Judgment :- P.A. Mohammed, J. These two Income Tax References under S.256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short'the Act') are coming up for decision at the instance of the Revenue. The questions of law referred to us for decision are as follows : 1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law and fact in deleting the levy of interest under S.139(8) of the Income -tax Act, 1961? 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and having found that 102 ITR 694 and 203 ITR 389 are in support of the Revenue's contention and also in the light of the observation of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Lally Jacob 1992 (1) KLT 746 = (197 KTR 439 at 454) (first paragraph) wherein the Full Bench distinguished G.B. Transport and found the same inapplicable to a similar case under consideration, the Tribunal is justified in relying on G.B. Transport and is not such an approach by the Tribunal an affront to the Hon'ble High Court and the conclusion highly strange and strained? 3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and the scope of 'regular assessment' being wider in scope, ambit, taking within its sweep both types of reassessments (in the light of decisions) is not the legislation introduced with effect from 1-4-1995 one to limit and confine to reassessment for the first time and not to bring in for the first time reassessment for the first time within its scope of regular assessment and is not the understanding of the intention of the legislature by the Tribunal wrong and unreasonable? 4. Whether, on the fact sand in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law and fact in deleting the levy of interest under S.217 of the I T. Act, 1961? Out of the above, questions 1 and 4 are only relevant and remaining two questions in substance contain arguments, 2. The facts leading to this references are shortly summarised thus : The assessee did not file the return of income under S.139(1) of the Act within the statutory period for the assessment year 1982-83 and 1983-84. In view of this default the assessing officer initiated proceedings under S.143(3) read with S.147(a). The facts leading to this references are shortly summarised thus : The assessee did not file the return of income under S.139(1) of the Act within the statutory period for the assessment year 1982-83 and 1983-84. In view of this default the assessing officer initiated proceedings under S.143(3) read with S.147(a). The officer further levied interest under Ss.139(8) and 217 for the aforesaid years. As against these orders, appeals were filed and the Dy. C.I.T. (Appeals) held that no interest can be changed under Ss.139(8) and 217 and directed the assessing authority to delete the interest charged under Ss.139(8) and 217. On second appeal the Tribunal upheld the findings of the Dy. C.I.T. (Appeals). It held that even the first assessment made under S.147 of the Act cannot be construed as a 'regular assessment' and that prior to 1-4-1985 the expression'regular assessment' could not take within its sweep an assessment made for the first time even though under S.147. The Revenue being aggrieved by the findings of the Tribunal filed the reference applications. That is how these references are coming before us for answer. 3. The Tribunal relied on the following decisions in support of its conclusions. '1. C.I.T. v. G.B. Transports 1985 KLT 908 = (1985) 155 I.T.R.548 (F.B.). 2. Charles D Souza v. C.I.T. (1984) 147 I.T.R.694) (Karnataka). 3. C.I.T. v. Padma timber Depot (1988) 169 I.T.R.646) (Andhra Pradesh). 4. S.139(8) and S.217 authorise levy of interest on'regular assessment'. The interest has to be calculated on the basis of the amount of tax payable on the total income as determined in regular assessment under S.139(8). Under S.217 interest is payable where on making a regular assessment the assessing officer finds that the assessee has not sent a statement of advance tax or estimate in lieu of such statement. In such cases. the interest that could be levied is from the first day of assessment year to the date of regular assessment. There provisions envisage a situation where there is no regular assessment, the quantification of interest is redundant. The question is whether such a construction is justified in view of the legislative purpose of the aforesaid provisions. 5. The term "regular assessment" has been defined in S.2(40) of the Act as assessment made under S.143 or 144. There provisions envisage a situation where there is no regular assessment, the quantification of interest is redundant. The question is whether such a construction is justified in view of the legislative purpose of the aforesaid provisions. 5. The term "regular assessment" has been defined in S.2(40) of the Act as assessment made under S.143 or 144. The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Charles D' Souza v. C.I.T. (1984) 147 ITR 694) interpreted this provision and said "it would be beyond the jurisdiction of any court to give it a wider and comprehensive meaning so as to include all assessments done under the Act whether under S.143/144 or completed after issue of notice under S.148." In this view of the matter the Division Bench answered the question against the Revenue holding that no interest under S.139(8) and S.217 of the Act is leviable in a case of an assessment or reassessment made under S.147 of the Act. A similar view was taken by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.I.T. v. Padma Timber Depot (1988) 169 I.T.R, 646) and held that since the assessment was made under S.143(3) read with S.147 was not a regular assessment and the levy of interest under S.139(8) and 217 was not valid. The Tribunal had placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of this court in C.I.T. v. G.B. Transports 1985 KLT 908 = (1985) 155 I.T.R.548). 6. Learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Revenue however contended that the above Full Bench decision in G.B. Transports' case is clearly distinguishable. He further adds that the propositions laid down by a later Full Bench of this court in Lally Jacob v. Income-tax Officer 1992 (1) KLT 746 = (1992) 197 I.T.R.439) would apply in the present case. 6. Learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Revenue however contended that the above Full Bench decision in G.B. Transports' case is clearly distinguishable. He further adds that the propositions laid down by a later Full Bench of this court in Lally Jacob v. Income-tax Officer 1992 (1) KLT 746 = (1992) 197 I.T.R.439) would apply in the present case. It is pointed out that the later Full Bench has distinguished the earlier Full Bench in G.B. Transports' case thus : "It was pointed out that there is an observation in a Full bench decision of this court in G.B. Transports' case 1985 KLT 908 = (1985) 155 ITR 548 to the effect that an assessment or reassessment under S.147 is not a regular assessment." The Full Bench also dissented the decisions of the Karnataka High Court in Chareles D 'Souza v. C. I. T. (1984) 147 ITR 694) and Andhra Pradesh High Court in C. I. T. v. Padma Timber Depot (1988) 169 I.T.R.646) referred to above. What is laid down by the Full Bench is that any assessment made for the first time by resort to S.147 will also be a regular assessment for the purpose of invoking S.217 of the Act. 7. The Standing Counsel for the Revenue also submitted that the decision of the Division bench of this Court in P. A. Abdul Muthalif Rowther v. Income Tax Officer (1976) 102 I.T.R.694) is still holding the field up till date and the principle laid down therein would sequarely apply in the facts of this case. Particular reference is placed by the counsel on the following passage contained in the said judgment: "It should be remembered that reassessment proceedings under Ss.147 and 148 of the Act are started because the income has escaped assessment for reasons which may range - as was put in a decision of this court - from "the stupidity of the officer to the cupidity of the assessee." These may well befall long after the period of time contemplated by S.139 and the various sub-clauses and provisos thereto. To read S.148 as rendering action under S.139 impossible in such circumstances, would be destructive of the very object and purpose of the reassessment proceedings sanctioned by the section. What S.148 enacts is to treat the reassessment proceedings as assessment proceedings and proceed accordingly under S.139 and other provisions of the Act. To read S.148 as rendering action under S.139 impossible in such circumstances, would be destructive of the very object and purpose of the reassessment proceedings sanctioned by the section. What S.148 enacts is to treat the reassessment proceedings as assessment proceedings and proceed accordingly under S.139 and other provisions of the Act. So understood, we are unable to accept the argument of the counsel for the petitioner. We, therefore, hold than the levy of interest under the impugned assessment orders under the provisions of S.139 was justified and proper". In substance the Division Bench in the above decision made the provisions contained in S.148 and 139 more effective and avoided an interpretation to S.148 as rendering action under S.139 impossible. What is propounded by this court is a purposive interpretation. 8. In view of the discussion hereinabove, we are of the view that the Tribunal is not justified in law in deleting the levy of interest under S.139(8) and 217 of the Act. In the result, the questions of law 1 and 4 are answered in the negative, that is to say, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. We decline to answer the questions 2 and 3 for the reasons recorded above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.