S. R. SINGH, J. This is an application for bail under Section 439, Cr. P. C. The applicant is incarcerated in jail for the al leged commission of offences under Sec tions 498-A/304-B, I. P. C. and 3/4, Dowry Prohibition Act, registered in case crime No. 34 of 1996 at P. S. Muthiganj, Distt. Al lahabad. 2. The incident in the instant case is said to have come to pass on 24-9-% at about 6 a. m. and the First Information Report of the incident was lodged at the Police Station concerned the same day at about 11. 50 a. m. by one Sri Chandra Nath Pandey father of the deceased Smi. Sandhya. Ramji Sharma, husband and Chandra Devi, mother-in-law of the deceased have also been incupated as accused besides the ap plicant, the father-in-law of the deceased, in the F. I. R. According to the allegations made in the F. I. R. The deceased was tortured, physically and mentally, by the accused per sons for or in connection with demand of dowry and the consequent suicide by the deceased by setting herself ablaze, was the culmination of unabated torture and ill-treatment, she was subjected to. The mar riage, according to the F. I. R. , with Ramji Sharma had been solemnised on 4-2-94 and out of the wedlock, a daughter was born on 16-6-96. The questions surfacing up for con sideration being of substantial importance, may be summed up as below: (1) Whether the commission of suicide by woman within 7 years of her marriage would at tract of Section 304-B, I. P. C. if it is borne out that "soon before her death she was subjected to cruel ty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry or could it at best attract only Section 306, I. P. C. ? (2) Whether a statement, written or oral, given by the woman before committing suicide that her husband and/or any relative of her hus band and been harassing or ill-treating her for, or in connection with any demand for dowry, could be relevant as dying declaration within the pur view of Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act? (3) Whether Sections 113-A and 113-B of the Evidence Act have brought about any change in suicide and dowry death cases? 3. (3) Whether Sections 113-A and 113-B of the Evidence Act have brought about any change in suicide and dowry death cases? 3. A bare reading of Sec. 304-B, I. P. C. reflects that where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or oc curs otherwise than under normal cir cumstances within seven years of marriage and it is projected that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her hus band for or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death" and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death and shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. Cruelty for the purposes of Section 304-B of the Penal Code means- (a) "any wilful con duct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental and/or physical) of the woman; (b) harassment of the woman whether such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand or any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 postulates that where the question is whether a person has committed dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connec tion with any demand of dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. The presumption raised by Section 113-B of the Evidence Act finds its echo in Section 304-B of the Penal Code itself in that such presumption is implicit in the language in which Section 304-B, I. P. C. is couched, particularly the definition of "dowry death" and the fiction created by the expression "shall be deemed to have caused dowry death. The presumption raised by Section 113-B of the Evidence Act finds its echo in Section 304-B of the Penal Code itself in that such presumption is implicit in the language in which Section 304-B, I. P. C. is couched, particularly the definition of "dowry death" and the fiction created by the expression "shall be deemed to have caused dowry death. " It is lucuiently clear from the language employed by the Parliament in Section 304-B, I. P. C. that where the death of a married woman has occurred, otherwise than under the normal circumstances, within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death, the woman was subjected to cruelty or harass ment by her husband or any relative of her husband for or in connection with any demand for dowry, the husband or such rela tive of her husband, as the case may be "shall be deemed to have caused her death. " It is, therefore, evident "that irrespective of the fact whether the accused has any direct con nection with death or not, he shall be presumed to have committed the dowry death provided the other requirements mentioned in section are satisfied. " Hem Chand v. State of Haryana, 1995 SCC (Crl.) 36, is the bench-mark authority in aid of the proposition that irrespective of the fact whether the accused had any direct connec tion with the death or not, he shall be presumed to have committed the dowry death provided the other requirements en capsulated in the section are satisfied. It is not necessary for attracting provisions of Sec. 304-B that apart from showing that the death has occurred in unnatural cir cumstances within seven years of her mar riage and that soon before her death, the woman was subjected to cruelty or harass ment by the accused for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, it must also be shown that the accused had any direct nexus with the death. To reword it, it is not at all essential for attracting the provisions of Sec. 304-B, I. P. C. that the blame must attach directly to the accused for the injuries which resulted in death. To reword it, it is not at all essential for attracting the provisions of Sec. 304-B, I. P. C. that the blame must attach directly to the accused for the injuries which resulted in death. Tb rephrase it, the cases of homicide and suicide both can attract Sec tion 304-B, I. P. C. if the same has come about within seven years of the marriage and it is borne out that soon before her death the woman was subjected to cruelty or harass ment by the accused for or in connection with any demand for dowry. The accused in that event would be taken to have com mitted the dowry death punishable under Section 304, I. P. C. The definition cruelty as given in Section 498-A, I. P. C. also leads to the same conclusion. 4. At the same time, the accused may also be exposed to punition under Section 306, I. P. C. for abetting suicide. Section 113-A of the Evidence Act provides that when the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman has been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is demonstrated that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her hus band or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume having regard to all other cir cumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or any such relative of her husband. In such a situation, the accused may be punished both under Section 306 I. P. C. as well as Section 304-B in addition to his punition under Section 498-A of the Penal Code. Certain observations made in Lakhjit Singh and another v. State of Punjab, 1994 SCC (Crl.) 235, no doubt, lend support to the view that dowry-related suicide even if committed by a woman within seven years of her marriage in the back-drop of dowry related ill-treatment would attract only Section 306, I. P. C. and not Section 304-B of the Penal Code, but the said decision stands impliedly eclipsed and over-shadowed by the subsequent larger bench decision in Hem Chand v. State of Haryana (supra) wherein the plea that there should be direct link or connection of the accused with the death of the woman tailed off and was specifically repelled. Therefore, where a woman commits suicide by consum ing poison or by handing or otherwise, the accused may be held guilty and be visited with the punishment both under Section 304-B and Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code if the other conditions stipulated in Section 304-B are satisfied and the accused falls short of rebutting the presumptions which the court is entitled to make under Sections 113-A and 113-B of the Evidence Act. To rephrase it, Section 304- B of the Penal Code encompasses within its sweep not only homicide but suicide as well if the incident of suicide takes place within seven years of marriage and was preceded by ill-treatment amounting to "cruelty" or harass ment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. 5. Before parting with the discussion on the first question, it would be worthwhile to reckon with the scope and ambit of the expression" soon before her death" used in Section 304-B, I. P. C. and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The term "soon before" non-doubt, connotes a sense of proximity of time between the dowry related mal-treatment amounting to cruelty and the incident of death but it "cannot be literally construed and practically reduced to cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a strait-jacket. " An isolated inci dent of dowry related ill-treatment amount ing to "cruelty" meted out to the woman in the remote past, may not be independently relevant but if it forms a chain of continuous incidence of ill-treatment amounting to "cruelty" it would certainly became relevant under Sections 6 and 11 (2) of the Evidence Act. That in my opinion, is the appropriate import of the expression "soon before her death" occurring m Section 304-B, I. P. C. and 113-B of the Evidence Act. 6. As regards the Second question, the submission made by Sri V. C. Tiwari, learned Counsel appearing, for the applicant was that the oral statement alleged to have been made by the deceased to her mother, sister and other relatives before the fateful inci dent of burning, would not be admissible as dying declaration under Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act. Sri D. S. Misra, Counsel appearing for the complainant and Sri G. S. Bisaria, learned Addl. Sri D. S. Misra, Counsel appearing for the complainant and Sri G. S. Bisaria, learned Addl. Government Advo cate appearing for the State, urged in op position that the statement made by the deceased to her mother, sister and other relatives regarding dowry related ill-treat ment and harassment before the fateful inci dent would be admissible as dying declara tion under Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act. The question, in my opinion, is no longer re-integra in view of Sharad v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 , where in the following amongst other expositions of law have been propounded by the Apex Court: (i) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hear-say and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies whether the death is homicide or a suicide provided the statement relates to the cause of death or exhibits circumstances leading to the death; (2) Test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a straight-jacket. Where the death is a logical culmination of continuous drama, long in process and is as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context; (3) where the main evidence consists of statement and Setters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal the tell tale story, the said statement will clearly fail within the four corners of Section 32 of the Evidence Act. The distance of time alone in such circumstances would not make the statement irrelevant; and (4) All the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide. 7. The Supreme Court, in Sharads case (supra), has given a nod of approval of the following observations made by the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court ifamanoharlalv. State of Punjab, 1981 Crl. L. J. 1373. "the torture administered sometimes manifests itself in various forms. To begin with, it might be mental torture and then it may assume the form of physical torture. State of Punjab, 1981 Crl. L. J. 1373. "the torture administered sometimes manifests itself in various forms. To begin with, it might be mental torture and then it may assume the form of physical torture. The physical harm done to the victim might be increased from stage to stage to have the desired effect. The fatal as-sauit might be made after a considerable interval of time, but if the circumstances of the torture appearing in the writings of the deceased, come into existence after the initiation of the torture the same would be held to be relevant as laid down in Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act. " 8. In Shiv Kumar v. State of U. P 1966 Crl. Appl. R. (SC) 291, it has been observed by the Apex Court as under: "the statement may be made before the cause of death has arisen, or before the deceased has any reason to anticipate being killed. . . . . " 9. In view of the ex-cathedra authorities aforestated, it is amply clear that the statement made by the deceased to the prosecution witnesses giving the tell tale story about the dowry related torture or ill- treatment amounting to cruelty as defined in Section 498-A, I. P. C. , would be admissible as dying declaration under Sec tion 32 (1) of the Evidence Act even though the statements were made before the inci dent of burning. What is relevant is that the statements were made after the commence ment of dowry related ill-treatment and they related to the circumstances which cul minated in suicide being committed by her. 10. Coming now to the grips of the third question, as to whether the fundamen tal principles of criminal jurisprudence that the accused shall be presumed to be in nocent unless found guilty, has been altered in relation to dowry death punishable under Section 304-B, I. P. C. and the abetment of dowry related suicide punishable under Sec tion 306, I. P. C. I am of the view that not withstanding the presumptions raised by Section 113-A and 113-B of the Evidence Act, the accused is to be presumed innocent unless found guilty. However, in relation to dowry deaths and dowry related abetment to suicide, the presumption of innocence is displaced on the prosecution showing that the death occurred in abnormal circumstan ces within seven years of marriage and was preceded by dowry related ill-treatment amounting to cruelty or harassment. 11. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Thamishrashi, (1995) 4 SCC190, has ruled that presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is displaced on the prosecution showing existence of reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is guilty and once the prosecution is able to show the existence of reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has been guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304-B, I. P. C. the Court will refuse bail to the accused in view of the limitation being operated by Section 437 Cr. P. C. on courts power to grant bail. In relation to dowry death offence punishable under Sec tion 304-B, I. P. C. , the prosecution will be deemed to have discharged its initial burden of showing existence of reasonable ground for believing that the accused is guilty of the offence if it is able to show that (i) the death has occurred by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under the normal cir cumstances within seven years of the mar riage; and (ii) soon before her death the woman was subjected to cruelty, harassment by the accused for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. 12. The prosecution in the instant case, has placed reliance upon the statement of Chandra Nath Pandey and Smt. Meena Devi, the parents of the deceased, Km. Yogita Rani alias Guriay, the sister of the deceased, Ghanshyam Sharma, uncle (Mausa) and one Satendra Tiwari. Accord ing to the prosecution case, Smt. Meena Devi and Km. Yogita Rani had paid a visit to the house of the deceased on the day preced ing the day of occurrence and the deceased, according to these witnesses, divulged to them the tell-tale story of dowry related ill-treatment and cruelty meted out to her by the accused persons. She is even said to have given vent to the apprehension of being killed by her parents-in-law and the hus band in the event of their avarice for dowry being not gratified. Chandra Nath Pandey, the father of the deceased in his statement under Section 161, Cr. She is even said to have given vent to the apprehension of being killed by her parents-in-law and the hus band in the event of their avarice for dowry being not gratified. Chandra Nath Pandey, the father of the deceased in his statement under Section 161, Cr. P. C. also echoed about the demand for dowry made by the accused persons including the applicant. He also claims to have visited the house of the deceased 5- 6 days preceding the occurrence and the deceased according to the state ments of the witnesses recorded under Sec tion 161, Cr. P. C. confided in her father that the accused had chorused their demand for dowry. Ghanshyam Sharma and Satendra Tiwari also gave the self-same encho about the demand for dowry in their statement under Section 161, Cr. P. C. The post-mortem report be speaks of superficial to deep burns all over the body except the back of chest, both the buttocks and feet. The cause of death is opined to be due to shock as a result of ante-mortem burn injuries. The abdominal cavity was found burst open and small and large bowls were found protrud ing out. Thus, the death was occasioned by ante-mortem burn injuries within seven years of the marriage. Evidence is there on the record to vouch safe that soon before her death, the deceased was tormented and subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused persons for or in connection with demand for dowry. What is the probative value of the evidence is, of course, a dif ferent question. All the postulates sine-qua-non for raising the statutory presumption under Section 304-B, IPC are, ex-fade, gratified and that is now to be reckoned with is whether the accused has been able to rebut the presumption brought to bear against him by virtue of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. 13. All the postulates sine-qua-non for raising the statutory presumption under Section 304-B, IPC are, ex-fade, gratified and that is now to be reckoned with is whether the accused has been able to rebut the presumption brought to bear against him by virtue of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. 13. The learned Counsel appearing for the applicant canvassed that had Smt. Meena Devi, mother of the deceased been to the latters house on a day preceding the day of occurrence and had the deceased spoken of her envisioning any apprehension of being killed by the husband or the parents-in-law for non-fulfilment of the demand of dowry, she would not have been so insouciant and must have brouched the matter with her husband about the impend ing perils brooding over her daughter and they would have certainly taken prophylac tic measures of reporting the matter to the Police authorities. The learned Counsel also canvassed that the father of the deceased was a witness to the inquest proceeding, but his reticence at that point of time, in disgorging the fact that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment and that it was a case of dowry related suicide is disquieting and yields place to a consider able doubt about the veracity of the sub sequent version. The learned Counsel vehe mently urged that it does not commend for acceptance even with a pitch of salt that the parents would be foolhardy in remaining clammed up even after such grave ap prehension voiced by the deceased to her mother a day before the occurrence as alleged by the prosecution. The learned Counsel also placed credence upon the suicide note allegedly written by the deceased, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure 3 to the affidavit in support of the bail application which note, according to the learned Counsel, does not reflect even a vestige of dowry related incident of cruelty or harassment. Inviting the atten tion of the Court to the contents of the case diary, a copy of which was produced by the learned Addl. Govt. Inviting the atten tion of the Court to the contents of the case diary, a copy of which was produced by the learned Addl. Govt. Advocate, the learned Counsel for the applicant urged that the theory about the demand for dowry and dowry related cruelty or harassment is mere concoction in order to paint the accused in a most lurid colours in that even the inquest report and the conduct of the father of the deceased and that of Ghanshyam Sharma who was also a witness to the inquest report do not give prop to the prosecution case. 14. I have bestowed my anxious con sideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel. It cannot be repudiated that the conduct of the accused before or after the occurrence would be relevant as per illustration (k) to Section 14 of the Evidence Act. Similarly, evidence on per sonal traits and evidence showing socio-economic and psycho-social problems if any, of the deceased would be relevant to the question whether suicide was committed in a moment of emotional disharmony caused due to reasons other than the reason dowry related mal-treatment. 15. It goes without saying that relevan cy of evidence is not to be confused with reliability thereof admissibility of evidence is a matter of law while reliability comes within the domain of appreciation. The Court may take into consideration the evidence, if any, on the, factors foretasted and come to the conclusion as to whether the presumption raised by Sees. 113-A and 113 B of the Evidence Act has been rebutted by the accused. No con clusive/decisive opinion can be expressed at this stage about the prosecution version regarding cruelty or harassment for or in relation to the demand for dowry. However, regard being had to the facts and cir cumstances of the case, I am of the view that the applicant has accused in making out a case for bail inasmuch as it cannot be said at this stage, with mathematical certainty, that it was a dowry related suicide and/or there are reasonable ground for believing that the circumstances are consistent with the guilty of the applicant for the offence under Sec tion 304-B, I. P. C. In the result, the applicant deserves to be enlarged on bail. The Court, it may be observed, is conscious of the solicitude of the Parliament in enacting more stringent provisions relating to dowry death obviously with a view to arresting the ever-expanding growth of dowry related malaise in the society but the penal provisions alone sans "dharma" concious-ness would not achieve the desired result. "dharma", a comprehensive term which in cludes law, religion, morality, righteous ness, duty, benevolence etc. is considered the primary virtue in Indian culture. It is defined as that which sustains society, and is regarded as the highest social values of which are to be based the other two social values of artha (wealth) and Kama (pleasure) and the trans-social value of mocks. Sri Krisna declares in the Bhagvad-Gita (VII. II): dharmaviruddho bhutesu Kamosmi-I am pleasure unopposed to dharma. (See the Cultural heritage of India Vol. I. p. 166 ). In my opinion, the problem is how to make the people value conscious. It cannot be gain-said that subjecting a woman to cruelty for or in connection with, any demand for dowry not only attracts the Penal Code but violates human right and human dignity as well but such a conduct is mainly due to irrational approach to social values of wealth and pleasure and lack of awareness to human dignity. Creative role of social organisation in this direction, would be more fruitful. 16. In view of the foregoing discussion, the applicant is ordered to be released on bail. Let the applicant Nanhey Lal involved in case Crime No. 334 of 1996 under Sec tions 498-A, 304, I. P. C. and 3/4, Dowry Prohibition Act PS. Mutthiganj Distt Al lahabad, be enlarged on bail on his furnish ing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 10,000 with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the C. J. M. Allahabad. Bail granted. .