JUDGMENT 1. - In this case PW1 Qutbuddin, Food Inspector purchased on 23.6.82 at 9 A.M. at Bus Stand Niwai Distt. Tonk 660 ml. of mixed milk for Rs. 165 from the petitioner, prepared three sample three sample thereof as per rules and got one of them examined by the Public Analyst, Jaipur for proof of adulteration. The Public Analyst, vide his report dated 8.7.1982 found, on examination, milk fat contents at 2.7% and solid non-fat contents at 4.46% as against the prescribed standard of 4.5% and 8.5% respectively and reported the same to be adulterated for not its conforming to the prescribed standard. With the written consent of the authority concerned the Food Inspector filed a complaint against the petitioner in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate Tonk (CJM). On trial the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate found the petitioner guilty of the offence under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 (the Act) convicted him as such and sentenced him to RI for six months and fine of Rs.1000/- vide her judgment and order dated 21.6.90. In appeal the learned Sessions Judge Tonk, by his impugned judgment and order dated 9.7.91 upheld the judgment and order of conviction and sentence of the petitioner. Hence this petitioner under section 397 Cr.P.C. before this court. 2. I have examined the correctness of the findings recorded by the courts below with reference to the evidence available on their records. The sworn testimonies of PW 1 Qutbuddin Food Inspector, and PW2 Azizaddin fully established the fact that the petitioner had sold 660 ML. mixed milk to the Food Inspector for cash consideration and the Food Inspector, observing the relevant rules in that behalf, had prepared, packed and sealed the samples and on examination of the sample milk the Public Analyst had found the same deficient in both the components namely fat contents and solids non-fat and hence adulterated. Neither of the two witnesses was inimical to the petitioner and his defence version as supported by PW1 Gajendra that the petitioner was carrying the milk to deliver the same to the ailing wife of one Itar Singh in the hospital, a version not got supported by Itar Singh or his alleged ailing wife did not demolish the sworn testimony of the two prosecution witness. The concurrent findings of fact on these points is fully supported by the evidence on record and is therefore, acceptable. 3. Mr. Inder Raj Saini, the learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that since the sanction issued under section 20 of the Act in this case was granted without the application of mind by the sanctioning authority, the very foundation of the prosecution was infirm and bad in law. Not only that I find no evidence on record of the courts below supporting Mr. Sainis contention but also that the argument has no soundness in law. 4. In the case of Nand Kishore v. State of Rajasthan, (SPO Cri. Revision Petition No. 24 of 1992) I have examined the legal aspect of the requirement of sanction' for prosecuting offenders under the Act and held that the words "written consent" used in the language of Section 20 (1) of the the Act is not to be misunderstood for the term "sanction" as used in other enactments like Prevention of Corruption Act and the Cr.RC. (Sec. 195). Whereas the expression "written consent" implies mere agreement or concurrence, the term "sanction" confers authority on the person on whose favour it is granted. Since written consent under section 20 (1) of the Act may be accorded by a general or especial order even before the taking place of the offence in a particular case, no question of applying ones mind to the facts of the case before institution of that case would arise (see Dhian Singh v. Municipal Board, Saharanpur 1973 FAC 404) . It may be recalled that in enacting Sec, 20(1) two objects were intended to be achieved viz (i) to prevent institution of prosecutions under the Act without written consent of the prescribed authorities and (ii) to relieve the prescribed authorities of the ever increasing burden of giving written consents in each and every case by assigning the function of giving the requisite consents to some other person. Subsequent amendment made to the origin provision simply liberalized the procedure for launching prosecutions. It may be taken note of that in some enactments legislature, in its collective wisdom, though it appropriate to use the words "written consent" and in some others the word "sanction" as essential requirement for launching prosecutions. The two expressions, as stated earlier, must necessarily convey different sense and meanings. It may be taken note of that in some enactments legislature, in its collective wisdom, though it appropriate to use the words "written consent" and in some others the word "sanction" as essential requirement for launching prosecutions. The two expressions, as stated earlier, must necessarily convey different sense and meanings. The former suggests the existence of the authority in the person to do an act, say, launching or prosecution but before doing that act he is required to obtain the approval of the other. Such approval for the act to be done is to be given in writing. That amounts to "written consent". The later expression suggests the absence of the authority in that person to do that act. He cannot do that act unless authorised by the other. In a sense it is the conferment of the authority to do that act by the former person in favour of the later. The person giving to or conferring upon the other person authority may reasonably be expected to apply his mind to the facts of the case. The expression "written consent" has therefore, to be read in the context of the powers and duties of the Food Inspector not only to check adulteration in food and food articles but also to bring the culprits to books. His power to initiate prosecution against the offenders should not be less than a purchaser of the adulterated food stuff who, under section 12 of the Act, is competent to initiate such prosecution simply by attaching the report of the Public Analyst to his complaint. Again, the requirement of "written consent" has been dispensed with under section 20 A in the cases of manufacturer, distributors and dealers of food articles against whom the court, if satisfied, may take cognizance of an offence under the Act at any time during the trial of the case. Therefore, where in a given case, like the present one, the "written consent" of the authority competent to give such consent is produced by the Food Inspector it should prima facie suggest that the initiation of the prosecution is valid. Therefore, where in a given case, like the present one, the "written consent" of the authority competent to give such consent is produced by the Food Inspector it should prima facie suggest that the initiation of the prosecution is valid. Unless there are cogent reasons to assume that the "written consent" was not given by the competent authority or the competent authority itself does not dispute the fact of giving its written consent no adverse assumption or inference should be made or drawn in favour of non-existence of the "written consent". The argument advanced by Mr. Saini, to my mind, has no legal basis too in this case and is accordingly rejected. 5. The other submission made by Mr. Saini is with regard to the sentence imposed upon the petitioner. It was submitted that the petitioner was a poor villager supporting his family by selling milk in towns or cities and that he has already faced a long prosecution. It was suggested that he should, under the circumstances of the case, be either released on probation or on the part of sentence already served out by him in this case with nominal increase in fine. 6. In the case of Nand Kishore (supra) I have examined the question of the necessity for the imposition of the minimum penalty under section 16(i) for the offences under the Act and have been of the opinion that the increasing menace of adulteration, threatening the health of the people at large, has forced the legislature to restrict and limit the judicial discretion to the imposition of punishment for not less than three months in jail and a fine of Rs.500/- and that too for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in judgment. In view of the gravity of the offence this legislative mandate, approved of by the judicial pronouncements up to the level of the Apex Court, has to be carried out in letter and spirit in the larger interest of the society rather than showing undeserved and misplaced sympathy to the offenders under the Act. Considering the reasons, submitted by Mr. Saini, as adequate and special in the present case, the sentence imposed upon the petitioner is reduced to three months RI and fine of Rs.500/- or in case of default payment of fine SI for one month with this modification in sentence this petition is dismissed.> Petition dismissed. *******