D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners factory was acquired under the provisions of U. P. Sugar Undertaking (Acquisition) Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the said Act. The compensation payable under the said Act to the petitioner is required to be adjudicated upon by the Prescribed Authority who, in exercise of quasi judicial authority, is likely to determine the amount of compensation payable. By a notification dated 13th May 1995, the Managing Director, U. P. State Sugar Corporation Limited, was appointed as Prescribed Authority under Section 10 of the said Act. The petitioner, by means of Writ Petition No. 20086 of 1995 had chal lenged the said appointment. By a judgment and order dated 1st September 1995, the said notification was quashed and the respondents were directed to issue fresh notification appointing appropriates authority other than the Managing Director of the Corporation as the Prescribed Authority. By a notification dated 4th Oc tober, 1995, the Cane Commissioner has been appointed as Prescribed Authority under Section 10 of the said Act. The said notification (Annexure T) has been chal lenged by means of the present writ petition. ( 2 ) MR. Singhal, learned counsel ap pearing in support of the writ petition chal lenged the validity of the said notification on the following grounds: (1) The function of the prescribed authority being a quasi judicial function as a Civil Court following some of the proce dures provided in the Code of Civil Proce dure and the proceeding deeming to be a judicial proceeding for all practical pur poses, the appointment of a District Judge is warranted and that on earlier occasions every time a District Judge was appointed as Prescribed Authority. (2) In the earlier writ petition, on the same ground, the Managing Director of the Corporation being an interested person having interest in the matter to be adjudi cated, the appointment was quashed by this Court and the present appointment also suffers from the said infirmity, namely, that a person can not be a judge in his own cause and that justice is not only to be done but shall also seem to have been done. (3) By reason of procedure prescribed, the State Government may require infor mation from the Commissioner for the pur pose of determining the compensation. (3) By reason of procedure prescribed, the State Government may require infor mation from the Commissioner for the pur pose of determining the compensation. As such, the Commissioner who furnishes the information is also a person interested and might develop bias to substantiate the infor mation submitted by him. ( 3 ) THE learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, submits that the Cane Com missioner, by no stretch of imagination, be considered to be a party interested in the payment of compensation to the claimant. The contention of Mr. Singhal. therefore, according to him, is wholly misplaced and misconceived through, however, he does not dispute the proposition of law advanced by Mr. Singhal. ( 4 ) I have heard Mr. Singhal, learned counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Standing Counsel both of whom had made extensive arguments in support of their respective contentions and had led me through different Annexures, pleadings and the provisions of law as well as the earlier judgment upon the notification dated 13th May 1995. ( 5 ) IN the earlier judgment, it was found that the Managing Director of the U. P. State Sugar Corporation to whom the ac quired Undertaking had vested was held to be an interested party. Inasmuch as though compensation was payable by the State Government but ultimately the burden is borne by the Corporation. ( 6 ) AFTER the quashing of the earlier notification, dated 13th May, 1995 by the said order dated 1st September 1995, pur suant to the direction contained in the said judgment, the present notification has been issued appointing the Cane Commissioner as the Prescribed Authority. ( 7 ) prescribed Authority has been defined in Section 2 (g) of the said Act mean ing the Prescribed Authority appointed under Section 10. Section 10 of the said Act empowers the Government to appoint by notification an officer not below the rank of a Commissioner or a District Judge for per forming the functions of the Prescribed Authority under the said Act. It also em powers the State Government to appoint different Prescribed Authorities in respect of different scheduled undertakings. In Sec tion 2 (h), scheduled undertakings have been defined to be these specified in Schedules I and II. The petitioners under taking figures in serial No. 4 in Scheduled II. It also em powers the State Government to appoint different Prescribed Authorities in respect of different scheduled undertakings. In Sec tion 2 (h), scheduled undertakings have been defined to be these specified in Schedules I and II. The petitioners under taking figures in serial No. 4 in Scheduled II. ( 8 ) ADMITTEDLY the petitioner is entitled to compensation on account of acquisition of its undertaking. The compensation is payable by the State Government. The amount of such compensation is to be deter mined by the Prescribed Authority ap pointed under Section 10 of the said Act in the manner provided in Section 7 of the said Act. Section 10 as it has been framed postu late the appointment of the Prescribed Authority. The person who can be ap pointed as Prescribed Authority, though not exhaustively dealt with but only an indica tion has been given to the effect that the officer should not be an officer below the rank of Commissioner or District Judge. It never postulated that only Commissioners or District Judges are to be appointed. The only criteria that has been laid down is that the person appointed as the Prescribed Authority should be of a rank of Commis sioner or District Judge or above. Admitted ly Cane Commissioner is an officer not below the rank of a Commissioner. There fore, he is also eligible for being appointed as Prescribed Authority. ( 9 ) IT is an established principle of law that a person can not be a judge in his own cause or a person interested or who might develop bias in the subject-matter or has in any way any thing to do with it in a different capacity with which he might be interested through not personally but in official capacity, he may not satisfy the test of the priciple that justice should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to have been done, as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Mineral Development Limited v. The State of Bihar and another, AIR 1960 SC 468 . Relying on the decision in the case otnageswara Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 376, wherein the following observation has been concurred: "the principles governing the "doctrine of bais" vis-a-vis judicial tribunals are well settled and they are: (i) no man shall be a judge in his own cause; (ii) justice should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done. The two maxims yield the result that if a member of a judicial body is "subject to a bias (whether finan cial or other) in favour of, or against, any party to a dispute, or is in such a position that a bias must be assumed to exist, he ought not take part in the decision or sit on the tribunal"; and that "any direct pecuniary interest, however small, in the subject-matter of enquiry will disqualify a Judge, and any interest, though not pecuniary, will have the same effect, if it is sufficiently substantial to create a reasonable suspicion of bias". The said principles are equally applicable to authorities, though they are not courts of justice or judicial tribunals, who have to act judicially in deciding the rights of others, i. e. authorities who are em powered to discharge quashi-jadicial functions". ( 10 ) IN the above context, it is to be determined as to whether the Cane Com missioner who has been appointed as Prescribed Authority satisfies this test and does not attract the mischief as enunciated by the above time tested principle since been repeated time and again by the Apex Court. ( 11 ) IN the counter-affidavit, it has been sought to be urged in paragraph 13 that the Cane Commissioner is in no way interested in the payment of compensation. The learned Standing Counsel countered the contention of the counsel for the petitioner to the effect that by reason of furnishing an information in terms of Section 7 (6) Ex planation, the Commissioner becomes an interested person and there is every likelihood of his developing bias, with the contention that such informations are ap plied through mechanical process based on the records available. Inasmuch as according to the learned Standing Counsel, the Sugarcane growers sell/supply sugarcane to the Mills through the Cane Cooperative Societies and are being paid through such Societies though the Cane Commissioner is invested with certain powers under the U. P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Pur chase) Act, 1953 and U. P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1954, hereinafter referred to as 1953 Act and 1954 Rules respectively. Yet the Cane Commissioner can not be said to be inter ested in the matter. According to him the Cane Commissioner has no concern with the supply of sugarcane or payment thereof to the cane growers. The Commissioner does not have any thing else other than the administrative control that the price of sugarcane is given to the respective Cane Societies within time. Mr. Singhal, on the other hand, stressed solely on the Explana tion provided under sub-section (6) of Sec tion 7 of the said Act and contended that it is open to the State Government to obtain relevant information from the Cane Com missioner amongst others. Therefore, he is an interested person and likely to develop bias in the matter of information furnished by him which is a relevant material for the purpose of deduction of ceitain amount from the compensation payable which is to be determined by him. ( 12 ) THE Commissioner or Cane Com missioner has not been defined in the said Act. The Cane Commissioner is appointed under Section 9 of the 1953 Act. Therefore, for the definition of cane Commissioner, we are to rely upon the definition given in Section 2 (d) of the 1953 Act. The said definition does not offend the context of the said Act. Section 2 (d) defines cane Commissioner to mean an officer ap pointed under Section 9 of the 1953 Act. Section 9 of the said Act postulate appoint ment of Cane Commissioner for performing the duties and exercising the powers con ferred or imposed upon the Cane Commis sioner by the 1953 Act. Various lands of duties and powers have been conferred on the Cane Commissioner under the 1953 Act. Within the scope of the present dis pute, it is not necessary to refer to all the duties and powers conferred or imposed on the Cane Commissioner under the 1953 Act. Various lands of duties and powers have been conferred on the Cane Commissioner under the 1953 Act. Within the scope of the present dis pute, it is not necessary to refer to all the duties and powers conferred or imposed on the Cane Commissioner under the 1953 Act. We have to determine in the context of the present dispute as to whether there is any scope to raise a suspicion that a Com missioner in furnishing the information as contemplated in Explanation II Section 7 (6) of the said Act is susceptible to develop any bias. ( 13 ) SECTION 7 of the said Act provides for determination and mode of payment of compensation. A plain reading of Section 7 indicates that the compensation is payable by the State Government on various items mentioned therein as determined by the Prescribed Authority. From the compensa tion payable, the State Government is en titled under Section 6 to deduct certain amounts as specified therein. Section 7 re quires the Government in sub-section (5) to deposit the compensation payable with the Prescribed Authority and such compensa tion is payable to the claimant in accordance with the decision of the Prescribed Authority. Whereas sub-section (6) re quires the State Government to deposit the balance of the amount payable after deduct ing the amounts mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of sub- section (6 ). In case the deductions are equal to or exceeds the compensation, in that event, no amount is required to be deposited. In such event only an informa tion is to be given by the Prescribed Authority. In case the deductions are equal to or exceeds the compensation, in that event, no amount is required to be deposited. In such event only an informa tion is to be given by the Prescribed Authority. ( 14 ) SUB-SECTION (6) of Section 7 provides as follows: " (6) The State Government shall provisionally deduct from the compensation referred to in sub-sections (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) the following amounts, namely: (a) any amount due on account of any debt, mortgage, charge, or other encumbrance or lien, trust or similar obligation attached to the scheduled undertaking which by virtue of the provisions of Section 3 shall, on the appointed day, attach to the compensation in substitution for the undertaking; (b) any amount due to any cane-growers or any cane-growers co-operative societies in respect of the price of sugarcane supplied by such cane-growers or by members of such society to the scheduled undertaking before the appointed day; (c) any amount of wages, retaining al lowance, bonus, provident fund or other payment due to persons employed as workmen (within the meaning of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1917) in connection with the scheduled undertak ing immediately before the appointed day ; (d) any amount due in respect of either the employers contribution or the employees con tribution realised by the employer or any other dues recoverable from the employer under the Employees Provident Fund Act. 1952 or the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 in respect of persons employed in- connection with the scheduled undertaking immediately before the appointed day that the employer may have failed to pay in accordance with the respective Acts; (e) any amount, not being an amount referred to in Cl. (a), claimed by the State Govern ment to be due immediately before the appointed day from any person interested in the scheduled undertaking on account of any loan, tax or cess, or any penalty or interest due in respect of such loan, tax or cess, - And deposit the balance, if any, with the Prescribed authority, and where such deduc tions are equal to or exceed the compensation, it shall inform the prescribed authority accordingly: Provided that the amount provisionally deducted under Cl. (a), in so far it is not claimed by the State Government as due to itself, be deposited with the Prescribed Authority for dis bursement to the persons interested according to their respective titles. Explanation.- The amount referred to in Cls. (a), (b), (c) and (d) shall be provisionally deducted on the basis of information available with the State Government in respect thereof, and it shall be open to the State Government to obtain relevant information either from the Corporation or from the Cane Commissioner, the Labour Commissioner, the Employees Provident Fund Commissioner or the Employees State Insurance Corporation, as the case may be". ( 15 ) WITHIN the ambit of the present case, we are concerned with clause (b) under which the State Government is entitled to deduct the amount due to the cane growers or Cane Growers Cooperative Societies in respect of prices of sugarcane supplied by them to the scheduled undertaking. The Ex planation provides that suck provisional deduction is to be mane on the basis of the information available with the Staie Government and it is open to the State Government to obtain the information con tained in clause (b) from the Cane Commis sioner. Similarly it can obtain information with regard to other clauses from the other authorities mentioned in the said Explana tion in respect of the deductions mentioned in various clauses. Therefore, under the said Act, the Cane Commissioner is an in strumentality in furnishing information with regard to the amount so to be deducted by the State Government. It is the cane Commissioner who having been appointed Prescribed Authority would be required to determine the amount payable and as to tho validity of the deduction so made by the State Government if it is so challenged. It might be a case that the claimant may also challenge the veracity or validity of the in formation furnished by the Cane Commis sioner and in such case, the Prescribed Authority would be called upon to decide and determine the same even if while acting as an officer it is expected and normally it is so done by such officer dispassionately but still then there might be scope of suspicion in the mind of the claimant that the Com missioner may develop bias and he might be a Judge in his own cause in respect of such infornjation furnished by him to the State Government. ( 16 ) SUCH a view stands fortified by the provision contained in Section 17 of the 1953 Act. Section 17 of the 1953 Act provides as follows: "17. Payment of cane price.- (1) The oc cupier of a factory shall make such provision for speedy payment of the price of cane purchased by him as may be prescribed. (2) Upon the delivery of cane the occupier of a factory shall be liable to pay immediately the price of the cane so supplied, together with all other sums connected therewith. (3) Where the person liable under sub-sec tion (2) is in default in making tlie payment of the price for a period exceeding fifteen days from the date of delivering, he shall afco pay interest at a rate of 7-1/2 per cent per annum from the said date of delivering, but the Cane Commissioner may, in any case, direct, with the approval of the State Government thr. t no interest shall be paid or be paid at such reduced rate as he may fix: Provided that in relation to default in pay ment of price of cane purchased after the com mencement of this proviso, for the figure 7-1/2 the figure 12 shall be deemed substituted. (4) The Cane Commissioner shall forward to the Collector a certificate under his signature specifying the amount of arrears on account of the price of cane plus inteiest, if any, due from the occupier and the Collector, inreceipt of such certificate, shall proceed to recover from such occupier the amount specified therein as if it were an arrear of land revenue". ( 17 ) UNDER the said provision, the Cane Commissioner has power to direct with the approval of the State Government that no interest shall be paid or be paid at such reduced rates as the Cane Commissioner may fix. If any amount is not paid by the occupier as provided in Section 17, in that event, the recovery proceedings is initiated by the Commissioner under his signature by forwarding a certificate specifying the amount of arrears to the Collector for its recovery as arrears of land revenue. There fore, the Commissioner is an instrumen tality in determining the arrears payable to the cane growers or the Society and inter ested in recovering it by issuing certificate under his signature through the Collector. There fore, the Commissioner is an instrumen tality in determining the arrears payable to the cane growers or the Society and inter ested in recovering it by issuing certificate under his signature through the Collector. ( 18 ) THE contention that an appeal lies from the order passed by the Prescribed Authority to the Tribunal appointed under Section 12 of the said Act, as contended by the learned Standing Counsel, does not ameliorate the proposition that in the mat ter of determination of compensation by the Prescribed Authority, the Commissioner plays a part in the manner of determination of the amount due to the cane growers and recovery thereof under the 1953 Act while furnishing information under the said Act in terms of Explanation to sub-section (6) of Section 7 brings him within the mischief of the principle that one should not be a judge of his own cause and that the justice is not only to be done but should also be seen to have been done. Inasmuch as since the Cane Commissioner is an instrumentality in is suance of the certificate for the recovery of the dues under his signature, therefore, there might be sufficient reason to raise a suspicion in the mind of the claimant that there is a scope of the Cane Commissioner being biased in respect of that particular aspect with regard to which he has to furnish information. If as Prescribed Authority, the Cane Commissioner is called upon to decide the same, in that everit, it would hit the principle that a person can not be a judge in his own cause. At the same time having furnished information himself to the State Government to enable the State Government to claim deduction on the basis of information furnished by him, if challenged, he is again called upon to decide the correctness or veracity of the informa tion supplied by him, which fact is capable of raising suspicion in the mind of the claimant that there is scope of developing bias by the Commissioner in respect of such informa tion furnished by him while determining the compensation as Prescribed Authority. ( 19 ) ON the above principle, as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Nageswara Rao (supra) in the case of Mineral Development Limited (supra), the appointment of the Cane Commissioner by the impugned notification, dated 4th. ( 19 ) ON the above principle, as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Nageswara Rao (supra) in the case of Mineral Development Limited (supra), the appointment of the Cane Commissioner by the impugned notification, dated 4th. Oc tober, 1995 can not be sustained. The notification, dated 4th October. 1995 is, therefore, quashed. ( 20 ) THE contention that only the Dis trict Judge ought to be appointed as Prescribed Authority by reason of the; fact that on all earlier occasion, only District Judges were so appointed does not seern to be of any substance. Section 10 specifically postulate that a person not below the rank of Commissioner or District Judge is to be appointed as Prescribed Authority. It does not postulate that only the District J udge is to be appointed as Commissioner. In view of the scheme of the Act, it can not be s,aid that the State Government is bound to appoint only District Judges as Prescribed Authority. It is open to the State Govern ment to appoint any person of trie rank of Commissioner or District Judge, as the State Government may deem fit. ( 21 ) IN view of the observations made above, the State Government shall be free to appoint Prescribed Authority keeping in mind the observations made in this judg ment read with the observations made in the judgment dated 1st September, 1995 in Writ Petition No. 20086 of 1995 M/s. Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U. P. and others. ( 22 ) THE writ petition thus succeeds and is allowed. The notification, dated 4th Oc tober, 1995 being Annexure 1 to the writ petition is hereby quashed. The State Government shall be free to appoint a Prescribed Authority as early as possible as observed earlier. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .