Judgment :- JAYASIMHA BABU J. An agreement styled as "agreement for development" was entered into between P. Nataraja Sastry and Ashok Leyland Finance Limited on April 30, 1990, wherein the subject-matter of the agreement was described as "88 per cent. of the undivided share and interest in the schedule A property to be conveyed to the party of the second part and/or to its nominee or nominees."The Schedule A property was described as" all that piece and parcel of vacant land being plot No. 164, present door No. 51 (old door No. 1) First Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Adyar, Madras 20, of an extent of five grounds and 1, 050 sq. ft. measuring north to south on either side 90 ft. and east to west on either side 145 ft." * The agreement sets out that the owner is in possession of the property; that the property was self-acquired under a sale deed dated September 28, 1965, that the owner had decided to develop the property by demolishing the existing bungalow and the land which was very old and build a conglomeration of flats on the land ; that the offer made by the party of the second part for development of the land had been accepted by the owner ; that the owner had secured eviction of the tenants who were in occupation of the building only with the intervention of the party of the second part ; that the party of the second part had agreed to develop the property even in the absence of the original of the parent document being available, that the parties had earlier entered into an agreement on December 23, 1989, and had also filed Form No. 37-I before the Appropriate Authority, the Income-tax Department, Chennai, which form was rejected by the authority on March 9, 1990, that thereafter, the parties agreed to enter into this agreement in supersession of the earlier agreement ; that the owner had retained for himself a portion only of the saidconglomeration together with the proportionate undivided share in the land amounting to 12 per cent. and sell the balance undivided 88 per cent. and sell the balance undivided 88 per cent. share in the land ; that the owner had decided to entrust the construction and sale of the flats/apartments/garages/shops/offices/etc., to be built on the land to the party of the second part ; that pursuant to the agreement reached between them the second party was authorised in the capacity of promoter to take steps immediately for the preparation of the plan and after securing necessary approval proceed with the construction ; that the second party was authorised to sell the constructed space together with the proportionate undivided share in the property for any consideration on terms and conditions to be determined by the second party who was to receive and appropriate for itself all such considerations or moneys except for an area of 2, 740 sq. ft. of built-up area which was to be constructed for the owner and delivered to the owner as part of the consideration for the sale of 88 per cent. interest in the land to the second party or its nominees ; that the owner would execute and register a power of attorney in favour of the second party to enable it to complete the construction and to sell all the constructed area excluding 2, 740 sq. ft. ; that the second party was to complete the construction within 15 months ; that the owner would not create any encumbrance in the property after the date of agreement ; that the building to be constructed excluding the area of 2, 740 sq. ft. was to vest absolutely in the second party or its nominees at all times ; that the second party was entitled to raise loans on the security of the building to be constructed on this property ; and that the owner would execute and register sale deeds in favour of the nominees of the second party whenever called uponThe consideration for the agreement was described in clause 3 of the agreement, in the following terms : "In consideration of the party of the second part/promoter agreeing to construct and deliver to the party of the first part and/or his nominee built up area of 2, 740 sq. ft. to be valued at Rs. 525 per sq. ft.) one-third to be earmarked by the party of the first part in such storeyed building for 12 per cent. ft. to be valued at Rs. 525 per sq. ft.) one-third to be earmarked by the party of the first part in such storeyed building for 12 per cent. undivided share in the land retained by him as per the specifications annexed hereto and also for the following cash considerations of an aggregate sum of Rs. 20, 63, 489 (rupees twenty lakhs, sixty-three thousand four hundred eighty nine only) paid and to be paid to him in the following manner (a) Rs. 8, 00, 000 (rupees eight lakhs only) paid by cheques as advance (b) Rs. 12, 63, 489 (rupees twelve lakhs sixty-three thousand four hundred eighty-nine only) to be paid within 15 days from the date of receipt of no objection certificate by both the parties." * The payment of consideration was set out in clause 4 of the agreement which reads as under: "The party of the first part herein agrees to sell 88 per cent., of the undivided share and interest in the Schedule A property which share is set out in Schedule C hereunder to the party of the second part/ promoter/and/or to its nominee or nominees either in parts or fully under one or more deeds. The apparent consideration in relation to this agreement is Rs. 30, 81, 700 (rupees thirty lakhs eighty-one thousand and seven hundred only) consisting of ; (a) Rs. 10, 18, 211 (rupees ten lakhs eighteen thousand two hundred and eleven only) representing the value of 2, 740 sq. ft. of built up area (rupees 525 per sq. ft. less 153.39 sq. ft. for proportionate undivided share of land) to be exchanged for part of the apparent consideration ; and(b) Rs. 20, 63, 489 (rupees twenty lakhs sixty-three thousand four hundred and eighty-nine only) being the cash consideration set out supra." Form No. 37-I filed by the parties before the appropriate authority together with this agreement having resulted in the impugned order, these writ petitions have been filed by the owner as also by the proposed transferee challenging the impugned order It was contended that this agreement which is styled as "development agreement" does not fall within the scope of Chapter XX-C of the Income-tax Act, and, therefore, the impugned order is one without jurisdiction. Though it was contended for the Revenue that the petitioners are estopped from raising such an argument after having filed Form No. 37-I, I consider it just to permit this argument being raised, as jurisdiction cannot be conferred by a party if it is not to be found within the four corners of the statute Chapter XX-C of the Act was introduced with the avowed object of ensuring the payment of tax properly payable on the market value of the immovable property transferred inter vivos. The Supreme Court in the case of C. B. Gautam v. Union of India 1993 (199) ITR 503, upheld the validity of the provision providing for pre-emptive purchases, after finding that the provision was intended to ensure the payment of tax properly payable on the market value of the immovable properties transferred and that such transfers are not to be allowed to become means for evading substantial part of the taxes lawfully payable on the market value. A rebuttable presumption that the parties intend evading tax would arise if the apparent consideration for the transfer as set out in the agreement is found to be less by 15 per cent. 'or more of the market value of the propertyThe petitioners contend that the restriction on "transfer" under section 269UC is only in respect of "transfer" as it is defined in section 269UA(f), and this transaction does not fall within either sub-clause (i) or (ii), of that clause. The petitioners do not dispute the fact that 88 per cent. undivided share in the land is to be transferred. That such transfer is for a consideration is also not in dispute. It is, however, the form of consideration, according to the petitioners, that makes it impossible to regard this transaction as a "transfer" for purposes of Chapter XX-C The consideration in substantial part is by way of cash payment of Rs. 20, 63, 489. In addition to this consideration, the transferee is required to construct for the petitioners 2, 740 sq. ft. of built-up space in a building to be put up on the entire plot including the undivided 12 per cent. retained by the owner. The agreed value of this extent of 2, 740 sq. ft. has also been recorded in the agreement of Rs. 10, 18, 211. ft. of built-up space in a building to be put up on the entire plot including the undivided 12 per cent. retained by the owner. The agreed value of this extent of 2, 740 sq. ft. has also been recorded in the agreement of Rs. 10, 18, 211. The apparent consideration as set out in Form No. 37-I filed by the parties has been stated as Rs. 30, 81, 700 Counsel submitted that this was not an agreement for sale as part of the consideration is not money, and "price" referred to in the definition of "sale" in section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act is only money consideration as held by the apex court in the case of CIT v. Motors and General Stores (P.) Ltd. 1967 (66) ITR 692, 1968 AIR(SC) 200, 1967 (3) SCR 876 . Counsel contended that this was also not an exchange as 2, 740 sq. ft. built-up space is yet to be constructed "Exchange" is defined in section 118 of the Transfer of Property Act as under: "When two persons mutually transfer the ownership of one thing for the ownership of another, neither thing nor both things being money only, the transaction is called an 'exchange'A transfer of property in completion of an exchange can be made only in manner provided for the transfer of such property by sale." " Apparent consideration" * in relation to an immovable property transferred by way of exchange is defined for the purpose of Chapter XX-C in section 269UA(b)(1)(i), (ii) of the Act to mean "(A) in a case where the consideration for the transfer consists of a thing or things only, the price that such thing or things would ordinarily fetch on sale in the open market on the date on which the agreement for transfer is made (B) in a case where the consideration for the transfer consists of a thing or things and a sum of money, the aggregate of the price that such thing or things would ordinarily fetch on sale in the open market on the date on which the agreement for transfer is made, and such sum ; " The word" thing" * used in these definitions is not defined in either Act. The dictionary definition shows that it has a wide variety of meanings depending upon the context. The dictionary definition shows that it has a wide variety of meanings depending upon the context. In the context in which this word is used in the definition of "exchange" and "apparent consideration" it means an object or service which has value quantifiable in terms of money A transaction which is otherwise an exchange does not cease to be so, because a part of the consideration is future construction promised to be done by the transferee. The market value of that construction as on the date of the agreement is the amount to be taken into account for the purpose of determining the apparent consideration Neither the Income-tax Act nor the Transfer of Property Act recognises, what counsel termed a "development agreement" as a special mode of transfer of the property. Any such agreement depending upon its scheme and contents has necessarily to fall within the recognised modes of transfer though the modes of transfer envisaged in such agreement may be more than oneThe definitions of "apparent consideration", "transfer" and "immovable property" read with section 269UC which restricts the transfer of immovable property indicate the legislative intention to bring within the ambit of Chapter XX-C of the Act, all agreements involving the divestment of rights in immovable property-which may be land, building or part of a building constructed or to be constructed, whether with or without machinery, plant, furniture, fittings or other things-for a tangible or intangible consideration, capable of being computed in terms of money and exceeding the amount prescribed under section 269UC, subject to the exemption provided for in section 269UO, viz., transfer to a relative on account of natural love and affection The fact that a part of the consideration for the transfer of the undivided share in the immovable property is to be by way of construction to be put up on the land transferred as also on the land retained, does not take away such an arrangement from the purview of Chapter XX-C of the Act. All arrangements involving the divestment of rights in immovable property in favour of another for a consideration, the amount of which exceeds the limit prescribed are meant to be covered by Chapter XX-C unless specifically exempted. All arrangements involving the divestment of rights in immovable property in favour of another for a consideration, the amount of which exceeds the limit prescribed are meant to be covered by Chapter XX-C unless specifically exempted. There is no exemption provided for development even when such agreement is in respect of transfer of the rights in immovable property for a consideration Learned counsel referred to two judgments rendered by two learned single judges of the Calcutta High Court as also to a judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in support of their submission that a development agreement is not covered by Chapter XX-C In the case of Hari Krishna Kanoi v. Appropriate Authority 1994 (207) ITR 743 , 1995 (124) CTR 370, 1993 (71) TAXMAN 413, 1995 (124) CTR(Cal) 370 the court held that the appropriate authority had travelled beyond the limits of the prescribed jurisdiction under section 269UD for determining the apparent consideration, and directing the purchase by the Central Government of lot "A" at an amount which cannot be considered to be equal to the amount of the apparent consideration. The court held that the apparent consideration was determined on a wrong appreciation of the law and, therefore, remanded the matter back to the authority to determine the consideration afresh. This decision is not of any assistance to the petitionerIn the case of Mahabodhi Society of India v. Union of India 1994 (209) ITR 412 , 1994 (122) CTR 211, 1995 (78) TAXMAN 401 (Cal) rendered by another learned single judge of the Calcutta High Court, after having held that the authority had acted with mala fides in directing the pre-emptive purchase of the property belonging to the religious institution entitled to protection under articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, and that the order of compulsory purchase was made beyond the period of limitation, it was further held that if consideration for transfer is not monetary consideration or non-existing things or is future things not having a workable present market value, the machinery for computation of the compensation fails and, therefore, such transaction would fall outside the purview of Chapter XX-C of the Act. These observations are in the nature of obiter as that question could not survive after the court had found that the action of the authority was ultra vires articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution and also barred by limitation Section 269UA clearly provides for cases where consideration comprises money and things. It cannot, therefore, be said that the computation provision must fail in a case where consideration is money and thing or things to be brought into existence in future Learned counsel lastly relied upon the case of Ashis Mukerji v. Union of India 1996 (222) ITR 168 , 1997 (137) CTR 244, 1996 (87) TAXMAN 290, 1997 (2) TLR 74, wherein a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held in the penultimate paragraph of the judgment thus: "Thus, though we hold that the provisions of Chapter XX-C would apply to the nature of the agreement for transfer of immovable property called the development agreement in the present case, there has been violation of the provisions of sections 269UE(3) and 269UG(1) of the Act falling under this Chapter. The order under section 269UD(1) is itself bad as it purports to acquire property which is not exactly the subject-matter of the agreement and then that property is sought to be vested in the Central Government under section 269UE(6) of the Act." The court did not invalidate the order for pre-emptive purchase on the ground that the statutory provisions are inapplicable to development agreements. The decision rested on the ground that the order impugned therein sought to acquire property which was not the subject-matter of the agreement The conclusion was reached by the court even though in the body of the judgment, the court had expressed the view that it is difficult to see how the development agreement before it, could be termed as a sale of 60 per cent. of the land of the owner as well as of the construction portion of the building. The court after having observed thus, also observed that no doubt in the ultimate analsysis, the agreement has the effect of transferring or enabling enjoyment of the property in question to the developer. The court had also found after considering the definitions of "immovable property" and "transfer" that "... The court after having observed thus, also observed that no doubt in the ultimate analsysis, the agreement has the effect of transferring or enabling enjoyment of the property in question to the developer. The court had also found after considering the definitions of "immovable property" and "transfer" that "... agreement will squarely fall under clause (d)(ii) and clause (f)(ii) of section 269UA of the Act." * Though that court had made several other observations, the court did not ultimately hold that Chapter XX-C was not attracted to that case. The court held that the agreement before it was for transfer of 60 per cent. of the undivided share in the land ; that the order made by the authority which also provided for transfer of 60 per cent. of the share in the constructed space was unwarranted and that, therefore, the order impugned therein could not be sustained. This decision also is not of any assistance to the petitioner The observations made in the judgment which indicate a view that Chapter XX-C cannot be applied to a case where the consideration for the transfer of an undivided share in the land is construction of whole or part of a building, is a view with which with great respect, I cannot agree. Where the consideration consists of thing or things only or thing or things and money the manner in which the thing/s is/are to be valued has been indicated in the statutory provisions and merely stating that the consideration is a thing only or a thing and any agreed amount would not take such an agreement out of the purview of Chapter XX-C of the ActIn this case, the parties themselves had valued the construction to be put up for the owner as part of the consideration for sale of 88 per cent. share in the land, and the appropriate authority has rightly adopted that value for the construction while determining the discounted apparent consideration Learned counsel for the owner contended that the value placed by the parties for the extent to be constructed was admittedly not undervalued but was found to be in fact higher than the cost of construction, such excess being determined as per the guideline value adopted by the Central Public Works Department and, therefore, the entire impugned order has to be set aside. This argument proceeds on the fallacy that the agreement is to, be read as if it consists of two parts, one for construction of flats and another for payment of cash consideration. The flats to be constructed is part of the consideration for the sale of 88 per cent. interest in the land. The aggregate of the monetary consideration and the value of the flat being less by well over 15 per cent. of the market value, there is no error in the appropriate authority taking that aggregate value for determining the conclusion that there has been under-valuation It must, therefore, be held that notwithstanding the description of the document as a development agreement, the subject-matter of the transfer being an undivided share in the land, and the consideration being partly in money and partly in a "thing" which was not in existence that thing being a flat which the transferee was required to construct, the provisions of Chapter XX-C of the Act are attracted and the petitioners had rightly filed Form No. 37-I. The impugned order cannot be set aside on the ground that the order is one made without jurisdictionOn the merits of the impugned order, it was contended by counsel that the order is based on irrelevant considerations, that relevant considerations have been omitted, and that the order has taken into account facts regarding which the petitioners were not called upon to answer in the show-cause notice There is no dispute about the fact that in the show-cause notice issued to the parties, it had been stated that the apparent consideration of Rs. 30, 52, 891 is less than the fair market value of the property by more than 15 per cent. for the reason that there was a previous instance on record of sale of the property immediately next door at No. 52, First Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Adayar, of nearly 15, 120 sq. ft., approximately 6.3 grounds, for a consideration of Rs. 68 lakhs, for which statement had been filed before the appropriate authority in August, 1989. The discounted value of that sale was Rs. 66, 15, 529 which worked out to the rate of Rs. 10.39 lakhs per ground. After adding 9 per cent. for inflation for the period of nine months between the dates of two agreements, the rate worked out for this property was Rs. 11.33 lakhs per ground. The discounted value of that sale was Rs. 66, 15, 529 which worked out to the rate of Rs. 10.39 lakhs per ground. After adding 9 per cent. for inflation for the period of nine months between the dates of two agreements, the rate worked out for this property was Rs. 11.33 lakhs per ground. At the rate of Rs. 11.33 lakhs per ground the value of the petitioner's land would work out to Rs. 54.21 lakhs. As against that sum, the apparent consideration under the agreement between the parties after discounting worked out to only Rs. 30, 52, 891 which was less than the estimated fair market value by nearly 37.60 per cent. After setting out the aforementioned facts in the show-cause notice, the petitioners were informed that a presumption had arisen that under statement of the consideration in the agreement of sale was with a view to evade tax. The petitioners were, therefore, called upon to show cause as to why the order for the purchase of the property should not be made under section 269UD(1) for the discounted apparent consideration of Rs. 30, 52, 891There is no dispute about the fact that the petitioners were heard thereafter on the objections which they had filed to the show-cause notice. The impugned order sets out all the objections raised by the petitioners, the same having been dealt with by the appropriate authority seriatim in the impugned order Counsel, however, contended that the order does not give reasons for rejecting the objections raised. Having perused that order, I am unable to agree with this submission The petitioners do not dispute the fact that the adjoining property at door No. 52, 1st Main road, Gandhi Nagar, Adayar, measuring an extent of about 6.3 grounds had been sold pursuant to an agreement dated March 1, 1989, at the rate of Rs. 10.39 lakhs per ground. The rate per ground under the agreement between the petitioners for an extent of about 5.4 grounds works out to Rs. 6.38 lakhs. The difference is about Rs. 4 lakhs per ground As on the date of the agreement, the owner was in possession and there was no impediment to the proposed construction being commenced on the land subject to the necessary licence and permission being obtained. 6.38 lakhs. The difference is about Rs. 4 lakhs per ground As on the date of the agreement, the owner was in possession and there was no impediment to the proposed construction being commenced on the land subject to the necessary licence and permission being obtained. The size of the two plots, that of the petitioner's plot and of the adjoining land at No. 52, Gandhi Nagar, Adayar, are certainly comparable. The plot of the petitioners measures about 5.4 grounds while the adjoining plot measures about 6.3 grounds. Both are situated on the same road, First Main Road, Gandhi Nagar. The FSI available for the two plots under applicable regulations is one and the same, namely, 1.5, though, in fact, the building put up on the adjoining plot by its owner, namely, "Malar Hospitals" now has an FSI of 2.5 which appears to have been obtained by way of special permission after the purchase of the plot The petitioners had apparently realised the fact that the apparent consideration in their agreement is less than the market value and had sought to provide justification for the sale at a lower price by stating that there was a tenant in the property whose eviction was secured with the good offices of the proposed transferee and that the title deeds of the property were lost and despite such loss, the transferee had come forward to develop the propertyThese factors had been reiterated before the authority along with the further objections that the sale of the adjoining plot was not comparable because the construction put up thereon had an FSI of 2.5. It was also, contended by the owner that there was an urgent need of money and therefore, the lower price was justified As pointed out in the impugned order, the loss of the original title deed which is alleged to have occurred in the bank to which property had been mortgaged by the owner, was not found to be an impediment to the title of the owner being accepted. The agreement recites the fact that the property had been acquired by way of purchase by the petitioner under a registered sale deed. Obviously, a certified copy of the registered deed was available. The agreement recites the fact that the property had been acquired by way of purchase by the petitioner under a registered sale deed. Obviously, a certified copy of the registered deed was available. The encumbrance certificate was also available from which the existence of prior encumbrances and alienations could be ascertained The owner was in the normal course required to give indemnity regarding prior encumbrance, if any, and the sale was to be free of any encumbrances. Counsel for the proposed transferee had, after scrutinising the documents, satisfied himself that the petitioner/owner had marketable title to the property. The transferee did not intend to use the property for itself but only to construct residential-cum-commercial complex for sale to others. Without being satisfied about the marketable title of the petitioner/owner to the property, it could not possibly undertake the risk of selling the property to others. The authority has held that the absence of the original document by itself did not afford a justification for the difference of more than Rs. 4 lakhs per ground. That finding cannot be regarded as perverse At the time of agreement, the property was admittedly in the possession of the owner. There was no tenant. The tenant who was in occupation is said to be the Animal Welfare Board. That tenant had vacated the premises before the date of agreement. The agreement states that the transferee had helped to secure vacant possession of the building from that tenant. No material was placed by the owner before the authority to show the nature of the efforts made by the proposed transferee, or the cost incurred by it, or the circumstances in which the tenant vacated the premises. The authority rightly did not regard the alleged effort made by the transferee to secure vacant possession of a Central Government body as affording justification for the difference of Rs. 4 lakhs per groundAs regards the alleged urgent need of the owner for funds, no material was produced to substantiate the alleged urgent need. No compelling circumstance necessitating the acceptance of a lower price by the owner was disclosed. No fault can be found with the authority for not accepting such unsubstantiated assertion of urgent need for funds. 4 lakhs per groundAs regards the alleged urgent need of the owner for funds, no material was produced to substantiate the alleged urgent need. No compelling circumstance necessitating the acceptance of a lower price by the owner was disclosed. No fault can be found with the authority for not accepting such unsubstantiated assertion of urgent need for funds. The owner had apparently purchased the property as an investment, as it is the case of the owner that he purchased the property in 1965 and thereafter for 20 years or more the Animal Welfare Board was his tenant. As regards the FSI, it is not in dispute that under the applicable regulations, the FSI is 1.5. The fact that after purchasing the plot, the purchaser of the adjoining plot was able to get special sanction for the FSI of 2.5 cannot be regarded as a material factor which had affected the price at which the plot had been purchased by that purchaser. Even if one were to accept that the FSI that the purchaser of the adjoining plot was able to secure subsequent to purchase and the purpose for which the plot was put to use, namely, for constructing and running a hospital, had affected the price to some extent, the difference of Rs. 4 lakhs per ground cannot be regarded as being attributable to those factors. The view taken by the authority that the FSI for the two plots being the same, the fact that the purchaser of the adjoining plot had, subsequent to the purchase obtained exemption from the normal FSI would not render that plot non-comparable cannot be said to be a perverse conclusion. The impugned order is, therefore, not liable to be set aside on the ground that this plot was not comparable to the adjoining plot and the value of that plot as set out in an agreement which is 9 months anterior to the agreement between the petitioners herein, is not comparableCounsel also contended that the guideline value for the plot in the area was only Rs. 5 lakhs per ground and, therefore, the value of Rs. 6.38 lakhs per ground in the agreement between the petitioners cannot by any means be regarded as a case of under-valuation. Chapter XX-C of the Act requires the authority to take into account the market value and not the guideline value. 5 lakhs per ground and, therefore, the value of Rs. 6.38 lakhs per ground in the agreement between the petitioners cannot by any means be regarded as a case of under-valuation. Chapter XX-C of the Act requires the authority to take into account the market value and not the guideline value. Where the fair market value is available the question of adopting the guideline value does not arise. Guideline value is relevant only in the absence of any other basis for ascertaining the market value. In such a case, the guideline value can be adopted as also representing the market value The authority has not erred in not adopting the guideline value as the basis of comparison, as the transaction relating to the adjoining land which was comparable in size with comparable relative advantages and which transaction was also proximate in point of time being nine months earlier, was available to the authority It was also contended that the authority has taken into account irrelevant facts inasmuch as it had, towards the end of the order, referred to two other transactions regarding which the petitioners had not been put on notice. Those two transactions are one in relation to another plot on the same road at 47, 1st Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, in which 921/4 of undivided shares in 13, 719 sq. ft. or 5.72 grounds was agreed to be transferred under an agreement dated April 10, 1989, at the rate of Rs. 8.62 lakhs per ground, and in the second, the sale of extent of 4.90 grounds comprised in No. 12, Gandhi Nagar, 1st Main Road, Kasturba Nagar, pursuant to an agreement dated September 7, 1989, at the rate of Rs. 8.42 lakhs per ground The authority has not relied upon these transactions to reach the conclusion that there has been under-valuation. As noted by the authority, the other two transactions if looked into only support the conclusion already reached by it after comparing this plot with the adjacent one which had been sold nine months earlier. Interestingly, the owner, along with the writ petition, has produced a certificate from a valuer which certificate is dated March 6, 1993, and in which after recording at the outset that the certificate is given at the request of the owner regarding the fair market value of the property as in April, 1989, it is stated thus: ". . . Interestingly, the owner, along with the writ petition, has produced a certificate from a valuer which certificate is dated March 6, 1993, and in which after recording at the outset that the certificate is given at the request of the owner regarding the fair market value of the property as in April, 1989, it is stated thus: ". . . We have taken two sales which have been taken place in 1989 and 1990 in and around the locality. One land rate is at Rs. 8, 62, 000 per ground and the other land rate is at Rs. 10, 39, 000 per ground..." * This valuation report has been referred to only to underscore the fact that even the transactions referred to by the authority towards the end of its order in relation to the property at No. 47, 1st Main Road, though not mentioned in the show-cause notice is a transaction which even according to the owner is a genuine transaction. It is not the case of the petitioners that there was no transaction stated in the order in relation to the property at No. 47, 1st Main Road, or that the property was in any way not comparable to the property of the owner Even ignoring the transactions relating to that property at No. 47, 1st Main Road, on the basis of the comparison made by the authority between the petitioner's plot and that of the adjoining plot, the two being comparable, the finding of the authority on such comparison that there had been substantial under-valuation by the petitioner which was in excess of 15 per cent. of the market value cannot in any way be said to be vitiated on account of reference made to two other properties with a view to underscore that conclusion. The petitioners have failed to rebut the presumption that arose as a consequence, that such under-valuation was with intent to evade the payment of tax properly payable on the market value. All the contentions urged for the petitioners thus fail and the petitions are, therefore, dismissed.