JUDGMENT SURINDER SARUP, J.—The facts giving rise to this revision petition are that the petitioners along with Shyam Sunder were the tenants of the disputed premises under respondent Nos. 1 to 3. The latter applied for their eviction on the ground that they were in arrears of rent and had ceased to occupy the premises for a period of more than 12 months from the date of eviction petition and lastly that the premises were in a dilapidated condition and required immediate reconstruction. 2. The learned Rent Controller (1) Dharamshala, Shri Indar Ram, passed the eviction order. Against that order, the tenants filed an appeal. The same was decided by the then Appellate authority, Shri R.L Khurana on 08-03-1994. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the record. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the appeal was listed on 23-06-1993 when the appellants made a statement that the premises would be vacated by 31-12-1993 and that the appeal be dismissed as having been withdrawn. The respondents did not object to this course being adopted, however, before an order could be passed by the learned Appellate authority, an application was made by the appellants that the statement was made by Shyam Sunder co-tenant under a mistaken belief that the respondent would re-construct the tenanted premises within six months and thereafter would re-let the same to them. It was prayed that the statement, undertaking to vacate the premises by 31-12-1993 and withdrawing the appeal be ignored and the appeal be decided on merits. 4. In their reply the respondents objected to the application being made. It was pleaded that the statements were made by the appellant Shyam Sunder and the counsel for the appellants after fully understanding that there was no talk or negotiation between the parties regarding re-letting of the tenanted premises to the appellants after re-construction. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Appellate authority framed the following issues: "1. Whether the appellant was under a bona fide mistake while making the t statement dated 23-06-1993, if so to what effect ? OPA. 2. Relief." 6. The learned Appellate authority after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and examining the record came to the conclusion that by virtue of the statement dated 23-06-1993, the appellants had abandoned their appeal against all the respondents. OPA. 2. Relief." 6. The learned Appellate authority after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and examining the record came to the conclusion that by virtue of the statement dated 23-06-1993, the appellants had abandoned their appeal against all the respondents. No formal agreement is required to be recorded by the parties for the purpose of abandoning the suit/appeal by the plaintiff-appellant. The finding further was that the statement dated 23-06-1993 was valid and binding and the appellants cannot be permitted to resile from the same. As such, Issue No. 1 was decided against the petitioners and consequently, the application was rejected. The appeal was dismissed having been withdrawn in terms of statement dated 23-06-1993 but without any order as to costs. 7. The submission of Pt. Om Parkash, learned counsel for the appellant is that even if assuming that the present case falls within the ambit of provisions of Order 23 Rule 1, Sub-rule (5) thereof provides that nothing in this rule shall be deemed to authorise the Court to permit one of several plaintiffs to abandon a suit or part of a claim, without the consent of the other plaintiffs. 8. The precise argument of Pt. Om Parkash is that Shyam Sunder, co-tenant was not competent to abandon the appeal on behalf of other tenants, who were also the appellants before the Appellate authority. The argument on the face of it, appears to be plausible but when viewed in the context of the facts of the present case, it falls to the ground. A perusal of the record of the proceedings before the Appellate authority indicates that when the appeal was fixed for arguments on 23-6-1993, Shyam Sunder, one of the tenants and appellant before the Appellate authority gave the following statement: "I undertake to vacate the premises by 31-12-1993. The present is not pressed. It may be dismissed as withdrawn." Then the statement of Shri K.S. Thakur, learned counsel for the appellants was also recorded, which is to the following effect: "Stated that I have heard the statement of Shri Shyam Sunder appellant. In view of the same, the appeal may be dismissed as withdrawn." In other words, both Shyam Sunder as well as the learned counsel were making a statement on behalf of all the appellants. In view of the same, the appeal may be dismissed as withdrawn." In other words, both Shyam Sunder as well as the learned counsel were making a statement on behalf of all the appellants. In any case, Shri K.S. Thakur, Advocate represented all the appellants and his statement that the appeal may be dismissed as withdrawn was made on behalf of all the appellants. 9. Then, an application was made subsequently. Statements of Shyam Sunder and K.S. Thakur were again recorded by the learned Appellate authority. In his statement AW-1, Shyam Sunder gave an explanation that when he made the statement dated 23-06-1993 that he would vacate the premises within six months, it was believed that the same shall be re-let to him after re-construction. However, in cross-examination, he admitted that during the course of arguments his counsel requested the Court to grant six months time to vacate the premises. He has also admitted that the Court had made him to understand that six months time for vacation of the premises was being given as maximum. He further admitted that after understanding that he was given six months time for vacation of the premises, he made the statement dated 23-6-1993. In other words, his cross-examination clearly lets the cat out of the bag. That means he was aware that he was making a statement that by that time he would vacate the premises and there was no such understanding that same shall be re-let to him after reconstruction. 10. Faced with the above factual situation, Pt. Om Parkash, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court reported as Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi and another, (1993) 1 SCC 581, wherein it has been laid down that where there is a compromise, it must be lawful and must be signed by the parties. This argument is also untenable inasmuch as it is not a case of compromise as rightly held by the learned Appellate authority and the case does not fall within the ambit of Order 23 Rule 1 C.P.C. Assuming that it does, even then the facts will show that during the proceedings of the application, giving rise to this petition, statements of Shyam Sunder as well as the learned counsel Shri K.S. Thakur were recorded. In his statement as RW-2, Shri K.S. Thakur, Advocate, has categorically mentioned vide his statement dated 23-6-1996, that the appeal was withdrawn by him on behalf of the appellants. This means that he had made the statement on behalf of the appellants and he was duly authorised to do so. 11. Shri Bhupender Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and others, AIR 1991 SC 2234. It has been laid down therein that a compromise decree which is signed by the counsel and not by the parties is binding, executable and operates as res judicata even if it extends beyond subject-matter of the suit. Another authority, which has been cited by the learned counsel for the respondents is Mohan Bai v. Jai Kishan, AIR 1983 Raj 22. Reliance has also been placed on a reported decision of this Court in Parduman Singh and another v. Narain Singh and another, 1991 (2) Shim. L.C. 215. In that case, a reported decision of the Apex Court reported as Smt. Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v. Gulabchand and others, AIR 1975 SC 2202 was referred to. It was observed therein as under: "We must uphold the actual, though implied, authority of a pleader (which is a generic expression including all legal practitioners as indicated in Section 2(15), Civil P.C. to act by way of compromising a case in which he is engaged even without specific consent from his client, subject undoubtedly to two overriding considerations (1) he must act in good faith and for the benefit of his client, otherwise the power fails, (2) It is prudent and proper to consult his client and take his consent if there is time and opportunity. In any case, if there is any instruction to the contrary or withdrawal of authority, the implicit power to compromise in the pleader will fall to the ground." 12. In view of the above authorities, there is no merit in the second submission of Shri O.P. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners. 13. For the reasons recorded above, the revision petition fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Revision dismissed.