JUDGMENT C.K. Prasad, J. 1. Defendant has preferred this appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 22-11-1994 passed by the Additional District Judge, Sagar in Civil Suit No. 6-B of 1993, whereby the suit filed by the wife for grant of maintenance under the provisions of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 has been decreed. 2. According to the plaintiff marriage took place between the parties according to Hindu rites about 33 years before the date of institution of the suit. After 2-3 years of the marriage the ceremony of Chouk was performed and she visited the house of the defendant for about 2-3 years thereafter. According to the plaintiff, defendant, his mother and other family relations started harassing the plaintiff and did not give her food. It has been further averred by the plaintiff that the jewellery given to her at the time of marriage was retained by the defendant. In the year 1974, she got sick and was pregnant and she was taken to her matrimonial home where she gave birth to a daughter. However, during her stay at matrimonial home she was treated with cruelty. According to the plaintiff in April 1975, plaintiff's father brought her to her parents place but thereafter neither the defendant nor his family member ever took her to her matrimonial home and defendant has married another lady. It has been further averred by the plaintiff that for a long period she was dependent upon her father and wages earned by her by working, but because of fracture of her left hand and old age she is unable to earn her livelihood. It has been averred by the plaintiff that the defendant is a member of a joint family possession 100 acres of land and has two tractors and their standard of living is high. Plaintiff gave a notice to the defendant on which the defendant replied that he is prepared to keep the plaintiff and further stated that the divorce has taken place in the form of CHHOD CHHUTTI, although according to her no such divorce has taken place. On the basis of the aforesaid averment plaintiff prayed for grant of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid averment plaintiff prayed for grant of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month. 3. Defendant in the written-statement has not denied the allegation of marriage but has stated that in the month of April, 1975 plaintiff's father took her to his place and thereafter did not come to the matrimonial home. Defendant has further denied the allegation of harassment and retention of the jewellery of the plaintiff given at the time of marriage. It has been further stated in the written-statement that defendant and his relation always went to bring the plaintiff to her matrimonial home, but they were being abused by the plaintiff's father and were asked to go back by him stating that they had sufficient land to maintain the plaintiff. It has been further stated that the plaintiff filed an application under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and by order dated 26-12-1991 the claim of the plaintiff for her maintenance and that of her daughter was rejected. On the basis of the aforesaid assertion the defendant denied his liability to pay maintenance to the plaintiff. Additional District Judge, Khurai (Sagar) by judgment and decree dated 22-11-1994 passed in Civil Suit No. 6-B of 1993 decreed the plaintiff's suit and held that the plaintiff is entitled for maintenance at the rate of Rs. 800/- per month from 8-1-1992 i.e. from the date of filing the suit. Aggrieved by the same, defendant husband has filed this appeal under section 96, Civil Procedure Code. 4. Shri Kishor Shrivastava appearing for the appellant has drawn my attention to paragraph 9 of the plaint wherein the plaintiff has stated that cause of action arose in 1977 and in that view of the matter the suit filed on 8-1-1992 is barred by limitation. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the suit shall be governed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, Shri Sapre appearing on behalf of the respondent submits that the suit shall be governed by Article 105 of the Limitation Act. In view of the rival stand of the learned counsel for the parties, first question which falls for determination is whether the suit filed by the plaintiff shall be governed by Article 58 or Article 105? Article 58 and Article 105 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read as follows : "58. To obtain any other declaration. In view of the rival stand of the learned counsel for the parties, first question which falls for determination is whether the suit filed by the plaintiff shall be governed by Article 58 or Article 105? Article 58 and Article 105 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read as follows : "58. To obtain any other declaration. Three years When the right to sue first accrues. 105. By a Hindu for arrears of maintenance Three years When the arrears are payable." 5. Shri Sapre to buttress his submission draws my attention to Article 128 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and submits that Article 128 of the earlier Act being replaced by Article 105 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the provisions of Article 105 shall apply. In support of the aforesaid submission learned counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Lahore High Court in the case of Mt. Shibbi v. Jodh Singh, AIR 1933 Lahore 747; and my attention has been drawn to the following passage of the Judgment: "...........The claim to maintain in such cases however is a recurring right which may be in abeyance during the unchastity of the wife and may revive on the cessation of this disqualification. There is authority in support of the proposition that it revives when the unchastity ceases, e.g. Satyabhama v. Keshavacharya, AIR 1924 Cal. 364. As remarked by the Calcutta High Court, the cause of action for maintenance accrues from time to time according to the want and exigencies of the person entitled. In this case the learned District Judge has found that the plaintiff was not unchaste at the time when she instituted the suit at any rate. In fact his finding is that she never was unchaste. Moreover, it seems to me that Article 129 is intended to apply to cases where the status of a person, on the basis of which maintenance is claimed, is denied." Articles 128 and 129 of the Limitation Act, 1908 reads as follows:- "128. By a Hindu for arrears of maintenance. Twelve years When the arrears are payable. 129. By a Hindu for a declaration of his right Twelve years When the right to maintenance. By a Hindu for arrears of maintenance. Twelve years When the arrears are payable. 129. By a Hindu for a declaration of his right Twelve years When the right to maintenance. is denied." It is contended that before the enactment of Limitation Act, 1963, provisions of Article 128 applies, provisions of Article 105 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which is in pan materia with Article 128 of the old Act the same shall apply. However, Shri Shrivastava submits that Article 129 of the earlier Act applied in the case and that being replaced by Article 58 later provision will apply. I find substance in the submission of Shri Shrivastava. Article 58 operates in the field of the right to maintenance whereas Article 105 operates in the field of arrears of maintenance. In my opinion, for application of Article 105 of the Limitation Act, prior adjudication is sine qua non, whereas for application of Article 58 no such prior adjudication is necessary. It is to be borne in mind that the right to maintenance is a constant right and once it has started it accrues de die in diem. The right for a suit for arrears of maintenance, starting point would be its wrongful denial. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that Article 58 of the Limitation Act applies. 6. Shri Shrivastava then contends that according to the plaintiff's own assertion in paragraph 9 of the plaint the cause of action arose in 1977 and Article 58 having provided for limitation of three years from the date the right to sue first accrues, suit filed on 8-1-1992 is beyond the period of limitation and the same deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone. Shri Shrivastava submits that according to the plaintiff's own showing the husband denied to maintain the wife from 1977, the right to sue for maintenance first accrued in the year 1977. In view of the aforesaid submission of Shri Shrivastava what falls for determination in the present appeal is the meaning of the expression when the 'right to sue first accrues'. It is contended by Shri Shrivastava that under Article 129 the expression used is "when the right is denied" whereas in Article 58 expression is "when the right to sue first accrues". It is contended by Shri Shrivastava that under Article 129 the expression used is "when the right is denied" whereas in Article 58 expression is "when the right to sue first accrues". He submits that the legislature having used word 'first' in Article 58 clearly shows its intention that on the every first day when the right accrued, the limitation will start to run. He submits that the clear unambiguous intention of the legislature in using the word 'first' in Article 58 has to be given effect to and once it is held so the suit is barred by limitation. As stated earlier, the right to maintenance is a constant right and once it has started it accrues de die in diem till happening of any determining event. I am of the opinion that for start of the period of limitation the time will run when the right is first denied, that is when there is a formal and final refusal on the part of the defendant of the claim of the plaintiff. Here in the present case in response to the notice given by the plaintiff, defendant has stated that he is prepared to keep the plaintiff. This clearly shows that there was no formal and final refusal on the part of the defendant to deny maintenance to the plaintiff. In that view of the matter, the suit cannot be held to be barred by limitation. Defendant has admitted in the written-statement that he has married a second lady. In the face of his admission the plaintiff is entitled for maintenance under section 18(2)(d) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The evidence of the plaintiff shows that because of her age and fracture in the hand, she is unable to earn wages for her livelihood. Accordingly, I concur with the finding of the trial Court that plaintiff is entitled and defendant is liable to pay maintenance to her. 7. The only submission made on behalf of the appellant having failed, I do not find any merit in this appeal. It is dismissed with cost. Counsel Fee Rs. 500/-.