Honble YADAV, J.–On 26.3.1997 it was brought to my notice that a revision in respect of land in question is pending before the State Government as envisaged u/S. 300 of Rajasthan Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as `the Act). It was also brought to my notice that aforesaid revision pending before the State Government under the aforesaid Section has been filed in continuation of a decision given by learned single Judge of this Court on 17.5.1986 against which a Special Appeal was filed before the Division Bench of this Court and the order of learned single Judge was modified vide order dated 6.9.1990. It was further brought to my notice that against the decision dated 6.9.1990 passed by Division Bench of this Court, SLPs were filed before the Honble Supreme Court which were dismissed on 30.1.1991. Learned counsel for the parties were directed on the aforesaid date to come prepared on the aforesaid point. (2). Today learned counsel for the appellant brought to my notice that he has moved an application supported with an affidavit by Shri Mangilal appellant u/O. 41 R. 27 CPC for bringing on record the aforesaid documents alongwith other impor- tant documents, having bearing on the merits of the case. (3). The aforesaid application moved u/O. 41, R. 27 CPC is being opposed by answering respondents by filing detail objection supported with an affidavit. The objection filed, opposing the application u/O. 41, R. 27 CPC is also accompanying with some of the important documents having bearing on the merits of the case. (4). I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. (5). I am of the opinion that this Court requires these documents accompanying with the application u/O. 42, R. 27 as well as the documents filed by contesting respondents, opposing the aforesaid application, to enable the Court to pronounce the judgment and adjudicate the controversy between the parties for all times to come.In absence of these documents, the controversy involved in the present appeal cannot be adjudicated finally, therefore, the application moved by the appellant u/O. 41, R. 27 CPC is hereby allowed in exercise of my powers u/Cl. (b) of sub-rule (1) of R. 27 of O. 41, CPC. In the interest of justice, the documents accompanying the objection filed by the contesting respondents are also required to be brought on record. (6). (b) of sub-rule (1) of R. 27 of O. 41, CPC. In the interest of justice, the documents accompanying the objection filed by the contesting respondents are also required to be brought on record. (6). After directing for bringing on record, aforesaid documents, I directed the learned counsel for the parties to argue this Second Appeal on merits. (7). Learned counsel for appellant raised a preliminary objection to the effect that till the revision pending before the State Government u/S. 300 of the Act in com- pliance of decision of Division Bench of this Court dated 6.9.1990 which has already been affirmed by Supreme Court on 30.1.1991 is not finally decided, the present appeal cannot be adjudicated on merits. In support of his contention learned counsel for the appellant invited my attention towards the judgment of learned single Judge in S.B.C. Writ Petition No. 1671/85 filed by appellant Mangilal against State Government which was decided by a composite order on 17.5.1986. The learned Single Judge allowed all the writ petitions and the resolution of the Municipal Board Sri Vijaynagar dated 26.12.1983 and the order of the Chairman dated 15.4.1985 were quashed. Some of the writ petitions mentioned in the operative portion at Item No.2 were allowed and it was declared that the petitioners of these writ petitions are lease- holders of the shops in their possession in their own rights but they shall be liable to pay the cost of the constructions and the structures on the shop as on the date the said shop was allotted to them by the Board with interest @ 10% p.a. from the date of allotment. The Collector Sri Ganganagar was imposed with the duty to determine the cost or cause it to be determined by any Additional District Collector of his District and intimate the same to the petitioner-lease holders within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the copy of judgment in his office. The petitioners were directed to deposit the cost with interest in the office of the Collector, Sri Ganganagar within a period of four months thereafter. The petitioners were directed to deposit the cost with interest in the office of the Collector, Sri Ganganagar within a period of four months thereafter. In the operative portion of the judgment of learned Single Judge there is a third category of writ petitions wherein it was held that it would be open to the Municipal Board Sri Vijaynagar to decide afresh the question as to who, the petitioners or the original allottees, are entitled to the grant of lease of the shop in their favour. However, before a decision is taken, the Municipal Board was directed to hear the petitioners and the original allottees. Till the matter is decided afresh, the possession of the petitioners was not be disturbed. It was also made open to the Board to give appropriate directions regarding the cost of constructions and structures on the shop. (8). It is pertinent to mention here that the petition No. 1679/85 filed by present appellant Mangilal found place in Third Category in the judgment of learned Single Judge. (9). Indisputably against the judgment of learned Single Judge dated 17.5.1986 a special appeal was filed by appellant Mangilal which was disposed of by a common judgment by two learned Judges, constituting Division Bench on 6.9.1990. (10). It is strenuously argued on behalf of appellant-Mangilal that the judgment given by learned Single Judge was modified in Special Appeal and the judgment of learned Single Judge was set aside with a direction to remand all those cases to Municipal Board, Sri Vijaynagar to decide them after hearing both the parties in accordance with law. It was made specific in operative portion of the judgment of learned Judges constituting Division Bench that any observation made in the judgment of the learned Single Judge in his order or any observation made by them will not prejudice any party. With the aforesaid observation all the Special appeals were finally disposed of. (11). Aggrieved against the judgment passed by Division Bench of this Court on 6.9.1990; indisputably, some of the petitioners, including Mangilal appellant preferred SLP before Honble Supreme Court. Indisputably SLP filed by Mangilal which was numbered 1191/90 was finally disposed of by the Apex Court on 30.1.1991 alongwith similar SLPs. (11). Aggrieved against the judgment passed by Division Bench of this Court on 6.9.1990; indisputably, some of the petitioners, including Mangilal appellant preferred SLP before Honble Supreme Court. Indisputably SLP filed by Mangilal which was numbered 1191/90 was finally disposed of by the Apex Court on 30.1.1991 alongwith similar SLPs. Their Lordships of Apex Court dismissed the SLP with an observation that all the points raised in these petitions are kept open and may be urged and agitated in the appropriate Court, if the petitioners so desired. (12). Learned counsel appearing on behalf of contesting respondents opposed the preliminary objection raised on behalf of appellants and invited my attention to the fact that due to pendency of revision of Shri Mangilal before the State Government u/S. 300 of the Act the final disposal of instant Second Appeal cannot be kept in abeyance till decision of said revision. According to learned counsel for respondents Shri H.C. Jain, if appellant-Mangilal was aggrieved against the decision taken by Municipal Board, Sri Vijayanagar he ought to have filed a writ petition before this Court instead of filing a revision as envisaged u/S. 300 of the Act. (13). The aforesaid argument of Mr. Jain is not acceptable to me for the reason that cause of action for filing a writ petition for petitioner would accrue only after exhausting all the statutory remedies provided under any of the Act. Indisputably the decision taken by the Municipal Board, Sri Vijayanagar is reversible as envisaged u/S. 300 of the Act, therefore, appellant-Mangilal was justified to file a revision before the State Government and after decision thereof, he would be at liberty to file a writ petition if he would be so advised. (14). It is next contended by Shri H.C. Jain, appearing on behalf of contesting respondents that in the judgment passed by Division Bench on 6.9.1990 it was specifically ruled by Honble Judges that looking to both the sides and the infirmi- ties pointed out by both the sides, they considered it just and proper to remand all those cases to the Municipal Board, Sri Vijayanagar to decide the rights of the competing parties after hearing all of them and subject to any decision of a Civil Court if there is any. Mr. Mr. Jain strenuously urged that the expression used by Honble Judges, constituting Division Bench ``any decision of a Civil Court if there is any means pendency of the civil suit. It is difficult for me to accept the aforesaid argument advanced by Mr. Jain, for the reason that decision of a Civil Court does not include within its ambit the ad interim stay order as suggested by him or pendency of a civil suit. (15). To my mind, the aforesaid expression used by learned Judges, constituting Division Bench means that if there is no decision on merits by a Civil Court on the date or order i.e. on 6.9.1990, then in those cases the petitioners were entitled to be heard before Municipal Board, Sri Vijayanagar about their rights and liabilities. It is admitted that on the date of order passed by Division Bench i.e. on 6.9.1990 the decision of trial Court was not in exitence. In fact, trial Court passed its judgment and decree on 19.4.1993, therefore, the Division Bench does not meant about the existence of ad interim stay order but it means only a decision on merits by the Civil Court. In abundant caution it is observed that normally a writ petition, is not maintainable where Civil Suit is pending but the decision taken between the parties by Division Bench and affirmed by the Supreme Court is binding on me, the decision taken by Division Bench, affirmed by the Supreme Court has to be complied with faithfully and religiously without any breach in the present facts and circumstances of the case within the meaning of Art. 144 of the Constitution after extending the principle of merger theory. In fact after dismissal of SLP, the judg- ment of Division Bench of this Court merged with the judgment of dismissal passed by Apex Court on 30.1.1991 and it shall be presumed that the judgment of Division Bench dated 6.9.1990 is affirmed. (16). I am of the view that after dismissal of SLP by Supreme Court on 30.1.1996, the judgment dated 6.9.1990 given by Division Bench of this Court shall be treated to be judgment of Apex Court by extending the principle of merger theory even though detailed reason for dismissal of SLP on merits are not given. (16). I am of the view that after dismissal of SLP by Supreme Court on 30.1.1996, the judgment dated 6.9.1990 given by Division Bench of this Court shall be treated to be judgment of Apex Court by extending the principle of merger theory even though detailed reason for dismissal of SLP on merits are not given. To my mind the very fact that SLP is dismissed means that the view expressed by Division Bench in its judgment dated 6.9.1990 is confirmed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court which amounts declaration of law. Expressing an opinion contrary to view expressed by Honble Supreme Court would be against the judicial propriety dignity and decorum of judicial discipline. Even the obiter dicta of the Supreme Court on a point raised and argued before it will be binding upon this Court. (17). However, in the interest of justice it would be expedient to direct the State Government to decide the revision filed by appellant Mangilal u/S. 300 of the Act expeditiously. (18). In view of what has been discussed above the application u/O. 41, R. 27 CPC is hereby allowed and the objection filed by the contesting respondents is hereby rejected. Preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant succeeds and the office is hereby directed to list this Second Appeal after deci- sion of revision pending before the State Government u/S. 300 of the Act which is in continuation of the decision taken by the Apex Court while dismissing the SLPs on 30.1.1991 by approving the decision taken by Division Bench of this Court on 6.9.1990 about the points of determination involved in the present Second Appeal relating to the subject matter of dispute.