JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. 1. This second appeal is at the instance of the defendants in a suit for declaration, recovery of possession and mandatory injunction and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31.7.1982 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 1st Court, Howrah in Title Appeal No.282 of 1981 thereby reversing those dated 25.9.1981 passed by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, 3rd Court, Howrah in Title Suit No.12 of 1978. 2. The respondent No.1 filed the aforesaid Title Suit for declaration that the appellants are licensees of the suit plot, for recovery of possession of the land in suit by demolishing and removing the improvised hut raised upon the suit land and for permanent injunction restraining the appellants from encroaching upon the "Khas" land of the respondent No.1 to the South-East of .04 acre of land of R.S. Plot No.324. The case made out by the respondent No.1 in support of the aforesaid claim was as follows:- (a) The suit property originally belonged to the father of the respondent No.1 who died leaving four sons including the plaintiff/respondent No.1. In a suit for partition among the aforesaid heirs of the father of the plaintiff/respondent No.1, the suit property has been allotted in favour of the plaintiff/respondent No.1 and thus he has become absolute owner thereof. (b) The father of the respondent No.1 gave licence to one Ratan Chandra Rakshit, a local brick manufacturer who occupied the plot for the purpose of taking earth and water from the pond lying within the said plot and laying bricks on the ground for drying purpose. The appellant No.2 being a labourer engaged by said Ratan Chandra Rakshit was permitted to stay in the suit property by raising an improvised hut with palm leaf cover on loose stack of bricks. The appellants have been living together in the said hut as licensee over the suit property. (c) Subsequently Ratan Chandra Rakshit gave up the licence but thereafter the appellant No.2 continued in occupation. (d) Before the allotment of the suit property in favour of the respondent No.1, a fire broke out in the locality and the hut constructed by appellant No.2 was destroyed by fire. Thereafter the appellant No.2 implored the then owners to allow her to continue in occupation and prayed for some more time until she could shift elsewhere. (d) Before the allotment of the suit property in favour of the respondent No.1, a fire broke out in the locality and the hut constructed by appellant No.2 was destroyed by fire. Thereafter the appellant No.2 implored the then owners to allow her to continue in occupation and prayed for some more time until she could shift elsewhere. The then owners consented to the aforesaid proposal of the appellant No.2 but subsequently the appellant No.2 with the help of some people made an endeavour to erect additional structure by claiming adverse possession. (e) The said attempt was however foiled by a suo moto case initiated under Section 44 (2a) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act wherein the Revenue Officer after inquiry found that the appellants were staying in the suit property in permissive possession and accordingly the record was corrected. (f) Inspite of the said Order the appellants having failed to vacate, a notice was issued upon the appellants through Lawyer but in spite of notice the appellant did not vacate. Hence the suit. 3. The aforesaid suit was contested by the appellants by filing joint written statement thereby denying the allegations made in the plaint and their defence were inter alia as follows:- (a) About 50 years ago the father of the appellant No.1 and the husband of the appellant No.2 viz. Antony Pantu Ekka came to Howrah in the suit locality for seeking a job and since then he started residing at the suit plot by constructing a hut on the land. The said predecessor of the appellants was an employee of Indian Machinery of Dasnagar, Howrah. (b) For the last 50 years the said Antony Pantu Ekka and thereafter the appellants are possessing the land as of their own right openly, peaceably and adversely against all including the plaintiff and his predecessor without any hindrence from any quarter. (c) The appellant No.1 came there along with his father when he was a little boy and thereafter he got education and was also married there and four children were born on the suit property. (d) The appellants were paying Chowkidari Taxes and Anchal Panchayat Taxes with regard to the suit plot. The appellants and their family members are also voters of the locality and their names are enlisted in the voter list. (d) The appellants were paying Chowkidari Taxes and Anchal Panchayat Taxes with regard to the suit plot. The appellants and their family members are also voters of the locality and their names are enlisted in the voter list. (e) It was absolutely false that appellant No.2 was inducted as licensee by Ratan Chandra Rakshit. 4. The learned Trial Judge by his judgment and decree dated 25.9.81 dismissed the aforesaid suit with a finding that the respondent No.1 failed to prove induction of the appellant No.2 as licensee and that the appellants had acquired title to the suit property by adverse possession. 5. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge the respondent No.1 preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 282 of 1981 which was ultimately heard by the learned Additional District Judge, 1st Court, Howrah and the learned Additional District Judge by his judgment and decree dated 31.7.82 allowed the said appeal thereby setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge and passing a decree for declaration and recovery of possession after demolishing and removing the hut standing thereon. 6. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have preferred the instant second appeal. 7. It appears from the record that at the time of admission of the Instant second appeal, the appeal was ordered to be beard on all the grounds taken in the Memorandum of Appeal. However, at the time of hearing of the instant second appeal, Mr. Dasgupta appearing in support of the appeal prayed for permission to agitate two further grounds In support of the Instant appeal which were not taken in the Memorandum of Appeal and sought for permission to take such grounds. After hearing Mr. Dasgupta I found that those two points were basically substantial questions of law requiring no investigation of any new fact and as such I permitted the appellants to take those two grounds and adjourned the matter for a week to enable Mr. Dutta appearing on behalf of the respondent to answer the aforesaid two new grounds. Accordingly the matter has been subsequently heard after a week and Mr. Dutta bas made his submission against the additional grounds taken by Mr. Dasgupta. Dutta appearing on behalf of the respondent to answer the aforesaid two new grounds. Accordingly the matter has been subsequently heard after a week and Mr. Dutta bas made his submission against the additional grounds taken by Mr. Dasgupta. The following two questions are thus formulated for the purpose of disposal of the instant second appeal:- (1) Whether in view of Section 6 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 the instant suit is maintainable as the respondent No.1 was admittedly not in "Khas possession" of the suit property on the date of vesting under the said Act viz. 15.4.55 ? (2) On the date of coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963 whether the right of the plaintiff/respondent No.1 to recover suit property from the appellants was barred in view of Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 ? 8. In elaborating the first additional ground as mentioned above Mr. Dasgupta contends that the suit holding being the holding of a raiyat and the said raiyat being admittedly out of possession on the date of vesting viz. 15.4.55, the owner of the land bad no right to retain the suit property as be could retain only the land In "Khas possession". Thus, having no right to retain, he had also no right of filing a suit for recovery of possession from a trespasser. In support of the aforesaid contention Mr. Dasgupta has relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in K.C. Singh vs. Kamala Singh, AIR 1977 SC 5 and a Division Bench decision of this Court in B.B. Ghosal vs. Sue Kamal Singh, AIR 1984 Cal 122 . 9. Mr. Dutta, the learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiff/respondent No.1 on the other hand contends that in the revisional record of right the suit property having been recorded as Bastu viz. homesteads, those decisions have no application to the Instant case. According to Mr. Dutta for the purpose of retaining agricultural land, those must be in "Khas possession" of the intermediary but for the purpose of righting homesteads there is no such mandate imposed by any of the provision of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act that such homesteads must also be in "Khas possession". After going to the relevant provision viz. Section 6 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act I find substance in the contention of Mr. Dutta. 10. After going to the relevant provision viz. Section 6 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act I find substance in the contention of Mr. Dutta. 10. According to Section 6(d), agricultural and in "Khas possession" not exceeding 25 acres in area as may be chosen by an intermediary may be retained. But according to Section 6(a), land comprised in homesteads can always be retained. Thus, In Clause (a) of Section 6 there is no provision that land comprised in homesteads must also be in the "Khas possession" of intermediary. Thus, in my opinion the aforesaid Supreme Court decision and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court has got no application to a case of homesteads of an intermediary. In my opinion, even if as intermediary is not In "Khas possession" of his homestead on the date of vesting he can retain such land and as such be is also entitled to file a suit for recovery of possession of such homesteads from a trespasser. This, the first point raised by Mr. Dasgupta is without any substance. 11. As regards the second additional ground taken by Mr. Dasgupta, it is now well settled that if a suit is filed for recovery of possession on the basis of title in such a case the suit will not be barred even If the trespasser is in possession of the suit property for more than 12 years, unless the trespasser, can establish that be is claiming adverse possession for more than 12 years. Article 142 of the Old Limitation Act applies in a case, where a suit is flied by a person on the basis of earlier possession and has got no application to a case where such suit is filed on the basis of title. In such a case Article 144 of the Old Limitation Act would apply. In the instant case the respondent No.1 has filed the suit not on the basis of earlier possession but on the basis of his title. Thus, on the date coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, the suit filed by the present respondent No.1 was not be barred unless the appellants can show that they were exercising adverse possession for more than 12 years. 12. Thus, on the date coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, the suit filed by the present respondent No.1 was not be barred unless the appellants can show that they were exercising adverse possession for more than 12 years. 12. In the instant case the learned First Appellate Court being the final Court of fact on consideration of materials on record has arrived at a conclusion that the appellant had failed to establish adverse possession. In arriving at such conclusion the learned First Appellate Court has drawn adverse interference against the appellants for non-examination of the appellant No.2. The learned First Appellate Court has also relied upon the entry made in the revisional record of right as corrected by a suo moto proceeding under Section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act. Mr. Dasgupta appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that the learned First Appellate Court bas merely relied upon the observation made in the proceeding under Section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, wherein the Revenue Officer based his finding on the basis of the alleged admission of the appellant No.2 before Enquiry Officer as licensee over the suit property. According to Mr. Dasgupta, admission recorded in a judgment cannot be binding unless the entire evidence recorded therein 18 also placed before the Court and in support of such proposition Mr. Dasgupta has relied upon a decision of Patna High Court reported in Sardar Bahadur Sardar Indra Singh vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1943 Patna 169, and that of a Madras High Court Reported in Medavarapur Narasayya vs. Medavarapur Veerayya, AIR 1935 Madras 268. There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition of law, but the fact remains that against the order on the aforesaid suo moto proceeding under Section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, the appellants have not preferred any appeal, although the said order is an appellable one. Thus, the learned First Appellate Court was quite justified in relying upon the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the authority concerned in the said proceeding by holding that the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the record of right prepared pursuant to the order passed by the Revenue Officer. Thus, the learned First Appellate Court was quite justified in relying upon the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the authority concerned in the said proceeding by holding that the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the record of right prepared pursuant to the order passed by the Revenue Officer. As indicated above the Appellate Court has also drawn adverse interference for non-examination of appellant No.2 who according to plaintiff came over the suit property as licensee. The question whether a person is a licensee or not is essentiality a question of fact. The learned First Appellate Court on the basis of materials on record bas differed from the conclusion arrived at by the learned Trial Judge. After going through the aforesaid finding I find that the said conclusion is a possible view and cannot be said to a perverse one. The said conclusion cannot also be said to be based on no evidence or on inadmissible piece of evidence or on non-consideration of any important material which goes to the root of the matter. 13. Such being the position, in second appeal I cannot interfere with such finding of fact arrived at by the learned First Appellate Court. Therefore the right of the plaintiff/ respondent No.1 to recover possession of the suit property was not barred at the time of commencement of the Limitation Act, 1963 and as such Section 31(a) of the aforesaid Act is of no assistance to Mr. Dasgupta's clients. Thus, I find no substance in the instant second appeal and the same is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be however no order as to costs.