S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. Feeling aggrieved by the orders passed in the four second appeals filed by the revisionist under section 10 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 arising out of assessments for the years 1983-84, 1984-85, 1985-86 and 1986-87 which were disposal of by a common judgment and order, he has approached this Court by means of these four revisions under section 11 (1) of the aforesaid Act, seeking setting aside of the impugned orders. 2. After hearing the counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel representing the respondent on October 4, 1996, the learned Standing Counsel requested for some time to produce the order sheets of the cases relating to the assessment years in question to demonstrate that the assessee himself had declined to avail the opportunity to show cause or lead evidence in rebuttal opposing rejection of the accounts submitted by him saying that apart from his statement he had nothing else to say. The learned Standing Counsel later on produced the records which have also been perused. 3. The facts shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of these revisions lie in a narrow compass. The assessing authority had passed the assessment orders in question on the basis of best judgment assessment, observing that the survey reports indicated that the assessee had not maintained the accounts. It was observed by the assessing authority that when it was decided to issue notice to the revisionist in regard to the facts noticed in the survey reports, the assessee had stated that he had nothing more to say and it was not necessary to issue the notice. The accounts submitted by the assessee were rejected and the assessing authority proceeded to determine the tax liability taking recourse to the best judgment assessment. 4. The assessee thereafter filed the appeals. In the memo of appeals it had been asserted that the assessing authority had erred in placing reliance upon the facts and utilise them against the assessee without affording him any opportunity to rebut the same. It was also asserted that the total turnover of the assessee was below the taxable limit. The appellate authority, however, dismissed the appeals upholding the best judgment assessment. This order was challenged by the assessee in second appeals. It was also asserted that the total turnover of the assessee was below the taxable limit. The appellate authority, however, dismissed the appeals upholding the best judgment assessment. This order was challenged by the assessee in second appeals. The second appellate authority while holding that the survey dated August 5, 1983 relied upon by the assessing authority was irrelevant and should not have been taken notice of dismissed the appeal No. 447 of 1989 relating to assessment year 1983-84 but allowed the second appeal No. 448 of 1989 relating to assessment year 1984-85 and second appeal No. 449 of 1989 relating to assessment years 1985-86 as well as second appeal No. 450 of 1989 relating to assessment year 1986-87 in part reducing the amount of tax by Rs. 2,900, Rs. 3,100 and Rs. 9,900 respectively. 5. It may be noticed that initially the ex parte orders of assessment had been passed. These orders were subsequently recalled in the proceedings under section 30 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948. The assessing authority in his orders had observed that after setting aside the ex parte order when the case was reopened for hearing, the statement of the assessee was recorded. The record reveals that after the statement of the assessee was taken down and he had concluded his statement, he was again recalled and a statement to the following effect was recorded : " Uprokt Bayan Ke Atirikt Mujhe Kuchh Nanhi Kahna Hai Atah Karan Batao Notice Dene Ki Aawashyakta Nahee. " After recording this statement the evidence was closed and the assessing authority proceeded to decide the case and gave the judgment and order, to which a reference has already been given above. 6. The learned counsel for the revisionist has strenuously urged that once the ex parte order of assessment passed against the revisionist had been set aside and the case had been reopened, it was incumbent on the assessing authority to cause a notice to be served on the dealer stating the reasons for non-acceptance of the turnover of sales or of purchases or both as disclosed in the return if any submitted by the assessee and afford him a reasonable opportunity of furnishing his reply thereto. This protection stood secured in favour of the assessee under the provisions of the Act and rules framed thereunder. 7. This protection stood secured in favour of the assessee under the provisions of the Act and rules framed thereunder. 7. In the aforesaid connection it has further been submitted that the statement of the petitioner recorded after he was recalled to which a reference has been made above cannot be a substitute for the notice which necessitated the bringing to the knowledge of the assessee the reasons for non-acceptance of the turnover of sales or of purchases or both as disclosed in the returns submitted by him and the requirement to give a reasonable opportunity of furnishing his reply thereto contemplated under the statutory rules. 8. Learned Standing Counsel representing the respondents has, however, urged that in view of the statement of the assessee the benefit completed under the rules will be deemed to have been waived and no interference is called for on that account. 9. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration is as to whether the respondent-authorities could proceed on the basis that the assessee had waived the right secured in his favour as indicated hereinabove and rejecting the claim of the assessee determine the tax liability on the basis of the best judgment assessment utilising the survey reports against the assessee without bringing to his notice that these survey reports will be utilised against him and without affording an opportunity to him to submit his explanation thereto. 10. As observed by the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. S. B. Sardar Ranjit Singh reported in AIR 1968 SC 933 waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is obvious, therefore, that there could be no "waiver" unless the person against whom the waiver is claimed had full knowledge of his right and the facts enabling him to take effective action for the enforcement of such a right. A more direct test is to find out whether the law that confronts the estoppel can be seen to represent a social policy to which the court must give effect in the interest of the public generally or some section of the public, despite any rules of evidence as between themselves that the parties may have created by their conduct or otherwise. 11. 11. In the present case the statutory rules secured a right in favour of the assessee in regard to notice and bringing to his knowledge all the materials which were sought to be relied upon or utilised against him in order to reject the return submitted by him and proceed taking recourse to the best judgment assessment. This right and consequential duty cast upon the assessing authority under the statutory provision could not be given a go by invoking a general and familiar principle of law that a man may, if he wishes, disclaim a statutory provision enacted for his benefit, for what is for a mans benefit and what is for his protection are not synonymous terms. In my considered opinion it was not open to the assessing authority to give its sanction to departure from the law that reflected a public policy even though the party concerned had himself behaved in such a way as would otherwise tie his hands. 12. It may further be noticed that the rules of natural justice can operate in areas not covered by any law validily made and are evolved to ensure fair adjudication whenever rights of an individual are affected. They are aimed to secure fair play in action and prevent miscarriage of justice. One of the first principles of natural justice is that you must not permit one side to use means of influencing a decision which means are not known to the other side. It has to be emphasised that any person even if represented at any enquiry who is to be adversely affected by any decision therein should not be left in the dark as to the risk of the finding being made depriving him any opportunity to adduce evidence or material of probative value which, had it been placed before the decision maker, might have deterred him from making the finding even though it cannot be predicted that it cannot inevitably have had that result. Observation to this effect occurring in the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Mohan v. Air Newzealand Ltd. reported in (1984) 3 All ER 201 at 210 clearly indicate that mere knowledge of the enquiry proceedings or presence at the hearing is not enough. Observation to this effect occurring in the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Mohan v. Air Newzealand Ltd. reported in (1984) 3 All ER 201 at 210 clearly indicate that mere knowledge of the enquiry proceedings or presence at the hearing is not enough. The person, who is going to be adversely affected must be informed of all the material which may be utilised against him so that he may have the opportunity to adduce the additional evidence or material of probative value which might deter the enquiring authority from making the finding as indicated above. As a matter of fact the apex Court in its decision in the case of State Bank of India v. D. C. Aggarwal reported in (1992) 6 JT SC 673; (1993) 1 UPLBEC 25 (SC) has clearly held that taking action against a person on the basis of certain material or evidence without bringing the same to the notice of such person is violative of procedural safeguards and contrary to fair and just enquiry. 13. In the aforesaid view of the matter the plea of waiver raised by learned counsel for the respondents is not sustainable at all and the contention in this regard is rejected. 14. This Court in its decision in the case of Green Restaurant v. Commissioner of Sales Tax reported in [1988] 8 STR 186 had clearly pointed out that the opportunity contemplated under the law which required to be provided to the assessee must be a reasonable opportunity and not an idle formality. The express object of giving opportunity is to afford protection to the tax-payer against arbitrary and capricious assessment. Principles of natural justice require that before charging a person with financial liability, he should be informed of the material on which the charge was going to be imposed and the assessee must be given an opportunity to rebut the effect of the material, if he can. It was emphasised that this is so, even when the material used is within the knowledge of the person proceeded against. It was further emphasised that the assessee must be told that it would be used against him, for unless he is so informed, he would have no opportunity of offering his explanation for meeting the inference that the authority seeks to draw from it. It was further emphasised that the assessee must be told that it would be used against him, for unless he is so informed, he would have no opportunity of offering his explanation for meeting the inference that the authority seeks to draw from it. In the aforesaid case it may be noticed that the assessee was never confronted with the outcome of the survey relied upon against him. 15. Further in the aforesaid case relying upon the Privy Council decision in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Central and United Provinces v. Laxmi Narain Badri Das reported in [1973] 5 ITR 170, it was indicated that if an order determining turnover to the best judgment is disproportionate to the material on record it cannot be maintained. In the absence of any attempt having been made to enquire into the past history of the assessee and the local reputation it enjoyed though there is an element of guess work in best judgment assessment it should not be a wild one but must have a reasonable nexus to the available material and the circumstances of each case. 16. In an other decision of this Court in the case of Munshi Singh Ashok Kumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax reported in [1988] 8 STR 378, this Court had indicated that before the assessing authority decides to pass a best judgment assessment he must inform the reasons or the grounds for non-acceptance of the turnover of the sales and purchases of the assessee before the best judgment assessment is passed. 17. It is not disputed that in the present case no such show cause notice was given to the assessee before rejecting the declared turnover. 18. In the result these revisions succeed in part and the matter is sent back to the first appellate authority, Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax, Meerut, with a direction to reconsider the appeals in accordance with law in the light of the observations made hereinabove. Petitions partly allowed. .