JUDGMENT : B.S. Chauhan, J. In all these writ petitions the impugned order dated 21.10.1996 has been challenged and the relief sought is also the same and thus all the writ petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment. However, for convenience the Writ Petition No. 39772 of 1996 is taken as the leading case. 2. The Writ Petition No. 39772 of 1996 has been filed for quashing the impugned order dated 21.10.1996 contained in Annexure 3 to the writ petition by which the Respondent had cancelled the selection process which started in pursuance of the advertisement dated 23.4.1995 contained in Annexure 1 to the writ petition and for staying the selection process in pursuance of the fresh advertisement dated 26.10.1996 contained in Annexure 4 to the writ petition. 3. The factual gamut of the case reveals that on 23.4.1995 an advertisement No. SC 30/65/5E (Rect.) 1995 was issued advertising 1747 for civilian candidates and 175 for ex-servicemen posts of constable for Railway Protection Force. In pursuance of that advertisement, the physical test was held and the candidates who qualified, were asked to appear in the written examination and subsequently to face the interview. The process of selection was over by February, 1996. The Respondents had to prepare the tabulation chart of the performance of the candidates and declare the result. However, instead of declaring the result of the said test, the Respondents vide order dated 21.10.1996 cancelled the entire selection process and provided that for the same posts a fresh advertisement would be issued. Subsequently, within a period of one week, a fresh advertisement was issued for 1767 including 160 posts for ex-servicemen. 4. It has been mentioned in the subsequent advertisement that all the candidates who had appeared earlier shall be eligible to apply in pursuance of the new advertisement but there is a basic difference between the two advertisements. Subsequently, within a period of one week, a fresh advertisement was issued for 1767 including 160 posts for ex-servicemen. 4. It has been mentioned in the subsequent advertisement that all the candidates who had appeared earlier shall be eligible to apply in pursuance of the new advertisement but there is a basic difference between the two advertisements. The latter advertisement dated 26.10.1996 provides for state wise reservation inasmuch as in general category, 803 posts had been advertised out of which 389 posts had been allocated to West Bengal, 348 to Bihar and 66 to U.P. Similarly, for the Scheduled castes 305 posts had been advertised, out of which 148 posts had been allocated to West Bengal, 132 to Bihar and 25 for U.P. For the Scheduled Tribes 129 posts had been advertised, out of which 62 posts had been allocated to West Bengal, 56 to Bihar and 11 to U.P. Similarly, the same ratio had been taken up for other reserved categories. It further provides under Clause (b) of the eligibility criterion that a candidate must pass the matriculation examination from the State which he claims to be resident of. 5. The cancellation of the earlier selection process and initiation of the fresh advertisement providing for entirely different conditions has been challenged in the instant writ petition before this Court on various grounds. This Court vide its order dated 16.12.1996 directed the Respondents not to give effect to the advertisement dated 26.10.1996. 6. The parties have exchanged their affidavits. 7. Heard Shri V.B. Singh, learned Counsel for the Petitioners and Shri S. Prasad, Senior Advocate with Shri Lalji Sinha, learned Counsel for the Respondents and perused the original record of the case which was produced by the Respondents on the direction of this Court as well as their written submissions. 8. The following main submissions have been made by the Petitioners: (i) The selection process has been cancelled for extraneous consideration as there was no sufficient material on the basis of which the alleged subjective satisfaction of the competent authority that the selection process was vitiated for corruption, nepotism etc., was formed. (ii) The selection process has been cancelled without giving any reasons, the same cannot be added now or explained by filing affidavits before this Court. Thus, the impugned order dated 21.10.1996 stood vitiated for want of compliance of the requirement of reasons. (ii) The selection process has been cancelled without giving any reasons, the same cannot be added now or explained by filing affidavits before this Court. Thus, the impugned order dated 21.10.1996 stood vitiated for want of compliance of the requirement of reasons. (iii) Reservation/allocation of posts State-wise is not in consonance with the constitutional scheme. (iv) Reservation on the requirement of residence is permissible only in a provincial service provided there is a central legislation to that effect, enacted under Article 16(3) of the Constitution. (v) The term "State" referred to under Article 16(3) means a province and not "State" as provided for under Article 12 of the Constitution. (vi) That to some extent reservation may be made on zonal basis, but it cannot further be mutilated State wise, falling in that zone. (vii) Requirement of matriculation certificate from a particular State from which he applies or claims to be resident of, is arbitrary as it does not have any rational nexus to the object to be achieved. 9. The Petitioners in the instant writ petition have made specific allegations that the selection process has been cancelled on whimsical and arbitrary grounds. The impugned order dated 21.10.1996 does not give any reason whatsoever except to the extent that the same had been passed on administrative ground. It has been passed in colourable exercise of power and the entire effort is being made by the Respondents to fill up the vacancies from the particular States as there had been no bar earlier to apply for the posts of the Central Government for any person living in any State of India. In the earlier advertisement, there was no requirement of residence and there was no allocation of posts to any particular State and there was no restriction that candidates applying from a particular State must have passed the matriculation examination from the said State itself. The allegation of mala fide has been raised in the writ petition, though without impleading any Respondent by name, that the impugned order has been passed only to achieve political gain, and the same is in violation of the mandate of the constitutional provisions. 10. In the counter-affidavit, the main submissions of the Respondents are as under: 8. The allegation of mala fide has been raised in the writ petition, though without impleading any Respondent by name, that the impugned order has been passed only to achieve political gain, and the same is in violation of the mandate of the constitutional provisions. 10. In the counter-affidavit, the main submissions of the Respondents are as under: 8. That in reply to paragraph 12 of the writ petition it is submitted that in fact it was considered desirable that Railway Protection Force as Armed Force of the Union has a national character having representation of the people from all the States and regions and also to eliminate regional imbalance and to have persons from all parts of States. It was also decided to make special recruitment also to give opportunities to those residing in the areas which are poorly represented in the Railway Protection Force. In this view of the matter that the candidates belonging to States through which the particular railway traverses, the recruitment is to be conducted, and persons of such States would alone be eligible for recruitment for that railway. Thus, the restriction is in larger interest of people itself. To achieve this goal a further condition was laid that the candidate should have passed the matriculation or equivalent examination from that area. It may also be mentioned that States like West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are being traversed by mere one Zonal railway. It may also be mentioned that areas where no railway passes, special recruitment are being conducted to have representation in Railway Protection Force of the areas. 9. That the allegation in paragraph 13 of the writ petition are absolutely baseless, incorrect and are denied. The selection held in pursuance of the earlier advertisement has been cancelled as there were complaints about serious irregularities and malpractices in the selection. The complaints were received from different sources from December, 1995 onwards including from Prime Minister's office alleging that money had passed hands in the selections. In such cases where the money transaction takes place in the selection it becomes difficult to get evidence of bribery. However, the Director General, Railway Protection Force, Railway Board, New Delhi, made personal enquiries from various sources and was satisfied that the selection was not fair and the allegations made in the complaint had substance. In this circumstance, the Director General had no option except to scrap the recruitment. However, the Director General, Railway Protection Force, Railway Board, New Delhi, made personal enquiries from various sources and was satisfied that the selection was not fair and the allegations made in the complaint had substance. In this circumstance, the Director General had no option except to scrap the recruitment. It was not considered in public interest to allow entry of persons in the Railway Protection Force which is a disciplined force on the basis of such selection. The allegation that the cancellation of selection is illegal, arbitrary, and is contrary to the principles of natural justice are denied. 11. It has further been mentioned that mere appearance in the test docs not confer any right whatsoever upon a candidate and thus, there has been no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order. It has also been mentioned in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit that changing the criterion and conditions provided for in the subsequent advertisement dated 26.10.1996 "is a policy decision of the Government', and thus it cannot be challenged by the Petitioners on the allegation that it is arbitrary or politically motivated or passed on irrelevant consideration. 12. In the instant case, there is no finding recorded by any authority whatsoever as to whether there was any irregularity in the selection or money had really changed the hands. It is based only on the complaints and the alleged subjective satisfaction of the superior authority is based on no evidence. Apart from that, not a single instance or circumstance has been brought to the notice of this Court from which, even indirectly, malpractice or corrupt practice in the examination or selection can be gathered. 13. The order dated 3.6.1996 produced with the original record by the Respondents, is the basis for issuing the impugned order dated 21.10.1996 which reads as under: The selection proceedings of Constables/R.P.F. of Eastern Railway, conducted by the Recruitment Committee consisting of Sh. B. S. Rawal, Sh. A. K. Singh and Sh. S. A. Khan has been examined by D.G./R.P.F.. A large number of complaints have been received in this office alleging malpractices in the recruitment process. After taking into account the allegations of malpractices in the recruitment process, D.G./R.P.F. has ordered that the recruitment proceedings referred to above is scrapped. Instructions for fresh recruitments will follow. 14. S. A. Khan has been examined by D.G./R.P.F.. A large number of complaints have been received in this office alleging malpractices in the recruitment process. After taking into account the allegations of malpractices in the recruitment process, D.G./R.P.F. has ordered that the recruitment proceedings referred to above is scrapped. Instructions for fresh recruitments will follow. 14. The said order simply provides that a large number of complaints have been received and the record of the selection was examined and selection process was scrapped. The said order or any other record does not reveal as to what precisely was the malpractice found, and what was the gravity or magnitude of the alleged illegality or malpractice. No details have been given about the same in the counter-affidavit and only a vague allegation has been made that money had passed, and that the Director General, had made personal enquiries from various sources and was satisfied that the selection was not fair. This is vague, because no details are given as to what kind of enquiry was made, what was found in the enquiry, what was the material for these findings etc. In such a case, mere examination or scrutiny of the record is not enough and cannot justify an order cancelling the selection process. The original record reveals that altogether one lakh candidates had applied in response to the advertisement and 42,620 candidates had appeared in the test. The details of the same are as under: Sl. No. Centre State Total candidates appeared 1. Mugal Sarai Uttar Pradesh 4435 2. Liluah West Bengal 22814 3. Asansol West Bengal 5362 4. Danapur & Barkakana Bihar 10009 Total 42620 15. The record further reveals that there had been only eleven complaints and most of them had been from State of Bihar which is a major beneficiary of new advertisement. There is no iota of evidence on record that any competent authority had investigated the said complaints. The competent authority had acted on its wisdom but the material on which such authority had acted upon has not been disclosed before the Court. In the selection process, the physical test was held, those who were found physically fit were allowed to appear in the written test and subsequently to face the interview. The competent authority had acted on its wisdom but the material on which such authority had acted upon has not been disclosed before the Court. In the selection process, the physical test was held, those who were found physically fit were allowed to appear in the written test and subsequently to face the interview. The selection was held at several places but there is nothing on record to show as what stage or in respect of which particular centre the complaints of corruption or nepotism were found to be true, and if the complaints were only in respect of the interview, why was the selection process from the initial stage scrapped. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the said complaints might have been filed just to form the basis for cancelling the earlier selection process as the fresh advertisement has been issued laying down entirely different conditions. In the instant case, the Respondents failed to produce any record before this Court on the basis of which the decision to cancel the selection process can be justified. 16. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Shankarsan Dash Vs. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47 , has held that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and candidates are found fit, the successful candidates do not acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed. The notification merely amounts to an invitation to the qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selections, they do not acquire any right to the post unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, this does not mean that the State has the license of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. 17. It is settled law that in spite of the fact that the Government is the appointing authority, it cannot claim that it has absolute power in the matter of selection and appointment, as such an argument is against the constitutional scheme. There must be some justification for not making the appointment and not offering the same to the candidates "expeditiously and in accordance with law", (vide R.S. Mittal Vs. Union of India (UOI), (1995) 2 SCC 230 Supp ; Union of India Vs. There must be some justification for not making the appointment and not offering the same to the candidates "expeditiously and in accordance with law", (vide R.S. Mittal Vs. Union of India (UOI), (1995) 2 SCC 230 Supp ; Union of India Vs. S.S. Uppal and another, (1996) 2 SCC 168 ; Hanuman Prasad and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, (1996) 10 SCC 742 and Asha Kaul (Mrs) and Another Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, (1993) 2 SCC 573 . 18. In Sukhdarshan Singh ect. etc. Vs. State of Rajasthan, (1989) 2 SCC 671 Supp, and A.A. Calton Vs. Director of Education and Another, (1983) 3 SCC 33 , it has been held that no doubt merely by making an application, a candidate does not acquire any right to the post, however, a right is created in his favour for being considered for the post in accordance with terms and conditions of the advertisement and the existing recruitment rules and this right of being considered cannot be affected even by the amendment of any rule unless the amending rule is retrospective in nature. 19. Even vacancies which occurred prior to the amendment of particular rules have to be filled up by applying the old rules and not by the amended rules, (vide The Ramjas Foundation and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, (1993) 2 SCC 20 Supp. 20. Thus, the grievance raised by the Petitioners that once the advertisement has been made and the selection process has been completed, the Petitioners have a legitimate expectation that the result would be declared and their candidature will be considered in accordance with advertisement and the Rules is full of substance in view of the law referred to above. 21. In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (1991) 1 SCC 212 , the Apex Court has observed as under: Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason is arbitrary. Rule of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time being. It is trite that 'be you ever so high, the laws are above you'. This is what men in power must remember, always. 22. Rule of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time being. It is trite that 'be you ever so high, the laws are above you'. This is what men in power must remember, always. 22. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre 1995 (5) SCC 480. the Apex Court observed that the State or its instrumentality must not take any irrelevant or irrational factor into the consideration or appear arbitrary in its decision. "Duty to act fairly is part of fair procedure envisaged under Articles 14 and 21. Every activity of the public authority or those under public duty, obligation must be informed by reason and guided by the public interest." 23. The same view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corporation and Ors. JT 1992 (2) SC 327 and Union of India (UOI) Vs. Mohan Lal Capoor and Others, (1973) 2 SCC 836 24. In State of West Bengal v. Atul Krishna Shaw 1991 Suppl. (1) SCC 414, the Supreme Court observed as under: If the findings are based on no evidence or based on conjecture or surmise as no reasonable man would, on given facts and circumstances come to the conclusion reached by the... authority on the basis of the evidence on record, certainly this Court would oversee whether the finding recorded by the... authority is based on no evidence or beset with surmise or conjecture. Giving of reasons is an essential element of administration of justice. A right to reason is, therefore, an indispensable part of sound system of judicial review. Reasoned decision is not only for the purpose of showing that the citizen is receiving justice but also a valid discipline for the Tribunal itself. Therefore, statement of reason is one of the essentials of justice. 25. In S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 , it has been held that the object underlying the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and secure fair play in action. Therefore, statement of reason is one of the essentials of justice. 25. In S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 , it has been held that the object underlying the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and secure fair play in action. The expanding horizon of, the principles of natural justice provides for requirement to record reasons as it is now regarded as one of the principle of natural justice, and it was held in the above case that except in cases where the requirement to record reasons is expressly or by necessary implication dispensed with, the authority must record reasons for its decision. 26. In Krishna Swami Vs. Union of India and another, (1992) 4 SCC 605 , the Apex Court observed that the rule of law requires that any action or decision of a statutory or public authority must be founded on the reason stated in the order or borne out from the record. The Court further observed as under: Reasons are the links between the material, the foundation for the erection and the actual conclusions. They would also administer how the mind of the maker was activated and actuated and their rational nexus and synthesis with the facts considered and the conclusion reached. Lest it may not be arbitrary, unfair and unjust, violate Article 14 or unfair procedure offending Article 21. 27. In Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, (1978) 1 SCC 405 , it has been held that every administrative or quasi-judicial order for invalidating the action taken should be based on reasons or grounds and their grounds or reasons must be contained in the order itself. The authority subsequently cannot be permitted to explain its action by way of affidavit or otherwise. 28. Shri Lalji Sinha urged that there have been various complaints of corruption and manipulation and thus, there was justification for the Respondents to cancel the selection process. In support of his submission, he placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Biswa Ranjan Sahoo and others Vs. Sushanta Kumar Dinda and Others, (1996) 5 SCC 365 , wherein it has been held that where a large number of candidates have committed malpractice in the selection, the selection process can be cancelled without giving opportunity to the said candidates. Sushanta Kumar Dinda and Others, (1996) 5 SCC 365 , wherein it has been held that where a large number of candidates have committed malpractice in the selection, the selection process can be cancelled without giving opportunity to the said candidates. In the said case the Apex Court has discussed the entire facts placed before the Court which exhibited that there had been an enquiry in which it was found that there had been bungling in the tabulation of the result. A large number of incidents have been quoted by the Apex Court itself and the Court came to the conclusion that a perusal of the record itself indicated the enormity of the malpractice in the selection process. The Apex Court was satisfied that it was a fit case for cancelling the selection process. In the instant case, no such material has been placed before this Court. It has been submitted that the authority who took the decision to cancel the selection process had received a large number of complaints and was satisfied that there had been malpractice, and thus he was justified in passing the impugned order of cancellation of the selection process. 29. Shri Sinha further submitted that it was a very high authority-Director General of Railway Protection Force who passed the said order, and thus there is a presumption of the order being bona fide. I cannot accept the contention that a high ranked officer is infallible and his order is not open to scrutiny by the Court. The earlier view that there is a presumption against abuse when power is vested in high ranking official, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Accountant General and Another Vs. S. Doraiswamy and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 93 , stood diluted to some extent. 30. In R.S. Dass Ors. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1986) 1 SCC 617 Supp, in an identical situation, the Supreme Court has observed that "it cannot be said nowadays if one is aware of the facts and currents of life that simply because categorisation and judgment of the service record of officers are in the hands of senior officers, this is a sufficient safeguard." 31. Similarly in Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. Similarly in Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Others, (1991) 1 SCC 600 Supp, Hon'ble Sawant, J has observed as under: There is need to minimise the scope of arbitrary use of power in all walks of life. It is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of individual. however, high place they may be. It is all the more improper and undesirable to expose precious right, like the right of life, liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whims and fancies. It is trite to say that the individual are not and do not become wise because they occupy high seat of power and good sense, circumspection and fairness does not go with the post, however, high they may be. There is only a complacent presumption that those who occupy high post have high sense of responsibility. The presumption is neither legal nor rational. History does not support and reality does not warrant it. In particular, in a society pledged to uphold the rule of law it would be both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered by the rule of law. 32. Thus, in view of (he above, there is no force in the submission of Shri Lalji Sinha, learned Counsel for the Respondents and the proposition so suggested that the action taken by the high official of the Railway Protection Force is necessarily bona fide and cannot be accepted. The law does not acknowledge and recognise such a proposition. No doubt u/s 114 Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act, there is a presumption in favour of the validity of official acts, but this presumption is rebuttable and when there is an allegation of illegality the authority must give the material justifying its action. The law presumes and Courts must also presume until the contrary is established that official acts will be done fairly and objectively as the authorities under the statute are presumed to, and expected to act, consistent with public interest and the interest of law, (vide State Through Anti-Corruption Bureau, Government of Maharashtra, bombay Vs. Krishanchand Khushalchand Jagtiani, (1996) 4 SCC 472 , and Shiv Sagar Tiwari Vs. Union of India and others, (1997) 10 SCC 211 , and State of Bihar and others Vs. Subhash Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 430 . 33. Krishanchand Khushalchand Jagtiani, (1996) 4 SCC 472 , and Shiv Sagar Tiwari Vs. Union of India and others, (1997) 10 SCC 211 , and State of Bihar and others Vs. Subhash Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 430 . 33. The selection process can be cancelled if there is sufficient proof after holding an enquiry that there had been malpractice or. a large scale or the members of the Selection Board have indulged in corruption, favouritism or nepotism as in such a situation, the selection itself would stand vitiated because of the fraud as fraud unravels everything ( S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, (1994) 1 SCC 1 , and Lazarus Estate Ltd. v. Beasley 1956 All. E.R. 341). It may also stand vitiated if there is violation of fundamental procedural requirement. But in all such cases, the authority is bound to record the reasons for its action. 34. It is settled law that it is not necessary that reason should be given in the order itself. It may be in the record and if once it is challenged, then the burden is thrown on the authority making the order to satisfy' the Court by other means, i.e., by producing the original record that the conditions precedent had been fulfilled before passing the order, but if the authority cannot satisfy the Court, then an inference is to be drawn against it, (vide The Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Limited Vs. The State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1961 SC 1381 , and Narayan Govind Gavate and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (1977) 1 SCC 133 . This is so because of the implied application of the principle enshrined in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which provides that "when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person, the burden to prove that fact is upon him." In Narain Govind Govate (supra), the Apex Court observed as under: Other cases may raise question involving consideration of facts which are specially within the knowledge of the authorities concerned and if they do not discharge their special burden, imposed by Section 106, Evidence Act, without even disclosing sufficient reasons for their abstention from disclosure, they have to take the consequences which flow from non-production of the best evidence which could be produced on behalf of the State if its stand was correct. 35. 35. In Kumari Anamica Mishra and another, Vs. U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad and others, (1990) 1 SCC 692 Supp, the Apex Court has observed that where there are serious lapses in the selection process, there may be justification for cancellation of the selection process, but it would render only that part of the examination invalid where the lapse has occurred. Further the Apex Court has stressed that there should not be unreasonable delay in completing the selection process. 36. In Union Territory of Chandigarh Vs. Dilbagh Singh and others, (1993) 1 SCC 154 , the Apex Court observed that a select list can be cancelled provided it is found to have been prepared in unfair and injudicious manner. The Court upholding the decision of the Respondents for cancelling the selection process, observed as under: That select list was also found to have been prepared without adopting common eligibility criterion, for all candidates when the said reasons formed the basis for the Chandigarh administration to cancel the select list of the Selection Board, the fact that charges of corruption levelled against the members of the selection board in the preparation of that select list had not been established by direct evidence produced in that regard, can make no difference. 37. In Pritpal Singh and others Vs. State of Haryana and others, (1994) 5 SCC 695, the Apex Court took the view that if the selection is not objective and fair, it may be quashed but for doing that, there must be sufficient evidence to take such a drastic decision. 38. It is well-settled that minimal and bare requirement of the rule of law is that every action of the State "should be free from arbitrariness" and Article 14 of the Constitution strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and reasonableness, (vide E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, (1974) 4 SCC 3 ; Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, (1978) 1 SCC 248 ; Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, (1979) 3 SCC 489 . Its scope is no more limited to the cases of discrimination only. 39. In an identical situation, this Court in Ramdarshan Rai and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, (1978) 1 SCC 248 ; Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, (1979) 3 SCC 489 . Its scope is no more limited to the cases of discrimination only. 39. In an identical situation, this Court in Ramdarshan Rai and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1995 (2) AWC 1327, had quashed the order of the State Government (U.P.) cancelling the selection process for the posts of Sub-Inspector of Civil Police, holding that the said decision was arbitrary, mala fide and against the law because the Respondents could not place any material before the Court to satisfy that there was sufficient ground to cancel the selection process. It was held therein that in a case like this, the Court has to scrutinise the material placed before it and to find out as to whether the action of the authority concerned is arbitrary, mala fide or illegal. The special appeal against the said judgment has also been dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 193 of 1996 Jagdamba Prasad Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. on 19.11.1996. [It may be observed that Special Appeal No 193 of 1996 has not been dismissed but has been disposed of by modifying the judgment of the single Judge as to the percentage of reservation for backward classes to be 15% as prescribed under U.P. Act No. 21 of 1989 and not 27% as held by the single Judge. Note.--[It may be noted that the aforesaid appeal was not filed against the judgment of the single Judge quoting the cancellation of selection but only against the finding as to the percentage of reservation for backward classes; see Jagdamba Prasad Singh v. State of U.P. 1997 (1) AWC 432 (DB) : Chief Editor]. 40. It is settled law that "an order made without any evidence to support it is in truth...made without jurisdiction and it, is therefore, invalid at law," (Vide Folke Stone Corporation v. Brokman 1914 Appeal Cases 338 at page No. 367). 41. Therefore, 1 am of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 21.10.1996 cancelling the selection process suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and must be declared illegal and mala fide. As the petitions succeed only on these grounds, the other issues do not require consideration. 42. 41. Therefore, 1 am of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 21.10.1996 cancelling the selection process suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and must be declared illegal and mala fide. As the petitions succeed only on these grounds, the other issues do not require consideration. 42. Thus, in view of the above, the writ petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned order dated 21.10.1996 and advertisement dated 26.10.1996 are hereby quashed. The Respondents are directed to declare the result of the selection held in pursuance of the earlier advertisement dated 23.4.1995 within a period of two months from today. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.