice was issued. Sec. 8 of the Rent Control Act will have to be read along with Sec. 10 of the Act. If the landlord has already a cause of action for non-payment of rent in time, by mere invocation of Sec. 8 of the Act, the cause of action cannot be taken away. That means, the tender of rent must be in accordance with the contract, and if only the landlord refused to accept the same, the provision under Sec. 8 of the Act could be invoked. Once the landlord gets a cause of action, the subsequent refusal by him is justified. A tenant can invoke Sec. 8(5) only before the landlord gets a cause of action for eviction. That means, the tenant must have tendered the rent in accordance with Sec. 10(2)(i) of the Act. He should not be a defaulter. A defaulter is not entitled to the benefits of the Act. If a legal tender is made and the landlord refuses to issue receipt or even refuses to receive the same, tenant is entitled to send the rent by money order, and thereafter, in case the landlord refuses to receive the money order also, the tenant can ask the landlord to specify a bank in which he can deposit the rent. The scope of Ss. 8 and 10 of the Rent Control Act came for consideration by this Court in the decision reported in 1990-1 L.W. 591 (Avinasilingam. K. v. Hamsa), wherein Ratnam. J as he then was has held in paragraph 5 of the judgment thus:— “Under Sec. 10(2)(i) of the Act, protection is given to the tenant against removability from the premises in his occupation, if the tenant pays or tenders the rent due by him in respect of the building within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable. Under Sec. 8(2) of the Act, in a case, where a landlord refuses to accept or evades the receipt, of any rent lawfully payable to him by a tenant in respect of any building, the tenant may call upon the landlord in writing requiring him to specify a bank into which the rent may be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. Sec. 8(3) of the Act permits the tenant to deposit the rent in the bank so specified by the landlord and enables him to continue to deposit the rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building. On the failure of the landlord to specify a bank under Sec. 8(4) of the Act, the tenant shall remit the rent to the landlord by money order, after deducting the money order commission. It is only when the landlord refuses to receive the rent remitted by money order, under sub-Sec. (5) of Sec. 8, the tenant may deposit the rent before the Rent Controller and continue to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building. It is thus seen that Sec. 8(5) of the Act, which had been resorted to by the petitioner in this case in H.R.C. No. 569 of 1981, is intended to protect the tenant from the consequences of non-payment of rent amounting even to wilful default owing to the refusal by the landlord to receive the rent when tendered. Under Sec. 9(2) of the Act, the amount deposited under Sec. 8(5) of the Act may be permitted to be withdrawn by the person held by the Rent Controller to be entitled to the amount on an application made by such person, to the Rent Controller on that behalf. Under Sec. 9(2) of the Act, the amount deposited under Sec. 8(5) of the Act may be permitted to be withdrawn by the person held by the Rent Controller to be entitled to the amount on an application made by such person, to the Rent Controller on that behalf. It is thus seen that the obligation of the tenant to pay or tender the rent within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy or in its absence, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable is intended to be fulfilled by resort to Sec. 8(5) of the Act and the deposit of the rents, refused to be received by the landlord when remitted by money order as well as that which may subsequently become due, under Sec. 8(5) of the Act, when paid out to the landlord under Sec. 9(2) of the Act, would ensure the payment of the rent regularly by the tenant as well as the receipt thereof by the landlord on being paid out to him by an order of the Controller under Sec. 9(2) of the Act . It is therefore, obvious that it is not merely for the sake of a deposit into court sec. 8(5) of the Act is intended, but it also serves to very vital and important purpose in that by resorting to a deposit of rents under Sec. 8(5) of the Act after obtaining the orders of the Controller in that regard, the rents refused to be received in the usual course by the landlord are not only paid by the tenant, but also made available to the landlord, so that a ground for eviction under Sec. 10(2)(i) of the Act does not arise , in the event of the deposit of rents being made without default. Thus, on a conjoint consideration of Ss. 10(2)(i), 8(5) and 9(2) of the Act, it is at once evident that the order for deposit under Sec. 8(5) of the Act is primarily intended to confer a protection on the tenant from eviction on the ground of wilful default in the payment of rent.” (Emphasis supplied) I have followed the aforesaid decision in the judgment reported in 1996-II-M.L.J. 154 = 1996-1-L.W. 737 (Saratha Ammal and Another v. Ganiappa). 12. 12. In the meanwhile, the tenant also moved an application under Sec. 8(5) of the Act seeking permission to deposit the rent in court. The landlord agreed that without prejudice to his rights, the same may be allowed, and accordingly it was allowed. At the time of initiating proceedings, if already the tenant was a defaulter, the subsequent payment of rent will not save him, and, under the provisions of Sec. 10(2)(i) of the Act, landlord is entitled to continue on the cause of action which was already available to him. Further, it is seen that even subsequent to the initiation of proceedings, rent was paid only in a lump. Ex. A22 will substantiate the same. We find that Rs. 3,000/- Rs. 1,500/-, Rs. 3,000/-, Rs. 6,000/- and Rs. 13,500/- have been deposited by the tenant after he initiated the proceedings under Sec. 8(5) of the Act. The amount of Rs. 3,000/- was deposited only on 6.8.1986, even though the proceedings were initiated on 26.6.1986. On 26.12.1986, a subsequent payment of Rs. 1,500/- was made. Ex. A22 also makes it clear that he continues to be a defaulter. 13. As held by Ratnam, J., as he then was in the decision aforementioned, which I followed in 1996-2-M.L.J. 154 = 1996-1-L.W. 737 (supra). when a tenant invokes the jurisdiction under Sec. 8(5) of the Act, it is his duty to pay rent in Court as and when it becomes due. Instead of actually paying the rent to the landlord, he gets discharged by depositing rent in Court. That means, the Court becomes agent of the landlord, and gives the tenant a discharge. If the entire conduct of the tenant is taken into consideration, it is clear that he was a wilful defaulter, and he was not entitled to invoke the provisions of Sec. 8(5) of the Act. 14. In (1996) 1 SCC 243 (Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal), their Lordships were considering a case under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction), Act, 1950. Sec. 19 of that Act is in pari materia with Sec. 8. of our Act. Their Lordships said that a tenant can deposit the amount in Court only if the conditions laid down in that Section are satisfied and in case even if he invokes the Act and obtains permission to deposit, he cannot be exonerated from the liability of being evicted. of our Act. Their Lordships said that a tenant can deposit the amount in Court only if the conditions laid down in that Section are satisfied and in case even if he invokes the Act and obtains permission to deposit, he cannot be exonerated from the liability of being evicted. Paragraph 8 of the judgment reads thus:— “In the present case, the appellant is seeking to avail of the benefit of the legal fiction under Sec. 19A(4) of the Act. It is settled law that a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it is created and should not be extended beyond that legislative field. (See; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (SCR at P. 646). The appellant can avail of the benefit of Sec. 19A(4) if the deposit of Rs. 3,600/- made by him in the Court of Munsif (South), Udaipur, on 29.10.1982, by way of rent for the months of May 1982 to October 1982, can be treated as a payment under Sec. 19A.(3)(c) so as to enable the appellant to say that he was not in default in payment of rent. Under Sec. 19A.(3)(c) the tenant can deposit the rent in the court only if the conditions laid down in the said provision are satisfied. It is the admitted case of the appellant that these conditions are not satisified in the present case. The deposit which was made by the respondent in Court on 29.10.1982 cannot, therefore, be regarded as a deposit made in accordance with clause (c) of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 19A and the appellant cannot avail of the protection of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 19A and he must be held to have committed default in payment of rent for the months of May, 1982 to October 1982. This means that the decree for eviction has been rightly passed against the appellant on account of default in payment of rent for the period of six months.” 15. Both the Authorities below have concurrently held that the tenant is a defaulter. In this revision, even though serious arguments were advanced by learned counsel challenging the correctness of the concurrent findings of the Authorities below, I do not think any reasonable ground is made out to interfere with those findings. 16. Learned counsel also relied on the decision reported in 1996-2-L.W. 467 (Krishna Mudaliar. In this revision, even though serious arguments were advanced by learned counsel challenging the correctness of the concurrent findings of the Authorities below, I do not think any reasonable ground is made out to interfere with those findings. 16. Learned counsel also relied on the decision reported in 1996-2-L.W. 467 (Krishna Mudaliar. V. v. Lakshmi Ammal) and argued that when a rent is refused to be accepted by the landlord, the landlord is not having any cause of action to sue the tenant on the ground of wilful default. I do not think the above decision will in any way help the petitioner. On the facts stated above, I have already said that the landlord is entitled to refuse to accept the rent if the same is not tendered in accordance with the terms of the tenancy. Tenant has also no case of any subsequent agreement whereby the landlord agreed to receive the rent in lump. Therefore, the cause of action already accrued to the landlord is not taken away, and it is not because of the conduct of the landlord, tenant became a defaulter. The decision cited supra may not have any application to the facts of this case. 17. In the result, the Revision Petition is dismissed, however, without any order as to costs.