Mrinal Kanti Mohapatra v. State of West Bengal — 1997 DIGILAW 468 (CAL)

JUDGMENT Gitesh Ranjan Bhattacharjee, J. 1. Both the writ petitions are being disposed of by this order Smt. Manjura Khatoon, the petitioner in W.P. No. 10864(W) of 1997 filed the writ petition for a direction upon the respondent No.1, the Pradhan of the Samsabad Gram Panchayat No.7 to postpone the meeting called by the Pradhan on 20.6.97 for considering the resolution of the removal of the Pradhan. The said Gram Panchayat was having 16 members. Out of those 16 members 6 members served a notice dated 13.6.97 on the Pradhan under Section 16(1) of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 for calling a meeting of the Gram Panchayat for considering a resolution for removal of the Pradhan. On receipt of that notice dated 13.6.97 for removal of the Pradhan, the Pradhan Issued on that very day notices to the members of the Gram Panchayat Including the writ petitioner Manjura Khatoon fixing 20.6.97 at 12 noon the meeting of the Gram Panchayat for considering the resolution of removal of the pradhan. The case of the petitioner Manjura Khatoon is that she received the said notice on 16.697. It is also her case that she had earlier received an interview letter from the Adhikarik of Sishu Bikash Pradalpa fixing 20.6.97 at 1-30 p.m. for interview of the petitioner at the office of the B.D.O. which office is situated at a distance from the concerned village as a result of which It was not possible for her to attend the meeting called by the Pradhan as well as to appear in the interview for appointment on the same date. Accordingly, the filed the writ petition on 19.6.97 being writ petition No. 10864 (W) of 1997 for postponement of the Gram Panchayat meeting scheduled to be held on 20.6.97. On 7.8.97 a learned Judge of this Court in this matter passed an order for maintaining status quo in respect of functioning of the Gram Panchayat. The meeting of the Gram Panchayat was however held on 20.6.97 as scheduled and in that meeting 13 members out of total 16 were present and out or them 8 members voted against the resolution for removal of the Pradhan and accordingly, the said resolution was lost. Subsequently, on 14.7.97 again even members of the Gram Panchayat served a notice upon the Pradhan for calling a meeting for removal of the Pradhan. Subsequently, on 14.7.97 again even members of the Gram Panchayat served a notice upon the Pradhan for calling a meeting for removal of the Pradhan. Against that notice the Pradhan Sri Mrinal Kanti Mohapatra filed on 24th July, 1997 the writ petition being W.P. No. 15003(W) of 1997 for stalling the said notice. On 28.7.97 a learned Judge passed an interim order in this matter restraining the respondents from acting upon that notice. Subsequently both these writ petitions have been heard together. 2. The first question that has to be considered is whether the meeting which was called by the Pradhan on 20.6.97 on receipt of notice from some members on that very date can be said to be bad in law so as to invalidate the meeting held on 20.6.97 on the basis of such notice. Under the second proviso to Section 16 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 the Pradhan is required to call the requisitioned meeting within 15 days after giving seven days' notice to the members of the Gram Panchayat. The question is whether in this particular cafe seven days notice was given by the Pradhan to the members of the Gram Panchayat. It may also be noticed here that in the very same proviso there is another provision that if the Pradhan fails to call such meeting, in that event the requisitioning members may themselves call the meeting after giving seven clear days' notice to the Pradhan 2nd other members of the Gram Panchayat. It may be noticed that while the said proviso requires the Pradhan to give seven days' notice for calling the meeting the requisitioning members, when they are to call the meeting, are required to give seven clear days' notice. This difference in the language should have to borne in mind. In my opinion while computing the period of seven clear days the date of issuing the notice as well as the date of the meeting are required to be excluded so that seven clear days may intervene between the said two dates. But In computing the period of seven days' notice, as distinct from seven clear days' notice, only the date of issuing the notice has to be excluded and not the due on which the meeting bas been fixed. Here we find that the notice was issued by the Pradhan on 13.6.97 fixing the meeting on 20.6.97. But In computing the period of seven days' notice, as distinct from seven clear days' notice, only the date of issuing the notice has to be excluded and not the due on which the meeting bas been fixed. Here we find that the notice was issued by the Pradhan on 13.6.97 fixing the meeting on 20.6.97. If 13.6.97 is excluded in computing the period of seven days' notice but including 20.6.97 in that case we will find that the notice as has been given satisfies the requirement of seven days' notice, although it would not have been sufficient to satisfy the requirement of seven clear days' notice. Therefore, I find that in this present case where under the law the Pradhan is required to give seven days' notice and not seven clear days' notice the notice which was issued on 13.6.97 fixing 20.6.97 as the date for bolding the meeting is valid. 3. The learned Advocate for the petitioner in the case of Manjura Khatoon refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jai Charan Lal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1968 SC 5 , in support of his argument that the date of issuing the notice as well as the date of the meeting should be excluded and only the intervening period should be counted in considering whether seven days' notice bas been given. In that case the Supreme Court was considering the relevant provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 under which the relevant notice was required to be sent not less than seven clear days before the date of meeting. The Supreme Court in Paragraph 6 of that decision observed that as the notice was sent on the 17th and the meeting was to be called on 25th it was obvious that seven clear days did intervene and there was no breach of the concerned part of the section. It will be thus clear that the provisions of the Act under consideration of the Supreme Court in that case required that not less than seven clear days notice must be given. It will be thus clear that the provisions of the Act under consideration of the Supreme Court in that case required that not less than seven clear days notice must be given. In our case the provision under consideration, as we have seen, does not require seven clear days' but requires only seven days' notice and that being so, the due of the meeting mentioned in the notice also has to be taken into consideration in computing whether the notice satisfies the requirement of seven days notice. The learned Advocate for the petitioner in Manjura Khatoon also attracts my attention to the decision of M.N. Roy, J. in Sirajul Islam vs. State of West Bengal, 85 CWN 188. That was a decision where the learned Judge had to consider Section 17 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act and not Section 16 which falls for our consideration in the present case. On the other hand two other decisions have been placed before me, by the learned Advocate for the respondent Pradhan, one in Md. Asraf Ali Mandal vs. Block Development Officer, 1992 (2) CHN 229 , rendered by Ruma Pal, J & the other in Samarendra Goswami vs. Dabuk Gram Panchayat, 1995 (2) CHN 238 , rendered by Satyabrata Sinha, J. where it has been specifically held that the provision regarding seven days' notice in the concerned proviso to Section 16 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act is directory and not mandatory. That being so any irregularity In the matter of giving seven days' notice will not ipso facto vitiate the notice or the meeting held on the basis of such notice if no prejudice has been caused to anybody by reason of such irregularity in the matter of a directory provision of law. I respectfully agree with the decisions of the abovementioned two learned Judges Satyabrata Sinha and Ruma Pal, JJ. on this point. 4. It is also the contention of the writ petitioner Manjura Khatoon that the notice which was sent by the Pradhan on 13.6.97 was received by her on 16.6.97. It is however to be noticed that the language used. In the concerned proviso to Section 16(1) requires the Pradhan to give seven days' notice. It is not required that the meeting should be held after seven days of the receipt of the notice. It is however to be noticed that the language used. In the concerned proviso to Section 16(1) requires the Pradhan to give seven days' notice. It is not required that the meeting should be held after seven days of the receipt of the notice. The requirement of giving seven days' notice is complied with if the notice is issued or sent seven days before the date fixed for the meeting. In Jai Charan Lal vs. State of U.P. (supra) the Supreme Court has, in Paragraph 6, clearly observed that the concerned sub-section says that the District Magistrate was required to send the notice not less than seven clear days before the date of the meeting and the word send shows that the critical day is the date of dispatch of the notice, In the case that is under our consideration the language used is give in connection with the notice which in my opinion has the same connotation as send, particularly in the context in which the word has been used and that being so in view of the said Supreme Court decision it is evident that the material date is the date of issuing the notice and not the date of receipt of the notice. This is otherwise also a reasonable interpretation in the context that the Section 16(1), proviso, requires that the meeting must be called within 15 days by the Pradhan after giving seven days' notice. Evidently, therefore, the Pradhan cannot fix a very long date for the meeting after receiving the requisition for holding the meeting In the context, the Supreme Court's interpretation in Jai Charan Lal vs. State of U.P. (supra) as mentioned above will apply to this case and therefore the mere fact that the writ petitioner Manjura Khatoon received the notice on 16.6.97 is inconsequential particularly when the meeting was fixed to be held on 20.6.97 yet leaving a margin of four or five days for her to attend the meeting after receiving the notice. That apart since the provision regarding the period of notice is directory, any irregularity. In the matter will not be of material consequence, unless it causes any substantial prejudice. Here it cannot be said that the petitioner Manjura Khatoon has been in any way prejudiced, far less suffered any substantial prejudice by reason of the receipt of the notice on 16.6.97. In the matter will not be of material consequence, unless it causes any substantial prejudice. Here it cannot be said that the petitioner Manjura Khatoon has been in any way prejudiced, far less suffered any substantial prejudice by reason of the receipt of the notice on 16.6.97. It is her case that already she bad received a notice to appear at an interview in connection with a service appointment on that very date at a different place as a result of which it would not be possible for her to attend the meeting on 20.6.97. She is also aggrieved that the Pradhan has fixed the meeting on the same day on which she was to appear is an interview elsewhere. This in my opinion, is Inconsequential because it is quite possible that an Individual member out of 16 members of the Gram Panchayat may have some difficulty of his or her own on a particular day that may be fixed by the Pradhan for holding the meeting. If the Pradhan is required to choose a date for meeting after ascertaining the convenience or inconvenience of each individual member, in that case it may be difficult to find out a com non date which may be convenient to all 16 members and that too within 15 days only. The grievance of the petitioner in this respect, in my opinion, does not necessarily make the notice or the meeting bad. 5. The learned Advocate for the petitioner Manjura Khatoon also refers to the decision of the Supreme Court is Pratap Singh vs. Stare of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 , where it has been observed that the Constitution enshrines and guarantees the rule of law and Article 226 is designed to ensure that each and every authority in the State, including the Government acts bona file and within the limits of its power and when a Court is satisfied, that there is an abuse or misuse of power and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to afford Justice to the individual. In the present case I cannot say that the Pradhan bas abused or misused his power by convening the meeting on 20.6.97 on which date the petitioner Manjura Khatoon had to appear before an authority elsewhere in connection with consideration for appointment. In the present case I cannot say that the Pradhan bas abused or misused his power by convening the meeting on 20.6.97 on which date the petitioner Manjura Khatoon had to appear before an authority elsewhere in connection with consideration for appointment. In this connection it will have to be also considered as to whether there would have been any substantial change of picture even if the petitioner Manjura Khatoon would have attended the meeting on 20.6.97. We have been that out of 16 members 13 members attended the meeting on 20.6.97 and Jut of those 13 members 8 members voted against the resolution for removal of the Pradhan. That being so even if it is assumed that all the 16 members of the Gram Panchayat were present in the meeting, even then there would have been no scope for majority voting in favour of the resolution for removal of the Pradhan when 8 members expressly voted against that resolution. There is then fore no reason why the writ Court should intervene in the matter even if it is assumed that there bas been any inconsequential irregularity in the matter of calling the meeting or any inconvenience has been caused to any particular member by reason of fixing of meeting on the particular date. 6. It is also argued by the learned Advocate for the petitioner Manjura Khatoon that the meeting which was held on 20th was presided over by a member who himself was one of the signatories to the requisition demanding a meeting for removal of the Pradhan. In my opinion there is no bar against a signatory presiding over such a meeting. In the circumstances there is no reason as to why the writ Court should interfere in this matter. The writ petition filed by Smt. Manjura Khatoon being W.P. No. 10364 (W) of 1997 is therefore dismissed. As regards the other writ petition filed by the Pradhan Mrinal Kanti Mohapatra being W.P. No. 15003(W) of 1997 It is to be stated that in view of the third proviso to Section 12 no meeting call be convened for removal of the Pradhan within six months from 20.6.97, the date on which the meeting for removal of Pradhan was held. In view of the fact that the entire matter was under consideration of the Court during this period and the period of six months is going to shortly expire on 20.12.97 the said writ petition W.P. No. 15003(W) of 1997 is disposed of by directing the Pradhan, the writ petitioner Mrinal Kanti Mohapatra to convene a meeting by fixing a date falling within 15 days from 20.12.97 after giving seven days' notice to the members for considering the resolution submitted by Manjura Khatoon and Others for removal of the Pradhan. He shall also give notice of the meeting to the prescribed authority and the prescribed authority also shall appoint an observer to be present in the meeting who will submit a report to him in due course. Both the writ petitions stand disposed of accordingly.