Judgment :- 1. Obstructor in E.A. No. 26 of 1981 in E.A. No. 18 of 1981 in E.P. No. 82 of 1979 in O.S. No. 423 of 1975, on the file of Sub Court, Coimbatore, is the appellant. She died after the filing of Second Appeal. Her legal representative has been impleaded as second appellant. 2. Relevant facts which have given rise to this Second Appeal may be stated as follows:- A suit was filed as O.S. No. 423 of 1975, by the first respondent herein against her husband and father-in-law for maintenance. The schedule property was alleged as belonging to her husband and she claimed a charge over the property. It was further said that her husband has executed another settlement deed in favour of his father, i.e., her father-in-law, and the same is invalid. 3. Parties went on trial, and ultimately the trial Court came to the conclusion that the settlement deed executed by the husband in favour of his father is invalid and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree as prayed for and also to realise maintenance by sale of the charged property. 4. In execution of the decree, the plaint property was brought to sale and purchased by the decree-holder. Sale Certificates were also issued to her and pursuant to the same, when the Court Amin wanted to hand over possession, the appellant herein filed an obstruction petition. The (first) appellant (who is now no more) was none other than the mother-in-law of the decree holder. It is the case of the (first) appellant that the property was purchased by her in the year 1958, and she executed a settlement deed in favour of her son on 26-8-1964, on certain conditions. It is her further case that on 2-5-1977, she has cancelled it and she is now the owner of the property. It is her further case that the settlement deed executed by her in favour of her son, i.e., the husband of the decree-holder will not create any interest in him and, therefore, the Court sale as well as the subsequent auction through Court are all invalid. She also said that even after the settlement deed, she continues to be in possession of the property. 5. The claim was seriously opposed by the decree-holder. She also said that even after the settlement deed, she continues to be in possession of the property. 5. The claim was seriously opposed by the decree-holder. After taking evidence, the executing Court passed an order on 22-12-1981 permitting the decree-holder to take possession by removing the obstruction. The unsuccessful obstructor filed A.S. 78 of 1982, on the file of lower appellate court. It also held that the obstructor has no right over the property, and the document Ex.B-2 dated 26-8-1964 is a gift and a right in praesenti is created. The subsequent cancellation deed was found to be invalid. 6. Both the Courts below have also concurrently found that it is another attempt made by the mother-in-law to defeat the daughter-in-laws right to get maintenance and that the application was lacking in bona fides . Both the Courts came to the conclusion that the cancellation deed was executed after the decree was obtained in the case, with an intention to deprive the maintenance right holder from realising the fruits of the decree obtained by her. 7. The concurrent judgments of both the Courts below are challenged in this Second Appeal. 8. At the time of admission of the Second Appeal, the following substantial question of law was raised for consideration: — “Whether Ex.B-2 is a settlement deed or a Will?” 9. Before interpreting a document, the circumstances under which the present obstruction petition came to be filed, are explained by the Courts below. The decree-holder is the wife of the first defendant in the suit. He refused to maintain his wife. A suit was filed to recover maintenance and arrears of maintenance, and there was a charge on the plaint property. The second defendant was impleaded in the suit since he had taken a document from his son. The son claimed his right on the basis of Ex.B-2 settlement deed dated 26-8-1964. As owner of the property, he executed a settlement deed in favour of his father. That was the reason why the father-in-law was also made a party. In the suit, it was held that the property belonged to the husband and the document was executed by the husband in favour of the father, is invalid and not binding on the plaintiff. A charge was also created for the amount payable to the plaintiff. The obstructor is the original title-holder who executed Ex.B-2. In the suit, it was held that the property belonged to the husband and the document was executed by the husband in favour of the father, is invalid and not binding on the plaintiff. A charge was also created for the amount payable to the plaintiff. The obstructor is the original title-holder who executed Ex.B-2. She did not object when her son executed a settlement deed in favour of her husband. Only when the Court declared that the settlement deed in favour of her husband is invalid and the same was executed to defeat the plaintiffs rights, she thought of cancelling it after a decree. Now she claims to be the owner of the property by interpreting Ex.B-2 settlement only as a Will, and not as a gift. It is her case that if Ex.B-2 is a Will, she continues to be the owner and, therefore, her rights cannot be affected and the cancellation deed is also proper. 10. Both the Courts below have concurrently found that the very purpose of the obstruction is to defeat a poor maintenance right holder from getting fruits of her decree. The husband tried to hold the property by executing a document in favour of his father. When that failed, the mother put forward a claim that she continued to be the owner. The bona fide nature of the obstruction was seriously doubted by the Courts below. I find justification in the conclusions reached by the Courts below, holding that when all the attempts of the obstructors son failed, he has now set up his mother to file the present obstruction petition to deprive his wife from implementing the decree. The Courts below have found that the petition is lacking in good faith, and that itself is sufficient to dismiss the second Appeal. 11. Both the Courts below have found that the intention of he obstructor at the time when she executed Ex.B-2 is to benefit her son and possession was also handed over to him. He was also dealing with the property as his own. The donor was a silent spectator to the acts of the donee, and when he executed a document in favour of his father, she never opposed that act of her son. That means, when the property went out of the hands of her son and was given to her husband, she was not aggrieved. The donor was a silent spectator to the acts of the donee, and when he executed a document in favour of his father, she never opposed that act of her son. That means, when the property went out of the hands of her son and was given to her husband, she was not aggrieved. Only when the earlier fraudulent acts failed, she came forward with a case that she had cancelled the settlement deed executed by her in favour of her son. It is in this background, we have to look into the interpretation suggested by learned counsel. 12. I do agree that while interpreting a document, the wordings alone should be looked into, and, if there is any vagueness, the surrounding circumstances should also be considered. While interpreting the deed, the intention of the executant of the same is material. In taking this view, I am supported by the decision reported in (1994) 2 SCC 10 (Keshav Kumar Swarup v. Flowmore Private Ltd.) wherein it was held thus: — “In interpreting a document the intention of the parties has to be ascertained, if possible from the expressions used therein. More often than not, this causes no difficulty, but if difficulty is felt owing to inarticulate drafting or inadvertence or other causes, the intention may be gathered by reading the entire document and, if so necessary, from other attending circumstances also. If through such a process the intention of the parties can be culled out consistently with the rule of law, the courts are required to take that course.” 13. In a subsequent decision also, the Supreme Court had given certain guidelines for interpreting a document. In (1994) 5 SCC 167 (Hind Plastics and another v. Collector of Customs, Bombay and another), in paragraph 17, their Lordships have said thus: — “Every instrument, statutory or otherwise, has to be so interpreted as to accord with the intention of its matter having regard to the language used. Though one cannot ignore the actual words used and go after the supposed intention of the maker since that would amount to entering the arena of speculation but all the same the principle is unexceptionable that whether it is statute, statutory instrument, or an ordinary instrument, the interpretation placed has to accord with the intention of the maker as evidenced by the words/language used.” 14. Bearing the above principles in mind, let us consider the document Ex.B-2. Relevant portion of the document reads thus:— Tamil The nomenclature of the deed is said as ‘settlement’. It is Said that the intention of executing the deed is that the obstructor wanted to provide something to her son, and the schedule property valued at Rs. 10,000/- was given to him by way of settlement. The first appellant has said Tamil “That means, by virtue of the document, a right in praesenti is created and she has immediately handed over possession to her son. Of course, in the subsequent portion of the deed, she says that her son has to maintain her, and her son should not alienate or encumber the property. Thereafter; it is said, he may deal with the property in any manner he likes. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that there is no bequest of the title to the property and what is given is only a right of enjoyment by the son and only on the death of the donor, the absolute right is vested with the donee. I do not think the interpretation given by learned counsel is correct. If the mother intended to provide the son only after death, the nomenclature of the deed would have been given as ‘Will’. Further, there is a purpose in restricting the power of the son from encumbering the property. The mother wanted the son to maintain her, and, for the said purpose, income from the property was to be utilised. If he encumbered the property or alienated the same, the purpose of settlement will be lost. That is why she has said that during her lifetime, he should not encumber or alienate the property, and only after her lifetime, he can deal with the property absolutely. In this connection, it may also be noted that her husband is also an attestor to the document. When her husband is alive, there was no purpose in asking the son to maintain the mother. It is only to secure her right to maintain, she restricted the power of her son from alienating the property during her lifetime. In this connection, it may also be noted that her husband is also an attestor to the document. When her husband is alive, there was no purpose in asking the son to maintain the mother. It is only to secure her right to maintain, she restricted the power of her son from alienating the property during her lifetime. But the earlier clause that she handed over possession of the property and also gave the property to him by way of settlement, itself makes it clear that a right in praesenti is created with a right of ownership. 15. Her intention was also to benefit the son immediately is clear. When the son executed a settlement deed in favour of his father including the ownership, the mother did not think of objecting the same at that time. She knew that her husband is a beneficiary. Only when that attempt failed, she thought of cancelling it. She was examined as D.W.1. She said that her son borrowed loans and executed promissory notes, and that was the reason for cancelling it. No evidence has been let in that regard. Both the Courts below have also found that immediately on execution of Ex. B-2, the donee obtained physical possession of the property and was dealing with the same. 16. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1996 (8) Supreme Today 699 (Baby Ammal v. Rajan Asari), their Lordships considered a similar question. In that case, the document read thus: — “All the rights to enjoy the property and the right to reside in the building will remain with me during my life time and Rajan Asari will derive the said rights will full freedom after my lifetime.” Interpreting the document, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held thus: — “Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act defines gift executed in the manner indicated thereunder divesting the title to and possession of the donor in the property and vesting the same in the donee under Section 123. There must be proof of delivery and acceptance of possession of the gifted property. In this case, both the title and possession in respect of the property remained with the plaintiff. There is no acceptance of possession by the respondent in the light of above recital. There must be proof of delivery and acceptance of possession of the gifted property. In this case, both the title and possession in respect of the property remained with the plaintiff. There is no acceptance of possession by the respondent in the light of above recital. As a consequence, the appellant remained to be the owner during her life time..” From the above decision, if an inference can be drawn that there was a divesting of title and possession was also handed over, immediately after the deed, the gift is complete. According to me, the interpretation given by learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. 16. A Learned counsel for the appellants relied on the decision reported in 1997 I M.L.J. 169 = 1997 2 L.W. 234 (Poongavanam v. Perumal Pillai) and submitted that the document which came for interpretation in that case and the one on hand are similarly worded and, therefore, the interpretation given by the learned Judge has to be accepted in this case. It is true the documents are similarly worded. But that by itself is not sufficient to held that this document has to be interpreted only as a Will. We have to look into the circumstances under which the document was executed and the intention of the executant while executing Ex.B-2 gift deed. The surrounding circumstances also should be taken into consideration in certain circumstances. Applying the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, I hold that the document in this case can only be interpreted as a settlement deed or a gift, and a right in praesenti was created by the appellant. As found by the Courts below, the attempt of the first appellant (who is now no more) was only to defeat the rights of a poor maintenance decree holder who was refused to be maintained by her husband and also by her father-in-law, and now by the mother-in-law too. I do not find any bona fides in this case. It was represented by learned counsel for the appellants that the decree-holders husband is also no more, and the widow, first respondent herein is prevented from executing the decree. 17. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed with costs.