JUDGMENT : S.P. SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved by the decree passed in second appeal by the Board of Revenue, Respondent No. 1 affirming the decree of the first appellate court whereunder allowing the appeal and reversing the decree of the trial court, the suit of the Plaintiff-Respondent was decreed, the Defendant-Petitioner has approached this Court seeking redress praying for the quashing of the judgment and decree of the second appellate court as well as the first appellate court. 2. I have heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner as well as the learned Counsel representing the contesting Respondent and have also carefully perused the record. 3. It may be noticed that after the dismissal of the second appeal, the Petitioner had moved an application seeking review of the judgment and order passed by the Board of Revenue dismissing the second appeal. This application was rejected vide the order dated 30.1.1983. 4. The facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this case lie in a narrow compass. Imam and Peeru were brothers. According to the allegations made in the plaint, Imam was the exclusive sirdar of the plots details whereof were given in Schedule A of the plaint. However, the land in dispute, the details whereof were given in Schedule B of the plaint, was joint sirdari holding of Imam and Peeru who had equal shares therein. Imam expired about ten years before the filing of the suit whereafter the Plaintiff being his widow became the exclusive tenure-holder of the plots detailed in Schedule A and co-tenure-holder with Peeru to the extent of 1/2 share in plots detailed in Schedule B of the plaint. The Plaintiff was old, weak and almost blind. Taking advantage of her condition, the Defendant, on the pretext of submitting an application for subsidy for digging a well obtained her signatures on blank papers, later on it transpired that defrauding the Plaintiff and taking undue advantage of her helplessness and confidence, the Defendant got prepared a sale deed in respect of the plots detailed in Schedule C of the plaint. A suit was filed for getting the sale deed cancelled being Suit No. 413 of 1967 which was decreed. At the time of the filing of the plaint, all the plots comprised in Schedules A and B stood recorded exclusively in the name of the Defendant. A suit was filed for getting the sale deed cancelled being Suit No. 413 of 1967 which was decreed. At the time of the filing of the plaint, all the plots comprised in Schedules A and B stood recorded exclusively in the name of the Defendant. On coming to know of the said erroneous entry, the Plaintiff filed the suit and since Peeru had died and the land in dispute was recorded in the name of Defendant No. J, the son of Peeru, a declaration was sought to the effect that the Plaintiff was the tenure-holder of 9 bigha 16 decimal area of the land detailed in Schedules A and B of the plaint and for partition of the said area and putting her in possession over the separated area. It may be noticed that the plots detailed in Schedules A and B referred to hereinabove were later on given a different number and the entire area of the total number of plots mentioned in Schedules A and B was divided into five plots with different numbers. The details of the new numbers with different areas was detailed in Schedule D of the plaint. 5. The aforesaid suit was contested by the Defendant asserting that the Plaintiff had never been in possession over the plots detailed in Schedules A and B of the plaint. It was also asserted that the Plaintiff had full knowledge of the entry of Peeru as sole tenure-holder of the land in dispute. The Defendant claimed that the suit was barred by time and also on the principles of estoppel and acquiescence. In para 14 of the written statement, it was asserted that even if it be assumed that the Plaintiff had any right the same got extinguished automatically. Prior to his, death Peeru was in possession of the land in dispute and thereafter it was continuing to be in possession of the Defendant whose name had been rightly recorded. 6. It may be noticed at this stage that the Defendant had not taken up any specific plea In regard to maturing of any title by adverse possession. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court had framed various issues. 6. It may be noticed at this stage that the Defendant had not taken up any specific plea In regard to maturing of any title by adverse possession. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court had framed various issues. The main issues framed were as to whether the suit was barred by estoppel and acquiescence and whether the Plaintiff was a co-tenant of the land in suit and if so what was her share and whether the Defendant was the sirdar of the land in suit and whether the suit was barred by time. 7. The trial court came to the conclusion that the Defendant had been in possession for the last 14-15 years and, therefore, his possession was adverse and the suit having been filed beyond the prescribed time was not maintainable. On the aforesaid findings the trial court came to the conclusion that the Plaintiff was neither the sole sirdar nor co-tenure-holder of the plots in suit as claimed and the Defendant was the sole sirdar of the land in suit. On the aforesaid findings, the suit was dismissed. 8. The decree passed by the trial court was challenged by the Plaintiff in appeal. The first appellate court found that in the Khatauni of 1363-1365 fasli the plots detailed in Schedule A were recorded exclusively in the name of Imam and the plots detailed in Schedule B were recorded in the names of Imam and Peeru. It was also found that the holdings detailed in Schedule D of the plaint represented the holdings the particulars whereof had been given in Schedules A and B of the plaint as disclosed by the relevant Fard Mutabiquat (comparative table). It was also found that the Defendant had taken undue advantage of the disability of the Plaintiff and had betrayed her confidence. It was also found that the suit filed by the Plaintiff for cancellation of the sale deed in respect of the plots detailed in Schedule C of the plaint had been decreed by the competent court of civil jurisdiction. The appellate court came to the conclusion that the possession of the Defendant never became hostile or adverse. Allowing the appeal, the first appellate court decreed the suit of the Plaintiff giving certain directions adjusting the equities. 9. The Defendant challenged the aforesaid decree in a second appeal. The appellate court came to the conclusion that the possession of the Defendant never became hostile or adverse. Allowing the appeal, the first appellate court decreed the suit of the Plaintiff giving certain directions adjusting the equities. 9. The Defendant challenged the aforesaid decree in a second appeal. The second appellate court found that the status of the Defendant was that of a co-tenure-holder as the entire holdings detailed in Schedules A and B of the plaint had been merged and a separate Khata had been prepared giving different numbers of the holdings with different areas, the total area of the entire holding remaining the same. In the circumstances, the Board of Revenue found that considering the nature of the pleadings set up by the Defendant and the effect of the merger of the Khatas, the claim of maturing of the rights by adverse possession could not be upheld. Accordingly, endorsing the findings of the first appellate court, the second appeal was dismissed. 10. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner Defendant has strenuously urged that on the facts found, the possession of Peeru and thereafter of his son Chidda had to be tagged together. Since it was without consent of the Plaintiff, it had to be taken as adverse and in that view of the matter, the decree of the trial court was liable to be restored. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent, however, has urged that even in the written statement, no specific plea in regard to the possession of the Defendant being adverse had been set up and since in view of the merger of the Khatas, the status of the Defendant qua the entire holding subsequent to the merger of the two khatas became that of a co-tenure-holder, in the absence of any plea in regard to ouster of the Plaintiff, the mere fact that the Defendant was continuing to be in possession as claimed could not, under the law, turn his possession to be hostile and adverse possession so as to entitle him to become the exclusive tenure-holder of the entire holdings specially when his share therein, had not been demarcated and his possession at the worst could be the possession of a co-tenure-holder even if it be assumed that the Defendant had remained in possession over the entire holding. 11. 11. It may be observed that adverse possession claimed by a Defendant seeking to defeat the right of the Plaintiff based on title must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show that possession became adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected could be found. A mere suggestion that there was an uninterrupted possession for several years is not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession as pointed out by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of S.M. Karim Vs. Mst. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 . Further, where a person accepted to be a co-tenure-holder with small or larger share his exclusive possession is of no consequence. What is material is whether he was recognised as a co-tenure-holder. The case of ouster or hostile possession is not ordinarily to be presumed amongst co-tenure holders. It has to be definitely proved. In the absence of specific plea about adverse possession having been taken, it is difficult to accept the case of adverse possession, as merely because the Defendant claimed exclusive right, it cannot be said that it was based on adverse possession. An adverse possession cannot be presumed and requires to be specifically pleaded and definitely proved. 12. It may further be noticed that a Division Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Puttu Singh and Ors. v. Kirat Singh and Ors. 1965 ALJ 936, had clarified that the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act has not made any provision for acquisition of rights by a tenure holder by adverse possession. All it provides is for a suit for dispossession of persons taking wrongful possession and it is only after the period of limitation for such suit expires and a suit becomes time-barred that the right to bring a suit would become extinguished with the consequential result that the right of the tenure-holder will also become extinguished u/s 28 of the Limitation Act. 13. 13. Considering the facts and circumstances noticed by the first appellate court as well as the second appellate court which stand established on record, it is apparent that the right of the Plaintiff to bring a suit to get her share separated and for as being put in exclusive possession thereof could not be deemed to have become extinguished by the date when the suit had been filed so as to result in the accrual of the consequential tenurial right in favour of the Defendant. 14. No justifiable ground has been made out requiring any interference by this Court in the present proceedings in the impugned decree while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. In the result, this writ petition being devoid of merit is dismissed. There shall however, be no order as to costs.