JUDGMENT SURINDER SARUP, J.—This second appeal is directed against the Judgment and decree of the Court of Shri S.S. Thakur, Addl. District Judge (I), Kangra at Dharamshaia dated 11-03-1991. By the said judgment, the judgment and decree of the Court of Shri J.L Chauhan, Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Dehra dated 10-01-1986 dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-respondent, was reversed and allowing the appeal a decree was passed for permanent injunction restraining the defendants-appellants permanently from interfering in any manner in the management of performing his duties as Chela to the temple (Guga) by the plaintiff comprised in the suit land and fully described in the plaint as per jamabandi for the year 1978-79. A decree was also passed restraining the defendants permanently from interfering in performing the duties of the plaintiff as Chela and to cause any other interference over the suit land. 2. The suit was filed by the plaintiff-respondents for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in any manner in the management and performing his duties as Chela (Pujari) of the temple of Guga, which is comprised in suit land, fully described in the plaint. It was pleaded that there is a temple known as "Guga Mandir" over the suit land and the plaintiff is its Pujari. He pleaded that he performs all duties of Chela to the said temple for long and he is also managing the suit land and the temple wholly and solely. The defendant No. 1 Duni Chand (who died during the pendency of the appeal before the District Judge and his name struck off from the array of defendants) was stated to be a very head strong and clever person, in order to create obstruction in the management aforesaid, purchased a portion of the land in suit in the names of defendants No. 2 to 5 who are his sons, and on the basis of the same, they started proclaiming that they are the Pujaris of the temple in question. Since they failed to desist from their illegal activities; hence this suit. 3. In the written statement filed by defendants No. 1 to 5, it was pleaded by way of preliminary objections that the suit is barred by Order 9 Rule 9 C.P.C. Objections regarding maintainability of the suit, locus standi of the plaintiff to file the suit, non-joinaer of necessary parties, estoppel and limitation were also taken. 4. 3. In the written statement filed by defendants No. 1 to 5, it was pleaded by way of preliminary objections that the suit is barred by Order 9 Rule 9 C.P.C. Objections regarding maintainability of the suit, locus standi of the plaintiff to file the suit, non-joinaer of necessary parties, estoppel and limitation were also taken. 4. On merits, it was pleaded that defendant No. 1 is the Chela of the temple in question and has been continuously performing the Puja of the Diety for the last 39 years. Before him on Lehnu, his cousin was its Pujari and before him Devi Singh, his uncle was the Chela of the temple in question. The appointment of the Chela is customary and recognised by the custom. The plaintiff never acted as Chela of the temple nor it remained in his possession. It was further pleaded that the possession of the defendant No. 1 is open, hostile and peaceful and adverse for the last more than 12 years and thus his possession has ripened into full ownership. It was further pleaded that earlier a similar suit was filed by the plaintiff, namely Civil Suit No. 166 of 1979 against the defendants, which was dismissed for non-prosecution on 19-071982, therefore, the present suit is barred. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues: "1. Whether the plaintiff has locus-standi to sue ? OPP 2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder ? OPD. 3. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct ? OPD. 4. Whether the suit is not within time ? OPD. 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable ? OPD. 6. Whether the suit is barred under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC, as alleged ? OPD. 7. Whether the plaintiff is the Pujari of the temple in dispute ? OPP. 8. Relief," 6. Issues Nos. 1 to 4, 6 and 7 were decided against the plaintiff while Issue No. 5 was decided against the defendants. On these findings, the trial Court dismissed the suit. The suit having been decreed in appeal has given rise to the present second appeal. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the record. 1 to 4, 6 and 7 were decided against the plaintiff while Issue No. 5 was decided against the defendants. On these findings, the trial Court dismissed the suit. The suit having been decreed in appeal has given rise to the present second appeal. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the record. It is first contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit was barred under Order 9 Rule 9 C.P.C. inasmuch as the earlier suit on the same cause of action had been dismissed indefault. That suit was between the same parties. 8. There is no merit in this contention. The earlier suit was for declaration and injunction, whereas the present suit giving rise to this appeal is only for permanent injunction, therefore, it cannot be said that both the suits were filed on the same cause of action. 9. Faced with this situation, the learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to the judgment of the trial Court where, vide para 7 the finding is that the present suit was barred. However, this finding is mainly and substantially based on the alleged concession/admission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff before the trial Court that in view of the previous suit and its dismissal, the present suit on the same cause of action is not maintainable. This concession/admission was totally against the interest of the plaintiff by its counsel, who was absolutely negligent in his duties by conceding the entire case in such a manner. It appears that he did so without going through the pleadings in both the suits and without discharging the onerous duty cast on him as a keeper of the plaintiffs case before the trial Court. Thus, this alleged concession/admission before the trial Court is of no avail to the defendants-appellants in the present second appeal. 10. It has then been contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the dispute between the parties has already been settled vide compromise Ex. D-1 on record. As regards this compromise, the learned lower Appellate Court has correctly appreciated the import thereof. A perusal of the alleged compromise Ex. D-1 indicates that it was arrived at during the proceedings between the parties under Section 107/151 Cr. D-1 on record. As regards this compromise, the learned lower Appellate Court has correctly appreciated the import thereof. A perusal of the alleged compromise Ex. D-1 indicates that it was arrived at during the proceedings between the parties under Section 107/151 Cr. P.C, As per the contents thereof, it was agreed that till the decision of that case, the person who used to worship the Diety by way of offering the Chhattar, shall continue and the plaintiffs do not object to this arrangement. This compromise was arrived at through the good offices of the Station House Officer, who forwarded it along with the police report to the Magistrate concerned. As rightly held by the learned lower Appellate Court, it was an arrangement, made by the police to avert the breach of peace till the final decision of the proceedings under Section 107/151 Cr.P.C. and does not have the effect of being a compromise of a Civil Court. Therefore, there is no merit in this argument also. 11. It has lastly been contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the application for additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. filed by the plaintiffs-respondents was wrongly allowed by the learned lower Appellate Court, without giving any opportunity to the defendant-appellants to rebut the same. Straightaway, this argument has to be rejected on the short ground that neither it finds mention in the grounds of appeal before this Court nor it has any bearing on any of the substantial questions of law formulated in the memorandum of appeal. Moreover, the application for additional evidence was allowed by a separate order of the learned lower Appellate Court. Admittedly, the defendants-appellants had a remedy by way of filing revision petition, etc. against that order. This they did not do, thus that order became final. Therefore, this argument is also without any merit. 12. No other point raised nor arises in the appeal. 13. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.