Order There are three petitioner in this case who seek to challenge the recommendation made by the High Court, in so far as it omitted their names, for appointments as District Judges in terms of Article 233 of the Constitution. 2. The selection was made on the basis of a written test followed by an interview of the candidates who qualified on the basis of the written test. The interview of the qualified candidates was taken by a Committee consisting of five Judges of this court presided over by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and the select list prepared on the basis of the marks obtained in the written test and the oral interview was later ratified by the Full Court. 3. All the three petitioners had qualified in the written test and in the list of the qualified candidates figured at serial nos. 5, 11 and 15 respectively. In the oral interview, however, they presumably failed to do well and were therefore unable to find a place among the selected candidates recommended by the High Court for appointments. 4. The petitioners challenge the selection process on the sole ground that the interview was taken by a committee of five Judges and not by all the Judges of the High Court who at the material time were 32 in number. According to the petitioners the interview of the qualified candidates by a Committee of the High Court was contrary to the provisions contained in Article 233 of the Constitution which provided that the appointment should be made in consultation with the High Court. 5. In support of the contention Mr. Y. V. Giri, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon Supreme Court decisions in (i) S.C. Advocates-on-Record Association & am. vs. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268 (Para-307 at page 375). (ii) Chandra Mohan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1966 SC 1987 and (iii) Prem Nath and others vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1599 (Para-7). 6. The observations in the S.C. Advocates' case relied upon by Mr. Giri were made in the context where the Supreme Court was highlighting the relatively more active role played by the Indian Judiciary in selecting Judges at all levels. 6. The observations in the S.C. Advocates' case relied upon by Mr. Giri were made in the context where the Supreme Court was highlighting the relatively more active role played by the Indian Judiciary in selecting Judges at all levels. In that context it was observed that the requirement of consultation with or recommendation by the High Court was a must and the decision had to be taken by the entire body of the Judges constituting the High Court. In my view the observation made by the Supreme Court in that decision cannot be taken as prohibiting the High Court from discharging its functions, in appropriate cases for the sake of convenience and better management, through smaller Committees. 7. In Chandra Mohan's case the facts were entirely different and that decision has no application to the present case. 8. The decision in Prem Nath's case at first appears to be quite close to the case in hands but closer scrutiny makes it evident that that decision too has no application to the facts of the present case. In that decision the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the constitutional validity of rules framed by the Governor in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. In terms of those rules the entire work of scrutinising the applications, interviewing the applicants, selection of eligible candidates was required to be done by a Selection Committee and not by the High Court. In other words, the rules, purportedly statutory in nature, precluded the, High Court from selecting the candidates and the High Court, so to say, was kept out of the selection process. It was in this situation that the Supreme Court found the rules offending Article 233 of the Constitution and declared them constitutionally invalid. 9. In the present case the situation is not analogous. No one precluded the High Court from the selection process. On the contrary the selection was made under the overall supervision and control of the Full Court but for the sake of convenience and for a better management of the selection process the High Court itself opted to act through a convenient and manageable Committee. No one precluded the High Court from the selection process. On the contrary the selection was made under the overall supervision and control of the Full Court but for the sake of convenience and for a better management of the selection process the High Court itself opted to act through a convenient and manageable Committee. It does not require much effort to imagine that a Committee of five Judges can take an interview to assess the merit and potential of a candidate far more effectively than an unmanageably large number of 32 interviewers. In view of the aforesaid I am of the definite opinion that the Supreme Court judgment in Prem Nath's case is of no help to the present petitioners. 10. I am further supported in my view on the basis of the Supreme Court decision in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi & anr., (1978) 2 SCC 102 . In paragraphs 15 and 16 of that decision it was stated as follows : 15. "Yet another misconception may now be cleared. It is urged on behalf of the respondent by his learned counsel Shri Misra that under Article 216, 'High Court' means the entire body of Judges appointed to the Court and therefore, the control over the subordinate judiciary which is vested by Article 235 in the High Court must be exercised by the whole body of Judges. The thrust of the argument is that the High Court cannot delegate its functions or power to a Judge or a smaller body of Judges of the Court. This argument requires consideration of the question whether any delegation as such is involved in the process whereby Judge or a Committee of Judges of the court, like the Administrative Committee in the instant case, is authorised by the whole court to act on behalf of court. 16. For answering this question it is necessary in the first place to bear in mind that the power of control over the subordinate courts which is vested in the High Courts comprises such numerous matters, often involving consideration of details of the minutest nature, that if the whole High Court is required to consider every one of those matters, the exercise of control instead of becoming effective will tend to cause delay and confusion in the administration of justice in the State. A construction which will frustrate the very object of the salient provisions contained in Article 235 ought, is so far as possible, to be avoided. The control vested in the High Court by that article comprehends, according to our decisions, a large variety of matters like transfers, subsequent postings, leave, promotions other than initial promotions, imposition of minor penalties which do no fall within Article 33, decisions regarding compulsory retirements, recommendations for imposition of major penalties which fall within Article 311, entries in character rolls and so forth. If every Judge is to be associated personally and directly with the decision on every one of these matters, several important matters pertaining to the High Court's administrative affairs will pile into arrears like court arrears. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the control will be better and more effectively exercised if a smaller committee of Judges had the authority of the court to consider the manifold matters falling within the purview of Article 235. Bearing in mind therefore the nature of the power which that article confers on the High Courts we are of the opinion that it is wrong to characterise as 'delegation' the process whereby the entire High Court authorises a Judge or some of the Judges of the Court to act on behalf of the whole Court. Such an authorisation effectuates the purpose of Article 235 and indeed without it the control vested in the High Courts over the subordinate cour1s will tend gradually to become lax and ineffective. Administrative functions are only a part, though an important part, of the High Court's constitutional functions. Judicial functions ought to occupy and do in fact consume the best part of a Judge's time. For balancing these twofold functions it is inevitable that the administrative duties should be left to be discharged by some on behalf of all the Judges. Judicial functions brook no such sharing of responsibilities by any instrumentality. 11. Mr. Addl. Advocate General No. II appearing on behalf of the High Court also submitted that the petitioners having appeared for their interview before the Committee and having taken their chances of selection cannot now be allowed to question the selection on the ground that interview was taken by an incomplete body. 11. Mr. Addl. Advocate General No. II appearing on behalf of the High Court also submitted that the petitioners having appeared for their interview before the Committee and having taken their chances of selection cannot now be allowed to question the selection on the ground that interview was taken by an incomplete body. He submitted that the interview was held on October 4, 1996 and the final recommendation was made by the High Court five or six months thereafter. Yet the petitioners did not raise any objection immediately after the interview or within a reasonable time before the final selection was made but filed this writ petition only on 13.3.1997, that is to say, after the recommendation was made by the High Court. In support of his submission Mr. Addl. Advocate General No. II relied upon a Supreme Court decision in Madan Lal vs. State of J. & K., (1995) 3 SCC 486 (Paragraph-9). I find considerable force in the point raised by the Addl. Advocate General No. II. 12. For the reasons stated above, I find no merit in this application. It is, accordingly, dismissed.