SAMARESH BANERJEA, J. ( 1 ) BOTH the writ applications containing the same question of law and fact have been heard together. ( 2 ) THE short question which has arisen in the present writ application is whether in view of the provisions of Rule 20-C of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 (which has been incorporated by way of an amendment by a notification dated November 12, 1993 substituting the previous rules) will stand in the way of the Tribunal in receiving evidence on materials after the expiry of the time limit prescribed in Rule 20-C. ( 3 ) IN W. P. No. 1583 of 1997 the petitioner company has challenged the order dated May 12,1997 being No. 32 of the Industrial Tribunal rejecting the prayer of the petitioner-company for producing certain documents which according to the petitioner company is relevant for adjudication of the dispute during cross examination of a witness for the workman on the ground that in view of the limitation fixed for the disclosure of documents specified under Rule 20-C under the aforesaid rules, such prayer cannot be allowed. , ( 4 ) ADMITTEDLY such application was made by the petitioner company long after the expiry of the aforesaid time limit specified in Rule 20-C and in fact when examination of the witnesses have stated and one of the witnesses for the workman was being examined. By the said application the petitioner-company wanted to produce certain documents on the ground that the same are very much relevant for proper adjudication of the disputes before the Tribunal and such documents were not in possession at the time of discovery of documents. While the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner company has contended, inter alia, that the time limit prescribed under Rule 20-C does not take away power of the Tribunal to receive evidence even subsequent to that, but the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent workman has submitted that since by the aforesaid amended Rule 20-C, the original Rule 20-C of the said Rules which permitted production of materials and documents even after completion' of the discovery stage with a special leave of the Tribunal, has been deleted and such amended provision has to be given credence by the Court and cannot be ignored and therefore after the, aforesaid expiry of the period, documents cannot be received. ( 5 ) SO far as W. P. No. 2025 of 1997 is concerned it appears that the same writ petitioner-company after rejection of the prayer by the Tribunal to produce such documents on the grounds aforesaid, applied under Sections 11 (a) and 11 (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act read with Rule 20-E of the said rules for enforcing attendance of witnesses of the Union compelling production of such documents which they wanted to produce earlier, but by order No. 36 dated July 31, 1997 the Tribunal has also rejected such prayer on the ground that the prayer of the petitioner company for production of such documents already having been refused by the Tribunal by earlier order the petitioner-company cannot now be allowed to take recourse to the provision of Sections 11 (a) and 11 (b) of the Act read with Rule 20-E and therefore to get something indirectly which they did not get directly. ( 6 ) HAVING heard the learned counsels for the parties and considering the applications it appears to this Court that Rule 20-C of West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 as it stands now after the amendment, really deals with discovery and inspection of documents. Whereas under the original Rule 20-C any party to the adjudication was required to apply on affidavit for inspection of original documents disclosed and call for any documents as may be necessary for proper appreciation of the dispute within 10 days from the date of filing of the written statement by the second party, under the present Rule 20-C within 14 days from the date of filing of the written statement by the second party, the parties are required to file a list disclosing the documents which are in their possession and power relating to the matter or matters in dispute and upon which they want to rely and each party is required to give notice to the other the date on which its list is filed. ( 7 ) A reading of the said rule ,therefore, makes it absolutely clear that as pointed out hereinbefore the said rule deals with discovery and inspection of documents which are in possession and power of the parties. ( 7 ) A reading of the said rule ,therefore, makes it absolutely clear that as pointed out hereinbefore the said rule deals with discovery and inspection of documents which are in possession and power of the parties. ( 8 ) THE time limit of 14 days as has been prescribed under the said rules is really confined to such discovery and inspection of documents which are in possession of the parties at the discovery stage. ( 9 ) RULE 15 of the said Rules empowers a Board, Court, Labour Court or Tribunal or an Arbitrator to accept, admit or call for evidence at any stage of the proceedings. ( 10 ) SUCH power of the Tribunal to call for evidence or admit evidence at any stage of the proceedings, therefore, certainly cannot be curtailed by limitation of 14 days as imposed under Rule 20-C. The power to receive evidence at any stage of the proceeding by the Tribunal is a power conferred upon the Tribunal which can be exercised in my view by the Tribunal either on its own motion or even at the instance of any of the parties for proper adjudication of the dispute. ( 11 ) UNDER such circumstances, in my view, the Tribunal has fallen into error being of the view that because of the limitation of 14 days prescribed in Rule 20-C it is unable to receive evidence which is sought to be produced by the writ petitioner-company at this stage. I however hasten to add whether such power to receive evidence or call for evidence at any stage of the proceeding under Rule 15 shall be exercised under the facts and circumstances of a particular case is a matter to be decided by the Tribunal and a party cannot claim such benefit as a matter of right. lt is obvious that the aforesaid rule has been enacted empowering the Tribunal to receive and call for evidence at any stage of the proceedings for the ends of justice and for proper adjudication of the dispute and therefore, unless the Tribunal itself is of the view that such evidence is required to be received or should be called for being really relevant for adjudication of the dispute, the mere fact that a prayer is made for exercise of such power cannot be aground for allowing such prayer. ( 12 ) CONSEQUENTIALLY, in my view, it will be also within the discretion of the Tribunal to refuse to exercise such power even if it is found that document which is sought to be introduced at such stage or in possession of a party at the discovery stage and yet not disclosed or if there is no satisfactory explanation as to the failure of the concerned party to produce such document at the discovery stage. This exercise of power, in my view, is necessary by the Tribunal while exercising power under Section 20 for the simple reason that the very intention of the legislature in creating a forum under the Industrial Disputes Act for adjudication of Industrial disputes was for the purpose of expeditious disposal of the matter. If such power is exercised casually or mechanically, the same certainly may become a weapon in the hands of the parties who are interested in delaying the proceedings. ( 13 ) SINCE it appears to this Court that in the instant case the Tribunal has rejected the prayer of the petitioner company only on the ground that such a power is not possessed by the Tribunal in view of the limitation of 14 days prescribed in Rule 20-C, for the reasons stated above, the impugned order cannot be sustained and the same is hereby set aside. The matter is accordingly sent back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration of prayer of the petitioner company which should be done positively within two weeks from the communication of the order. ( 14 ) IT is made clear that this Court has not decided the application on merits, and the question whether the documents which are sought to be introduced by the petitioner-company are at all relevant or whether there is any sufficient explanation for the company in not producing any documents at the discovery stage, or whether the Tribunal should be of the view that such documents would at all be necessary for proper adjudication of the industrial dispute in question. ( 15 ) IN view of the orders passed as above in W. P. No. 1583 of 1997 the impugned order passed in W. P. No. 2025 of 1997 is also set aside. Both the writ applications are thus disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.