JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner, who is an ex-permanent employee of the Rajasthan State Co-operative Bank, Limited, Jaipur (for short 'the Bank') has by way of this writ petition raised the substantial questions of law for consideration of this Court with reference to interpretation of Rule-7 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Rules, 1966 (for short 'the Rules') which are as follows : (i) as to whether a permanent employee of the Bank, who retires from services of the Bank on attaining the age of superannuation is entitled to the payment of gratuity by the employer, the maximum outer limit for which is 20 months of salary, which is calculable @ one month's substantive salary last drawn by the employee or not ? (ii) whether the word 'salary' as referred to in Clause-C of Rule-7 of the Rules envisages within it's ambit & scope as substantive salary last drawn by the employee, who retires from service on attaining the age of superannuation or the word 'salary' would include the total salary inclusive of all allowances as admissible to the employee on the basis of his last drawn salary ? 2. The facts giving rise to the filing of this writ petition briefly stated are that the petitioner served the respondent-Bank for a period of 29 years and retired from services of the respondent-Bank as Deputy Manager w.e.f. 31.7.1.992. The respondent-Bank is a Co-operative Bank of the State of Rajasthan and is governed by the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 as well as the Co-operative Society Rules, 1966 & on the basis of which the respondent-Bank had issued Ex.R/2, which is a bipartite settlement between the Bank & its employees and Annexure-2 (dated 20.11.1992), pertains to the payment of gratuity as admissible to the retired employees of the Bank. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended at the bar that the petitioner was entitled to the payment of gratuity as admissible to him on attaining the age of superannuation w.e.f. 31.7.1992 in view of his having rendered 29 years of qualifying service to the Bank. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended at the bar that the last drawn salary of the petitioner was Rs. 8,416.93, which includes the basis pay @ Rs. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended at the bar that the last drawn salary of the petitioner was Rs. 8,416.93, which includes the basis pay @ Rs. 2,030/- p.m. It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was paid an amount of Rs. 40,600/- by multiplying basic pay with 20 months' of salary instead' of paying the gratuity @ one month's substantive salary last substantive salary last drawn for each year of completed service subject to the maximum ceiling limit of 20 months of salary, to which an employee is entitled to receive on attaining the age of superannuation, which includes all allowances etc. as admissible to the petitioner as on the date of his retirement, but as a result of the misinterpretation of the Rule by the Bank, the petitioner was deprived of the benefit of gratuity in accordance with the aforesaid Rule. 4. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that on calculation of the last drawn salary of the petitioner i.e. Rs. 8,416.93/-, which comes to Rs. 1,69,320/- for 20 months of salary, the total amount comes to Rs. 58,870/-, as against which the petitioner was paid a sum of Rs. 40,600/- and as a result of which the petitioner has been put a loss of Rs. 18,270/- on account of erroneous interpretation of the Rule-7 of the Rules. For the sake of convenience and ready reference it will be appropriate to refer to Rule-7 of the Rules which reads as under : "Rule-7 Gratuity (a) When a permanent employee who has rendered approved and meritorious service to the Bank cases to be in its employment on account of death, or retirement, the Board, at its discretion, may sanction payment of a gratuity to such an employee or his heirs as the case may be provided; (i) he has completed continuous service for a mimimum period of ten years and (ii) in case of death while in service he was in continuous service for not less than five years. (b) Gratuity shall not be admissible in the case of any employee who is dismissed from service or who leaves, resigns or discontinues the service without written permission or whose services are terminated by the Bank as a disciplinary measure. (b) Gratuity shall not be admissible in the case of any employee who is dismissed from service or who leaves, resigns or discontinues the service without written permission or whose services are terminated by the Bank as a disciplinary measure. (c) The amount of gratuity payable shall be at the rate of one month's substantive salary last drawn, for each year of completed service, subject to a maximum of 20 months' salary." 5. The respondents on being noticed by this Court have controverted the contentions of the petitioner on the grounds inter-alia that keeping in view the provisions relating to the payment of the gratuity as contained in the Staff Service Regulations and Bipartite Settlement dated 14.5.1980, the petitioner was entitled to the payment of maximum gratuity equivalent to 20 months salary i.e. Rs. 40,600/- only for which the payment was made to the petitioner. 6. The respondents have further contended in their reply that the word 'salary' implies within its import 'basic salary' last drawn by the employee, which would imply the substantive salary last drawn devoid of the allowances as admissible to the said employee and it is for this reason that the respondents had not paid the balance gratuity amount as admissible to the petitioner in accordance with Rule 7 as referred to above.The word 'salary' in STROUDS. Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edition) at page 2426 has been defined thus : (1) 'Salarie' is a word often used in our books, and it signifies a recompene or consideration given upto any man for his paines bestowed upon another mans business." (Termes de la Ley, Salarie). (2). Whether the engagement is for a period, is permanent or substantially permanent in character, and is for other than manual or relatively unskilled labour, the remuneration is generally called a salary" (per Latham C.J. in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Thompson, J. Walter, (Aus.) Pty. Ltd. 69 C.L.R. 227 ? 7. The Apex Court in the matter of Gestetner Duplicators Pvt. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, reported in, A.I.R. 1979 SC page 607 while dealing with the term "salary and wages" in Civil Appeals Nos. Ltd. 69 C.L.R. 227 ? 7. The Apex Court in the matter of Gestetner Duplicators Pvt. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, reported in, A.I.R. 1979 SC page 607 while dealing with the term "salary and wages" in Civil Appeals Nos. 565/570 of 1978, decided on 24,12.1978 observed as under : "Conceptually there is no difference between salary and wages both being a recompense for work done or services rendered, though ordinarily the former expression is used in connection with services of non-manual type while the latter is used in connection with manual services. This compensation to the labourer or artisan could be a specified sum for a given time of service or a fixed sum for a specified work i.e. payment made by the job, the commonest example of the latter category being a piece-rated worker. In other words, the expression 'wages' does not imply that the compensation is to be determined solely upon the basis of time spent in service; it may be determined by the work done, it could be estimated in either way. If conceptually salary and wages mean one and the same thing then salary could take the form of payment by reference to the time factor or by the job done. In fact, in the case of salary the recompense could be determined wholly on the basis of time spent on service or wholly by the work done or partly by the time spent in service and partly by the work done. In other words, whatever be the basis on which such recompense is determined it would all be salary. AIR 1964 SC 980 Rel. on." 8. In order to better appreciate the meaning of the term 'Salary', it will also be appropriate to refer to its definition in Rule 2'h' of the Rules appended to the Income Tax Act "43 of 1961" under Section 36(1)(iv) and Schedule IV Part-A of the Rules 2(h) and 4(b) and (c) of the Rules appended to the Income Tax Act, 1996 hereinafter referred to as 'The Act'. The term 'salary' in Rule 2(h) has been defined as : "Including dearness allowance if the terms of employment so provide and excludes all other allowances and perquisites. Though the definition itself does not in terms exclude commission as such, it may in certain circumstances represent salary." 9. The term 'salary' in Rule 2(h) has been defined as : "Including dearness allowance if the terms of employment so provide and excludes all other allowances and perquisites. Though the definition itself does not in terms exclude commission as such, it may in certain circumstances represent salary." 9. Thus it will depend upon the terms of the contract of employment, remuneration or recompense for the services rendered by the employees is determined at the fixed percentage of turnover achieved by him then such remuneration or recompense will partake of the character of salary, the percentage basis being the measure of the salary and therefore such remuneration or recompense must fall within the ambit of expression 'salary' as defined in Rule 2(h) of Part A of the Fourth Schedule to the Act. 10. The Apex Court in the matter of Gestetner Duplicators Pvt. Ltd, v. The Commissioner of Income Tax West Bengal (supra) has gone even to the extent of observing that the Provident Fund maintained by the assessee satisfies the condition laid down in Rule 4(c) of Part A of the fourth Schedule of the Act and has observed thus : 11. "It would be conducive to judicial discipline and the maintaining of certainty and uniformity in administering the law that the taxing authorities should proceed on the basis that the recognition granted and available for any particular assessment year implies that the Provident Fund satisfies all the conditions under Rule 4 of Part A of the Fourth Schedule to the Act and not sit in judgment over it. Hence until the Commissioner acting under the powers reserved to him under Rule 3 withdraws such recognition the taxing authority must proceed on the basis that the Provident Fund has satisfied all the requisite conditions for its recognition for that year, any other course is bound to result in chaos and uncertainty which has to be avoided."11-A. Section 17 of the Act, defines the expression 'salary' for purposes of Section 15 and 16, which deal with the said terms as a head of income, and under Clause (iv) of sub-section (1) that expression includes : "any fees, commissions, perquisites or profits in lieu of or in addition to any salary or wages." In Part A of the Fourth Schedule to the Act, which contains rules relating to recognised Provident Funds the word 'salary' has been defined in Rule 2(h) thus : "Salary includes dearness allowance, if the terms of employment so provide, but excludes all other allowances and perquisites." Prima-facie, I am of the considered opinion that the respondents have not correctly interpreted the scope and ambit of the Rule 7(c) of the Rules, which reads as under : "The amount of gratuity payable shall be at the rate of one months' substantive salary last drawn, for each year of completed service, subject to a maximum of 20 months' salary." 12. I am further of the opinion that it is well settled proposition of law that where two words are used by the legislature in a statute, they imply different meanings and their scope cannot be restricted to the one and the same meaning and rather liberal interpretation should be placed by the employer particularly when the question pertains to the payment of gratuity which has been safeguarded and protected by the Legislature by means of a Payment of Gratuity. Act, 1972 which is a beneficial legislation and other consequential benefits as admissible to an employee on attaining the age of superannuation. 13. I am of the view that in this regard an obvious fallacy, which the respondents have committed in this case is that they have interpreted Rule-7 of the Rules in a very restricted and narrower sense by interpreting the word 'Salary' as basic or substantive salary devoid of all allowances as admissible to an employee which they should not have done. 14. 14. I am further of the opinion that the word 'salary' as referred to in the Rules is implies substantive salary inclusive of all allowances as admissible to the employee and it's scope cannot be restricted on narrow interpretation of the Rule by interpreting the word 'salary' as basic or substantive by excluding from it's purview the payment of total emoluments i.e. substantive salary including all other allowances, which may be admissible to the employees in accordance with the Rules. 15. I am fortified in my aforesaid observations from the Judgments of the Apex Court in the matter of The Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall, reported in A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 35 as well as in the matter of The Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh v. Burhanpur Tapti Mills Limited & Others, reported in A.I.R. 1964 S.C. page 1687 . 16. In the matter of The Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall (supra), the question which arose for consideration of the Apex Court in an appeal from the Calcutta High Court was regarding the interpretation of the relevant paragraph of the Stamp Act (1899) with particular reference to Sections 4, 5 & 6 of the said Act. The question which arose in this context was as to whether the words 'Distinct matters' and 'Descriptions' as referred to in the Words and Phrases-Interpretation of Statutes in the context of the Act, 1899 was not intended to convey the same meaning as the word 'description' in Section 6 of the Act. On interpretation of the aforesaid provisions, it was held by the Apex Court that the expression "distinct matters" would connote something different from distinct "categories". Two transactions might be of the same description, but all the same they would be distinct. It was further held that when two words of different import are used in a statute in two consecutive provisions, it would he difficult to maintain that they are used in the same sense, and the conclusion must follow that the expression "distinct matters" in Section 5 and 'descriptions' in Section 6 have different connotations. 17. It was further held that the. 17. It was further held that the. purpose of saving clause in Section 6 of the Act that "it is subject to the last preceding section is to repel any contention that Sections 5 & 6 of the Act are mutually exclusive and hence the object and scope of the Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, 1899 cannot be the same and would obviously imply different connotations.The aforesaid view was again confirmed by the Apex Court in it's subsequent decision in the matter of the The Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh v. Burhanpur Tapti Mills Limited & Others (supra). The question which has arisen for consideration of the Apex Court was in the context of the C.P. ana Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act (23 of 1947). The question which was to be considered was as to whether the words 'rendered illegal' would mean "held illegal" in respect of the strike declared by the workers of the -management of the ~.~spondent-Company in which the members of the organisation were involved. 18. It was held by the Apex Court that the phrase 'rendered illegal' in Section 42(1)(g) of the Act has been deliberately used by tho legislature in 'Contradistinction to the words 'held illegal' used in Sections 43, 44 & 45 of the Act. 19. I am in perfect agreement with the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court and the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court are fully attracted to the facts of the instant case. 20. With the above observations the writ petition, is allowed. Mandamus is issued to the respondents directing them to release the balance of gratuity amount of Rs. 18,270/-, which is the balance of the total gratuity amount of Rs. 58,870/-, which was admissible to the petitioner on account of the gratuity payable to him as on the 31.7.1992, when he retired on attaining the age of superannuation. The said amount should be released by the respondent-Bank in favour of the petitioner within a period of 90 days with interest @ 18 percent from the date of filing of the writ petition in this Court i.e. 3.8.1993. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.Writ Petition Allowed. *******