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1997 DIGILAW 463 (PAT)

Jadu Gope v. State of Bihar

1997-07-03

GURUSHARAN SHARMA

body1997
JUDGMENT Gurusharan Sharma, J 1. In the year, 1975, the Petitioner No.5 was married with the opposite party no.2 at Biharsharif. Subsequently the petitioner no.5 got employment at Giridih and started living there with his family. 2. According to opposite part no. 2, in the year 1987 while at Giridih the petitioner no. 5 started torturing her and demanded motorcycle, coloured television and Rs.15,000/- in cash from her parents. She was assaulted and attempt was made to burn her. In November, 1987, she was allowed to go to her parents at Biharsharif after execution of bond. She came back to Giridih in February, 1988 and on the intervention and pursuation of the neighbourers, she was any how allowed to enter into the house of the petitioner no.5 but her parents were not allowed. After Some time her ornaments and clothes were snatched and she was turned out from the house. In the year, 1988 the petitioner no.5 filed complaint case no.334 of 1988 under Section 498 of the Indian Penal Code in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Giridih against the father, uncle and two brothers of the opposite party no.2. Thereafter the petitioner no.5 filed Matrimonial (divorce) case no.4 of 1990 in the court of District Judge, Giridih against the opposite party no.2. Lastly no 28.3.1996 all the petitioners came to Biharsharif and pressed opposite party no.2 to put her signature on the proposed petition for mutual divorce, which she refused and consequently she was assaulted by fists and slaps. 3. On 29.3.1996, opposite party no.2 filed complaint case no. 131C of 1996 against the petitioners in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Biharsharif for the alleged offence under Sections 323, 379 and 498 of the Indian Penal Code. Same day she was examined on S.A. and cognizance of the aforesaid offence was taken against the petitioners. 4. Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad, Senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that the alleged offence was said to have been committed by the petitioners at Giridih and as such the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Biharsharif had no jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof and under Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the complaint, if any, should have been filed in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Giridih, within whose loca1 Jurisdiction, it was alleged to have been committed. It was further submitted that no case under Sections 323, 379 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code was made out against the petitioners and the cognizance was barred by limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The alleged acts subjecting the opposite party no.2 to cruelty occurred at other place i.e. at Giridih and not at the place of filing of complaint at Biharsharif and so the learned Magistrate at Biharsharif had no territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of take alleged offence. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Aquil Ahmad Khan, counsel for the opposite party no.2 submitted that she was illtreated and sent back to her fathers house at Biharsharif demanding dowry. The cruelty and torturing under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was a continuous offence and she was forced to live at Biharsharif and she was also assaulted there and as such the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Biharsharif had the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the aforesaid offence against the petitioners and there was no question of any limitation as provided under Section 468 of the Code or Criminal Procedure. 6. The allegations in the complaint are that the petitioner no.5 started making demands of cash, motorcycle and television and harassed opposite party no.2 and she was assaulted and turned out from the house. So I find that opposite party no.2 has generally stated about the demands and assault. I, therefore, feel that the complaint contained only vague allegations of torture and harassment without details and without specific allegations with refence to dates. 7. In the present case the alleged harassment, if true was meted out to the opposite party no. 2 only at Giridih where the motorcycle television and cash was demanded from her parents, she was assaulted and was turned out from the house. I find that no part of the alleged cruelty or harassment arose within the Jurisdiction or the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate at Biharsharif and so it had no Jurisdiction to entertain the complaint against the petitioner herein under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. 8. Under Section 498A the cruelty must be one which is likely to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the women. 8. Under Section 498A the cruelty must be one which is likely to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the women. The mere statement that the petitioners asked the opposite party no.2 to join the petition for mutual divorce may not constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code unless the mental agony, if any to the opposite party no.2 was of such nature as to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health. Similarly the harassment must also be such as should have been actually meted out by the accused. It cannot be stretched further and stated that the petitioners were guilty of harassment to the opposite party no.2. It appears that opposite party no.2 was not living with petitioner no.5 and his family members at Giridih, after she left Giridih and came to her parents house at Biharsharif In the year, 1988 and the petitioner no.5 filed complaint case no.334 of 1988. 9. According to opposite party no.2, her ornaments and clothes were snatched by the petitioners at Giridih in the year, 1988 and the said act constituted offence under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, but the complaint was filed on 29.3.1996 at Biharsharif and as such it is clear that the Biharsharif court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. 10. So far as the alleged offence under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners was concerned, there was absolutely no statement as to who assaulted the opposite party no.2 on 28.3.1996. 11. The allegation that the petitioners visited Biharsharif on 28.3.1996 has no basis and was falsified. The cognizance could not have been taken of the alleged offence against the petitioners at Biharsharif. There was no allegation whatsoever that opposite party no. 2 was subjected to continuous cruelty after she left Giridih in the year, 1988. 12. I am of the view that the mere fact that the opposite party no.2 resides at Biharsharif cannot give jurisdiction to the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Biharsharif to take cognizance of an offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code in absence of some act subjecting her to cruelty which had occurred or taken place at Biharsharif. That is the reason why opposite party no.2 alleged that the petitioners came to Biharsharif on 28.3.1996 to get over the question of jurisdiction. That is the reason why opposite party no.2 alleged that the petitioners came to Biharsharif on 28.3.1996 to get over the question of jurisdiction. 13. The opposite party no. 2, therefore abused the process of the court on the basis of the materials, which was before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and could not be controverted by the opposite party no. 2, the impugned order taking cognizance was without territorial Jurisdiction and, therefore, contrary to law. 14. I have, therefore, no option but to quash the entire criminal proceeding vide case no. 131 C of 1996 pending in the court of Chief Judidial Magistrate, Nalanda at Biharsharif against the petitioners including the order dated 29.3.1996, whereby cognizance was taken. The complaint and the orders passed and the proceedings emaneting therefrom are quashed. 15. In the result, this application is allowed. Application Allowed.