Rallis India Ltd v. State of Gujarat — 1997 DIGILAW 420 (GUJ)

JUDGMENT : 1. Initially notice was issued in this matter on July 4, 1997 and on July 18, 1997, we admitted the appeal and was ordered to be fixed for final hearing. Today, the matter is called out. 2. The appellant is original-petitioner. He challenged the order passed by the State Government under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 {hereinafter referred to as "the Act"} at Annexure "J" & "K" of the petition i.e. Special Civil Application No. 1350 of 1996, on July 15, 1995 and July 20, 1995 respectively and confirmed by the learned Single Judge on February 20, 1996. 3. So far as the order passed by the State Government at Annexure-J is concerned, the State Government held that in view of decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Vasudeva v. State of Karnataka, (1993) 3 SCC 467 , no permission under section 20 of the Act could be granted, and hence, the application was required to be rejected. In the second order at Annexure "K", it was mentioned that the exemption under Section 20 of the Act was granted on certain terms and conditions as mentioned in the order of November 28, 1977, and since there was violation of those conditions, the exemption was liable to be cancelled. Therefore, a notice was issued on December 14, 1992 and impugned order was made. 4. When petition came up before the learned Single Judge, attention of the Court was invited to a matter pending in the Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 546 of 1993 {T.R Thandur v. Union of India & Ors.}. It was stated to the learned Single Judge that S. Vasudeva (supra) was pending before the larger Bench of the Supreme Court for reconsideration. A prayer was, therefore, made to the learned Single Judge not to dispose of the matter on basis of law laid down in S. Vasudeva. The learned Single Judge, however, was of the view that reconsideration of the matter by a larger Bench could not be said to be a sufficient ground and when the point was concluded by the Supreme Court in S. Vasudeva, the petition deserved to be dismissed, and accordingly, the said prayer was not granted. 5. The learned Single Judge, however, was of the view that reconsideration of the matter by a larger Bench could not be said to be a sufficient ground and when the point was concluded by the Supreme Court in S. Vasudeva, the petition deserved to be dismissed, and accordingly, the said prayer was not granted. 5. On merits, the learned Single Judge observed that there was violation of terms and conditions by the Company and even after the proceedings of amalgamation, which were going on in the High Court of Bombay as well as High Court of Gujarat, nothing was done by the Company, and hence, the petition did not deserve admission even on that ground. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. 6. We heard Mr. N.D Nanavati, learned senior counsel instructed by Mr. C.G Sharma for the appellant and Ms. B.R Gajjar, learned AGP for State. 7. Mr. Nanavati contended that on both the points, the learned Single Judge has committed an error of law which is required to be corrected in the exercise of appellate powers of this Court. Regarding reconsideration of S. Vasudeva, it was submitted that the learned Single Judge ought to have issued "Rule" and ought not to have dismissed the petition. A copy of the order passed by the Supreme Court referring the matter to a larger Bench was also produced by the learned counsel for the petitioner before the learned Single Judge. It was submitted that now the point is concluded in T.R Thandur v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 1643 and it was held by a Bench of three Judges that S. Vasudeva (supra) was not correctly decided and the said decision stands over-ruled. In that view of the matter, the order of learned Single Judge suffers from legal infirmity and Letters Patent Appeal deserves to be allowed. 8. We find considerable force in the argument of Mr. Nanavati. As observed by the Supreme Court in T.R Thandur (supra), the law laid down in S. Vasudeva is over-ruled and to that extent, the judgment of the learned Single Judge requires interference. 9. On merits, Mr. Nanavati contended that no period was prescribed in the order of granting exemption under Section 20 that within a particular period, expansion was to be made. 9. On merits, Mr. Nanavati contended that no period was prescribed in the order of granting exemption under Section 20 that within a particular period, expansion was to be made. In any case, proceedings for amalgamation of two companies were pending in the High Court of Bombay and High Court of Gujarat respectively, and they were over in the year 1991. Immediately thereafter, steps were taken and the said fact was mentioned to the authority in reply to the show cause notice by the petitioner on January 28, 1993. There is total non-application of mind on the part of the State Government in not considering that fact and not even mentioning it. Ms. Gajjar, no doubt, submitted that till the order was passed in 1995, no action was taken by the Company. The fact, however, remains that though the pendency of proceedings in two courts was brought to the notice of the State Government, from the impugned order passed by the State Government withdrawing the order of exemption, it is clear that the said fact was not considered at all. Under these circumstances, in our opinion, it would be in the fitness of things if the State Government is directed to pass appropriate order in accordance with law. 10. Since we are of the view that the orders passed by the State Government are not in accordance with law, we remand the matter to the State Government by quashing and setting aside orders at Annexure "J" and "K" and by setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and by directing the State Government to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law, after hearing the appellant. 11. In the result, Letters Patent Appeal is allowed. The orders at Annexure "J" and "K" as well as the order passed by the Single Judge are set-aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, no order as to costs. Since the matter is old, the State Government is directed to decide the same as expeditiously as possible, preferably before December 31, 1997. At the time of admission of appeal, we had granted status quo, which is hereby ordered to be continued till the final disposal of the proceedings. It is directed that the appellant will neither create any equity nor make any change in the property till the final decision is arrived at by the State Government. Appeal allowed.