JUDGMENT A.L. VAIDYA, J.—The present petitioner claims himself to be a specified landlord under the H.R Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter to be called as "the Act"). The respondent, admittedly, is occupying the demised premises as tenant. The demised premises consists of three rooms, one dining room, one kitchen, two bath rooms, one store, one dry latrine, one flush latrine, two covered verandahs and an open verandah which is situated in the eastern portion in top floor of building known as Old Butail Building, Middle Bazar, Shimla. 2. The petitioner, being a specified landlord, preferred an eviction petition under Section 15 of the Act on the following grounds against the present respondent: "1. That the respondent has failed to make payment of arrears of rent w.e.f. 28.10.86 to 31.10.87 despite repeated requests made by petitioner. . . 2. That the premises in question are bona fide required by the petitioner for his own use and occupation and also for the use and occupation of his family members which consists of his wife and one son who is studying in 10th class. The petitioner has retired in the month of November 1986 as Wing Commandor from the Indian Air Force and at present he is residing with his family members at Chandigarh. The petitioner intends to settle at Shimla and only because of this wish in mind he has purchased the present premises by spending a sum of Rs- 43,000. Moreover, in the light of prevailing disturbed conditions in Punjab and also at Chandigarh it is not possible for the petitioner to make Chandigarh as his permanent place of residence. Further all the relations of the petitioner are settled in Shimla and after active service in Indian Air Force he wants to maintain and relink the relations with all the relatives and it was also one of the reasons because of which the premises have been purchased by the petitioner. Keeping in view the status of the petitioner, the premises in occupation of the respondent are most suitable for his residence. 3. The petitioner purchased the demised premises from the owner and the tenant had been occupying these premises as tenant of the previous owner. The demised premises have been described as residential in the petition preferred under Section 15 of the Act. 4. 3. The petitioner purchased the demised premises from the owner and the tenant had been occupying these premises as tenant of the previous owner. The demised premises have been described as residential in the petition preferred under Section 15 of the Act. 4. The tenant-respondent, after having received the summons of the petition, as prescribed, filed affidavit stating the grounds on which he sought to contest the application for eviction and also sought leave from the Controller to contest the application. Para 2 of the Affidavit so submitted, contained the grounds on which the tenant sought permission to defend application filed by the landlord. Those grounds are being reproduced hereunder for the sake of convenience: "(a) That the respondent had tendered rent to the petitioner on several occasions including that the respondent also sent the rent through cheque by registered A.D. cover but the same was returned undelivered to the petitioner. (b) That to the best of the knowledge of the respondent the petitioner after retirement has been employed at Mohali with Punjab Electronic Equipment and as such the petition is being filed simply with a view to force the respondent to increase the rent of the premises in question as the petitioner has been pressing hard the respondent since the time when he purchased the premises in question to enhance the rent-of the premises. (c) That the petitioner has permanently settled at Chandigarh in his own house bearing No. 3096, situated in Sector 35-D, Chandigarh and has no intention whatsoever, to settle or to stay in Shimla. (d) That the premises are not suitable for the petitioner keeping in view his status as the same are situated in the most congested area of Shimla i.e. Middle Bazar, Shimla and as such the premises are not suitable at ail for the residence of the petitioner and his family. (e) That the respondent has recently come to know from reliable source that the petitioner after getting the disputed premises vacated from the respondent intends to accommodate the family of his in-laws as the family of his in-laws is large in number and it is not possible for them to reside in the premises in which they are residing presently, Thus, the petition is mala-fide and has been filed simply with a view to harass the respondent. (f) That the respondent was always ready and willing to purchase the disputed premises, however, it was at the instance of the in-laws of the petitioner that the earlier owner was coerced to sell the premises in question to the petitioner as they were not willing to purchase the premises in their occupation i.e. in the occupation of the-in-laws of the petitioner until and unless the owner sells the disputed premises to the petitioner. (g) That it appears that the petitioner has purchased the premises in question at the behest of his in-laws so that the family of the in-laws of the petitioner can occupy the premise jp dispute which is just adjacent to the premises preseittftiiHBnPM^upi6^ by the in-laws of the petitioner. 5. The landlord congested this petition and filed counter-affidavit. However, later on the learned counsel for the landlord represented that he had no objection if application for leave to defend is also allowed. Thereafter, the tenant preferred reply to the main petition and the following preliminary objections were raised: "PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS 1. That the present petition is not maintainable on the alleged ground of bona fide requirement, inasmuch as, the premises are non-residential. The respondent is an agent of Life Insurance Corporation of India and United India Insurance Company Limited and the premises were taken on rent from the previous owner for the purpose of office-cum-residence. The respondent has been using the premises for his office-cum-residence since 1941 when the premises were taken on rent from the previous owner. 2. That even otherwise the present petition has been filed with an ulterior motive to force the respondent to enhance the rent of the premises in question inasmuch as, after retirement, the petitioner has joined service with Punjab Record Limited at Mohali and has permanently settled at Chandigarh, where he owns a house bearing No. 3096 in Sector 35-D." On merit, the averments made in the petition were denied. 6. The rejoinder to the preliminary objections was put in by the landlord, which runs as under: "TO PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS: 1. Para 1 of the Preliminary objections is absolutely wrong, false and afterthought and hence the contents thereof are emphatically denied. The premises in question were rented out to the respondent by the previous owner for residential purposes only and at no stage the same were used for non-residential purposes as has been falsely alleged. Para 1 of the Preliminary objections is absolutely wrong, false and afterthought and hence the contents thereof are emphatically denied. The premises in question were rented out to the respondent by the previous owner for residential purposes only and at no stage the same were used for non-residential purposes as has been falsely alleged. Moreover, the present plea cannot be allowed to be taken in view of the facts that no such objection was taken by the respondent at a time when he filed an application for taking leave to contest. 2. Para 2 of the preliminary objections is absolutely wrong and hence denied. It is denied that the present petition has been filed with a purpose to get the rent enhanced. The petitioner is though at present employer in Punjab Recorders Ltd. at Mohali but he has got no intention to permanently settle at Mohali and the same is only a stop gap arrangement." 7. The Rent Controller, after making an inquiry, came to the conclusion that the landlord has failed to prove that the demised premises were residential one and accordingly on the score, petition under Section 15 of the Act was disallowed. With respect to the bona fide requirement of the landlord, the Rent Controller only observed that the claim of the petitioner for seeking eviction of the respondent from the premises in dispute on the ground of personal bona fide ground, was declined. 8. The aforesaid order declining the prayer of the landlord has been assailed in the present revision petition on various grounds. 9. Learned Counsel for the parties have been heard and the entire record has been minutely scrutinised. 10. There is no dispute to the proposition that eviction under Section 15 of the Act can be sought by the specified landlord with respect to any residential premises. According to learned Counsel for the landlord-petitioner, it has been forcefully contended that the Rent Controller acted illegally in coming to the conclusion that the demised premised were not residential on the basis of unlawful appreciation of the legal as well as factual aspects of the case. 11. According to learned Counsel for the landlord-petitioner, it has been forcefully contended that the Rent Controller acted illegally in coming to the conclusion that the demised premised were not residential on the basis of unlawful appreciation of the legal as well as factual aspects of the case. 11. The submissions put forth on behalf of the learned Counsel for the parties can safely be summed up as under: (i) According to learned Counsel for the petitioner-landlord, the tenant in his affidavit submitted before the Rent Controller for seeking permission to defend the petition, had not taken this specific plea while describing the grounds for contest of the petition. It has been contended that the grounds mentioned in the affidavit pertained to the bona fide requirement of the demised premises and so far as the residential nature of demised premises was concerned, that had not been disputed. According to learned Counsel, as this fact was admitted, therefore, the tenant could not take this plea in his reply to the main petition, especially when only those grounds could be taken which had been deposed by the tenant in the affidavit preferred earlier seeking permission to contest the petition. (ii) According to learned Counsel for the respondent, the point of jurisdiction could be taken even at the time of execution and as such, there was no legal bar to raise such a plea when the reply to the main petition was submitted; (iii) According to learned Counsel for the tenant under Section 15/16 of the Act, the tenant has not been debarred to raise such a plea which has not been earlier taken in the affidavit seeking permission to contest the main petition op the grounds already deposed in such affidavit. It has been argued that in case the Court decides that it is the affidavit which would include all the grounds of contest and such a ground could not be taken afterwards in the reply-affidavit, it would amount to legislating a provision by the Court which is not the function of the Court; and (iv) It has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that even on the basis of evidence examined, the findings of the Rent Controller to declare demised premises to be non-residential one were palpably wrong and legally unsustainable. 12. 12. The aforesaid propositions are being dealt with hereunder seriatim-wise: 13(i) Section 16 of the Act provides a special procedure for the disposal of application for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement under Section 15 of the Act. Section 16(4) and (5) are very much relevant to dispose of the controversy which run as under: "16(1) to (3)..... (4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served (whether in the ordinary way or by registered post) in the form specified in the Scheduled-11 shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtain leave from the Controller as hereinafter provided: and in default of his appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave, the statement made by the landlord or by the specified landlord, or as the case may be, the widow, widower, child, grand child or widowed daughter-in-law of such specified landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the applicant shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such fact as would disentitle the landlord or the specified landlord or as the case may be, the widow, the widower, child, grand child or widowed daughter-in-law of such specified landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in sub-clause (iii) of clauses (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 14 or in Section 15." 13. The leave sought for to contest the petition on the grounds referred in the affidavit as described earlier was not objected to. When the leave had been granted, the Controller under Section 16(6) of the Act was required to commence the hearing of the application as early as practicable and under sub-section (7) the Controller was to follow the practice and procedure of Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. 14. When the leave had been granted, the Controller under Section 16(6) of the Act was required to commence the hearing of the application as early as practicable and under sub-section (7) the Controller was to follow the practice and procedure of Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. 14. From the bare reading of the aforesaid provisions of law, before the petition for eviction is proceeded by the Controller, the tenant was required to file an affidavit stating the ground on which he sought to contest the application for eviction and obtain such leave from the Controller That means, the affidavit has to contain the two aspects, namely, (i) stating the grounds on which the tenant sought to contest the petition and (ii) he has to obtain the leave of the Controller for such a contest. Both aspects have to be reflected from the affidavit put in by the tenant. 15. As pointed out earlier eviction under Section 15 of the Act can be sought for from a residential premises. This aspect has not at all been contested by the tenant in the affidavit sworn in by him, as was the requirement of Section 16(4) of the Act. He has contested on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord. In case the tenant contested the nature of the premises, he could have taken such a ground in the affidavit, but that aspect was not contested, meaning thereby it stood admitted. 16. The tenant, after leave had been granted to him to contest the petition, filed reply to the main petition wherein as a preliminary objection, the ground was taken that the demised premises were used by the tenant for his office-cum-residence since 1941 when the premises were taken on rent from the previous owner. At the very outset while filing rejoinder, it was pleaded by the landlord in reply to this preliminary objection that the present plea could not be allowed to be taken in view of the fact that no such objection was taken by the respondent at the time when he filed affidavit to contest the petition. The Rent Controller acted illegally in framing issue on merit on the basis of this preliminary objection raised by the tenant. The Rent Controller acted illegally in framing issue on merit on the basis of this preliminary objection raised by the tenant. The Rent Controller before putting the parties on issue on this plea, was required to have disposed of the legal objection taken by the landlord in I the rejoinder submitted to preliminary objection No. 1. It was legal objection I and could have been disposed of on the pleadings of the parties. The Rent I Controller, as such, acted illegally in proceeding on merit on the aforesaid Plea. 17. It may not be out of place to mention here that as per the provisions I of Section 16 of the Act, all the grounds of contest have to be deposed I in an affidavit by the tenant. As this particular ground taken as a preliminary 1 objection in the reply was not taken in the affidavit by the tenant, it simply I amounted to his admission that the premises were residential one. This [ admission has been tried to be resiled from while filing the reply. 18. It may not be out of place to mention here that the grounds once taken, cannot include other grounds if available to the tenant, but the fact remains that it could be so done with the leave of the Court and no attempt in this behalf has been made by the tenant to seek the leave of the Court for that additional ground of contest as was pleaded in the reply under preliminary objection No. 1. Thus, taking into consideration the provision of law and the facts involved in the present case, it can safely be said that only grounds which were taken by the tenant in the affidavit sworn in by him, could not be altered afterwards by incorporating additional ground without the leave of the Court. If no leave is taken, the tenant restricts himself only to the grounds sworn in, in the affidavit for contesting the petition. Thus, so far as the present case is concerned, the ground that the demised premises were being used as residential-cum-office could not be taken in the reply, especially when this aspect had not been disputed in the affidavit put in by the tenant. 19. In 1996(2) Sim.L.C. 284 Smt. Anita Chanana v. Sh. Thus, so far as the present case is concerned, the ground that the demised premises were being used as residential-cum-office could not be taken in the reply, especially when this aspect had not been disputed in the affidavit put in by the tenant. 19. In 1996(2) Sim.L.C. 284 Smt. Anita Chanana v. Sh. Surinder Singh Obrei, the observations made by the Court reflected under para 15 are I very much relevant, which are being re-produced as under: "15. The words "if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises "appearing in sub-section (5) of Section 16 are very material. It is implicit therein that while seeking necessary leave to contest the petition, the tenant must put forward and state all the necessary grounds on which he proposes to contest the eviction petition. The scheme of Section 16 of the Rent Act further shows that leave is to be granted or refused by the Rent Controller on the facts/ grounds put forward by the tenant in his affidavit while seeking the necessary leave to contest the eviction petition. Therefore, once a leave to contest an eviction petition granted in favour of a tenant on the grounds stated by him in his affidavit, he cannot be permitted to take a new ground at a subsequent stage by widening the scope of his defence." 20. In 1991 (2) Rent Control Reporter 558 Udho Ram v. Swaran Kanta, the following observations are also very much relevant: "6. If the scheme of the Act which was amended in 1985 is taken into consideration, it would show that the Legislature intended that the Government servants retiring or having retired should be able to get their houses vacated from the tenants if they wanted to settle there in a summary manner. A speedy procedure was prescribed under Sections 13-A and 18-A of the Act, that is, a tenant cannot contest the application without permission of the Court and such permission can be granted if grounds of contest are submitted on affidavit, proof of which would result in dismissal of the application. The filing of the affidavit containing such grounds itself indicates that at the initial stage prima-facie evidence was required to be submitted on the basis of which the Court could act otherwise. The filing of the affidavit containing such grounds itself indicates that at the initial stage prima-facie evidence was required to be submitted on the basis of which the Court could act otherwise. Merely on the pleas in the written statement, the Court could not act or take any decision. The averments of the landlord were to be taken as correct. Filing of the affidavit as required under Section 13-A and 18-A of the Act is not merely procedural formality. As a mater of fact, this provision of law requires the party to produce the evidence though prima-facie at the initial stage of the written statement. If there had been formal defect in the affidavit such as defect in the manner of attestation of the affidavit, the same could be rectified if objection had been taken but in the affidavit filed there is no averment regarding the grounds of contest. It would be taken that such grounds mentioned in the written statement were merely in the form of pleadings and in the absence of any affidavit containing such grounds, it would be a case of lack of evidence. It is not expected of the Court to call upon the parties to adduce evidence in support of their allegations. Evidence is to be led by the parties themselves at the relevant stage provided in the procedure. The contention of Shri M.L. Sarin with regard to non-filing of the affidavit containing the grounds of contest or that filing of an affidavit without containing such grounds which could be supplemented at a later stage cannot be accepted. The very purpose of the amendment of the Act made for summary eviction of the tenant at the instance of the specified landlord for personal requirement of the landlord would stand frustrated." 21. In 1988(2) Rent Control Reporter 92 Babu Lai and others, v. Satya Narain it has been held that the High Court can set aside a finding of fact given by the Controller if it was shown that the findings were based on illegal principles of law or have been based on no evidence or have been arrived at ignoring important evidence existing on the record because in such a case, the findings would be a perverse one. 22. 22. In 1993(2) Rent Control Reporter 224 Amar Singh v. Ram Lal Mohindru, this Court held that in a case of present nature under Section 16(8) of the Act, High Court can interfere with order order of Rent Controller if the order was not according to law, i.e. where there was misappreciation of evidence amounting to findings being pervese in the sense that no reasonable person would arrive at on the material on record. This ruling has been cited on behalf of the tenant with the submission that there is no perversity in appreciating the evidence by the Rent Controller and such an order does not require interference. This aspect of the matter would be dealt with when the evidence is appreciated. However, at this stage, it is a pure question of law raised on behalf of the landlord that no further ground for contest can be taken except as swron in the affidavit put in under Section 16(4) of the Act. 23. Thus, taking into consideration the legal proposition being argued on behalf of the landlord-petitioner, in the background of the present case, has to be accepted favourably. It is a case where the Rent Controller was not required to frame an issue on a ground which has not been taken in the affidavit sworn in by the tenant. Insofar as this aspect of the matter was concerned, it was final between the parties. 24. (ii) It has been argued on behalf of the tenant that the point of jurisdiction can be raised even at the time of execution also and in the present case, it has been taken in the reply submitted by the tenant, there could be no legal bar for taking such an objection. Learned Counsels line of argument in this particular behalf has been that the Rent Controller was empowered to pass an eviction order under Section 15 of the Act pertaining to residential premises and in case premises are held to be non-residential, the Rent Controller shall have no jurisdiction to pass an order. There is no dispute to the proposition that the Rent Controller cannot pass an eviction order under Section 15 of the Act for a non-residential premises. But, Rent Controller is the forum who has to decide whether the premises were residential or non-residential, in case that issue crops up before him on the pleadings of the parties. There is no dispute to the proposition that the Rent Controller cannot pass an eviction order under Section 15 of the Act for a non-residential premises. But, Rent Controller is the forum who has to decide whether the premises were residential or non-residential, in case that issue crops up before him on the pleadings of the parties. He does not lack inherent jurisdiction in disposing of such an application, more-so, such a plea. In the present case, the tenant in his affidavit sworn in before the Rent Controller did not dispute the nature, of the premises. No ground was taken to contest the petition that the premises were non-residential. With this background, so far as the present case is concerned, the Rent Controller did to lack inherent jurisdiction in disposing of the petition. In case the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain such a petition, in that event, the order passed by him could be termed as without jurisdiction and as such, an objection to that effect could be take at a later stage, but it is not a cause of that type. That being so, the plea being raised on behalf of the tenant does not carry any legal weight whatsoever and has to be ignored. 25.(iii) The objection being raised on behalf of the tenant that in case the Court comes to the conclusion that the tenant has to limit the grounds of contest taken in the affidavit alone and additional ground cannot be taken afterwards, it would amount to add something to the provisions of the Act which does not exist there. I think, such a submission has absolutely no legal base. It is not a case where the Court, by its order, is legislating something which is not there in the Act, but it is a case where everything is provided in the Act, which is being interpreted legally. To interpret a Statute is the domain of the Judiciary. In this context, the plea being raised, again, does not carry any legal weight whatsoever and has to be not considered favourably. 26.(iv) Before the evidence examined can be appreciated, some other aspects have, at first instance, to be taken note of. 27. To interpret a Statute is the domain of the Judiciary. In this context, the plea being raised, again, does not carry any legal weight whatsoever and has to be not considered favourably. 26.(iv) Before the evidence examined can be appreciated, some other aspects have, at first instance, to be taken note of. 27. Non-residential building has been defined under Section 2(e) of the Act as follows: "2.(e) "non-residential building" means a building being used (i) mainly for the purpose of business of trade; or (ii) partly for the purpose of business or trade and partly for the purpose of residence, subject to the condition that the person who carried on business of trade in the building resides therein: Provided that if a building is let out for residential and non-residential purposes, separately to more than one person, the portion thereof let out for the purpose of residence shall not be treated as non-residential building. Explanation—Where a building is used mainly for the purpose of business or trade, it shall be deemed to be a non-residential building even though a small portion thereof is used for the purpose of residence." 28. The plea raised by the tenant regarding non-residential nature of the demised premised has been taken in the preliminary objection No. 1 of the reply submitted by him which objection has already been described earlier. In that objection, it has been pleaded that the premises were non-residential. It has also been alleged that the tenant being an agent of LIC and United India Assurance Co. Ltd., therefore, the premises were taken on rent from the earlier owner for the purpose of office-cum-residence and the tenant had been using the premises as office-cum-residence since 1941. 29. As per definition of the non-residential building under the Act, it has to be seen that the plea taken fits in, in the aforesaid definition. 30. There is nothing in the plea of the tenant that the premises were being used mainly for the purpose of business or trade. There is also nothing in the plea taken by the tenant that the demised premises were used partly for the purpose of business or trade and partly for the purpose of residence. There is no doubt that the tenant was residing in these premises. The plea only reflected that the premises were being used as office-cum-residence. There is also nothing in the plea taken by the tenant that the demised premises were used partly for the purpose of business or trade and partly for the purpose of residence. There is no doubt that the tenant was residing in these premises. The plea only reflected that the premises were being used as office-cum-residence. There is no specific plea that it were mainly used for the purpose of business or trade and if it is used for office-cum-residence, what was the part of the demised premises which was being used as office and what was other part being used as residence. Thus, the plea raised by the tenant that the demised premises were non-residential was of the general nature and not in accordance with the definition as re-produced above. 31. Needless to say, the evidence is examined on the basis of the pleas taken by the party. The variance in pleadings and evidence can be there in certain special circumstances, but the fact remains that whatever has been examined has to be appreciated in the background of the aforesaid definition of non-residential building, even if for arguments sake, the specific plea in this regard, has not been taken. 32. The parties have brought on record documentary as well as oral evidence to prove their respective claim and counter-claim pertaining to the aforesaid fact. Ex. P-1 is the registered sale deed dated 28.10.1986 through which, the demised premises were purchased by the present petitioner-landlord from the previous owner. The vendor executed the said deed through General Power of Attorney Shri Ajay Bhutail. The demised premises have been described in this deed and it has been mentioned that those were in occupation of Shri Roshan Lai Sood as tenant. This deed also recorded that the purchaser had purchased this set for his bona fide requirement and to accommodate himself and his family members after retirement, which was due in the month of November 1986 from the active service. There is nothing in the sale deed that Shri Roshan Lai Sood, tenant was occupying the same for the purpose of residence-cum-office. 33. One copy of the rent deed Ex. RX has been brought on record which is dated 16.12.1972. In this deed, there is nothing as to for what purpose the demised premises were rented out, more so for the purpose pleaded by the tenant. 34. 33. One copy of the rent deed Ex. RX has been brought on record which is dated 16.12.1972. In this deed, there is nothing as to for what purpose the demised premises were rented out, more so for the purpose pleaded by the tenant. 34. As per tenant, he had been occupying the demised premises since 1942 which has been rented out in his favour for the purpose of office-cum-residence. The original rent note, if any, has not come on record. 35. One important document Ex. RW-5/A dt. 8.11.86 has been brought on record and the statement of RW-5 Shri Ajay Butail who was holding power of attorney for the landlord, has also been recorded. He stated that the tenant Roshan Lai had written him a letter and he sent the reply to the tenant, the Photostat copy of which is Ex.RW-5/A, the production of which has been objected to by the opposite side. In this Photostat copy, the tenant Shri Roshan Lai has been informed that the premises which were with him for residence-cum-office has been transferred in favour of the present petitioner through a registered sale deed and through this letter, the tenant has been asked to pay the future rent in favour of the present petitioner. The original of this document has not been brought on record. The letter of the tenant in response to which the aforesaid letter was issued, has also not been brought on record. The contents in the letter especially describing the nature of the demised premises have to be appreciated in the background of the facts involved in the present case. This RW-5 is the person who, on behalf of the owner, effected the sale in favour of the present petitioner vide registered deed as discussed above. In that deed, no mention has been made that the demised premises under occupation of Roshan Lai tenant were being used as office-cum-residence and had been rented out for that purpose. In case it was so, this fact should have been mentioned in the registered deed. The likelihood of creating such a evidence by writing Ex.RW-5/A could not be ruled out as has been argued on behalf of the landlord-petitioner. 36. There are various letters addressed to the respondent which have been brought on record, which are Ex. R-1 to Ex. R-15. The likelihood of creating such a evidence by writing Ex.RW-5/A could not be ruled out as has been argued on behalf of the landlord-petitioner. 36. There are various letters addressed to the respondent which have been brought on record, which are Ex. R-1 to Ex. R-15. These letters have been addressed to M/s. Roshan Lai and Co., Agent, Laxmi Insurance Co., Shimla or in the some of the letters, the address of tenant is given as C/o M/s. Roshan Lai & Company, Old Butail Building, Shimla. Even if for arguments sake these letters contained the official address of the tenant, that will not ipso facto mean that the premises were being used as office also. The official address denotes the official position held by the addressee and not that the office is located in those premises. In this view of the^ matter, these letters will not be of much help to the case of the tenants especially when only the address given therein will not prove the demised premises being used for non-residential purposes. 37. The oral evidence examined by the tenant is of very general nature. The tenant himself while appearing as RW-2 made a general statement that he had taken the premises on r^nt for residential/office purpose. He stated that in the year 1938, first of all he took this premises on rent and at that time, rent note was executed and thereafter in the year 1973-74, another rent note was executed. He has admitted the execution of rent note RX executed in the year 1972. He also stated that Ex.RX was correct to the original. The original rent note has not come on record. RW-1 Shri Jogeshwar Prasad deposed that he had been visiting the demised premises for the last 20 years and in these premises, according to this witness, there was an office of union. This witness will not, again, be helpful to the case of the tenant, inasmuch as it has not been the case of the tenant that the office of the union was housed in the demised premises. 38. RW-3 is one Paras Ram. According to him, he has been visiting the demised premises for the last 40 years. He has working as Development Officer in LIC. He stated that the premises in dispute were housing the registered office of LIC Union and Roshan Lai was the President of that Union. 38. RW-3 is one Paras Ram. According to him, he has been visiting the demised premises for the last 40 years. He has working as Development Officer in LIC. He stated that the premises in dispute were housing the registered office of LIC Union and Roshan Lai was the President of that Union. Again, the version given by this witness cannot go in favour of the tenant, inasmuch as according to him, it was Union office which was housed in the demised premises. He has nowhere stated that the tenant was using these premises as his office also, as the tenant was working in LIC and for the discharge of his professional duties, he has hired the premises. 39. RW-3 is one Daulat Ram who stated that the demised premises were taken by Roshan Lai for insurance office and his residence. According to him, he got his truck insured in the year 1958-59. He did not know up to which period Roshan Lai remained in Insurance service.Again,this witness has given a general statement that he got his truck insured from Roshan Lai and the premises were used as office. 40. Oral evidence on behalf of the landlord examined has tried to prove that premises were residential in nature. 41. The aforesaid documentary as well as the oral evidence examined during the trial of the proceedings did not, in a way, legally establish the claim of the tenant in this particular regard. Simply because there is some evidence that the respondent had done some LIC work while residing in these premises will not, on any stretch of imagination, make any part of the premises to be non-residential. It may not be out of place to mention here that the tenant, in case was doing some of his official work in the residential quarter, will not make that residential quarter to be non-residential one. Again, it may not be out of place to mention that the best evidence to prove this aspect was to establish on record through a legally competent evidence the purpose for which the premises were rented out. The original rent note has not come on record. The later rent note did not record this fact. Again, it may not be out of place to mention that the best evidence to prove this aspect was to establish on record through a legally competent evidence the purpose for which the premises were rented out. The original rent note has not come on record. The later rent note did not record this fact. It has been very forcefully contended that the letters addressed to the tenant in his official capacity pertaining to the building under reference I is a circumstance which proved the nature of the premises to be non-residential I one. This argument does not appeal to reasoning at all especially when I by describing the profession of a person in the address where he was residing, I will not make that residence to be an office. An example in this behalf I has been quoted on behalf of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, which can safely be considered. According to learned Counsel, a letter is addressed I to an Advocate as per his residential address. Such an address will not make the residence to be office of the Advocate, unless and until it is proved that the residence was used as an office also. 42. The evidence examined, as pointed out earlier, is of very general nature. There is nothing in the evidence as to what part of the demised premises was used as an office and what other part as residence. Under the definition of the term non-residential,.it has to be established on record that a part of the demised premises was being used as office. Unless and until that part is specified by making a general statement that the entire premises were used as residence-cum-office, it will not serve the purpose so far as the present case is concerned. 43. Thus, taking into consideration the aforesaid facts brought on record, I even if for arguments sake, the evidence examined is appreciated, it does not legally established the non-residential character of the demised premises as defined under the Act. 44. The term residential building has been defined under Section ; 2(h) of the Act as under: M2(a) to (g)....:. (h) "residential building" means any building which is not a residential building." The present premises having been held to be non-residential, are, therefore residential one. 44. The term residential building has been defined under Section ; 2(h) of the Act as under: M2(a) to (g)....:. (h) "residential building" means any building which is not a residential building." The present premises having been held to be non-residential, are, therefore residential one. Moreover, the construction and the situation of the premises in a residential locality, coupled with the fact that the tenant has been residing therein, make the premises to be residential one. 45. The learned Rent Controller appears to have been influenced by some circumstances which legally did not establish the said fact as raised by the tenant. The appreciation of evidence has been done in a most palpably wrong and unsustainable manner. 46. Thus, taking into consideration the case of the tenant from any angle, the non-residential character of the demised premises, as pleaded, has not been proved at all. At first instanse, such a plea was not available under the circumstances of the present case and in case, if at all it was there, it has not been proved successfully. 47. In view of the foregoing reasons, the present revision petition is accepted and the order under reference is set aside. The. eviction petition preferred under Section 15 of the Act is remanded to the Rent Controller for disposal in accordance with law, inasmuch as, the other aspect of the matter pertaining to the bona fide requirement of the landlord has not been dealt with on the basis of the evidence examined during the proceedings. The final disposal of the petition, for one reason or the other, has been delayed. The Rent Controller, as such, is directed to finally dispose of the same without any undue delay, but not later than 30.4.1998. Parties are directed to appear before the Rent Controller on 8.1.1998. The records be sent to the Rent Controller so as to reach there before the aforesaid date. Parties to bear their own costs in the present revision petition, which stands disposed of accordingly.