R. A. SHARMA, J. Petitioner was ap pointed as a temporary Family Welfare Worker (Mid-wife) vide order dated 30-3-1978 by the Deputy Chief Medical Officer. Bahraich and was posted at Primary Health Centre (hereinafter referred to as" P. H. C.) Gilula on 17-4-1978. By order dated 22-11-1982 her service was terminated. Being ag grieved by the ;:aid order she has filed this writ petition. 2. Respondents have filed counter-af fidavit and the petitioner has filed rejoinder-affidavit in reply hereto. 3. The sole contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order contains stigma and as such the petitioners service could not have been terminated without giving her a reasonable opportunity of being heard. On the other hand the learned Standing Coun sel has contended that the petitioner being a temporary employee was not entitled to any opportunity of hearing before termination of her service. 4. There is no dispute that the petitioner was appointed as temporary Family Welfare Worker (Mid-wife) vide order dated 30-3-1978 which contains a con dition that her service is purely temporary which can be terminated at any time without prior notice. The impugned order dated 22-11-1982, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure 9 to the counter-affidavit, as translated from Hindi to English, is as under:- "you are informed that you illegally remained absent from duty from 24-7-1981 regarding which the office has sent letters to you from time to lime and has sent the last notice dated 4-11-1982 asking you lo resume duty, but you have failed to do so. Your service is purely temporary. In accord ance with the terms and conditions of your ap pointment order your service is terminated with effect from 24-7-1981 as it is no more required in the Department. SD/ 5. Although the last paragraph of the impugned order states that the petitioners service is being terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the ap pointment order, but in the first paragraph of the said order it has been mentioned that she illegally remained absent from duty with effect from 24-7-1981 and in spite of several letters and the notice given to her by the Department she did not resume the duty. Whether the statement about illegal ab sence of the petitioner from duty, contained in the impugned order, is or is not stigma, is a question on the answer of which depends the fate of this petition. 6. According to the respondents the petitioner was transferred on 24-7-1981 from P. H. C. Giluia to P. H. C. Chittura in the same district Bahraich and was relieved from P. H. C. Giluia on 24-7-1981, but there after she never joined at her now place of posting and was in fact absconding from duty without any authority or proper leave. As such her service was terminated by the respondent No. 3 by the impugned order. According to the petitioner she was ill from 17-12-1979 to 31-12-1979 and was not per mitted thereafter to join her duties at P. H. C. Giluia and was also not paid her salary for the period from December, 1979 to March, 1980. She thereafter filed a civil suit in the Court of the Civil Judge Bahraich for recovery of the pay for the aforesaid period. The suit is said to have been decreed. The petitioner claims that it is on account of filing of the suit by her that she was trans ferred from P. H. C. Giluia to P. H. C. Chit tura. It is further stated that the petitioner also filed a writ petition before this Court (Lucknow Bench) challenging her transfer order and when the respondent No. 3 came to know about filing of the said writ petition he passed the impugned order on 22-11-1982. The aforesaid averments made by the petitioner in the writ petition have been disputed by the respondents in their counter- affidavit. 7. It is settled law that if the order of termination of service of the Government servant contains stigma, it cannot be passed without giving him/her a reasonable oppor tunity of being heard. In Jagdish Miner v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 449 , the service of the appellant therein, who was a tem porary employee, was terminated by an order in which it was stated that he has been found "undesirable to be retained in the Government service". The Supreme Court held that the said order of termination of service expressly casts stigma on the appel lant and such an order amounts to dismissal and not a simple discharge. The Supreme Court held that the said order of termination of service expressly casts stigma on the appel lant and such an order amounts to dismissal and not a simple discharge. In this connec tion the Supreme Court laid down as under:- "but it seems to us that when the order refers to the fact that the appellant was found undesirable to be retained in Government service, it expressly casts a stigma on the appellant and in that sense, must be held to bean order of dismissal and not a mere order of discharge. The learned Additional Solicitor- General attempted to argue that what the order really meant was that Govern ment did not think it desirable or necessary to continue the appellant in its employment. He iair-ly connected that the words in the order were somewhat unfortunate, but he urged that the order should be liberally constructed and should be held to have been pass. ed by the authority by virtue of its power to terminate the service of the appellant on one months notice. It is obvious that to say that it is undesirable to continue a tem porary servant is very much different from saying that it is unnecessary to continue him. In the first case, a stigma attaches to the servant, while in the second case, termination of service is due to the consideration that a temporary servant need not be continued and in that sense, no stigma attaches to him. It seems that anyone who reads the order in a reasonable way, would naturally conclude that the appellant was found to be undesirable and that must necessarily import an element of punishment which is the basis of the order and is its integral part. When an authority wants to ter minate the services of a temporary servant, it can pass a simple order of discharge without casting any aspersion against the temporary servant or attaching any stigma to his character. As soon as it is shown that the order purports to cast any asper sion on the temporary servant, it would be idle to suggest that the order is a simple order of dis charge. The test in such cases must be done the order cast aspersion or attach stigma to the officer when it purports to discharge him? As soon as it is shown that the order purports to cast any asper sion on the temporary servant, it would be idle to suggest that the order is a simple order of dis charge. The test in such cases must be done the order cast aspersion or attach stigma to the officer when it purports to discharge him? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative then not withstanding the form of the order, the termina tion of service must be held, in substance, to amount to dismissal. " 8. In Jai Shanker v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 492 , removal from service of a temporary employee for overstaying leave without giving him any opportunity of being heard, was held to be illegal even though the service regulations provided that if the ser vant absents from duty without permission after the end of his leave he shall be deemed to have sacrificed his appointment. In Kan-hai Lal v. District Judge, AIR 1983 SC 351 , the order of discharge from service of the appellant therein on the ground that "he was prima facie responsible for the loss of some documents from the judicial record on ac count of his negligence and carelessness", was held to be penal in character and was, therefore, declared illegal as no such order could have been passed without giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to him in accordance with Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. Injagdish Prasad v. Sachiv Zila Ganna Committee, (1986) 2 SCC 338 ; the order of termination of service of the concerned employee contained a statement to the effect that while he was working in Roadways he was "caught in cor ruption on June 6, 1967 and his service was terminated and he obtained his appoint ment in the Society by concealing the above facts. Supreme Court declared that the aforesaid statement in the termination order casts stigma and, therefore, such an order could not have been passed without giving reasonable opportunity of being heard. 9. In the instant case the impugned order of termination of service contains a statement to the effect that the petitioner has remained absent from duty illegally and did not resume duties in spite of several letters and the notice given to her. 9. In the instant case the impugned order of termination of service contains a statement to the effect that the petitioner has remained absent from duty illegally and did not resume duties in spite of several letters and the notice given to her. For a Government servant, remaining absent from duty illegally is a misconduct and not joining duty in spite of several letters and the notice makes the matter worst. Such a statement in the order undoubtedly casts stigma on the service career of the petitioner. The impugned order amounts to dismissal from service for illegal absence from duty and is penal in nature. Such an order, therefore, could not have been passed without giving a reasonable oppor tunity of being heard to the petitioner. It is admitted that no such opportunity was given to her. The order, therefore, cannot be sustained. 10. The learned Standing Counsel has, however, submitted that temporary employee is not entitled to the opportunity of hearing before termination of his service. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on (i) State of U. P. v. Kaushat Kishore Shukla, (1991) 1 SCC 691 ; (ii) lriveni Shankerv. State of U. P. AIR 1992 SC 496 (iii) State of U. P. v. Km. Prem Lata Mishra , AIR 1994 SC 2411 ; and Stale of UP. v. Smt. Kamla Devi, (1996) 3 UPLBEC 1740 : 1996 (2) LBESR 752 (SC) In none of the aforesaid cases the order of termination of service contains any stigma on the career of the Government servant. They dealt with different controversy. It is always open to the Government to terminate the service of the temporary Government servant on ac count of his unsuitability, insubordination, misconduct, inefficiency etc. by passing a simple order of termination without casting any aspersion on his career and in such a case it is not necessary to give him an oppor tunity of hearing. In this connection refer ence may be made State of U. P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla (1991) 1 SCC 691 and State of U. P. v. Km. Prem Lata Mishra, AIR 1994 SC 2411 (supra ). But if the order of termina tion contains a stigma on the career of the Government servant it becomes penal in nature and such an order cannot be passed, without giving him a reasonable oppor tunity of hearing. Prem Lata Mishra, AIR 1994 SC 2411 (supra ). But if the order of termina tion contains a stigma on the career of the Government servant it becomes penal in nature and such an order cannot be passed, without giving him a reasonable oppor tunity of hearing. In the instant case, as mentioned earlier, the impugned order con tains stigma and it could not have been passed without giving opportunity of hear ing to the petitioner. Such an opportunity not having been given to her the order has to go. 11. This writ petition is accordingly allowed with costs. The impugned order of termination of service dated 22-11-1982 is quashed. The respondents are directed to re-instate the petitioner in service forthwith. As regards the other service benefits it will be open to the petitioner to make application before the concerned authority and if such an application is made the same shall be disposed of in accordance with law, within a period of three months of the production of certified copy of this judg ment. D. K. Trevedi, J.-Judgment pronoun ced today. Petition allowed. .