P. VISHWANATHA SHETTY, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, in this petition, is the owner of the premises bearing No. 5, III Cross, puttaranganna Layout, Pipe Line, Malleswaram, Bangalore. In this petition, she has challenged the correctness of the order dated 29th of April 1993, a copy of which has been produced as annexure-B, passed by the third respondent confirming the order dated 29th July 1992, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-A, passed by the first respondent treating the premises, referred to above belonging to the petitioner, as having become vacant and allotting the same in favour of the second respondent. ( 2 ) IT is the case of the petitioner that the premises in question was not vacant at any time and the same was in her juridical possession having been occupied by her younger sister one Dr. Savitharani and her husband. According to the petitioner, since the said sister of the petitioner, who is a Doctor by profession, and her husband, who is an Engineer, used to go to work early in the morning and return late in the evening and the premises was not vacant at any time and the same has been in possession of the petitioner from the very date of its purchase by the petitioner and prior to the purchase of the premises by the petitioner, it was in actual possession and enjoyment of the vendor of the petitioner. It is her further case that though the father of the petitioner had appeared before the first respondent and brought to his notice that the premises in question was not vacant and was occupied by the petitioner's sister and her husband, the first respondent, without any justification, treated the premises as having become vacant and allotted the same in favour of the second respondent solely relying upon the report of the Revenue inspector and also the alleged spot inspection of the premises said to have held by the first respondent without notice either to the petitioner or to her father; and that the appeal filed by the petitioner before the third respondent challenging the order passed by the first respondent, also came to be rejected without considering the claim of the petitioner on merits and in a mechanical manner. ( 3 ) SRI Sundar Raj, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the orders impugned are totally illegal and suffer from errors apparent on the face of the record. According to the learned Counsel, the orders impugned are liable to be quashed mainly on three grounds. Firstly, he submitted that respondents 1 and 3 have, to come to the conclusion, that the premises in question had fallen vacant, solely relied on the report of the Revenue Inspector and also the alleged spot inspection said to have been held by the first respondent without giving notice to the petitioner or her father and, therefore, the orders impugned are liable to be quashed on the ground that there is no material on record to support the findings of respondents 1 and 3 that the premises in question had fallen vacant and also on the ground that the entire procedure followed by the first respondent was in disregard to the principles of natural justice. Elaborating this submission, the learned Counsel submitted that it is not permissible for respondents 1 and 3 to rely upon the report of the Revenue Inspector without furnishing a copy of the said report either to the petitioner or at least to the father of the petitioner, who had appeared before the first respondent in the course of the proceedings on behalf of the petitioner. It is further pointed out by the learned Counsel that the Revenue Inspector, who is stated to have given the report, was also not examined in the course of the proceedings by the respondent and he was not made available for cross-examination on behalf of the petitioner. Secondly, the learned Counsel pointed out that the entire approach made by respondents 1 and 3 in respect of the matters in controversy is erroneous in law. He submitted that respondent 1 and 3 have proceeded on the basis that the burden is on the petitioner to establish that the premises had not fallen vacant and the petitioner having failed to discharge the said burden, the first respondent is entitled to proceed on the assumption that the premises in question has fallen vacant. He submitted that respondent 1 and 3 have proceeded on the basis that the burden is on the petitioner to establish that the premises had not fallen vacant and the petitioner having failed to discharge the said burden, the first respondent is entitled to proceed on the assumption that the premises in question has fallen vacant. The learned Counsel pointed out that the said approach made by respondents 1 and 3 is erroneous in law and totally unwarranted from the reading of the provisions of Part-II of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" ). It is the contention of the learned Counsel that since the first respondent gets jurisdiction to notify the premises as vacant and allot the same, he is required to satisfy himself that the premises had fallen vacant. If there is no material or evidence collected by the first respondent, according to the learned Counsel, it is not permissible for the first respondent to proceed on the assumption that the premises had fallen vacant and on that basis, on that basis, allot the premises. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel relied upon a Decision of this Court in M. JAYARAM vs. HOUSE RENT and ACCOMMODATION controller, ILR1992 KAR 1915 , 1992 (2 )Karlj1. Finally it is the contention of Sri Sundar Raj that the orders impugned are not speaking orders and they came to be passed in a mechanical manner and in disregard to the mandate contained in Sections 4, 5 and 8 of the Act. ( 4 ) I am of the view that this petition is entitled to succeed. Firstly, it is necessary to point out that the finding recorded by respondents 1 and 3 that the premises in question had fallen vacant, is based on the report of the Revenue Inspector and also the inspection of the premises by the first respondent. ( 4 ) I am of the view that this petition is entitled to succeed. Firstly, it is necessary to point out that the finding recorded by respondents 1 and 3 that the premises in question had fallen vacant, is based on the report of the Revenue Inspector and also the inspection of the premises by the first respondent. In the order Annexure-A, the first respondent has referred to the report of the revenue Inspector dated 4th of February 1992 wherein the Revenue Inspector appears to have reported that the earlier tenant of the premises in question one Gnyana Prakash had vacated the premises about two months prior to the date of the report and also the spot inspection held by the first respondent along with the Revenue Inspector on the 8th of July 1992 and the information stated to have been furnished to the first respondent at the time of inspection by the neighbourers of the premises that the premises was vacant for the last about four months prior to the date of the inspection. e. , 8th of July 1992. I am of the view that the finding recorded by the first respondent that the premises in question was vacant, is liable to be set aside both on the ground that the said finding has been recorded in utter disregard to the principles of natural justice and also on the ground that there is no evidence on record to support the said finding. Admittedly, a copy of the report of the Revenue Inspector was not made available either to the petitioner or to her father one Mr. Seshaiah, who had appeared before the first respondent and no opportunity was given to them to have their say. Further, the Revenue Inspector was also not examined. The statement of the neighbourers of the premises in question, who stated to have informed the first respondent at the time of his spot inspection, was also not made available to the petitioner or her father. Neither the petitioner nor her father, who had participated in the proceedings on behalf of the petitioner, was informed about the visit of the first respondent to the premises in question. Neither the petitioner nor her father, who had participated in the proceedings on behalf of the petitioner, was informed about the visit of the first respondent to the premises in question. Under these circumstances, the reliance placed by the first respondent with regard to the report of the Revenue Inspector and also the information stated to have been collected by the first respondent at the time of spot inspection of the premises in question on 8th of July 1992, is totally illegal. Therefore, the order Annexure-A is liable to be quashed on the ground that the materials collected by the first respondent to base his conclusion that the premises in question had fallen vacant, is in violation of the principles of natural justice. Further, admittedly, neither the Revenue Inspector, who is stated to have given the report, nor the neighbourers, who are stated to have informed the first respondent at the time of spot inspection that the premises was vacant, were examined in the proceedings. If the report of the Revenue Inspector and the information stated to have been collected by the first respondent at the time of spot inspection are ignored, there is no other evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the first respondent that the premises in question had fallen vacant and, therefore, on this ground also, the impugned order Annexure-A is liable to be quashed. The third respondent, in appeal filed by the petitioner, has completely overlooked this aspect of the matter and committed the same error which the first respondent had committed, while confirming the order Annexure-A, in his order Annexure-B and, therefore, the order Annexure-B is also liable to be quashed. 4a. Secondly, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the first respondent has proceeded to treat the premises in question as having fallen vacant on the ground that the petitioner did not appear before the first respondent and file her written statement and produce any document in support of her claim that the premises in question had not fallen vacant. In other words, the first respondent proceeded on the basis that the burden to prove that the premises had not fallen vacant, is on the petitioner. The said approach made by the first respondent is erroneous in law. Admittedly, the father of the petitioner had appeared and had claimed that the premises was not vacant. In other words, the first respondent proceeded on the basis that the burden to prove that the premises had not fallen vacant, is on the petitioner. The said approach made by the first respondent is erroneous in law. Admittedly, the father of the petitioner had appeared and had claimed that the premises was not vacant. Under these circumstances, the first respondent was not justified in ignoring the objections raised by the father of the petitioner. If the first respondent can rely upon the say of the neighbourers of the premises in the absence of the petitioner, I do not find any justifiable ground to overlook the objections/statements of the father of the petitioner that the premises was not vacant. There is no presumption in law that all the premises, which are brought under the purview of the Act, are vacant and available for allotment. Each case has to be decided on the basis of evidence. While Section 4 of the Act requires that every landlord, within 15 days after the building becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it or by the termination of a tenancy or by the eviction of the tenant etc. , is required to intimate vacancy to the House Rent and accommodation Controller (hereinafter referred to as "the Controller" ). Section 5 of the Act confers power on the Controller to allot any vacant building to any public authority or any other person as he deems fit. Section 8 of the Act provides for the procedure to be followed by the first respondent while allotting the premises. Therefore, from a reading of Sections 4, 5 and 8 of the act, it is clear that the power conferred on the Controller to allot a premises to any other person or public authority is only in respect of a vacant building. The question whether the building is vacant or not, is a question of fact. It is only in respect of a vacant building, the Controller gets jurisdiction to allot the premises. The Controller, has pointed out earlier, before passing an order allotting a premises in exercise of the power conferred on him under Section 5 of the Act, is required to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 8 of the Act. It is only in respect of a vacant building, the Controller gets jurisdiction to allot the premises. The Controller, has pointed out earlier, before passing an order allotting a premises in exercise of the power conferred on him under Section 5 of the Act, is required to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 8 of the Act. Therefore, a reading of sections 5 and 8 together makes it clear that it is not permissible for the Controller to proceed on the assumption that every building is vacant and the burden is on the landlord to show that the same is not vacant. No doubt, it is permissible for the Controller to call upon the landlord to produce such materials as he may think relevant to decide the question whether the premises has fallen vacant or not. But, primarily, it is for the Controller to satisfy himself that the premises has fallen vacant and for that purpose, he must collect necessary materials. The burden to prove that the premises is vacant, is entirely on him. In my view, I am supported by the decision of this court in the case of M. Jayaram v. House Rent and Accommodation Controller. In the said decision at Paragraph-4, it is observed thus: "the proceedings are initiated under Sections 4 and 5 of the Karnataka Rent Control "act ("the act' for short ). The authority under the Act can clutch at the (jurisdiction if the building is only vacant. It has been repeatedly stated by this Court on several occasions that the burden is entirely on the authority to establish the fact that the building has been vacant entitling the authority to take an action for allotment of the premises. In the instant case the landlord had obtained possession after a very hard fought litigation and the tenant was in possession upto 30th June 1987. That is the date given to the tenant for vacating the premises. The authority expected the landlord to prove, in December 1989, that the landlord had occupied the premises within two months of 30. 6. 1987. It should be noted here that it is not the case of the authority or that of the second respondent that the landlord had in fact leased the premises to any one else. It is not a case of any one found in unauthorised occupation of the premises. 6. 1987. It should be noted here that it is not the case of the authority or that of the second respondent that the landlord had in fact leased the premises to any one else. It is not a case of any one found in unauthorised occupation of the premises. Therefore, it cannot be inferred by any stretch of imagination that the landlord had parted with the legal possession of the premises. . . . . . (Emphasis supplied) ( 5 ) IN the instant case, as stated above, except the report of the Revenue Inspector and the information collected by the first respondent at the time of spot inspection, there is no other material on the basis of which the first respondent could have come to the conclusion that the premises was vacant. Further, it is the case of the petitioner that her sister Dr. Savitharani and her husband have been residing in the premises in question and they used to go out of the premises early in the morning and come late in the evening as both of them were engaged in their profession as Doctor and Engineer respectively. Under these circumstances, when the said, plea was taken before the first respondent, the first respondent could not have rejected the said plea and proceeded to rely upon the report of the Revenue Inspector, in respect of which the petitioner was not given an opportunity to have her say and also the information collected by the first respondent at the time of spot inspection, which was also not put to the petitioner to have her say. It is necessary to point out that the occupation of the premises by the owner does not mean that he/she should alone reside or stay physically. It involves what is called juridical possession. It is permissible for the owner to exercise his right to physically reside or occupy the premises at any point of time without earlier parting with the said rights to any one else. It is the case of the petitioner that on the date of the purchase of the premises in question by the petitioner, her vendor was in actual possession and on the date of purchase, the petitioner came into possession and since then, she is in possession of the same. It is the case of the petitioner that on the date of the purchase of the premises in question by the petitioner, her vendor was in actual possession and on the date of purchase, the petitioner came into possession and since then, she is in possession of the same. Further, even assuming that the premises was locked as found by the Revenue Inspector and the first respondent when they visited the premises, still from that alone, it cannot be inferred or assumed that the premises has fallen vacant. When a person intends to use a premises for his occupation, it may be found locked on several occasions and the actual user in the sense of the landlord visiting it may be of temporary duration and intermittently and not continuously. In the instant case, as pointed out earlier, it is the case of the petitioner that her sister, who is a Doctor, and her husband, who is an engineer, who have been residing in the premises, used to go out early in the morning for work and come late in the evening after their work. From this, it cannot be held that the premises has fallen vacant for the purpose of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. The entire approach made by respondents 1 and 3 on this aspect of the matter is erroneous in law. Even on this ground also, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. ( 6 ) IN view of my above conclusions, I find it unnecessary to consider the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the orders impugned are not speaking orders, except reminding the authorities. e. , respondents 1 and 3, that the power conferred on them is quasi judicial in nature and the orders passed by them must be speaking orders supported by evidence and reasons in support of their finding. When a valuable right of the owner of a premises is sought to be interfered with by allotting the same either to a public authority or to any other person, contrary to the wishes of the owner and rejecting his plea that the premises has not fallen vacant, the respondents are required to discuss the evidence and consider the case put forth by the owner in an objective manner. Any short cut either in the procedure required to be followed or in any manner, in the discharge of their functions, would not only seriously impair the rights of the parties leading to multiplicity of litigation and result in waste of public time and money and it would also impair the confidence of the public on the authorities, who are conferred with quasi judicial powers. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons stated above, this Writ Petition is entitled to succeed and the orders impugned are liable to be quashed. ( 8 ) ACCORDINGLY, the Writ Petition is allowed and the order dated 29. 4. 1993 Annexure-B passed by the third respondent as also the order dated 29. 7. 1992 Annexure-A passed by the first respondent are hereby quashed. Rule issued is made absolute. ( 9 ) SRI S. Subbanna, learned High Court Government Pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance within four weeks from today.