JUDGMENT - R.G. DESHPANDE: J.---Rule returnable forthwith. 2.Atmaram- the original plaintiff has come up before this Court as a revisionist challenging the order dated 27.4.1992 passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Beed, in Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 3/90, whereby the learned Judge of the trial Court rejected the application filed by the present petitioner for restoration of the Restoration Petition No. 92/85. The present revision appear to have been raised on a very friable ground that the original suit i.e. Regular Civil Suit No. 165/83 which was filed by the present petitioner was dismissed in default on 1.10.1985 and an application for restoration of the same is also dismissed in default. 3.It is evident from the record that after the suit was dismissed in default, the petitioner filed Restoration Application No. 92/85 which also came to be dismissed in default on 18.11.1989. After the dismissal of that Restoration Application No. 92/85, Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 3/90 was initiated at the instance of the petitioner for getting restored the Restoration Petition No. 92/85. It is this application which is dismissed by the learned Judge of the trial Court on 27.4.1992. This order dated 27.4.1992 is under challenge by way of present revision application. 4.Heard Shri D.B. Yevatekar, advocate for the petitioner and Shri A.B. Tele, advocate for the respondents. Shri Yevatekar, learned advocate has argued that when his original Restoration Petition No. 92/85 was dismissed on 18-11-1989, the petitioner could not remain present as he was busy in agricultural operations. Even otherwise, according to Shri Yevatekar, on that day, he was under the impression that necessary orders would be passed on the restoration application and, therefore, his presence was not necessary. The fact remains that the matter was fixed on 18-11-1989 and the statements on the record indicate that the petitioner was aware of that date. Since the learned Judge noticed the absence of the applicant, I do not find that the learned Judge did commit any mistake in dismissing that application in default, particularly when there was no application on behalf of the plaintiff in any manner even as regards the adjournment of the matter. Since the learned Judge noticed the absence of the applicant, I do not find that the learned Judge did commit any mistake in dismissing that application in default, particularly when there was no application on behalf of the plaintiff in any manner even as regards the adjournment of the matter. Shri Yevatekar further argued that taking into consideration the facts of the case and the subject matter thereof that the plaintiff was seeking injunction against the defendants in that original suit as he had apprehended encroachment on his land, Shri Yevatekar says that it would cause great hardship to the plaintiff and possibility of irreparable loss to him also could not be overruled. I am not impressed by this argument of Shri Yevatekar, even otherwise, Shri Yevatekar, as also Shri Tele, both have pointed out that at least till this date there was no encroachment on the land of the plaintiff. 5.Shri Yevatekar further argued that the observations made by the learned Judge of the trial Court in his order dated 27-4-1992 that the remedy open for the petitioner was to have filed an appeal against the order dated 18-11-1989 which was passed in Restoration Application No. 92/85 is wrong, as according to Shri Yevatekar that indicates that the learned Judge was under the impression that no second restoration application could be maintainable. In support of his contention, Shri Yevatekar brought to my notice two decisions, first being (Anantrao v. Krishnaji)1, reported in A.I.R. 1964 Bombay 232. I have curiously gone through this judgment and it is seen that in that case there was an application for stay of the execution of a valid decree which was dismissed in default. Thereafter, an application to restore that stay application also came to be dismissed. But the facts reveal that the application was not dismissed in default, but the same was dismissed on its merit and, therefore, the decision given by this Court was that against that order appeal should have been filed and no fresh application for restoration of that application could have been made. It appears that the learned Judge of the trial Court did not read this judgment in its proper perspective. The question before him was as to whether could there be a restoration application for restoration of the earlier restoration application which came to be dismissed in default. It appears that the learned Judge of the trial Court did not read this judgment in its proper perspective. The question before him was as to whether could there be a restoration application for restoration of the earlier restoration application which came to be dismissed in default. In support of his contention, Shri Yevatekar brought to my notice another decision of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1968 Bombay 250 in the case of (Laxmi Investment Company v. Tarachand)2. After going through this judgment and as is observed by the Division Bench of this Court in that judgment in paragraphs 10 and 13, it is clear that an application, for restoration of the earlier application which was dismissed in default could be entertained by the Court in its inherent powers under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, and in appropriate cases, the Court can grant necessary reliefs if deserved by the party concerned. There cannot be any second opinion about this and at the same time the principle cannot be forgotten that if powers are vested in the Court to grant certain reliefs in its inherent powers then in those circumstances, it also includes the power in the Court to not to grant that relief, because power to do also includes power to not to do. Keeping in mind this principle, I have to decide this application. 6.In the present matter, the learned Judge has observed that even the statements recorded on behalf of the petitioner as regards his absence also appear to be false because at one stage it is pointed out that the petitioner was under the impression that on that day orders would be passed and his presence was not necessary and at the second breath he says that since he was busy in agricultural operations, he could not remain present. It is very difficult to synchronize both these statements and this itself is sufficient to throw light on the conduct of the plaintiff petitioner. 7.Another aspect which needs to be seen in the present matter is that the original suit is of 1983 and I do not find it appropriate now to restore the same on the file in the year 1997 i.e. after about 14 years. 7.Another aspect which needs to be seen in the present matter is that the original suit is of 1983 and I do not find it appropriate now to restore the same on the file in the year 1997 i.e. after about 14 years. If a lenient view to this extent is taken by the Court in granting such relief, it would create havoc, particularly when no prejudice whatsoever is shown to have been caused to the plaintiff and particularly when the matter can be said to be an ideal example of lack of diligence on the part of the petitioner. 8.I do not find any merit in the present revision application. Revision Application stands rejected with no order as to costs. Rule is accordingly discharged. Application rejected.