Ved Prakash Kapoor v. Kamla Prasad Rai — 1997 DIGILAW 467 (ALL)

JUDGMENT R. A. Sharma, J. (1.) THIS appeal has been filed under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the High Court Rules read with Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act by the appellants against the Judgment of the learned single Judge dated 8.5.1995, the concluding portion of which is as under : "In view of my discussions made above, I hold that the opposite parties have flouted the Hon'ble Courts' directions and the opposite parties are guilty of the contempt of Court. However, the present Director General of Police was not a party to the Selection Committee and in his affidavit it has been made abundantly clear that he was not informed of the Court's order earlier as he was not holding the post of the D.G.P., U. P.. Lucknow and as such he should be exonerated from the alleged charge of contempt of Court and he will abide by any decision of this Hon'ble Court. I shall consider his case regarding his punishment at all, if any, afterwards. I direct the opposite parties to promote Kamla Prasad Rai as directed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. L. Yadav and Kamla Prasad Rai should be given all benefits of promotion including his salary and seniority accordingly. Regarding the compliance of the Hon'ble Court's Order, the opposite parties are directed to file an affidavit by 17.5.1995. Respondent No. 1 is also directed to attend the Court on that date, if an affidavit of compliance is not filed." By the above judgment, the learned Judge has held that the appellants had committed the contempt of Court by flouting the judgment/directions given by this Court; but no sentence was awarded and an opportunity was given to them to comply with the orders of this Court. (2.) SRI V. B. Singh, learned counsel for the appellants has made two submissions in support of this appeal, namely, (i) the appellants have complied with the earlier judgment/order of this Court and. therefore, there was no occasion for the learned single Judge to declare the appellants guilty of the Contempt of Court ; and (ii) it was not open to the learned singe Judge to go into the comparative merits of the claims of the respondent and others. SRI Dilip Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent has. apart from disputing the aforesaid contentions, contended that this appeal is not maintainable. SRI Dilip Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent has. apart from disputing the aforesaid contentions, contended that this appeal is not maintainable. As a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of this appeal has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondent, it is necessary that the same should be decided at the thresh hold. (3.) IN the instant case, the impugned order has been passed under the Contempt of Courts Act. Therefore, the appeal can be filed only under Section 19 of the said Act. In such a case Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the High Court Rules will not apply. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, so far as it is relevant, is as under: "19. Appeals.-(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt- (a) where the order or decision Is that of a singe Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court, (b) where the order of decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union Territory, such appeal shall He to the Supreme Court." A Division Bench of this Court in Vijay Krishan Goswami v. Suresh Chand Jain, 1994 AWC 82 , has held that against a decision of a learned single Judge holding a person guilty of Contempt of Court, an appeal lies under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act even though no sentence has been awarded. Relevant extract from the said decision of the Division Bench is as under : "From the above, it would be seen that appeal lies from a "decision" as well as from an "order". Decision, in our opinion, would be final decision of the contempt application. When a separate word 'order' has been used in the same clause, it would appear that it refers to something other than the final Judgment. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that an appeal is maintainable even against an order, which does not finally dispose of the contempt proceedings. However, every interim order passed in the contempt proceedings is not appealable under the above provision. Only that order is appealable which is passed in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that an appeal is maintainable even against an order, which does not finally dispose of the contempt proceedings. However, every interim order passed in the contempt proceedings is not appealable under the above provision. Only that order is appealable which is passed in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In the present case before proceeding to issue directions in the operative portion, the learned single Judge has recorded finding that he was fully satisfied that Sri Jai Krishna Goswami and Sri Vijay Krishna Goswami had deliberately. In defiance of the orders of law courts and their undertaking continued to retain the possession of the disputed premises. It has also been observed ; "Their conduct is reprehensible and they are liable to be punished for contempt and also the premises, in these circumstances, is liable to be got vacated from them through some other machinery in accordance with law. (Emphasised) From this, it would appear that the learned single Judge was satisfied that contempt of Court had been committed by the appellant. It cannot, therefore, be said that the order under appeal was not passed in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. We are accordingly of the opinion that the present appeal is maintainable. The view taken by us has the support of a Division Bench of the Court in Simesh Sachdev v. Baldev Raj. 1989 ALJ 928. IN paragraph 10 of the report it has been reported : "From the above, it will be seen that there is no total bar on an appeal against an order passed at an intermediate stage. It will depend upon the nature of contention raised and the manner in which the same has been disposed of by the Court. IN case a contention which goes to the very root of jurisdiction is raised and the same Is turned down, certainly it must give rise to a right of appeal under Section 19 (1)." (4.) IN the State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and another, JT 1996 (6) SC 151. the relevant extract of which is reproduced below, the Supreme Court has held that unless the 'order' or 'decision imposes a punishment for contempt, appeal under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act is not maintainable : "On a plain reading. the relevant extract of which is reproduced below, the Supreme Court has held that unless the 'order' or 'decision imposes a punishment for contempt, appeal under Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act is not maintainable : "On a plain reading. Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. IN other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provided that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words 'any order' has to be read with the expression 'decision' used in said sub-section which the High Court passed in exercise of its Jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 'Any order' is not independent of tire expression 'decision'. They have been put in an alternative form saying 'order or 'decision'. IN either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt If the expression 'any order' is read independently of the 'decision' then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result" (Emphasis supplied). In the instant case, the learned single Judge held that the appellants are guilty of contempt of Court as they have flouted this Court's order passed earlier. After holding as above, the learned Judge gave opportunity to the appellants to comply with the orders of this Court. There is no order Imposing punishment on the appellants. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and another (supra), this appeal is not maintainable, because by the impugned order/judgment, no punishment has been imposed on the appellants. There is no order Imposing punishment on the appellants. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and another (supra), this appeal is not maintainable, because by the impugned order/judgment, no punishment has been imposed on the appellants. The law laid down by this Court in Vijay Krishna Goswami v. Suresh Chand Jain (supra), being contrary to what is laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy (supra), is no more a good law and stands overruled. (5.) PRESUMING that this appeal is maintainable, it has to be dismissed even on merits for the reasons given below. (6.) SRI Kamla Prasad Rai. the respondent In this appeal was appointed as Sub-Inspector of Police In 1969. In 1988, the Departmental Selection Committee considered the case of the respondent and various other Sub-Inspectors for promotion to the post of Inspector of Police. The Selection Committee selected seven persons for promotion to the post of Inspector and rejected the claim of the respondent and others. Three Sub-Inspectors Including the respondent, who were not selected for promotion, filed a Writ Petition No. 2071 of 1989 before this Court (hereinafter referred to as the first writ petition), challenging the aforesaid decision of the Selection Committee. This writ petition was allowed by Hon'ble H. C. Mlttal. J., by Judgment dated 21.11.1990, holding that the meritorious claims of the three petitioners therein including the respondent were ignored and the persons whose names were not clear by the Senior Superintendent of Police and who were not even called for interview and against some of whom departmental proceedings and trial under Section 302, I.P.C. were pending, were selected. Relevant extract from the said judgment is as under : "Petitioner No. 1 is B.A., LL.B and was passed as Confidential Officer, Basti. He was appointed as Sub-Inspector in the year 1973-1974 and was appointed as Inspector C.B.I, at Patna from January, 1986 to October, 1988. He was eligible to the post of Inspector since 1984 and has worked as Station Officer from 1979-1985. His name was forwarded for promotion as Inspector and was called for interview in 1986 also. He was given selection grade as well. It is also not denied that he had no adverse entry regarding punishment of misconduct and his integrity was beyond doubt. His name was forwarded for promotion as Inspector and was called for interview in 1986 also. He was given selection grade as well. It is also not denied that he had no adverse entry regarding punishment of misconduct and his integrity was beyond doubt. He has also obtained more than 100 rewards during the tenure of his service. Petitioner No. 2 was appointed as Sub-Inspector in 1969 and is working as Station Officer since 1986. He is eligible for promotion as Inspector since 1982 and was called for Interview In 1982 but was not promoted. He has also got more than 100 rewards and has been regularly called for interview since 1982 and no punishment has ever been awarded to him. His name was also cleared by Senior Superintendent of Police. Basti and the D.I.G. for selection 1988. Petitioner No. 3 was also appointed as Sub-Inspector in 1966 and has been working as Station Officer since 1972 till today. He has also got more than 100 rewards. There is no entry of misconduct or adverse entry against him during the last five years. He was also cleared by the D.I.G. and was called for interview In 1988. On behalf of the State it has not been denied that the candidates who have been selected one of them was facing the trial under Section 302, I.P.C. and departmental and C.I.D. inquiries were pending against him and that respondent No. 3 was also punished under Section 7 of the U. P. Police Act in 1988 and that he worked as Munshi of the Director General of Police who was Chairman of the Selection Board and that he was posted only as Sub-Inspector and not as Station Officer at the time of his selection. The fact that proceedings against respondent No. 4 Loknath Verma were pending and his name was not cleared by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Basti and even then he was called for Interview and was selected, have not been denied by the State. Regarding respondent No. 5 Sri Lal Chand Bharti It has not been denied that he is facing the trial under Section 302, I.P.C. and also proceedings of misconduct and C.I.D. Inquiry are pending against him. It is also not denied that his name was not cleared by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gorakhpur and even then he was called for interview and selected. It is also not denied that his name was not cleared by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gorakhpur and even then he was called for interview and selected. 1, Regarding respondent No. 6 SRI Baleshwar Yadav it was argued that he was reverted from the post of Station Officer and was posted as Sub-Inspector and he was held guilty of misconduct and is facing departmental inquiry and his name was not cleared by the Senior Superintendent of Police. He was called for Interview and was selected and this fact is also admitted by the State. The State has also admitted that respondent No. 7 Sri Raghvendra Singh is also facing C.I.D. inquiry. The State has also not denied that entries of misconduct were awarded to SRI Tirath Raj Pandey, respondent No. 8, and his name was not recommended by the Senior Superintendent of Police nor by the D.I.G. Range and that was not called for interview. He directly appeared before the Board and was selected. Similarly, it has not been denied that SRI Mahesh Narain Mishra, respondent No. 9 was not recommended by the Superintendent of Police and the D.I.G. nor called for interview but he directly appeared before the Board and got himself selected. Thus it was admitted to the State that the Selection Committee did not follow the rules and various provisions of the Government Order but arbitrarily selected the candidates who were neither recommended by the Superintendent of Police nor by the D.I.G. and some whom were not even called for interview and thus the entire selection suffers from arbitrariness and violation of Government Orders committing selection to be made on merit alone. The respondents have prima Jacle failed to justify the decision of the Selection Committee on both the counts. The petitioners are senior as well as nothing adverse has been pointed out against their merit. It was the duty of the State to bring on record the facts which could Justify the decision of the Selection Committee." The concluding portion of the said judgment of the learned Judge is also reproduced below : "In view of the facts discussed above, it is clear that the present petitioners were in all manner better than respondents No. 3 to 9 who have been selected for the reasons best known to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 who have not cared to disclose them and bring relevant facts on record and, therefore, the learned standing counsel also could not Justify why respondent Nos. 3 to 9 were selected in preference over and above the present petitioners when they were not even qualified and some of them were not even called for interview. The question, therefore, remains as to what relief the petitioners should get, so that Injury caused to them be undone and those selected would also not be disturbed. It would, therefore, be proper in the ends of justice if the names of the present petitioners be also recommended by the Selection Committee. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed to the extent that the respondents No. 1 and 2 are directed to constitute a Selection Committee within one month of filing of the certified copy of this order and then it may recommend the names of the petitioners for promotion as Inspectors of Police and accordingly they be promoted. The petitioners have given an undertaking that they would not claim seniority from those selected promotees in 1988 Batch. The names of the petitioners be kept at the bottom of the Select, 1988 Batch keeping in mind their inter se seniority." By the aforesaid Judgment, the learned Judge held that the names of the petitioners therein including the respondent be recommended by the Selection Committee for promotion. The learned Judge accordingly issued direction contained in the last paragraph of the judgment to the respondents therein to constitute a Selection Committee within one month of filing of the certified copy of the said judgment, which is to recommend the names of the petitioners therein Including the respondent for promotion to the post of Inspector. However, selection of seven persons for promotion was not disturbed and an undertaking from the petitioners therein to the effect that they will not claim any seniority over those promotees. was recorded. Certified copy of the aforesaid decision: in the first writ petition was produced before the appellants by the respondent on 23.11.1990. The Government, however, made an application before this Court for three months' time in order to comply with the said Judgment/Order but no order was passed on that application and even after lapse of three months, no action was taken pursuant to this Court's judgment. The Government, however, made an application before this Court for three months' time in order to comply with the said Judgment/Order but no order was passed on that application and even after lapse of three months, no action was taken pursuant to this Court's judgment. The respondent thereafter filed a Contempt Petition No. 467 of 1991 before this Court on 20.3.1991. This Court on 2.4.1991 instead of taking any action for contempt granted one month's further time to the appellants to comply with this Court's Judgment; but even then this Court's Judgment was not complied with. On 15.5.1991 Hon'ble R. B. Mehrotra, J., holding the contemner guilty of contempt of Court, directed them either to comply with the aforesaid judgment of this Court dated 21.11.1990 or to appear before the Court on 23.7.1991 for being punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. The appellants even then did not comply with the judgment and moved an application for review of the judgment dated 21.11.1990. The contempt case was accordingly adjourned. During the pendency of the review application the appellants constituted a Selection Committee and rejected the claim of the respondent vide order dated 26.9.1991 for promotion to the post of Inspector holding that the earlier decision of the Selection Committee passed in 1988 rejecting the respondent's claim for promotion does not require any change. This order was placed in sealed cover, as in the meantime two cases were instituted against the respondent. It may here be mentioned that on 26.9.1991 when the Selection Committee rejected the claim of the respondent for promotion, the first Judgment dated 21.11.1990 which has become final, was fully operative and only a review application was pending. The result was that the mandatory directions issued by this court in the judgment dated 21.11.1990 directing the Selection Committee to recommend the respondent's name for promotion were not only not complied with but were flouted deliberately. The appellants thus clearly committed contempt of this Court on 26.9.1991 when they rejected the claim of the respondent for promotion for two reasons, firstly, they did not constitute the Selection Committee within a month of production of certified copy of the judgment dated 21.11.1990 ; and secondly the Selection Committee did not recommend the respondent's name for promotion to the post of Inspector in spite of the directions to that effect contained in the said judgment. The review application came up before Hon'ble Anshuman Singh, J., who allowed it to the extent that the operative portion of the judgment (last paragraph of the judgment) was substituted as follows : "In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed to the extent that the respondent Nos.1 and 1 are directed to constitute a Selection Committee within one month of filing of the certified copy of this order and reconsider the case of the petitioners opposite parties for promotion as Inspectors of Police according to the G.O. applicable to the said promotion and, if selected, their seniority shall be fixed according to law but without disturbing the seniority of respondent Nos.3 to 9." While substituting the last paragraph of the judgment dated 21.11.1990 on the review application filed by the appellants. Hon'ble Anshuman Singh. J., did not interfere with the said judgment, so far as the merit was concerned. This is clear from the following passage of the order dated 27.9.1991 passed by Hon'ble Anshuman Singh, J., on the review application : "Not by way of repetition but as a matter of abundant caution, I would like to emphasise again that so far as the merits of the judgment passed by the learned single Judge is concerned, the same has not been questioned at all in the present review petition." (7.) AS mentioned hereinbefore, the claim of the respondent was rejected before the order dated 27.9.1991 was passed on the review application ; but as by the review order the last paragraph of the judgment dated 21.11.1990 has been substituted, the contempt petition filed by the respondent was dismissed by this Court with the observation that it will be open to the respondent to challenge the order dated 26.9.1991, rejecting his claim for promotion. The respondent accordingly filed a Writ Petition No. 2373 of 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the second writ petition) before this Court challenging the decision of the appellants, rejecting his claim for promotion. This writ petition was allowed by Hon'ble B. L. Yadav, J., by judgment dated 7.4.1994. The learned Judge held that the judgment In the first writ petition dated 21.11.1990 is binding on the appellants, because the same was maintained by Hon"ble Anshuman Singh. J., also while partly allowing the review petition. This writ petition was allowed by Hon'ble B. L. Yadav, J., by judgment dated 7.4.1994. The learned Judge held that the judgment In the first writ petition dated 21.11.1990 is binding on the appellants, because the same was maintained by Hon"ble Anshuman Singh. J., also while partly allowing the review petition. In this connection, relevant passage from the second writ petition is reproduced below : v "AS regards the first point, suffice it to say that the ratio of the decision in the aforesaid petition was that the persons similarly situated, were recommended for interview and were selected. These facts were stated in the petition but just evasive reply was given in the counter-affidavit. In fact, the petitioner has 100 rewards to his credit and similarly situate other persons arrayed as respondents 3 to 9, in the earlier writ petition, were not possessed with such meritorious service as the petitioner, nor they were senior to him, nevertheless they have been selected whereas the petitioner with meritorious service and having a number of rewards and good entries has not been selected. Consequently, the order of the first Selection Committee was quashed in the earlier petition and the Selection Committee was to be constituted again within a month, with the modification that the petitioner would not claim seniority over the respondents 3 to 9, who were selected. This ratio was maintained in the order dated 27th September, 1991 passed by Hon'ble A. Singh, J. and the review petition was partly allowed. Only the operative portion was substituted to the effect that the petition succeeds and the respondents 1 and 2 were directed to constitute a fresh Selection Committee and they were to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion as Inspector of Police according to the Government order and in case he was selected, seniority was to be fixed according to law. The observations of this Court about the suitability and merit of the petitioner having so many awards to his credit were maintained. Consequently, the ratio and commendation about the suitability and meritorious service of the petitioner became final. The matter was not taken to the Apex Court so that any modification could have been made. The observations of this Court about the suitability and merit of the petitioner having so many awards to his credit were maintained. Consequently, the ratio and commendation about the suitability and meritorious service of the petitioner became final. The matter was not taken to the Apex Court so that any modification could have been made. Consequently, if such observation about the suitability and merit of a particular candidate in the Police service was made and the same was commended, could it be said to be justified on the part of the Selection Committee meeting on 31st October, 1991 or on some earlier date to ignore the observations of this Court. As the meritorious services of the petitioner were appreciated and opinion was expressed by this Court, may be that the Departmental Selection Committee or the Selection Committee has its own sphere of working, nevertheless if an opinion is expressed or a finding is recorded in a judgment dated 21.11.90 (Annexure 5) about the suitability of a particular candidate, that could not be Ignored when the Selection Committee for more than one reason particularly when respondents were parties to the writ petition in such matters. The doctrine of State Decisis Et Non Quiete MOVERE, connotes to stand by decisions and not to disturb which is settled. It was put by Lord Coke in his classic English version as those things which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace. See Wamen Rao v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 271 . This doctrine is also regarded as a rule of policy which promoted certainty, predictability and uniformity. The respondents being parties and otherwise also, were bound by the findings and opinion expressed by this Court in favour of the petitioner." AS regards the claim of the appellants regarding two fresh departmental proceedings initiated against the respondent, the learned Judge rejected the same by holding as under : "In the present case, the Departmental Selection Committee made a lame excuse that two fresh departmental proceedings had been initiated against the petitioner as given in the impugned order. Consequently, the petitioner could not be selected and the result was kept in the sealed cover. Consequently, the petitioner could not be selected and the result was kept in the sealed cover. This appears that as the petitioner Initiated contempt proceedings against the respondents as the earlier order of this Court was not complied with, rather the same was alleged to be wilfully disobeyed, hence the contempt proceedings, even though dismissed, appear to have influenced the mind of the members of the Selection Committee." The order dated 26.9.1991 as communicated by letter dated 31.10.1991 was accordingly quashed and directions were issued to consider the candidature of the respondent for promotion to the post of Inspector in view of the observations made in the two judgments and the relevant Government Order applicable to the promotion. The operative portion of the second judgment is also quoted below: "In the view of the aforesaid premises and applying the priori and posterori reasonings, the present petition succeeds and the same is allowed. The impugned order dated 31st October, 1991 (Annexure 7 A to the writ petition) adopting the sealed cover procedure Is quashed. The Home Secretary, U. P. Shasan, Lucknow and the Director General of Police/Chairman of Selection Committee, Police Head Quarters, Dalibagh. Lucknow, the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are directed to constitute another Selection Committee to consider the candidature of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Inspector of Civil Police within two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. The Selection Committee so constituted would consider the case of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Inspector in view of the observations made hereinbefore in this Judgment and the relevant CO. applicable to the said promotion and keeping in view that the two departmental proceedings indicated in the impugned order have already been found incorrect and the petitioner has been exonerated vide Annexures RA-1 and RA-2 to the rejoinder-affidavit, and the averments in para 12 of the rejoinder-affidavit It is, however, made clear that the seniority of the petitioner would be fixed according to law but without disturbing the seniority of respondents 3 to 9 arrayed in the earlier Writ Petition No. 2071 of 1989 Udai Narain Rat and others v. State of U. P. and others, decided on 21st November, 1990 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition). There shall be no order as to costs." (Emphasis supplied) The certified copy of the judgment dated 7.4.1994 of the second writ petition was furnished to the appellants on 14.5.1994. The appellants accordingly constituted a Selection Committee, which rejected the respondent's claim for promotion on 2.7.1994. The respondent thereafter filed the contempt petition in which the learned Judge has passed the order impugned in his appeal. (8.) THE appellants were required to consider the claim of the respondent for promotion taking Into consideration the findings recorded and the observations made in the two Judgments of this Court and the Government Order applicable to promotion. In their affidavits, filed in the contempt proceedings by the appellants, it has been stated, which has also been highlighted before us by the learned counsel for the appellants, that the claim of the respondent for promotion was considered according to the relevant G.O. but the observations made and the findings recorded by this Court regarding the merit of the claim of the respondent contained in the two judgments were not taken Into account although specific directions to that effect were Issued vide judgment dated 7.4.1994. The learned single Judge in his order given in the contempt petition, which has given rise to this appeal, has held that the Selection Committee did not pay any heed to the directions and observations made by this Court in its earlier judgments regarding the merit and suitability of the respondent for promotion to the post of Inspector. In this connection, the learned Judge has held as under: "I find irregularity has been committed by the said Selection Committee for not paying any heed to the directions and observations made by his Hon’ble Court In its judgment dated 7.4.94 passed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. L., Yadav and also of Hon. Mr. Justice A. S. and as such the petitioner has been a victim, possibly he sought redress through the writ petition and as both writ petitions were allowed on contest." The judgment dated 21.11.1990 given In the first writ petition had become final and even by an order passed on the review application filed in the said case, Hon'ble Anshuman Singh, J., did not disturb the findings recorded and the observations made by this Court regarding the merit of the claim of the respondent. The judgment dated 7.4.1994 given by Hon'ble B. L. Yadav, J., in the second writ petition has also become final, as we have dismissed the appeal filed against it by a separate order on the ground of limitation. Both these Judgments and the findings recorded and the observations made therein are binding on the appellants. They were thus bound to consider the case of the respondent for promotion on the basis of the observations and findings contained in those two judgments and the Government Order relating to promotion. It is clear from the record that the claim of the respondent for promotion was rejected on 2.7.1994 by the Departmental Selection Committee only on the basis of the G.O. without taking into consideration the finding and the observations made in the two judgments. The result is that the directions Issued by this Court in the said judgments remained uncomplied with and candidature of the respondent for promotion was rejected in deliberate and contumacious defiance of the Judgments/orders of this Court. The learned single Judge was, therefore, justified to hold that the appellants are guilty of contempt of Court. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants lacks merit and is accordingly rejected. (9.) THE second contention of the learned counsel for the appellants deserves the same fate. The learned Judge discussed the case of another candidate in his Judgment. But it was only with the object to highlight the arbitrariness in the order. However, it is not necessary to go into this question because even If the finding of the learned Judge on this question Is ignored, the impugned Judgment/order is not affected because of the reasons given above while dealing with the first contention of the learned counsel. (10.) BEFORE parting with the case, it may also be mentioned that more than once we suggested to the learned counsel for the appellants to consider the claim of the respondent for promotion even now taking into consideration the observations and findings recorded by this Court in its judgments ; but our suggestion was not accepted. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.