JUDGMENT Samir Kumar Mookherjee, J. 1. This first miscellaneous appeal is directed against an order refusing the prayer for interim injunction, made on behalf of the present appellant, as plaintiff, in a suit, inter alia, for cancellation of the deeds of revocation of trust, of sale and of lease all dated 5.3.63 and another deed of lease dated 11.7.66 and for declaration that the decree passed in T.S. No. 704/81 is not binding and that Trust Deed dated 18.7.55 is valid and the plaintiff petitioner was the beneficiary thereunder with respect to premises Nos. 266A and 266B, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta. 2. The relevant facts may be stated as follows:- One Lal Behari Mallick, was the owner of the disputed properties; he executed a deed of trust, relating to 266A, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, inter alia, providing for utilization of the benefits of the income of trust property by himself and after his death by his wife and in the event of they having an Issue, by such issue as the absolute owner of the suit properly; the present plaintiff/appellant Is admittedly the daughter of the said settlor and was born on 18.6.57, the father of present respondent No.1, was the personal doctor of the said settlor and was also a tenant under him with regard to the adjoining house being 266B, Chittaranjan A venue, Calcutta; when the plaintiff/appellant, was of the age of about 6 years, the said settlor appears to have revoked the trust by the aforesaid deed of revocation and sold the property to the said doctor of his, who In turn created a tenancy in favour of the said settlor by a deed of lease as mentioned above, all the aforesaid three documents appear to contain a statement that the said settlor and his wife did not have any issue on the dates of execution thereof, presumably for the purpose of justifying the revocation and sale without complying with the required statutory formalities the terms of tenancy had subsequently been modified by a further deed making the tenancy operative for the life time of Lal Behari after the death of Lal Behari, in or about 1971, a suit for eviction was instituted by the father of respondent No.1 against the present plaintiff/appellant and her mother; during the pendency of an appeal before the High Court. the plaintiff/appellant at allied majority and admittedly contested as such major the proceeding before the Supreme Court, arising on the basis of the special leave for appeal to Supreme Court from the judgment and decree passed by this High Court In appeal; the appeal before the Supreme Court stood dismissed and the decree for eviction was put into execution whereafter the present suit bad been instituted leading to the instant appeal. 3. The Trial Court appears to have dismissed the application for interim order, inter alia, on the following grounds:- (i) After the Supreme Court judgment a judgment in rem the plaintiff must be deemed to have been properly represented. (ii) Question of fraud has no relevance after pronouncement by Supreme Court. (iii) Due to expiry of period of limitation after attainment of majority by plaintiff, she cannot get any benefit due to her minority. 4. In course of hearing before us, detailed submissions as had been made by the Counsel representing the contesting parties. We are not unmindful that as an Appellate Court from the order of the Trial Court, at an Interlocutory stage. it will not be proper for us to deal with such submissions in details and express a firm view, as, the same may fetter the hands of the Trial Court in disposing of the suit on Its merit, according to law. We, therefore propose to deal with the contentions only to the extent as may be necessary for the purpose of enabling us to adjudicate on the propriety of the order under appeal. According to us, the submissions, as made by the learned Counsel, on proper analysis raise the following points for being considered by us: - (a) Maintainability of the suit, (b) Existence of a prima facie case or arguable issues, (c) Balance of convenience, and (d) Question of irreparable injury. 5. With regard to (a) Mr. Roy Chowdhury, has argued that the provisions of Order 21, Rules 97 to 101 render the instant suit totally non-maintainable. In support of his argument he has relied upon the decision reported in Deba Prasad Mazumdar vs. Man Mohon Mazumdar, 1997 (1) CHN 495 and Mr. 5. With regard to (a) Mr. Roy Chowdhury, has argued that the provisions of Order 21, Rules 97 to 101 render the instant suit totally non-maintainable. In support of his argument he has relied upon the decision reported in Deba Prasad Mazumdar vs. Man Mohon Mazumdar, 1997 (1) CHN 495 and Mr. Dasgupta on the other hand has contended that in the instant case the execution case is at the stage of Order 21 Rules 34 and 35, and, as such, in view of the specific language of Order 21, Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it cannot be said that the suit on the face of it is not maintainable. 6. In this connection, Mr. Roy Chowdhury, has also argued that the present suit is hit by the principles of constructive res-judicata Inasmuch as the right, which is now sought to be asserted on behalf of the plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that the attained majority during the pendency of the appeal before this Court horn the suit for eviction and contested the proceeding before the Supreme Court as a major, not having based her defence on such rights had forfeited her entitlement to get any relief in the present suit. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, in support of this contention had cited the decisions in the cases of P.K. Vijayan vs. Kamalakshi Amma, 1994 (4) SCC 53 and Rajlakshmi vs. Banamali, AIR 1953 SC 33 . Mr. Dasgupta on the other hand has contended that in view of the case pleaded on behalf of his client about lack of knowledge, about the facts of revocation of the trust deed, execution of the deed of sale and deed of lease, till 22nd and 24th December, 1995, without allowing her opportunity to adduce evidence in support of such case, the Trial Court did not have no jurisdiction to presume knowledge on her put about Such documents and facts and as such the principle of constructive res-judicata could not apply to non suit her. The plea of limitation from the date of majority could operate only from the above mentioned dates of discovery of fraud. 7. In our considered view, Mr. Dasgupta's contentions deserves acceptance for the reasons as argued by him. 8. The plea of limitation from the date of majority could operate only from the above mentioned dates of discovery of fraud. 7. In our considered view, Mr. Dasgupta's contentions deserves acceptance for the reasons as argued by him. 8. Regarding (b) admittedly, the deeds of revocation, sale and transfer contained, prima facie, untrue statements, namely, that Lal Behari Mallick and his wife did not have any issue, though on the date of execution of the said deeds, plaintiff had attained the age of about 6 years. The absence of knowledge of the father of respondent No.1 about existence of the plaintiff when he was the personal doctor of Lal Behari and also a tenant of the adjacent premises, deserves strict scrutiny, which cannot be bad without evidence being taken. The enforceability of the transactions entered into through the said three deeds, in the context of the aforesaid facts, without compliance with statutory requirements in connection with revocation of the trust and sale of the trust property, gives rise to an arguable issue. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that the allegations fraud, as made in the application before the Trial Court, were not specifically denied or controverted in the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondents. 9. As regards the question of balance of convenience and irreparable injury, it must tilt in favour of the plaintiff/appellant as she is in possession of the disputed property and if during the pendency of the suit, she is allowed to be dispossessed by the execution of the decree, undeniably, she would suffer irreparable injury which cannot be remedied even If she succeeds in the present suit. The interest of the respondents can be amply protected by directing the plaintiff/appellant to file a written undertaking before the Trial Court, as a condition precedent to the order of injunction prayed for on her behalf, not to alienate, encumber, sale or deal with the property during pendency of the suit. 10. The discretion exercised in refusing prayer for interim relief cannot be said to have been exercised judicially for the Infirmities in the order of the Trial Court as mentioned above. 11. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the order under appeal and Issue an order of injunction, restraining the respondents from disturbing the plaintiff/ appellant's possession. The discretion exercised in refusing prayer for interim relief cannot be said to have been exercised judicially for the Infirmities in the order of the Trial Court as mentioned above. 11. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the order under appeal and Issue an order of injunction, restraining the respondents from disturbing the plaintiff/ appellant's possession. In any manner, including by execution of the decree till the disposal of the suits on condition that the plaintiff/appellant files a written undertaking before the Trial Court to the effect, as indicated hereinabove, within a period of one week after reopening of Court after X was vacation and for such period there will be an unconditional order of injunction, which shall stand vacated in the event of the appellant's default in filing such undertaking There will be no order as to costs. We keep on record that other questions raised about effect of valid revocation of trust or effectation of interest of a bona fide purchase for value are required to be decided on evidence in course of trial in the suit. We make it clear that the trial Court, in proceeding with the suit and disposing of the same, will not in any manner be influenced by the views expressed by us in this judgment. Later - If all urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment is applied for by any of the parties, the Department is directed to deliver the same within ten days from the date of requisite stamps and folios. I agree.