Order Heard counsel for the parties. 2. It is not in dispute that the father of the petitioner died on 23.1.1984 in harness. The application filed by the petitioner in the year 1989 has been rejected by the respondents on the ground of delay since the application was made more than five years after the date of the death of the father of the petitioner. 3. It is not in dispute that at the relevant time in January, 1984, a period of •two years was prescribed for making an application for appointment on compassionate ground. In paragraph 5 of the writ petition, the petitioner has made an averment that within two years of the date of his father's death, he had made an application for appointment on compassionate ground, even though he was only 15 years of age on that day. The date of birth of the petitioner admittedly is 3.4.1971. 4. The first ground on which the application for grant of appointment on compassionate ground can be rejected is that the application was not made within the period of two years prescribed by the relevant circulars. 5. Counsel submitted that subsequently the period was extended to five years. He also relies upon a division bench decision of this Court for the proposition that the circular being a beneficial in nature, must be given wide application. Without going into the correctness of that decision, we must still reject the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner because admittedly the application if filed in the month of July or August, 1989 was beyond the period of five years from the date of death of the father of the petitioner. Counsel then submitted that such delay could have been condoned by the State Government. We are aware of the decision or the Supreme Court which has laid down the proposition that appointment on compassionate ground must be granted strictly in accordance with the relevant law or circular in force. There is no question of our compelling the Government to condone the delay in making the application. 6. Moreover the Supreme Court has held that where at the time of the death of the father, the petitioner was a minor, appointment on compassionate ground cannot await the attaining of majority by the dependant. There is no question of our compelling the Government to condone the delay in making the application. 6. Moreover the Supreme Court has held that where at the time of the death of the father, the petitioner was a minor, appointment on compassionate ground cannot await the attaining of majority by the dependant. No doubt, if the petitioner had attained majority within the period prescribed by law for making an application, he could have applied, and that could have been considered. In the facts of this case that was not possible because the petitioner was only 12-13 years of age at the time of his father's death. 7. Counsel submitted that an application had been filed by the petitioner even when he was a minor. There is nothing to support that assertion contained in paragraph 5 of the writ petition. The affidavit in support of paragraph 5 has been verified as true to knowledge. We had called for the original file and from that we find that there is no application filed in the year 1986. There is nothing on the record to support that any such application was filed. On the contrary there is application filed by the petitioner himself in the year 1992 praying for condoning the delay in filing the application and explaining that he could not apply earlier as he had not attained majority. Even a mere perusal of the original application filed by the petitioner in the year 1989, gives the same impression that the application was being filed on attaining majority. There is no statement in the said application that any earlier application had been filed. In the circumstances, it is difficult to accept the assertion of the petitioner that he had earlier filed an application within two years of the death of his father. 8. For these reasons, we find no merit in this writ application and the same is accordingly dismissed.