OM PRAKASH, J. This bunch of as many as 13 writ petitions arising out of ac quisition proceedings raised common ques tions of law and fact and, therefore, all the writ petitions are being decided by a com mon judgment. 2. In the first set of writ petitions com prising writ petitions No. 39430/94, 39854/94 and 502/95, Shri Sushil Harkauli advanced arguments for petitioners: in the second set consisting of writ petitions No. 39853/94 and 2302/96, Shri Swami Dayal appeared for petitioners and in the third set of writ petitions comprising remaining cases, counsel for the petitioners Shri P. C, Pathak holding brief of Shri V K. Shukla adopted the arguments advanced by Shri Harkauli and Shri Swami Dayal and made no new submission. 3. As all the writ petitions are directed against a notification dated 5-10-1993 is sued under Section 4 (1), read with Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (shortly, called as the Act) and a dec laration dated 6-10-1994, issued under Sec tion 6 of the Act and as pleas raised in all the writ petitions are common, to obviate repetition of the pleas we prefer to state the factual position of Writ Petition No. 39430 of 1994. 4. 4. The case of petitioners is that petitioner No. 1 purchased plot No. 1324 in 1991 and set up a Bakery thereon; that petitioner No. 2 purchased plot No. 1326 in 1989 and set up a factory for manufacturing chains there; that a master plan came to be prepared in respect of the land, sought to be acquired inter alia under the aforesaid notifications; that in the master plan the area sought to be acquired under the aforesaid notifications, is earmarked for In dustries; that vide notification dated 5-10-1993 issued under Section 4 (1), read with Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Act, the plots of land as set out in the schedule forming part of the notification, are being acquired for the construction of a market yard for fruits and vegetables instead by the Krishi Ut-padan Mandi Samiti (briefly, the Mandi Samiti hereafter); that in view of the master plan plots in question cannot be ac quired for the construction of the market yard; that delay between the date of proposal and the date of the notification issued under Section 4 (1) and further the delay having occurred between the date of the notification issued under Section 4 (1) and the declaration Issued under Section 6, has not been explained; that the unex plained delay shows that there was no ur gency; that issuance of the notification under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17 (4) directing that the provisions of Section 5 shall not apply was, therefore, a colourable exercise; that the land sought to be acquired under the aforesaid notification is in and odd shape, in as much as several vacant plots belonging to influential persons which were more suitable for the construction of the market yard have been left out and the plots of land on which industries/factories are situated are included in the schedule, an nexed to the notification under Section 4 (1) and, therefore, the entire acquisition proceedings are arbitrary and mala fide and that had the opportunity of being heard under Section 5 been afforded to the petitioner then they would have shown the arbitrariness on the part of the respondents in excluding the vacant plots of land of in fluential persons and including the land of the petitioners on which Industries/fac tories are situated. 5. 5. A detailed counter-affidavit dated 25-4-1995 has been filed on behalf of the Mandi Samiti-respondent No. 3 pleading that a proposal accompanied by a plan was sent by the District Magistrate, Agra on 25-5- 1991 to the Government of U. P. for acquiring 10. 175 Hect. of land of village Bainptir for the construction of the market yard for fruits and vegetables pursuant to a resolution passed by the Mandi Samiti in 1991. It is denied that the plots of land belonging to influential persons were left out and that the plots of land belonging to the people of backward classes were in cluded in the notification issued under Sec tion 4 (1 ). It is averred that some plots belong to private persons and that out of the land vested in the Government or Gaon Sabha in view of the ceiling laws, the Mandi Samiti got certain plots of land released from the Government or the Gaon Sabha. It is averred that the factories situated on the plots in question are of temporary nature and most of them were established after the commencement of the acquisition proceed ings. In para 14 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that the existing market yard is wholly inadequate to cater the needs of the growers to transact their business in the yard; that the existing market yard is bereft of basic amenities; that the existing market yard had been constructed more than 100 years back when the arrivals were meagre; that after mechanised farming the yield has grown tremendously and the existing yard is wholly illeguiped and insufficient to handle the ever increasing arrivals of the growers; that Section 5 was dispensed with as that would have considerably delayed the construction of a modern market yard and ultimately defeated the purpose; that realising the pressing urgency of setting up a modern market yard it was considered necessary to dispense with the hearing under Section 5 and, therefore, sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 17 were invoked in the notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act. 6. Another counter-affidavit has been filed by Shri S. P. Mishra, Addl. District Magistrate, Agra for respondent Nos. 1 & 2 reiterating that there was an urgent need to construct a modern market yard for vegetables and fruits as the existing market yard is wholly unsuitable for the growers to transact their business. 6. Another counter-affidavit has been filed by Shri S. P. Mishra, Addl. District Magistrate, Agra for respondent Nos. 1 & 2 reiterating that there was an urgent need to construct a modern market yard for vegetables and fruits as the existing market yard is wholly unsuitable for the growers to transact their business. He deposed in para 10 that apart from the land belonging to the individuals, the. plots of land comprising ceiling areas, were got released from the Government or the Gaon Sabha as the case may be and a separate resolution was sent by the District Magistrate therefore. It is stated that no delay occurred before the notification was issued under Section 4 (1) and that nor mal time was taken in processing the resolu tion of the Mandi Samiti for acquiring the land before issuing the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act. It is averred that plots No. 1184. 1186,1187, 1194 and 1320 were declared surplus in the ceiling proceedings and they came to be vested in the State Government. The Mandi Samiti made a separate proposal for releasing that land and that land was released for the use of the Mandi Samiti besides some other land, which belong to the Gaon Sabha. 7. The submission made by Shri Harkauli and Shri Swami Dayal are com mon and, therefore, we propose to deal with them as a single set of submissions. 8. The first submission of learned Counsel for the petitioners is that Section 5 of the Act was illegally dispensed with in voking sub-section (4) of Section 17 in the notification, issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act. It is not denied by them that there was urgency for the construction of the market yard for fruits and vegetables. What they submit is that mere urgency is not enough to dispense with the hearing under Section 5-A; but what is necessary is for the acquisition authority to apply its mind whether there is urgency of such a nature that even the summary proceedings under Section 5-A of the Act as would be eliminated. In short, the argument is that it is not just, the existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with an enquiry under Section 5- A, which has to be considered by the acquisition authority. 9. In short, the argument is that it is not just, the existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with an enquiry under Section 5- A, which has to be considered by the acquisition authority. 9. In Narayan Govind Gavate and others V. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1977 (SC) 183 the Court elucidated the legal position as follows: (para 10 p. 186) "it is true that, in such cases, the formation of an opinion is a subjective matter, as held by the this Court repeatedly with regard to situations in which administrative authorities have to form cer tain opinions before taking actions they are em powered to take. They are expected to know bet ter the difference between a right or wrong opinion than courts could ordinarily on such mat ters. Nevertheless, that opinion has to be based upon some relevant materials in order to pass the test which courts to impose. That test basically is: was the authority concerned acting within the scope of its powers or in the sphere where its opinion and discretion must be permitted to have full play? Once the Court comes to the conclusion that the authority concerned was acting within the scope of its powers and had some materials, how ever meagre, on which it could reasonably base its opinion, the courts should not and will not inter fere. . . . . . . " Para 2 of the Notification dated 5-10-1993, Annexure-7 to the writ petition issued under Section 41 (1), read with Section 17 (1) and (4) reads as under: "2. Being of the opinion that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the said Act are applicable to the said land inasmuch as the said land is urgently required for the construction of fruits and vegetables market yard in District Agra and that in view of the pressing urgency it is as well necessary to eliminate the delay likely to be caused by an inquiry under Section 5-A of the said Act, the Governor is further pleased to direct under sub-section (4) of Section 17 01 the said Act that the provisions of Section 5-A of the said Act shall not apply" 10. The question for consideration is whether the opinion of the Governor that it is necessary to dispense with the hear ing under Section 5-A to eliminate the delay likely to be caused in the inquiry envisaged by that section, is based on some material. One material, howsoever meagre that may be, is found, the Courts will not interfere. 11. In para 14 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that there was a pressing urgency to invoke Section 17 (4) to dispense with the hearing, envisaged by Section 5-A, as the existing market yard is situated in a very congested area having no scope for expan sion to cater the ever growing needs of the constituents; that there is no adequate space for the free movement and parking of trucks/bullock carts etc. and to provide necessary shelter to the constituents; that the existing market yard is devoid of amenities- necessary for human being, bul locks etc. converging every day in a big num ber in the market yard, that during the rainy season it becomes well-nigh impossible for the producers to find out suitable shelter for themselves and. for their produce in the market yard; that. PO provide modern amenities, adequate space, systematic ap proach roads and sufficient accommodation to all concerned, the construction of a new market yard in a planned mariner posed an extreme urgency and the Mandi Samiti could not brook any delay in the construc tion of a modern well planned market yard. It is submitted by Shri Madhyan, Counsel for the Mandi Samiti that the Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that in a Developing Nation construction of a market yard well equipped with modern amenities is indispensable. 12. The question whether the con struction of a market yard by the Mandi Samiti poses an extreme urgency is not com ing up before this Court for the first time. In Satyendra Prasadjam (S. P. Jain) and others v. State of UP and others, 1987 AWC 382, similar question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court and then the Division Bench observed : (para 8 p. 383) "the question herein is whether the State was justified in dispensing the requirements of enquiry contemplated under Section 5-A, It could be taken judicial notice of, that in regard to agricultural produce there were no proper market facilities. There were ennumerable charges, levies and exactions which the agriculturists were re quired to pay without having any say in the proper utilisation of the amount paid by them. The Government of India and the various committees and commissions appointed to study the condition of agricultural markets in the country had stressed the need to provide proper market yards for the sale and purchase of agricultural produce. The planning Commission also stressed long ago in this regard. The Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 has been enacted to provide for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment, superinten dence and control of markets therefore, in Uttar Pradesh. The proposed construction of market and market yard by the Mandi Samiti is, therefore, a step forward to ameliorate the conditions of produces with due representation to them in the Mandi Samities for the fair settlement of disputes relating to their transactions. It is a long felt need which is said to have been included in the planned Development Scheme. " Adverting to the appall ing conditions of the Mandi Samiti the Division Bench had to say in para 11 of p. 384 that "it cannot be said that there is no urgency in the matter of acquiring the land in question. " 13. In State of U. P. v. Smt. Pista Devi and others, AIR 1986 SC 2025 , the State Government sought to acquire the land for housing scheme for Meeuut city and for that a notification under Section 4 (1), read with Section 17 (1) and (4) eliminating the en quiry contemplated by Section 5-A was is sued, then an objection on behalf of the respondents similar to the one being raised by the petitioner herein, was raised before the Supreme Court which held: (para 5 p. . 2028) ". . . . . . . The provision of housing accommoda tion in these days has become matter of National urgency. We may take judicial notice of this fact, Now it is difficult to hold that in the case of proceedings relating to acquisition of land for providing house sites it is unnecessary to invoke Section 17 (1) of the Act and to dispense with the compliance with Section 5-Aof the Act. " 14. We may take judicial notice of this fact, Now it is difficult to hold that in the case of proceedings relating to acquisition of land for providing house sites it is unnecessary to invoke Section 17 (1) of the Act and to dispense with the compliance with Section 5-Aof the Act. " 14. When construction of the housing accommodation is a matter of National ur gency, we fail to understand as to why the construction of a modern market yard to cater the needs of the growers of fruits and vegetables and other agricultural produce cannot be a National urgency. It cannot be gainsaid that every human being is in need of a balanced diet, which includes fruits and vegetables in sufficient quantity. They can be available to the public only when the farmers have marketing facilities. If the farmers do not find adequate and con venient place to transact their business, then they will not be sale to sell their entire produce, much less profitably, which means that considerable produce of the agricul tural sector will go waste depriving the farmers the benefit of their toiling hard in the fields and the public of the availability of the fruits and vegetables-essential in gredients of food. If the entire yield of fruits and vegetables is not marketed for want of marketing facilities that would cause Na tional loss. Any steps taken to avert such National loss will be a part of National ur gency. The matter viewed from this angle. The only irresistible conclusion that can be arrived at is that the Courts can take judicial notice of the fact that the construction of the market yard-facilitating transactions by the farmers in fruits and vegetables is noth ing but a National urgency. Therefore, elimination of the enquiry envisaged by Sec tion 5-A of the Act, cannot be said to be an illegality. 15. Another submission of learned Counsel for the petitioners is that a master plan for Development of Agra was prepared and the plots in question came to be in cluded therein which were earmarked for industries and that being so the land in ques tion could not be permitted to be used for any purpose contrary to the one as stated in the master plan. The question for con sideration is whether respondent No. 3 is free to acquire the land for the master plan. The question for con sideration is whether respondent No. 3 is free to acquire the land for the master plan. Similar contention was raised in Kendriya Karamchdri Evam Mira Sahkariavas Samiti Ltd. Village Bhovapur Hasanpur, District Ghaziabad and another v. State of U. P. and another, 1988 UPLBEC 645 in which a Division Bench of this Court relying on the case of Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others AIR 1974 SC 2077 held that the Central Government could acquire any property under the Act and develop it after obtaining the approval of the local authority. In para 13 at p. 651, the Division Bench further held: "amendment of a Master Plan is a permis sible with the approval of the State Government under Section 13 of the U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 and in the present case the Master Plan showing the area in question as green belt was modified with the approval of the State Government which approved no doubt was accorded subsequent to the issue of Notifications under Sections 4 and 6. However, as observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court the mere fact that till the date of the issue of the Notification under Section 4 the necessary approval of the Government had not been obtained cannot preclude the Government from acquiring the land for planned development under the Land Ac quisition Act. Acquisition generally precedes development and consequently the land in ques tion could be acquired in anticipation of the ap proval of the State Government for the change of the land use of the master plan prepared by the Development Authority. " 16. Respectfully following the above reproduced authority with which we fully agree, we hold that the contention of the petitioners that the land earmarked for In dustries in the master plan could not have been acquired for setting up the market yard, has to be rejected. 17. It is also submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioners that from the initiation of acquisition proceedings in respect of the land which is earmarked for Industries in the Master Plan an inference can be legitimately drawn that the acquisi tion authority grossly failed to apply its mind to the question whether or not on the given facts elimination of enquiry under Section 5-A was necessary. This argument also does not held to be good since the acquisition authority was free to acquire the land for the construction of the market yard notwithstanding the master plan which is liable to be amended subject, of course, with the approval of the State Government. 18. Lastly, it is submitted by Shri Swami Dayal, learned Counsel for the second set of writ petitions that declaration under Section 6 in this case was issued after a year from the date of the Notification dated 5-3-1993 issued under Section (1) and that per se goes to show that there was no urgency of such a nature as to justify elimination of the summary enquiry under Section 5-A. There is enough law on the point that greater the delay greater the ur gency is there [see Kasireddy Papaiah v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1975 AP 269 .) In the said case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court also held as under: ". . . . . . . Therefore, one can never venture to say that the invocation of the emergency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for provid ing house sites for Harijans is bad merely because the officials entrusted with the task of taking fur ther action in the matter are negligent or tardy in the discharge of their duties, unless, of course, it can be established that the acquisition itself is made with an oblique motive. The urgent pres sures of history are not to be undone by the inaction of the bureaucracy. " 19. In the counter-affidavit filed for the Mandi Samiti it is clearly stated that delay of one year between the date of Notification issued under Section 4 (1) and the declara tion issued under Section 6 of the Act is merely bureaucratic. In the counter affidavit filed for the State it is clearly averred that delay of one year between the notification and the declaration does not deserves any serious notice to be taken by the court be cause that is a usual delay in official processing. 20. In Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. In the counter affidavit filed for the State it is clearly averred that delay of one year between the notification and the declaration does not deserves any serious notice to be taken by the court be cause that is a usual delay in official processing. 20. In Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, AIR 1984 SC 1721 , the Court had upheld the Notification issued under Section 17 (4) even though lapse of time of 7 years had occurred due to inter departmental discussion before publishing the notification that itself was considered to be a ground to invoke urgency clause. It was further held that delay on the part of the lethargic officials to take further action in the matter of acquisition was not sufficient to nullify the urgency which existed at the time of issuance of the notification and to hold that there was never any urgency. In Jage Ram v. Stale of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1033 , the Court upheld the exercise of the power of urgency under Section 17 (4) and held that the lethargy on the part of the officials at an early stage was not relevant to decide whether on the date of the notifica tion there was urgency or not. Therefore, the pre-notification and post-notification delay caused by the lethargic officials does not create a cause to hold that there is no urgency. 21. In Rajasthan Housing Board and others v. Shri Kishan and others, (1993) 2 SCC 84 , the court clearly held that it must be remembered that the satisfaction under Section 17 (4) is subjective one and that so long as there is material upon which Government could have formed the said satisfaction fairly, court would not interfere nor would it examine the material as an appellate authority. Following this authority we hold that this Court is not an appellate authority to sit over the satisfac tion subjectively gathered by the Govern ment asking the acquisition authority that looking to the urgency of the purpose viz. the construction of the market yard, Section 5-A will no apply. Taking judicial notice of the fact that the construction of the market yard for the benefit of the community of the agriculturist was a National urgency we hold that Section 17 (4) was rightly invoked eliminating the summary enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. 22. the construction of the market yard, Section 5-A will no apply. Taking judicial notice of the fact that the construction of the market yard for the benefit of the community of the agriculturist was a National urgency we hold that Section 17 (4) was rightly invoked eliminating the summary enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. 22. For the above reasons we see no illegality in the Notification issued under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17 (4) and the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act. 23. No other submission was made by learned Counsel for the parties. Counsel representing the third set of writ petitions having adopted the arguments advanced by Shri Harkauli and Shri Swami Dayal and he having made no other new submission of his own, no separate discussion is required in his cases. 24. For the foregoing reasons, all the petitions fail and are dismissed. Interim order passed in all these cases are dis charged. Petition dismissed. .