TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) CONSTITUTIONAL validity of the Karnataka Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988 (Karnataka act No. 8 of 1989) is under challenge in this writ petition. By the said Act, apart from amending the provisions of the section 6 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, an explanation to the same has been added, retrospectively with effect from the first of April, 1970. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a dealer registered under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, engaged in extraction of oils from oil cakes and rice bran. For purposes of carrying on the said activity, the petitioner purchases firewood for use as fuel. Purchases so made by the petitioner for the assessment years 1979-80 to 1983-84 were brought to tax under section 6 of the Karnataka Sales tax Act and in the meantime, the Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Thomas Stephen and Co. Ltd. AIR1988 SC 997 , 1988 (34 )ELT412 (SC ), JT1988 (1 )SC 631 , 1988 (1 )SCALE569 , (1988 )2 scc264 , [1988 ]3 SCR248 , [1988 ]69 STC320 (SC ) while considering an analogous provision contained in the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, held that since cashew shells used by the assessee as fuel, did not go into the end-product and were not used as raw material in the manufacture of other goods. Purchase of such goods used only as fuel did not fall within section 5 (A) (1) (a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act and did not therefore attract the tax payable thereunder. Relying upon the said pronouncement, applications were made by the petitioner purporting to be under section 25a of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, seeking rectification of the orders of assessment for five assessment years commencing 1979-80 to 1983-84. These applications were by an endorsement dated 11th October, 1988, rejected by the A. C. T. O. on the ground that Karnataka Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988 (Karnataka Act No. 8 of 1989) had retrospectively amended section 6 of the Act, in the light whereof there was no question of either rectifying the orders in question or directing any refund of the tax already paid. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition assailing the constitutional validity of the amendment, inter alia, on the ground that the same was beyond the legislative competence of the state. ( 3 ) MR. Gandhi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner made a two-fold submission in support of the writ petition. He argued that the addition of the explanation to section 6 by the amending Act beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature, as by introduction of the explanation what was brought to tax was not a sale or purchase of goods but the consumption of such goods, which fell beyond the purview of entry 54 of Second Schedule. Alternatively he argued that the retrospective effect given to the amendment was unsupported by any reason and therefore unsustainable. Reliance was placed by him in this regard upon the decision of the supreme Court in D. Cawasji and Co. v. State of Mysore [1985] 58 STC 1 and a decision of the high Court of Calcutta in Bengal Paper Mill Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Calcutta [1976] 38 STC 163. ( 4 ) SECTION 6 of the Act, as it stood immediately before the impugned Amending Act, was made, read thus : "6. Levy of purchase tax under certain circumstances.- Subject to the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 5, every dealer who in the course of his business purchases any taxable goods in circumstances in which no tax under section 5 is leviable on the sale price of such goods, and (i) either consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise or disposes of such goods in any manner other than by way of sale in the State, or (ii) despatches them to a place outside the State except as a direct result of sale or purchase in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, shall be liable to pay tax on the purchase price of such goods at the same rate at which it would have been leviable on the sale price of such goods under section 5 : provided that this section shall not apply - (i) in respect of sale or purchase of goods specified in the Fourth Schedule, - (a) which are taxable at the point of purchase; and (b) which have already been subjected to tax under sub-section (4) of section 5. (ii) in respect of sale or purchase of goods specified in the Second Schedule which have already been subjected to tax under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 5. " ( 5 ) BY the amending Act, sections 5 and 6 of the present Act, were amended. We are in the present case concerned only with the amendment to section 6 in which the amending Act, made the following additions : "2. Amendment of Karnataka Act 25 of 1957.- In the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (Karnataka Act 25 of 1957), - (1) in section 5, in sub-section (1a), in the second proviso, - (i) for the figures and words 31st day of May, 1988' the figures and words 31st day of July, 1988' shall be and shall be deemed always to have been substituted; (ii) the words 'at the rate of forty-five per cent' shall be and shall be deemed always to have been omitted. (2) in section 6, - (a) in clause (i), after the words 'sale or otherwise', the words and the punctuation mark 'or consumes otherwise', shall be inserted; (b) at the end, the following explanation shall be deemed to have been inserted with effect from the first day of April, 1970, namely :- 'explanation.- For the purpose of this section "consumes such goods in the manufacture" shall include goods consumed for ancillary purposes in or for such manufacture'. " ( 6 ) IT is apparent from the above that with the addition of the words "or consumes otherwise" in clause (i) of section 6 and the addition of the explanation at the end of the provision even such of the goods as were not consumed, in the manufacture of other goods, but were consumed otherwise, such consumption being for an ancillary purpose shall also for purposes of levy of purchase tax be treated as goods consumed for purposes of "manufacture of goods for sale or otherwise". In other words, the explanation gave to the expression "consume such goods in the manufacture of other goods", an extended meaning according to which even purchases of goods for purposes of a consumption not directly resulting in the manufacture of goods meant for sale or otherwise but serving only an ancillary purpose, would also be deemed to be a consumption for purposes of manufacture of other goods for sale. The addition of the explanation is considering the language employed therein aimed at extending the scope of the expression used in section 6 (i ). Looking to the background in which the explanation was added the same was meant to overcome an interpretative error, which in the opinion of the Legislature, was committed by the courts, while ascertaining the legislative intent behind the enactment of the provisions contained in section 6. That an explanation can restrict or extend the enacted part is well-settled. Equally well-settled is the proposition that the construction of an explanation must depend mainly upon its terms and not on any theory of its purpose or intention. An explanation can even introduce a fiction or settle a matter in controversy. It is different in nature from a proviso which excepts, excludes or restricts the main provision while an explanation explains or clarifies the same. An explanation may be in respect of matters whose meaning even though implicit is not stated explicitly in the main section. Suffice it to say that in each case the court interpreting the explanation shall have to find out the true intention of the Legislature and since the Legislature can express themselves in different ways, the best way to arrive at the true intention is to go by the words used by it for the words used alone are the last repository of the intent which they are meant to convey. See (1) Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of maharashtra AIR 1989 SC 2227 ; (2) Bihta Co-op. Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar AIR1967 SC 389 , [1967 ]37 Compcas98 (SC ), [1967 ]1 SCR848 ; (3) Hira Lal Rattan Lal v. Sales Tax Officer, Section III, Kanpur AIR1973 SC 1034 , (1973 )1 SCC216 , [1973 ]2 SCR502 , [1973 ]31 stc178 (SC ); (4) Keshavji Ravji and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax AIR 1991 SC 1806 . Keeping in view the language employed in the explanation added by the amending provision, as also the background in which the addition, Legislature intended by the said provision to extend the meaning of the expression "consume such goods in the manufacture of other goods", even to such goods as did not actually result in production of other goods for sale or otherwise but were all the same used for a purpose ancillary to any such manufacture. For instance firewood purchased by the petitioner even though consumed as fuel for manufacture of other goods does not itself go into such manufacture. It only serves an ancillary purpose, namely, the purpose of consumption as fuel which may be essential for manufacture of other goods for sale but which does not in itself go into such manufacture. The extended meaning given to the words "consume such goods in the manufacture of other goods" y the explanation does not however, change the nature of the levy under section 6 of the Act. The levy continues to be one on purchases of goods, in the circumstances in which no tax under section 5 is leviable on the price thereof. The crucial expression in the charging section is "every dealer who in the course of his business purchases any taxable goods, in the circumstances in which no tax under section 5 is leviable". So long as the goods purchased are not taxable under section 5 and are consumed for either manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise, or for any purpose ancillary to such manufacture, the purchases made would attract tax under section 6. In extending the meaning of the expression "consumed such goods in the manufacture of other goods" to consumptions for ancillary purpose also, the Legislature did not either alter the taxing event which continues to be the purchases made by the dealer nor even the essential condition of such goods being not taxable under section 5. I have therefore no difficulty in holding that the addition of the explanation to section 6 by the impugned enactment does not have the effect of altering the nature of the tax so as to render the levy under section 6 in the altered situation in excess of the legislative competence of the State under entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the constitution. ( 7 ) THAT brings me to the only other submission urged by Mr. Gandhi, according to whom the retrospective addition of the explanation was unsupported by any compelling reasons which was enough in itself to render the said addition unconstitutional. ( 8 ) THE power to enact a law that is within the legislative competence of the Legislature and make the same retrospective is well-recognized. Gandhi, according to whom the retrospective addition of the explanation was unsupported by any compelling reasons which was enough in itself to render the said addition unconstitutional. ( 8 ) THE power to enact a law that is within the legislative competence of the Legislature and make the same retrospective is well-recognized. It is permissible for a Legislature competent to legislate on a subject to do so with retrospective effect even when the law relates to fiscal matters like the levy of a tax. The only exception is where an act which was not an offence on the date, the same was committed, is sought to be made so by a retrospective legislation. It is also well-settled that if the Legislature intends to render ineffective any judgment or order of a competent court, it can do so by a legislative enactment subject only to the condition that the legislature must effectively remove the basis on which the decision was delivered. The legislature cannot by a mere declaration overrule, reverse or set aside a judicial pronouncement. So also, it is well-settled that while considering whether the Legislature has given an excessive retroactive action to a law affecting past transactions, the courts have to take into consideration the relevant facts and circumstances, in which a retrospective legislation was considered necessary. Where retrospective legislation in the form of validating Acts, are resorted to by the legislature in fiscal enactment the courts have upheld such measures as small repairs that become necessary and are frequently resorted to. Reference can in this regard be made to : (1) assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Madras v. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. AIR1970 SC 169 , [1970 ]75 ITR603 (SC ), (1969 )2 SCC55 , [1970 ]1 scr268 ; (2) Utkal Contractors and Joinery Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Orissa AIR1987 SC 1454 , JT1987 (2 )SC 466 , 1987 (1 )SCALE1162 , (1987 )3 SCC279 , [1987 ]3 scr317 ; (3) Hira Lal Rattan Lal v. Sales Tax Officer, Section III, Kanpur AIR1973 SC 1034 , (1973 )1 SCC216 , [1973 ]2 SCR502 , [1973 ]31 stc178 (SC ) and (4) Epari Chinna Krishna Moorthy v. State of Orissa AIR1964 SC 1581 , [1964 ]7 SCR185 , [1964 ]15 STC461 (SC ). ( 9 ) IN the instant case, the necessity to amend the provisions of section 6 arose on account of the decision handed down by the Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Thomas Stephen and Co. Ltd. AIR1988 SC 997 , 1988 (34 )ELT412 (SC ), JT1988 (1 )SC 631 , 1988 (1 )SCALE569 , (1988 )2 scc264 , [1988 ]3 SCR248 , [1988 ]69 STC320 (SC ), where while interpreting an analogous provision in the Kerala Act, the court declared that goods like cashew shells used as fuel in the kiln could not be deemed to be "goods consumed in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise". The expression "consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise" appearing in section 5a of the Kerala Act, is in pari materia with the provisions contained in section 6 of the State Act. A consumption of goods for a purpose that was ancillary to the process of manufacture like using firewood, in the instant case, could not in the light of the said pronouncement be brought to tax under section 6. The result would be that taxes recovered by the State Government on the legal position as it was understood by all concerned before the said pronouncement would have to be refunded to the assessees as indeed, was the demand of the petitioner also in his applications seeking rectification of the previous orders. In order to overcome any such financial burden that would flow from the interpretation given by the supreme Court, the Legislature considered it appropriate to incorporate an explanation clearly explaining the legislative intent behind section 6 and making the same retrospective in operation. The decision of the Supreme Court in Thomas Stephen's case AIR1988 sc 997 , 1988 (34 )ELT412 (SC ), JT1988 (1 ) SC 631 , 1988 (1 )SCALE569 , (1988 )2 SCC264 , [1988 ]3 SCR248 , [1988 ]69 STC320 (SC ) proceeded on the interpretation of the provisions contained in the Act, as it then stood. With the addition of the explanation the very basis on which the interpretation proceeded was removed thereby rendering the decision ineffective and validating assessments as also the recoveries made over the previous years. With the addition of the explanation the very basis on which the interpretation proceeded was removed thereby rendering the decision ineffective and validating assessments as also the recoveries made over the previous years. The Legislature was in my opinion perfectly justified in doing so particularly in relation to the case like the present where the taxes had already been assessed by the authorities and remitted by the assessees concerned. Reliance by Mr. Gandhi, upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in D. Cawasji and co. v. State of Mysore [1985] 58 STC 1 is wholly misplaced. The said decision does not state the legal position any different from the decisions referred to earlier. What is noteworthy is that in cawasji's case [1985] 58 STC 1 (SC), the court came to the conclusion that the amendment under challenge before it had been brought by the State Legislature without curing the defect or the lacuna on the basis whereof the decision of the court had proceeded. This is apparent from the following passage from the report : "in our opinion, the enhancement of the rate of duty from 6 1/2 per cent to 45 per cent with retrospective effect is in the facts and circumstances of the case clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. The defect or lacuna is not even sought to be remedied and the only justification for the steep rise in the rate of duty by the amended provision is to nullify the effect of the binding judgment. The vice of illegal collection in the absence of the removal of the illegality which led to the invalidation of the earlier assessments on the basis of illegal levy, continues to taint the earlier levy. In our opinion, this is not a proper ground for imposing the levy at the higher rate with retrospective effect. It may be open to the legislature to impose the levy at the higher rate with prospective operation but levy of taxation at higher rate which really amounts to imposition of tax with retrospective operation has to be justified on proper and cogent grounds. " The last four lines of passage extracted above, heavy reliance whereupon was placed by Mr. Gandhi, have therefore to be understood in the context in which the same appear in the decision. So also, reliance placed upon the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Bengal Paper Mill Co. " The last four lines of passage extracted above, heavy reliance whereupon was placed by Mr. Gandhi, have therefore to be understood in the context in which the same appear in the decision. So also, reliance placed upon the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Bengal Paper Mill Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer [1976] 38 STC 163 is of no assistance to Mr. Gandhi, in the light of the subsequent authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the subject. ( 10 ) IN the result, this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs. ( 11 ) PETITION dismissed.