Judgment P. K. Sarin, J. 1. This criminal revision application is directed against the order dated 30-11-1996 passed by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, begusarai, in Sessions Trial No.537 of 1995 by which he has rejected the claim of the petitioner that on the date of occurrence the petitioner was a juvenile. 2. The petitioner is an accused in nayagaon P. S. Case No.18 of 1995 for the offence under Sec.302/34 of the indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code) and 27 of the Arms Act. The first information report of the case (Copy at Anncxure- 1) was recorded on 9-5-1995. The incident also took place on 9-5-1995. 3. It appears that the petitioner moved an application before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, that his date of birth is 13-1-1981 as such he was juvenile on the date of occurrence of the case. The learned Additional Sessions judge held enquiry in respect of the claim made by the petitioner. He called for a report by a Medical Board and took evidence of the parties on the issue. The Medical Board assessed the age of the petitioner to be in between nineteen-twenty years on examining him on 11-6 1996. The learned Additional sessions Judge, on consideration of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not a juvenile on the date of occurrence and, accordingly, rejected his application by the impugned order. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the learned Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to enquire and determine the age of the petitioner when the petitioner had made a claim that he was a juvenile. It has been contended that the age of a juvenile can only be determined by a juvenile Court under Sec.32 of the juvenile Justice Act (here in after referred to as the Act ). It is contended that the learned Magistrate ought to have referred the case of the petitioner to the Juvenile Court for determination of his age under Sec.32 of the act and ought not to have determined the age himself. It is contended that the learned Magistrate ought to have referred the case of the petitioner to the Juvenile Court for determination of his age under Sec.32 of the act and ought not to have determined the age himself. It has been contended that if the case had been referred to the juvenile Court for determination of age under Sec.32 of the Act the petitioner would have got the right of appeal and revision if the order was passed against him by the Juvenile court and the petitioner had been deprived of that right by passing of the order by the learned Additional Sessions judge himself. Thus, the question for consideration, in view of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is whether a Court is bound to refer the case of a person for determination of his age under Section 32 of the Act to a Juvenile Court if that person raises a claim that he was juvenile on the date of occurrence. Under Sec.5 of the Act Juvenile courts have to be constituted for different areas by the State by Notification. The powers of the Board and Juvenile court under the Act have been provided in the provisions of the section 7 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of section 7 further provides that where no Board or Juvenile Court has been constituted for any area the powers conferred on the Board or the Juvenile court by or under the Act shall be exercised in that area by the District magistrate or the Subdivisional magistrate or any Metropolitan magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be. Thus, in absence of constitution of Juvenile court under Notification by State government under Sec.5 of the Act the Judicial Magistrate (which includes chief Judicial Magistrate as well) are empowered to exercise the powers of juvenile Court in their respective areas. Sec.24 of the Act forbids joint trial of juvenile and person not a juvenile and it has been provided that the Court taking cognizance shall direct separate trial of the juvenile and the other person. 5. Section 32 of the Act reads as follows: "32. Sec.24 of the Act forbids joint trial of juvenile and person not a juvenile and it has been provided that the Court taking cognizance shall direct separate trial of the juvenile and the other person. 5. Section 32 of the Act reads as follows: "32. Presumption and determination of age:- (1) Where it appears to a competent authority that the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (otherwise than for the purpose of giving evidence) is a juvenile, the competent authority shall make due inquiry as to the age of that person and for that purpose shall take such evidence as may be necessary and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or not, stating his age as nearly as may be. (2) No order of a competent authority shall be deemed to have become invalid merely by any subsequent proof that the person in respect of whom the order has been made is not a juvenile, and the age recorded by the competent authority to be the age of the person so brought before it shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person. " 6. The perusal of provision of Section 32 would show that when a person is brought before a competent authority (which includes Juvenile Court also by virtue of definition of competent authority under Sec.2 (d) of the act) and it appears that the person is a juvenile, the Juvenile Court shall make due enquiry as to the age of that person and for that purpose shall take evidence and thereafter record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or not stating his age as nearly as may be. The power under Sec.32 of the Act is to be exercised by Juvenile Court when a person is brought before it under any of the provisions of the Act and it appears to Juvenile Court that he is a juvenile. A juvenile may be brought before a Juvenile Court when he is accused of an offence and he is arrested or detained or he himself appears before juvenile Court. There is another provision contained in Sec.8 of the act which provides procedure to be followed by a Magistrate not empowered to exercise the powers of a Juvenile court. A juvenile may be brought before a Juvenile Court when he is accused of an offence and he is arrested or detained or he himself appears before juvenile Court. There is another provision contained in Sec.8 of the act which provides procedure to be followed by a Magistrate not empowered to exercise the powers of a Juvenile court. It lays down that when any magistrate not empowered to exercise the powers of a Board or a Juvenile court under the Act is of opinion that a person brought before him under any of the provisions (otherwise than for the purpose of giving evidence) is a juvenile he shall record such opinion and forward the juvenile and the record of the proceeding to the competent authority having jurisdiction over the proceeding. Sub-section (2) of Sec.8 provides that the competent authority to which the proceeding is forwarded under subsection (1) shall hold the enquiry as if the juvenile had originally been brought before him. Thus, procedure has been laid down under Sec.8 of the Act to be followed by a Magistrate who cannot exercise the powers of a Juvenile Court if he is of the opinion that the person concerned is a juvenile. If a person is sent under Sec.8 with such opinion of the Magistrate, he may be brought before Juvenile Court and Juvenile court shall hold enquiry as if the juvenile had originally been brought before it. In that case also the provisions of Sec.32 of the Act would become applicable and the Juvenile Court does not appear to be bound by the opinion recorded by Magistrate under Sec.8 of the Act. The provision of Sec.32 does not make any exception. It lays down the procedure for holding enquiry and recording the finding whether or not the person brought before the juvenile Court is a Juvenile and the finding shall also contain the statement regarding his age. 7. Section 37 of the Act provides appeal against an order made by a competent authority to the Court of Sessions. While Sec.38 provides revision to the High Court in respect of an order passed by the competent authority or the Court of Sessions (appellate Court ). 8. 7. Section 37 of the Act provides appeal against an order made by a competent authority to the Court of Sessions. While Sec.38 provides revision to the High Court in respect of an order passed by the competent authority or the Court of Sessions (appellate Court ). 8. S ection 32 of the Act does not provide that whenever any question is raised before any Court that a person is or was a juvenile the Court has to outright send the case to the Juvenile Court for determination of his age under section 32 of the Act. In absence of such provision the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Sessions court was bound to refer the case of petitioner to the Juvenile Court for determination of his age under Section 32 of the Act does not appear to be tenable. In my opinion, when a question is raised before any Court (other than the Juvenile Court) that the accused is or was a juvenile that Court has to itself hold an enquiry to be satisfied, prima facie, that the person concerned is or was a juvenile on the date of occurrence. If the Court concerned is, prima facie, satisfied by the materials on the record that the accused concerned appears to be juvenile then only the Court may refer the case to Juvenile Court and fn that event the Juvenile Court will have jurisdiction to follow the procedure of section 32 of the Act to enquire and determine the age of the accused concerned. However, if that court is not satisfied, prima facie, from the materials on the record that the accused was a juvenile on the date of occurrence there is no necessity of that court to send his case to Juvenile Court for determination of his age under Section 32 of the Act. If the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted that the Court has not to consider any material for being even prima facie satisfied that the accused concerned was a juvenile on the date of occurrence it would be that in a trial accused may raise such plea of being juvenile on the date of occurrence and the trial will have to be held up by referring his case to the Juvenile Court for determination of his age under Section 32 of the Act. That does not appear to be the intention of the legislature by making provision of Sec.32 of the act. It may also be pointed out that section 32 would become applicable when a person is brought before the juvenile Court under any of the provisions of the Act. There is no provision in the Act that a Sessions court may send a person to the Juvenile court for determination of age under section 32 of the Act. If by analogy provision of Sec.8 be deemed to apply to other Courts also than the court of Magistrates even then the court has to be, prima-facie, satisfied that the person concerned is a juvenile and the Court has to record such opinion before forwarding the juvenile and record of the proceeding to the juvenile Court by virtue of Sec.8 of the Act. For forming such opinion consideration of materials on record would be necessary. Sec.8 does not contemplate forwarding of a person to the juvenile Court even if the Magistrate has not formed the opinion that the accused concerned is a juvenile. Thus, the condition precedent for forwarding an accused as juvenile to the Juvenile court under Sec.8 appears to be the formation of opinion by the concerned magistrate (or Court) that the person concerned is a juvenile. Without recording such opinion the accused cannot be forwarded to juvenile Court by virtue of the provisions of Sec.8 of the Act. Therefore, the Sessions Judge was perfectly justified in holding enquiry and considering the materials on record to form an opinion whether or not the petitioner was a juvenile on the date of incident. There appears to be n6 illegality in the procedure adopted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Full bench decision of this Court in the case of Krishna Bhagwan V/s. State of Bihar, 1989 (2) Bihar law Judgment 27. In the said case the Court considered the provisions of the Bihar Children Act and the present Act. In the said case the court was concerned with a matter in appeal against conviction where, for the first time, the accused had raised a plea in the appellate Court that he was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence. In the said case the court was concerned with a matter in appeal against conviction where, for the first time, the accused had raised a plea in the appellate Court that he was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence. This Court laid down the procedure to be followed if such a plea is taken before the appellate Court for the first time. It observed that if the plea that the accused was the child or juvenile on the date of commission of the offence is taken, for the first time, in this Court, then this Court should proceed with the hearing of the appeal as required by Sec.26 of the Act and should record a finding in respect of the charge which has been levelled against such an accused and if the finding of the guilt recorded by the Court below is affirmed and the Court, on the basis of materials on record, is, prima facie, satisfied that the accused may be a child/juvenile within the meaning of the relevant Act on the date of commission of the offence it should call for a finding from the Childrens Court/juvenile court in accordance with Sec.32 of the Act. It further observed that if the finding so received is accepted by the court then the Court, in terms of Section 26 of the Act, should pass an order directing the Juvenile Court to pass orders in accordance with Sections 21 and 22 of the Act. The decision of the Full bench in the said case itself show that the finding should be called for from juvenile Court under Sec.32 of the act if the Court is, prima facie, satisfied on the basis of materials on record that the accused may be a juvenile. This itself shows that unless Court is, prima facie, satisfied that the accused may be a juvenile on the date of commission of offence it has not to call for any finding under Sec.32 of the Act. The said decision does not help the petitioner in the present case. 10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has next relied on the decision of this Court on the case of kumar Satyanand V/s. State of Bihar, (1983 pljr 327 ; 1983 BLJ 386 ). The said decision does not help the petitioner in the present case. 10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has next relied on the decision of this Court on the case of kumar Satyanand V/s. State of Bihar, (1983 pljr 327 ; 1983 BLJ 386 ). In the said case there was no question of applicability of the Act as the case arose prior to the enforcement of the present act. It has been held in the said case that in a case in which the age of accused is in dispute it will always be advisable for the Court concerned to give a definite finding regarding the age of the accused after due consideration of the documents like certificate etc. or the medical report and the Court should fix the age on his own estimation. This is so because the Court has been authorised to form its own opinion regarding the estimation of age of the accused or witness involved in a criminal trial. The said decision does not lay down that the court, before which question of age of the accused is raised, has not to record its finding but has to refer his case to any other authority for determination of his age. 11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has next placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bhoop Ram V/s. State of UP, (1989) 3 scc 1 . In the said case question regarding accused being a child was raised before the Supreme Court and the supreme Court called for a report from the Sessions Judge, Bareilly, after enquiry into the age of the appellant. The sessions Judge, after holding such enquiry, submitted his report to the Apex court. The Apex Court on the basis of materials on record in the enquiry held by the learned Sessions Judge held that the accused appellant could not have completed sixteen years of age on the date of commission of offence and as such he ought to have been treated as a child within the meaning of Sec.2 (4) of the UP. Children Act. The said decision of the Apex Court does not laid down that when a question is raised the enquiry regarding age has to be necessarily done by a Juvenile Court. Children Act. The said decision of the Apex Court does not laid down that when a question is raised the enquiry regarding age has to be necessarily done by a Juvenile Court. Getting a finding after enquiry from a subordinate court is a different matter than making a reference of the case to juvenile; Court for determination of age under Sec.32 of the Act. Therefore, the said decision also does not help the learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that the sessions Judge himself had no jurisdiction to enquire into the age of the petitioner. 12. A decision of the Allahabad high Court in the case of Aquil Alvi V/s. State of UP, 1996 Cri. l. J.103 has been referred to by the learned Counsel for opposite party wherein it has been held that the Sessions Court had power by virtue of Sec.7 (3) of the Act to make enquiry and determine the age of the accused and it is not necessary to refer the case back to Magistrate or to juvenile Court to determine age. Such a view appears to have been taken on the interpretation of the provisions of subsection (3) of Sec.7 that Sessions court can also exercise the powers of juvenile Court when a proceeding comes before it. In the said case the proceeding had not come before the court of Sessions under any of the provisions of the Act but the matter was pending before Court of Sessions in a sessions trial. Sub-section (3) of section 7 of the Act reads as follows: "7 (3 ). The powers conferred on the board or Juvenile Court by or under this act may also be exercised by the High court and the Court of Session, when the proceeding comes before them in appeal, revision or otherwise. " 13. The said provision would show that the powers of Juvenile Court has been provided to be exercised by High court and the Court of Sessions when the proceedings come before them in appeal, revision or otherwise. This makes it clear that the proceedings must come before the Court of Sessions or the High Court under the provisions of the Act. Court of Sessions is appellate court under the Act by virtue of section 37 of the Act while High Court is a Court of revision under Sec.38 of the Act. This makes it clear that the proceedings must come before the Court of Sessions or the High Court under the provisions of the Act. Court of Sessions is appellate court under the Act by virtue of section 37 of the Act while High Court is a Court of revision under Sec.38 of the Act. The proceeding under the act can come to the appellate Court or the revisional Court under the Act and such proceedings must relate to the case pending before a Juvenile Court because Sec.37 contemplates filing of appeal against the order made by competent authority and Sec.38 empowers the High Court to exercise revisional jurisdiction in respect of an order passed by competent authority or the Court of Sessions (appellate authority)under the Act. The word otherwise has to be read in that context that proceeding in the nature of appeal, revision, or otherwise than appeal or revision when comes to the high Court or Court of Sessions under the Act then only powers conferred by sub-section (3) of Sec.7 may be exercised by the High Court or the Court of Sessions. It necessarily means that the proceeding must arise out of an order passed by competent authority (which includes Juvenile Court or the appellate authority ). The word otherwise cannot be read to mean that the power under sub-section (3) of Sec.7 is conferred on the Court which is not acting under the Act. I find myself unable to agree with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the said case. It does not appear to be correct interpretation of the provisions of section 7 (3) of the Act that Sessions Court in sessions trial may exercise powers of juvenile Court under Sec.32 of the act. 14. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, there does not appear to be any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order and it does not call for any interference in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The criminal revision application is dismissed accordingly. The stay order dated 7-4-1977 is vacated. Revision Dismissed.