JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the parties and I have gone through the records of this case. 2. Respondent was tried before the court below under section 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and was found guilty for having committed said offence, as such he was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months as well as to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 in default of payment of fine he was required to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of two months. Respondent was dissatisfied with this judgment passed by the trial Court, therefore, he preferred an appeal before the appellate court below, By means of judgment dated 1-10-1993 passed by the learned Sessions Judge Sirmaur district at Nahan, appeal of the respondent had been allowed and consequently his conviction and sentence has been set aside. Hence this appeal at the instance of the State. 3. Facts in this case are within narrow compass. Ft is not disputed on behalf of the appellant that respondent is running a tea stall at Paonta Sahib when sample of milk was drawn by the Food Inspector on 25-7-1991 front the said tea stall after having disclosed his intention to draw sample. Food Inspector appears to have drawn the sample on the assumption that the milk that was kept by the respondent in his tea stall was meant for sale to the general public and on this basis he proceeded to draw the sample in question. 4. After observing codal formalities as well as after complying with the requirement of law when one sample was sent to the Public Analyst, Chandigarh. It was opined by Public Analyst vide Ex. P4 that the sample of milk was found deficient in milk fat by 33 0 per cent and in milk solid not fat by 52 0 per cent of the minimum prescribed standard Thereafter prosecution was launched after the Local Health Authority had accorded sanction vide Ex. P-17 Record further shows that intimation about the launching of prosecution alongwith a copy of this report of the Public Analyst was sent to the respondent so as to enable him to exercise his right under section 13 (2) of the Act ibid 5. P-17 Record further shows that intimation about the launching of prosecution alongwith a copy of this report of the Public Analyst was sent to the respondent so as to enable him to exercise his right under section 13 (2) of the Act ibid 5. Learned Assistant Advocate General forcefully urged that the appellate court below has fallen into error by up-setting the well reasoned judgment of the trial Court whereby respondent was sentenced since sample of milk was found to be adulterated A perusal of the prosecution evidence shows that it is admitted case of the prosecution as is clear from the statement of PW-2 G.R. Puri, Food Inspector that respondent was running a tea stall at Paonta Sahib in Gurdwara building There is no legal evidence to show that the milk sample whereof was drawn and which was lateron found to be adulterated was in fact meant for sale by the respondent In this context, it may be appropriate to notice that mere storing of adulterated article of food by itself is not offence unless it is further shown that it is meant for sale to general public. This type of evidence is admittedly missing in the present case and after having referred to the entire prosecution evidence, learned Assistant Advocate General was not in a position to show anything in this behalf. 6. Merely because 5 KGs of milk had been stored by the respondent in a shop where he was running the tea stall by itself will not show that the respondent had committed any offence unless further evidence was led to show that the milk in question was stored for sale within the meaning of the provisions of the Act. As a corollary to this it can further be said that Food Inspector had oo authority to have drawn the sample of milk which was meant for preparing tea by the respondent 7. For taking the aforesaid view, reliance can be placed in case Municipal Corporation of Delhi v Laxmi Narain Tandon etc. etc., AIR 1976 SC 621 and relevant observations are to the following effect ; 1 to13 * * * * "14. From a conjoint reading of the above referred provisions, it will be clear that the broad scheme of tie Act is to prohibit and penalise the sale or import, manufacture, storage or distribution for sale of any adulterated article of food. From a conjoint reading of the above referred provisions, it will be clear that the broad scheme of tie Act is to prohibit and penalise the sale or import, manufacture, storage or distribution for sale of any adulterated article of food. The terms “store" and "distribute” take their colour from the context and the collocation of words in which they occure in sections 7 and 16. "Storage" or distribution" of an adulterated article of food for a purpose other than for sale does not fall within the mischief of this section. That this is the right construction of the terms "store" and "distribute" in section 16 (1) will be further clear from a reference to section 10. Under that section, the Food Inspector, whom the Act assigns a pivotal position for the enforcement of its provisions, is authorised to take samples of an article of food only from particular persons indulging in a specified course of business activity. The immediate or ultimate end of such activity is the sale of an article of food The section does not give a blanket power to the Food Inspector to take samples of an article of food from a person who is not covered by any of the sub-clauses of subsection (1) (a) of sub section (2). The three sub-clauses of sub-section (1) (a) apply only to a person who answers the description of a seller or conveyer, deliverer, actual or potential, of an article of food to a purchaser or consignee or his consignee after delivery of such an article to him Sub-section (2) further makes it clear that sample can be taken only of that article of food which is “manufactured", "Stored" or exposed for sale. It follows that if an article of food is not intended for sale and is in the possession of a person who does not fulfil the character of a seller, conveyer, deliverer, consignee, manufacturer or store for sale such as is referred in sub sections (1) (a) and (2) of the Section, the Food Inspector will not be competent under the law to take a sample and on such sample being found adulterated, to validly launch prosecution thereon. In short, the expression "store" in section 7 means "storing for sale", and consequently storing of an adulterated article of food for purposes other than for sale would not constitute an offence under section 16 (1) (a)". In short, the expression "store" in section 7 means "storing for sale", and consequently storing of an adulterated article of food for purposes other than for sale would not constitute an offence under section 16 (1) (a)". Placing reliance on this judgment of Honble Supreme Court referred to in the preceding para, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held in case State of Haryana v. Inder Singh, 1992 (1) FAC 55, as under : 1 to 3 * * * * * * "4. The only contention considered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge was that the milk kept by the respondent in his premises was not meant for sale to the public and it was for preparation of tea. In support of these observations the learned Lower Appellate Court placed reliance on the State of Maharashtra v. Udayram Rupram Oza, 1977(2) FAC 213: 1987 Criminal Law Journal 1807, according to which milk kept in a tea shop which was not for sale but for being used as an ingredient in the preparation of tea was not a sale within the meaning of section 2 (xiii) of the Act and as such it cud not amount to an offence. The observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v Laxmi Narain Tandon etc., 1977 (1) FAC 73 : AIR 1976 Supreme Court 621, make it clear that the food stored for a purpose other than for sale does not fall within the mischief of this section. If an article of food is not intended for sale and is in possession of a person who does not fulfil the character of a seller or store for sale, the Food Inspector will not be competent under the law to take a sample and on such sample being found adulterated, to validly launch prosecution thereon. In view of these authorities the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the respondent was liable for having been found in possession of adulterated milk does not hold good." 8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it cannot be said that the acquittal of the respondent ordered by the appellate court below calls for any interference. In view of these authorities the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the respondent was liable for having been found in possession of adulterated milk does not hold good." 8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it cannot be said that the acquittal of the respondent ordered by the appellate court below calls for any interference. Besides this, no infirmity could be pointed out by the learned Assistant Advocate General after having referred to the entire evidence examined in support of its case by the Food Inspection and calling for interference in this appeal. On the other hand, it appears that the appellate court below has taken a reasonable and balanced view of the whole case by applying the law correctly to the facts of this case on proper consideration of the prosecution evidence. It is thus obvious that there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. Respondent is on bail, his personal and surety bond is discharged. Fine if deposited is ordered to be refunded to the respondent. Appeal dismissed.