HIMACHAL PRADESH NAGAR VIKAS PRADHIKARAN v. REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER
1997-03-13
LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, M.SRINIVASAN
body1997
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT M. Srinivasan, C.J.—The petitioner is aggrieved by the order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Sub-Regional Office, Stokes Place,. Shimla dated 25-9-1996 passed under Section 7-A of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). By the said order, the first respondent has rejected the contentions of the petitioner that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the petitioner and held that the petitioner is liable to comply with the provisions of the Act m respect of its employees engaged directly or through the contractor engaged for its activities for the period under enquiry and also for further period. 2. Before the petitioner came into existence, the concerned body was known as Shimla Development Authority under the provisions of H.P. Town and Country Planning Act, 1977. The petitioner was constituted by the Government in exercise of its powers under Section 40 of the said Act, by a Notification dated 14-11-1994. Section 41 of the Town and Country Planning Act provides that every Town and Country Development Authority shall be a body corporate by the name specified in the notification under Section 40, and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire and hold property both movable and immovable, and subject to the provisions of the Act or rules made thereunder to transfer any property held by it, to contract and to do all other things necessary for the purposes of the Act and may sue and be sued in its corporate name. Under Section 42, every such Authority shall consist of Chairman and other members not exceeding six appointed by the State Government. Section 42-A deals with Constitution of Town and Country Development Authority for the capital town of Himachal Pradesh. 3.
Under Section 42, every such Authority shall consist of Chairman and other members not exceeding six appointed by the State Government. Section 42-A deals with Constitution of Town and Country Development Authority for the capital town of Himachal Pradesh. 3. A notification dated 14-11-1994 is produced by the petitioner as Annexure P-l. It is seen therefrom that the Governor has exercised powers under Section 40 to establish the petitioner with immediate effect for the planning areas/special areas as specified in the schedule annexed to the notification and that all the assets and liabilities of the Shimla Development Authority, Special Area Development Authority for Kullu Valley Special Area, the Town and Country Development Authority for planning area, namely, Hamirpur, Dharamshala, Mandi, Parwanoo and Barotiwala By the said notification, the said Authorities were dissolved and the assets and liabilities stood transferred to the petitioner with immediate effect therefrom. 4. The normal activities of the petitioner under the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act are to acquire land and develop the same for sale or to construct houses/flats for sale to public. The activities were to be carried out through employees taken on deputation from other Government departments and also by engaging their own employees on daily wages While the employees, who were taken on deputation, were covered by the provisions of Provident Fund Scheme relating to such departments, the persons who were employed on daily wage basis were not covered by any such scheme. The dispute before us relates only to such daily wage employees, who are not covered by any scheme relating to Provident Fund. 5. Notice was issued to the petitioner by the respondents and the petitioner was called upon to deposit the Provident Fund dues from the date of coverage, that is, August, 1988 to February, 1992. Further notice was issued for the next period, that is, March, 1992 to May, 1993. Sufficient opportunities were given to the petitioner in the first instance. The petitioner deposited the amount claimed for the earlier period but it did not deposit the amount claimed for the later period and decided to contest the liability to make payments under the provisions of the Act. After sufficient opportunities were given, the matter was heard under Section 7-A of the Act by the respondents.
The petitioner deposited the amount claimed for the earlier period but it did not deposit the amount claimed for the later period and decided to contest the liability to make payments under the provisions of the Act. After sufficient opportunities were given, the matter was heard under Section 7-A of the Act by the respondents. Several contentions were raised by the petitioner before the respondents in challenge to the applicability of the Act to the petitioner The main contention is that the petitioner is a departmental under undertaking under the control of the State Government and therefore, the Act is not applicable to the petitioner. Secondly, it is argued that the only activity of the petitioner is construction of buildings and it did not involve in any manufacturing process. Thirdly, it is contended that the petitioner is working on No profit. No loss’ basis, therefore, it should not be charged with any liability under the Act. Fourthly, it is argued that the establishment is working on the pattern of other Government department and since other departments are not covered by the Act, the petitioner also should not be brought under the scope of the Act. 6. The respondent has passed a detailed order by which the aforesaid contentions of the petitioner are negatived The respondent has pointed out that under Section 16(1) in order to claim the benefit of exclusion from the provisions of the Act any department of a Government has to show that its employees are entitled to the benefit of contributory provident fund or old-age pension in accordance with any scheme or rule framed by the Central Government or the State Government and in the absence of such benefits being given to the employees, such department would be covered by the provisions of the Act Reliance was placed by the petitioner before the respondent on the Circular dated 2 4-1990 issued by the Central Office of the Provident Fund Commissioner relating to non-levy of damages on the departmental undertakings owned or controlled by the Central or State Governments The respondent construed that the said Circular would apply only to such Government undertakings as covered by Section 16(1) (b) & (c) and not to other undertakings. 7 Aggrieved by the order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition 8.
7 Aggrieved by the order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition 8. Apart from reiterating the contentions, which were urged before the respondent, the petitioner has raised two more contentions before us, namely, the petitioner came into existence only on 14-11-1994 and for the period of five years from the said date, the petitioner will not be covered by the provisions of the Act Secondly, it is argued that the petitioner is carrying on its activities only through contractors and the employees cannot be considered to be the employees of the petitioner and in so far as the order of the respondent directs the petitioner to make payments even with regard to the employees who are not directly employed by the petitioner, it is erroneous. 9. The first question for our consideration is whether the petitioner can claim to be a departmental undertaking of the State Government. We have already referred to the provisions of Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Himachal Pradesh Town and Country Planning Act, 1977. It is sufficient to refer the provisions of Section 41, which make it clear that the petitioner is a body corporate by the name specified in the notification, which brought it into existence, and it shall have perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire and hold property as well as transfer the same and sue and be sued in its corporate name. It cannot be by any stretch of imagination considered to be a department of the Government 10. Section 16(1) (b) of the Act as it stood prior to 1988 was in the following terms : "(b) to any other establishment employing fifty or more persons or twenty or more, but less than fifty, persons until the expiry of three years in the case of the former and five years in the case of the latter, from the date on which the establishment is, or has been, set up " 11. The Act was amended by Act 33 of 1988, The statement of objects and reasons shows that certain recommendations were made by a high level Committee to review the working of the Employees Provident Funds Organisation Accepting the said recommendations certain amendments were brought in by Act 33 of 1988.
The Act was amended by Act 33 of 1988, The statement of objects and reasons shows that certain recommendations were made by a high level Committee to review the working of the Employees Provident Funds Organisation Accepting the said recommendations certain amendments were brought in by Act 33 of 1988. One such amendment was substitution of sub clause (b) of section 16 (1) After the amendment, the said clause reads as follows : "(b) to any other establishment belonging to or under the control of the Central Government or a State Government and whose employees are entitled to the benefit of contributory provident fund or old-age pension in accordance with any scheme or rule framed by the Central Government or the State Government governing such benefits." 12. It is necessary to refer to sub clause (c), which was also introduced by the same amendment, which reads as follows : "(c) to any other establishment set up under any Central, Provincial or State Act and whose employees are entitled to the benefit of contributory provident fund or old-age pension in accordance with any scheme or rule framed under that Act governing such benefits " 13. It is very significant to note that the section does not stop with referring to any establishment belonging to or under the control of the Central Government or the State Government There is a qualification in the section expressly mentioning that the employees thereof are entitled to the benefit of contributory provident fund or old age pension in accordance with any scheme or rule framed by such Government In the absence of both the requirements being fulfilled neither clause (b), nor clause (c) can be invoked In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner does not have any scheme or rule by which the daily wagers employed by the petitioner are entitled to the benefit of contributory provident fund or old-age pension. In such circumstances, the petitioner cannot claim the benefit of section 16 (1) (b) or (c). 14. The view expressed by the respondent in his order that the petitioner is not entitle to get exemption from the provisions of the Act is, therefore, correct. 15. The next contention of the petitioner that the petitioner is not an industry as contemplated by the Act is unsustainable in view of the fact that the statute uses the expression establishment and is not confined to industry.
15. The next contention of the petitioner that the petitioner is not an industry as contemplated by the Act is unsustainable in view of the fact that the statute uses the expression establishment and is not confined to industry. Section 16 also uses the expression establishment’. The word establishment is no doubt not defined by the Act, but the petitioner cannot deny the fact that it is an establishment as contemplated by the provisions of the Act, 16 The next contention of the petitioner that in so far as the petitioners activities are concerned, they are always entrusted to the, contractors and there is no construction activities directly by the petitioner is of no merit. Even if, the petitioner has engaged workmen through a contractor, the liability of the petitioner under the provisions of the Act will still be there The Supreme Court had on more than one occasion dealt with the question as to whether the principal employer will be liable under the provisions of the Industrial law to give the benefit to the actual worker In Peopled Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1473, the question was whether the establishment, namely, the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority had the legal obligation for observance of the various labour laws vis-avis the employees of the contractors. Referring to section 20 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, the Court held that if any amenity required to be provided under the said for the benefit of the workmen employed in an establishment is not provided by the contractor, obligation to provide such amenity rested on the principal employer and, therefore, the principal employers were liable to provide the same. A similar view was taken in M/s P.M. Patel and Sons v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 447, in which the definition of employee in the Act with which we are concerned was considered. The Court held, that the terms of the definition of the said expression were wide which included not only persons employed directly by the employer but also persons employed through a contractor. 17. Learned Counsel for the petitioner places reliance on a decision of Orissa High Court in Executive Engineer, National Highway Division, Balasore and others v Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bhubaneshwar, 1988 Lab IC 690.
17. Learned Counsel for the petitioner places reliance on a decision of Orissa High Court in Executive Engineer, National Highway Division, Balasore and others v Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bhubaneshwar, 1988 Lab IC 690. The question which arose before that Court was whether the workmen engaged by the Works Department of the Government of Orissa were entitled to the benefits of the Provident Fund Act. A Division Bench of that Court distinguished the aforesaid two judgments of the Supreme Court on the footing that in the cases before the Supreme Court, there was a relationship of employer and employee on account of the facts in those cases and in the case before the Division Bench there was no such relationship existing between the Government on the one hand and the workers employed by the contractor on the other. Obviously, the decision of the Division Bench turned on the facts placed before the Court. If the ruling of the Division Bench is to be taken as settling a general principle of law, it may not be possible for us to agree with the same as it may run counter to the ruling of the Supreme Court, referred to earlier. 18. In such circumstances, we cannot accept the contention that the direction of the respondent to the petitioner to make payments even with regard to the employees employed through a contractor is not correct. 19. The next contention urged by the petitioner is that the petitioner came into existence only in November i994 and the Act as such will not apply. There is no merit in the contention, As pointed out already, even the notification which constituted the petitioner has clearly stated that all the assets and liabilities of the authorities which existed previously stood transferred to the petitioner It is not in dispute that the petitioner is only continuing the activities which were being carried on by the previous authorities It Is only a case of change of ownership if at all and it is not a case of new establishment coming into existence Similar question arose before the High Court of Madras in Mis R.L Sahni and Co v. Union of India, AIR 966 Mad 416.
There was change of ownership with regard to an establishment The question was whether on such a change of ownership, an establishment could be considered to be a new establishment within the meaning of the Act The contention before the Division Bench of that Court was that the matter should be decided with reference to the owner or the employer and not with regard to the establishment as such. The Division Bench rejected that question pointing out that the. establishment is entirely different from the employee and employer. Just because the owner has changed, the establishment will not become a new establishment The Supreme Court had also an occasion to express the same opinion in Sayaji Mills Ltd v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, AIR 1985 SC 323 The Court held that it was not as if the old establishment was reduced into scrap and a new establishment came into existence on the change of ownership and, therefore, the provisions of the Act f cannot be excluded by mere change of ownership. 20. Our attention is drawn expressly to the Circular issued by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (Hqrs) for Central Provident Fund Commissioner on 2-4-1990. The Circular reads as follows : "With reference to Ministry of Labours letter No. R-11025/17/84-SS. II, dated 71-3-1990 I am directed to say that no damages are to be levied against the departmental undertakings owned or controlled by the Central/State Governments for belated payments if any, as these establishments have now been excluded from the purview of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Misc. Provisions Act, 1952 with effect from 1-8-1988.” 21. Learned Counsel attempted to contend that the last part of the Circular would mean (hat there is a notification by the Government excluding departmental undertakings owned or controlled by the Central or the State Governments from the provisions of the Act with effect from 1-8-1988. We are unable to accept this contention. It is quite obvious that what is referred to in the Circular is only the statutory provision introduced by Act No. 33 of 1988, which came into force from 1-8 -1988, and it does not refer to any other notification by the Government. 22.
We are unable to accept this contention. It is quite obvious that what is referred to in the Circular is only the statutory provision introduced by Act No. 33 of 1988, which came into force from 1-8 -1988, and it does not refer to any other notification by the Government. 22. It is rightly pointed out by learned Counsel for the respondents that if the benefit of section \6 (2) is claimed by the petitioner, it is for the petitioner to apply to the Central Government under that provision and establish either because of its financial position or other circumstances, it should be exempted from the provisions of the Act. If the Central Government is satisfied, then it may issue a notification under section 16 (2) granting such exemption In the absence of such exemption, the petitioner cannot escape from the applicability of the provisions of the Act, It is certainly open to the petitioner to move the Central Government, if so advised for exemption. As on date, the petitioner is not exempted from the provisions of the Act and the conclusion of the respondent in the impugned order is correct and the writ petition has to fail and it is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. CM P. No. 3988 of 1996 : In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, the present application is also dismissed and the interim order is vacated. Application dismissed.