E. Devarani and others v. Santhanam Kumar Nadar — 1997 DIGILAW 469 (MAD)

Judgment :- C.R.P. No.2839 of 1996 is against the order dated 19. 1996 in M.P. No.357 of 1994 in R.C.A. No.240 of 1994 on the file of the VII Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras. 2. C.R.P. No.246 of 1997 is against the order dated 11. 1996 in R.C.A. No.1134 of 1996 on the file of the VII Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras. 3.C.M.P.No.1171 of 1997 in C.R.P.SR.No.450 of 1997 is to grant leave to the petitioners to prefer a revision petition against the order dated 11. 1996 in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992 on the file of the VII Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras. 4. In all the three cases, Mrs.E.Devarani and others are the petitioners. According to them, their father G.Ethirajulu filed R.C.O.P.No.2630 of 1989 for eviction of a tenant by name Santhana Kumar Nadar under Sec. 10(2)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. On 12. 1991 an order of eviction was passed in the said petition by the 15th Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras. Against the said order, the tenant Santhana Kumar Nadar preferred R.C.A. No.240 of 1992. While the said appeal was pending, two petitions were filed for impleadment. M P. No.357 of 1994 was filed by the appellant Santhana Kumar Nadar for impleading third parties i.e., persons from whom he purchased the very same property, in which he is the tenant. While the said petition was pending, the landlord G.Ethirajulu died on 26. 1995. Hence, the appellant in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992 filed two petitions, one is M.P. No.71 of 1996 to condone the delay of 120 days in filing the petition to implead the legal representatives of the deceased Ethirajulu and the other is for bringing the legal representatives on record. The said condone delay petition was opposed by the legal representatives of the deceased Ethirajulu. 5. In M.P.No.357 of 1994, the tenant contended that he has purchased the property on 14. 1993, of which he was the tenant, from the lawful owners, who have obtained a decree in their favour, in a suit for partition i.e., O.S.No.8565 of 1975. 6. On 19. 1996 the petition to condone delay i.e., M.P. No.71 of 1996 in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992 was dismissed. Therefore, the legal representatives of Ethirajulu were not impleaded as parties in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992. 6. On 19. 1996 the petition to condone delay i.e., M.P. No.71 of 1996 in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992 was dismissed. Therefore, the legal representatives of Ethirajulu were not impleaded as parties in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992. But on the same day M.P. No.357 of 1994 was allowed and Mrs.Thaiyal Nayaki and others were added as respondents 2 to 5 in the Rent Control Appeal. Thereafter on 11. 1996, the appellate authority passed an order in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992 allowing the appeal. The main ground for allowing the appeal is that the tenant Santhana Kumar Nadar has purchased the tenanted property from the co-sharers of the landlord and hence the question of payment of rent did not arise. He has considered Ex.R-18, dated 14. 1993, under which he purchased the property and Ex.R-1 the certified copy of the preliminary decree in O.S. No.8565 of 1975. He has also considered Exs.R-19, 20 and 21. Exs.R-17 to 23 were marked in appeal as per order in I.A. No. 18497 of 1992. 7. Before G.Ethirajulu died, he filed another R.C.O.P.No. 18 of 1995 for eviction against the very same tenant Santhana Kumar Nadar for default to pay rent from 1992 to 1995. In the said petition also M.P. No.773 of 1995 was filed for impleading Mrs.Thaiyal Nayaki and others as parties. The petitioners herein, who were already added as legal representatives of the deceased landlord Ethirajulu opposed the impleading. The XI Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras, dismissed the said petition on 8. 1996. As against the said order, the tenant Santhana Kumar Nadar filed an appeal R.C.A. No. 1134 of 1996 on 11. 1976. The VIIth Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras, allowed the appeal. The said appellate authority in the above appeal has held that the proposed parties i.e., Thaiyal Nayaki and others were necessary parties, since as the co-owners of the petition mentioned property and in that capacity have sold it to the appellant. As against the order of the appellate authority in R.C.A. No. 1134 of 1996 the petitioners herein have filed C.R.P. No.246 of 1997. 8. As against the order of the appellate authority in R.C.A. No. 1134 of 1996 the petitioners herein have filed C.R.P. No.246 of 1997. 8. As against the order in R.C. A. No.240 of 1992, the petitioners herein have filed C.R.P.SR.No.450 of 1997, as they are not parties in the appeal R.C.A. No.240 of 1992 and the eviction order which their father had obtained against the tenant Santhana Kumar Nadar was set aside by the appellate authority after impleading the proposed parties, namely, Thaiyal Nayaki and others. The aggrieved appellants want permission in this Court to file the said civil revision petition and for the said purpose they have filed C.M.P.No.1171of 1997. 9. As already stated the appellate authority before allowing the appeal R.C.A. No.240 of 1992, allowed the petition of the tenant M.P. No.357 of 1994 in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992, to implead Thaiyal Nayaki and others as parties respondents in the said appeal on 19. 1996. As against the said order C.R.P. No.2839 of 1996 has been preferred. 10. In all the three petitions, the common question that has to be decided by this Court is whether Thaiyal Nayaki and others are necessary parties for the disposal of the proceedings, namely R.C.A. No.240 of 1992 and R.C.O.P.No. 18 of 1995 and whether the Appellate Court, namely, the VII Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras, who has allowed the appeals was justified in impleading Thaiyal Nayaki and others as parties in the eviction proceedings instituted by the father of the petitioners herein i.e., G.Ethirajulu. 11. The main contention urged by the counsel for the petitioners in these three petitions is that since the eviction petition was filed by Ethirajulu alone against a tenant admittedly inducted by him into possession, the third parties cannot be impleaded as parties. As far as R.C.A. No.240 of 1992 is concerned, the third parties Mrs.Thaiyal Nayaki and others were impleaded as parties in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992 as per order in M.P. No:357 of 1994 and after they were added, the appeal itself has been allowed. According to the learned counsel fro the petitioners, the original landlord Ethirajulu has obtained the order of eviction against the tenant Santhana Kumar Nadar. The appeal preferred by the tenant against the said eviction order has abated as against the original landlord. Hence, in the absence of legal representatives of the deceased landlord, the eviction order cannot be set aside. According to the learned counsel fro the petitioners, the original landlord Ethirajulu has obtained the order of eviction against the tenant Santhana Kumar Nadar. The appeal preferred by the tenant against the said eviction order has abated as against the original landlord. Hence, in the absence of legal representatives of the deceased landlord, the eviction order cannot be set aside. As against the contention of the counsel for the petitioners, the learned counsel for the respondent-Santhana Kumar Nadar, contended that inasmuch as Ethirajulu was only a co-sharer of the petition building and he has filed the eviction petition without impleading them as parties, there is nothing wrong in impleading the co-sharers of a building in question as parties in the eviction proceedings. He also contended that inasmuch as the tenant himself has purchased the very same petition building from the co-sharers to whom the said building itself was allotted in the partition proceedings, the appellate Court was right in allowing the appeals, as the original landlord ceased to be the person entitled to receive the rent in respect of the building. 12. The question that has to be decided is whether there are justifications for impleading the proposed parties (Thaiyal Nayaki and others) as respondents in the appeal and in the R.C.O.P.No. 18 of 1995, If the said question is answered either way it will decide the three cases. 13. The contention of the counsel for the petitioners is that the proposed parties are not necessary parties, since they have nothing to do with the case, namely, the eviction proceedings, initiated by G.Ethirajulu. The eviction proceedings or any other proceeding instituted under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (as amended by Act 23 of 1973) has to relate to a building and it has to be between the landlord and tenant. If a party or parties can be construed to be landlord under the said Act in relation to a building, then, such a party or parties may be necessary party or parties in a proceeding instituted under the said Act. 14. If a party or parties can be construed to be landlord under the said Act in relation to a building, then, such a party or parties may be necessary party or parties in a proceeding instituted under the said Act. 14. The definition of landlord under the Act under Sec.2(6) of the Act is an inclusive definition and it is as follows: “(6)” landlord “ includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the building were let to a tenant; Explanation: A tenant who sub-lets shall be deemed to be a landlord within the meaning of this Act in relation to the sub-tenant.” 15. The definition does not exclude the definition of landlord in the parent enactment, namely, the Transfer of Property Act. It is needless to say that Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 though an independent statute it cannot exclude the application of Transfer of Property Act completely. In certain circumstances, the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act will be applicable to the landlord and the tenant defined under the enactment. This is very clear from the definition of landlord mentioned above. The inclusive definition adds to the definition of landlord contained" in the Transfer of Property Act. 16. As per the definition in the enactment a person or persons who is or are receiving or entitled to receive the rents of a building is also a landlord or landlords. In the present case, what is the position of the proposed parties. The documents produced go to show that they were entitled to receive the rents of the petition building. In the appellate Court number of documents have been produced and marked as Exhibits. The respondents in C.R.P. No.2839 of 1996 has filed Exs.R-9 to R-14. Similarly the newly added parties, Thaiyal Nayaki Ammal and others filed Exs.P-17 to P-23. Ex.P-14 is the order of the High Court dated 4. 1994 in C.M.P. No.6149 of 1994 in A.S.No.329 of 1994. The said order shows that the preliminary decree dated 28. The respondents in C.R.P. No.2839 of 1996 has filed Exs.R-9 to R-14. Similarly the newly added parties, Thaiyal Nayaki Ammal and others filed Exs.P-17 to P-23. Ex.P-14 is the order of the High Court dated 4. 1994 in C.M.P. No.6149 of 1994 in A.S.No.329 of 1994. The said order shows that the preliminary decree dated 28. 1992 in O.S. No.8565 of 1975 was confirmed by the lower appellate Court and an appeal has been preferred against the final decree to the High Court. The High Court has stayed all further proceedings pursuant to the passing of the final decree. 17. Ex.R-17 is the copy of the final decree and the judgment thereto dated 28. 1992. From the final decree it is clear that a preliminary decree was passed on 20.12.1982 and pursuant to the said preliminary decree a final decree was passed. As per the final decree, the portion mentioned as M.N.Q.R. in the sketch attached to the preliminary decree should be handed over by Ethirajulu to Doraisamy’s legal heirs i.e., Thaiyal Nayaki and others. Further Ethirajulu should pay them a sum of Rs. 1,05,835 towards past mesne profits. It is not in dispute that the portion allotted to Thaiyal Nayaki and others is the subject matter of dispute in the eviction proceedings. From Exs.P-14 and R-17 it is clear that Ethirajulu has no right at all in the petition property. He has lost his interest in the property. He is not entitled to collect the rent from it. 18. It is true that as per Ex.P-14 all further proceedings pursuant to the passing of the final decree is stayed. In substance, the execution of the final decree is stayed. But as per Ex.R-18, the sale deed, dated 14. 1993, the respondent Santhana Kumar Nadar has purchased the petition mentioned property from Mrs.Thaiyal Nayaki and others. Thus the third par- ties - Thaiyal Nayaki and others have been declared to be the owners of the suit property. The stay was granted only on 4. 1994, when the property was sold, there was no impediment for Thaiyal Nayaki and others to convey the property to the respondent herein. Therefore, the petitioners’ predecessor Ethirajulu has lost his interest in the petition property. .19. Another important factor to be noticed is that the preliminary decree has become final and conclusive. The stay was granted only on 4. 1994, when the property was sold, there was no impediment for Thaiyal Nayaki and others to convey the property to the respondent herein. Therefore, the petitioners’ predecessor Ethirajulu has lost his interest in the petition property. .19. Another important factor to be noticed is that the preliminary decree has become final and conclusive. As per the preliminary decree dated 20.12.1982 Thaiyal Nayaki and others have been declared to be entitled to half share in door No. 1, Melpatti Ponnappa Mudali Street, Perambur, Madras-11, comprised in C.C.No. 135, O.S. No.217-218, R.S.No.792/1, measuring an extent of 148’ north to south on the western side and 138’ on the eastern side; east to west 95’ on the southern side and 34’ on the northern side. This extent includes the petition property. Inasmuch as the petition property has been allotted to Thaiyal Nayaki and others in the final decree proceedings, they were the absolute owners of the petition property and after sale, the respondent has go to absolute right. However, even assuming that the final decree has not become conclusive, since an appeal is pending in the High Court inasmuch as the said Thaiyal Nayaki and others have been declared to have half share in the larger extent and inasmuch as they have sold a portion of the same, even if the final decree is modified, it is open to Thaiyal Nayaki and others to claim the property sold by them to be allotted to their share. Further, it is represented that Ethirajulu has already sold away his half share in the larger extent to some third party during his life time and his heirs and not entitled to any share in the larger extent mentioned in the preliminary and final decree proceedings. Even though this statement was made from the Bar, the learned counsel for the petitioner could not deny the said fact. This statement is further strengthened by the observation in the final decree proceedings in paragraph 10 of the said judgment, which reads as follows: 20. It may be stated that a stay has been obtained from the High Court, but the stay is only with reference to stay of all further proceedings in O.S. No.8565 of 1975 on the file of the VII Judge, City Civil Court. Madras. It may be stated that a stay has been obtained from the High Court, but the stay is only with reference to stay of all further proceedings in O.S. No.8565 of 1975 on the file of the VII Judge, City Civil Court. Madras. In substance, it tantamounts to staying the execution, but there is no stay of the operation of the final decree passed in O.S. No.8565 of 1975. Therefore, the petitioners cannot contend that in view of the stay obtained by them in the High Court, the final decree passed cannot be taken into account for any purpose. .21. As per sec.27 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the appeal could have been proceeded with against his legal representatives. Rule 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1974, prescribes a time-limit of one month to bring the legal representatives of the deceased petitioner or respondent. The petition to condone the delay, including the petition to add the legal representatives, after the time-limit, was dismissed. Therefore, a reading of Sec.27 and the Rule 25 goes to show that the appeal cannot be proceeded with after the death of the respondent and his legal representatives were not added as parties. The appellate authority has not adverted to this aspect. If the appellate authority has proceeded and passed any order in the appeal in the absence of the legal representatives of the only deceased respondent, it is without jurisdiction. 22. From the discussion above, we find that Ethirajulu has lost his right, title and interest in the petition building. Therefore, he was not entitled to collect the rent from the tenant eversince the final decree was passed in O.S. No.8565 of 1975 on 28. 1992. On the other hand, the proposed parties - Thaiyal Nayaki and others became co-sharers in the petitioner building since 20.12.1982 when the preliminary decree was passed in O.S. No.8565 of 1975 and absolute owners with effect from 28. 1993 when the final decree was passed in the said suit. Inasmuch as they became entitled to receive the rents for the said building, they become the landlords within the meaning of Sec.2 (6) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 1960. The petition to implead them was filed on 28. 1994. Even though then have parted with their rights on 14. Inasmuch as they became entitled to receive the rents for the said building, they become the landlords within the meaning of Sec.2 (6) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 1960. The petition to implead them was filed on 28. 1994. Even though then have parted with their rights on 14. 1993 when the respondents purchased their interest including their right in the petition building, it cannot be said that impleading them is illegal or unjustified. However, they can be impleaded to defend the respondent as his predecessors in interest when there is a pending threat to the title which they have conveyed. 23. The learned counsel for the respondent cited a decision reported in Syed Shafee y. Asmath Basha. (1989)1 M.L.J. 193 . Wherein a learned single Judge of this Court has held as follows: “It is well-settled principle of law that the court has to take into consideration the subsequent events and the court must have regard to events as they present themselves at the time of hearing and mould the relief accordingly. In view of the legal position, the present respondents have no locus standi to continue then proceedings and evict the petitioners herein.” In this case, the original landlord has lost his title to the suit property and to sustain the said fact, the proposed parties are necessary parties. .24. The learned counsel for the respondent also cited another decision reported in M.M.Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and others, (1981)3 S.C.C. 36 . Wherein, the Supreme Court, has taken the view that the right of the original landlord to continue the proceedings against the tenant continues even after he has transferred the interest. In the said case, the landlord was allowed to continue the proceedings for eviction in the interest of the transferee. In the case on hand also even though Thaiyal Nayaki and others have transferred their title in favour of the respondent, they can come on record to assert the title, which they have conferred in favour of the respondent. 25. In the absence of legal representatives of the deceased Ethirajulu in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992, the order passed in the appeal is not binding on them. As stated above, when the legal representative petition and the petition to condone delay were dismissed, the eviction order obtained by Ethirajulu has become final as far as his legal representatives are concerned. 25. In the absence of legal representatives of the deceased Ethirajulu in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992, the order passed in the appeal is not binding on them. As stated above, when the legal representative petition and the petition to condone delay were dismissed, the eviction order obtained by Ethirajulu has become final as far as his legal representatives are concerned. Their remedy is only to approach the Execution court for execution of the eviction order obtained by late Ethirajulu. 26. Inasmuch as Santhana Kumar Nadar has become the owner, even if the petitioners file an execution petition, it is open to him to contend before the ex ecuting Court that the order of eviction has become unexeculable. If necessary he can file a petition under Sec.47 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is needless to point out that when an order of eviction by Rent Controller is being executed, the executing Court is a Civil Court, for the purpose of executing and the other connected matters. Therefore, it is open to the respondent to file a petition under Sec.47 of the Civil Procedure Code and get his relief. From a reading of the order passed by the appellate authority, we find that the appeal has been allowed and the main ground that the respondent has become the owner of the property and there was no question of his paying rent to the building. The documentary evidence produced before the appellate Court could have been filed in a petition under Sec.47 of the Civil Procedure Code. But the appellate Court in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992 has marked documents produced to establish the fact that the respondent has become the owner of the property. .27. But since the appellate authority has proceeded with R.C.A. No.240 of 1992 and passed an order therein, setting aside the eviction order, the relief has been granted to the respondent Santhana Kumar Nadar. The said relief has been given in the absence of the proper and necessary party, namely, legal heirs of the deceased Ethirajulu. Such a relief ought not to have been granted, because the eviction order has been set aside, the respondent will be in a position to produce the said order before the execution Court and claim that the eviction order has been set aside on appeal. Such a relief ought not to have been granted, because the eviction order has been set aside, the respondent will be in a position to produce the said order before the execution Court and claim that the eviction order has been set aside on appeal. Even though the order in appeal is not binding on the legal representatives of Ethirajulu, the executing Court will be in a dilemma. This situation, rather the complication has been created by proceeding with the appeal after the original respondent, who alone obtained the order of eviction, has died and his legal representatives were not brought on record. 28. As far as C.R.P. No.2839 of 1996 is concerned, as I have pointed out earlier, there was no necessity for the appellate Court to implead the proposed parties as parties to the Rent Control Appeal even though they are formal in the sense that their role can only to defend the respondent as his predecessors in title if the appeal was pending. But after the legal representative petition was dismissed, the appeal ceased to be pending. Therefore, the appellate Court was wrong in impleading them as parlies, because no purpose is served by impleading them as parties. However, the petitioners though chose to file the civil revision petition against the order passed in M.P. No.357 of 1994, they have not chosen to implead the proposed parties in this civil revision petition, when the order in M.P. No.357 of 1994 has been passed in their favour. In their absence, no relief can be granted to the petitioners in this civil revision petition. 29. As far as C.R.P.SR.No.450 of 1997 is concerned, it is against the order passed in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992. There is no necessity for preferring any civil revision petition against the order passed in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992. As stated above, they were not impleaded as parties in the said appeal. Therefore, they cannot have any grievance against the order passed by the appellate authority in R.C.A. No.240 of 1992 and seek to have the same set aside in this Court in a civil revision petition by them. Consequently, C.M.P. No. 1171 of 1997 seeking leave to file the civil revision petition is also rejected as unnecessary. 30. Next we have the C.R.P. No.246 of 1997. The said revision is against R.C.A. No..1134 of 1996. Consequently, C.M.P. No. 1171 of 1997 seeking leave to file the civil revision petition is also rejected as unnecessary. 30. Next we have the C.R.P. No.246 of 1997. The said revision is against R.C.A. No..1134 of 1996. R.C.A. No.1134 of 1996 was allowed by the appellate authority on 11. 1996. Consequent of the said order, Thaiyal Nayaki and others are impleaded as respondents in R.C.O.P.No. 18 of 1995. We have already seen that Ethirajulu filed R.C.O.P.No. 18 of 1995 against Santhana Kumar Nadar for eviction on the ground of default to pay rent. The said petition filed is based on the default committed by the first respondent therein for non-payment of rent from 3. 1992 to 12. 1994. After the filing of the petition, Ethirajulu died and his legal representatives have been brought on record. The first respondent Santhana Kumar Nadar filed M.P. No.773 of 1995 in R.C.O.P.No. 18 of 1995 for impleading Thaiyal Nayaki and others as parties. The said petition was dismissed by the Rent Controller on 8. 1996. But the appellate authority has allowed the appeal. Against the said order, the petitioners have preferred this C.R.P.No.246 of 1997. 31. The question in this revision is whether Thaiyal Nayaki and others are necessary parties to decide the issue involved in the Rent Control Petition. We have seen above, while considering the C.R.P. No.2839 of 1996 that Ethirajulu lost his right, title and interest in the petition building when the final decree was passed on 28. 1992. Under the said final decree, the petition building has been allotted to Thaiyal Nayaki and others. Further, the preliminary decree was passed as early as on 20.12.1982, declaring the aforesaid Thaiyal Nayaki and others as co-sharers in the properties, including the petition premises. Further, there is also a direction for ascertainment of mesne profits. The mesne profits has to be ascertained at Rs. 1,05,835. As Santhana Kumar Nadar has purchased the petition premises from Thaiyal Nayaki and others, they can be added as parties to defend the right, title and interest of the said Santhana Kumar Nadar in the said petition premises. They can support the tenant in the said eviction petition and defend the eviction proceedings. 32. The Rent Controller has stated that the are unnecessary parties. However, the appellate authority has found that they can be impleaded as parties in the eviction proceedings. They can support the tenant in the said eviction petition and defend the eviction proceedings. 32. The Rent Controller has stated that the are unnecessary parties. However, the appellate authority has found that they can be impleaded as parties in the eviction proceedings. I have already found that they are proper parties in the eviction proceedings. As far as R.C.A. No.240 of 1992 is concerned, since the appeal ceased to exist after the death of Ethirajulu, there was no necessity to bring these persons as parties in the said appeal. But however, R.C.O.P.No.18 of 1995 is still pending. The legal representatives of the deceased Ethirajulu are prosecuting the said eviction proceedings against Santhana Kumar Nadar. Therefore, the appellate Court has rightly held that they can be added as parties. 33. The learned counsel for the Petitioners cited a decision reported in Annamalai and another v. The Official Receiver’ North Arcot Ambedkar District and another, (1996)1 L.W. 83 and contended that the Rent Controller has no authority to go into the question of title. Therefore, the finding of the appellate authority that Thaiyal Nayaki and others were necessary parties and in view of the fact that they have got title to the petition premises is unsustainable. But the appellate authority has not decided the title but it has simply relied upon the title found by the Civil Court in the partition proceedings. It has not discussed the title independently and arrived at a decision of its own. Therefore, the said case is not helpful to the petitioners. 34. The learned counsel for the petitioners cited another decision reported in S.Thangaswamy v. R.Vinayakamurthy, (1996)11 C.T.C. 105. In the said case, it has been held by AR.Lakshmanan, J., that having paid the rent and having recognised a person as landlord, it is not open to the tenant to deny his title. The facts of the case are entirely different. In the said case, the tenant set up title in the temple after taking possession from the respondent. In the present case, the Civil Court has decided the title to the petition premises, which is binding on the petitioners. It is not a case of denial of title, but it is a case where the original landlord losing his right and the proposed parties acquiring title by a proper adjudication in civil court. In the present case, the Civil Court has decided the title to the petition premises, which is binding on the petitioners. It is not a case of denial of title, but it is a case where the original landlord losing his right and the proposed parties acquiring title by a proper adjudication in civil court. What is done by the appellate authority is only to recognise the title declared in favour of the parties in the civil proceedings. There- fore, the said case is also not helpful to the petitioners. 35. The learned counsel for the petitioners cited a decision reported in Ramadoss, K. v. I.S.Vaidvanatha Swamy (Died) and another, (1996)2 L.W. 320 . In the said case, the landlord filed a petition for eviction on the ground of own use i.e., for running a hotel business. After the death of the landlord, the tenant contended in the civil revision petition that after the death of the original landlord his intention to carry on business ceased and therefore the eviction cannot be sustained. The said contention was rejected by S.S. Subramani, J., of this Court. I do not know how this case will help the petitioners. The facts of the case are totally different and the principle laid down in this case is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. 36. In the circumstances, I do not find anything wrong in the appellate authority in allowing Thaiyal Nayaki and others to come on record in R.C.O.P.No. 18 of 1995. Therefore, the civil revision petitions are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, C.R.P.Nos.2839 of 1996 and 246 of 1997 and C.M.P. No. 1171 of 1997 are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.