JUDGMENT 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 2. The appellant/petitioner filed O.P. No. 732 of 1995 challenging herreversion order dated 10th January 1995,Ext. P-2. The appellant was appointed by order dated 1st April 1992 astemporary Headmistress in the V.V.U.P.S., Kothaparamba with effect from 1stApril 1992. The appointment order clearly states that the appointment issubject to provisions of the Kerala Education Act and the Rules framed thereunder. 3. The reversion order Ext. P-2 came to be passed by the AssistantEducational Officer (A.E.O.), when respondent No. 4 acquired requisitequalification. R.45C, sub-rule (2) of the Kerala Education Rules (briefly,K.E.R.), provides that the teacher temporarily appointed under sub-rule (1)shall be replaced as soon as possible by the member of the service, whobecomes entitled to the promotion under the Rules. R.45B(1), starting with anon obstante clause, states that notwithstanding anything contained in R.45and 45A, Account Test (Lower) conducted by the Kerala Public ServiceCommission, shall be an obligatory qualification to the teachers for promotionas Headmasters of Lower Primary and Upper Primary Schools. It is notdisputed that the 4th respondent acquired such qualification in July, 1993.Admittedly, neither the appellant nor the 4th respondent was qualified on 1stApril 1992, when the vacancy occurred. 4. The appellant was appointed under R.45 of the K.E.R., which inter alia,provides that if 'there is a graduate teacher with B.Ed. or other equivalentqualification and who has got at least five years experience in teaching, hemay be appointed as Headmaster, provided he has got a service equal to halfof the period of service of the senior most undergraduate teacher. From R.45,it is clear that a graduate teacher could get preference to be appointed asHeadmaster. Since the appellant was a graduate teacher, and the 4threspondent was not qualified as on 1st April 1992, preference was given to theappellant and she was appointed as temporary Headmistress by Ext. P-1. 5. R.45 C(2) clearly states that a teacher temporarily promoted under sub-rule(1) shall be replaced as soon as possible by a member of the service, whobecomes entitled to promotion under the rules. Therefore, the 4th respondenthaving acquired qualification in July 1993, became entitled to be appointed asHeadmistress and consequent upon that, the reversion order Ext. P-2 waspassed on 10th January 1995. There is no dispute that whereas respondentNo. 4 had become qualified in July 1993, the appellant did not acquirerequisite qualification at that time. Admittedly, the 4th respondent is senior tothe appellant. 6. P-2 waspassed on 10th January 1995. There is no dispute that whereas respondentNo. 4 had become qualified in July 1993, the appellant did not acquirerequisite qualification at that time. Admittedly, the 4th respondent is senior tothe appellant. 6. The question for consideration is whether the appellant can be preferredover the 4th respondent, who was senior to the appellant and qualified. Underthe rules, unless a teacher acquires requisite qualifications, he or she cannotbe appointed as Headmaster. But, if a qualified teacher is not available, tomeet out that eventuality, several provisions have been made under the rules.It is only in that situation, the appellant, though she was not qualified, came tobe appointed under R.45, because she was given preference, being agraduate teacher. 7. The learned Single Judge took note of R.45B Chap.14A, K.E.R., whichsays that a pass in Account Test (Lower) is an obligatory qualification forpromotion as Headmaster in U. P. School. As the 4th respondent acquired thatqualification earlier than the appellant, the learned Single Judge took the viewthat the former had become entitled to replace the appellant under R.45 G (2)with effect from 2nd July 1993. The appellant was consequently reverted asshe acquired the test qualification much later in December 1995. The learnedSingle Judge also took into consideration the seniority of the 4th respondent. 8. The statutory rules fully support the action, taken by the A.E.O. in revertingthe appellant. As already pointed out, the reversion order Ext. P-2 is nothingbut a consequence of R.45C(2), which clearly states that unqualified teacherwill be replaced by a qualified teacher. 9. Counsel for the appellant states that appointment of the appellant was dulyapproved by the A.E.O. and, therefore the A. E.O. cannot review his own orderby passing reversion order Ext. P-2. We do not see any substance in thissubmission. Ext. P-2 is not a review order of the order according approval tothe appointment order Ext. P-1. The A. E. O. is under legal duty to passreversion order in view of R.45 C (2) after the 4th respondent a qualifiedteacher-became available. 10. Another submission of counsel for the appellant is that the A.E.O. is notcompetent to appoint respondent No. 4. This submission was made referringto the reversion order Ext. P-1. The A. E. O. is under legal duty to passreversion order in view of R.45 C (2) after the 4th respondent a qualifiedteacher-became available. 10. Another submission of counsel for the appellant is that the A.E.O. is notcompetent to appoint respondent No. 4. This submission was made referringto the reversion order Ext. P-2, in which the A.E.O. stated as follows: "Hence Smt. V. P. Lalitha is hereby reverted as U.P.S.A. and Smt. K. S.Ushakumari, L.P.S.A. who is fully qualified is posted as Teacher-in-chargewith effect from 2nd July 1993 until further orders." Pointing out the delineated portion, counsel for the appellant submits thatrespondent No. 4 was appointed by the A.E.O. Adverting to S.11 of the KeralaEducation Act and R.44 (1), which conferred the power of appointment on theManager, counsel for the appellant submits that the appointment ofrespondent No. 4 by Ext. P-2 is without jurisdiction. We do not agree with thisaverment of counsel for the appellant. The order Ext. P-2 is a reversion ordersimpliciter and that cannot be termed as an appointment order of the 4threspondent. By order Ext. P-2, the 4th respondent was posted asteacher-in-charge with effect from 2nd July 1993 until further orders. This, infact, is not an appointment order. But the A.E.O. had to pass theconsequential order, as the appellant was reverted by the order Ext. P-2.When the appellant was reverted, somebody had to be put in charge in placeof the appellant and this is what had been done by Ext. P-2. In the place of theappellant, the 4th respondent was put in charge. The appointment order, nodoubt, could be issued only by the Manager. Challenging the order Ext. P-2,the appellant approached this court by means of the Original Petition andobtained a stay order. This is how a regular appointment order could not bepassed by the Manager. 11. Another submission of counsel for the appellant is that the 4th respondentpermanently relinquished her claim to be appointed as Headmistress and,therefore, she cannot be permitted now to claim the post of Headmistress. Inthis connection the 'Note' to R.44 (1) of the K.E.R. states that whenever theManager intends to appoint a person as Headmaster other than the seniorclaimant, the Manager shall obtain a written consent from such seniorclaimant, renouncing his claim permanently. Such consent shall have theapproval of the Educational Officer concerned. The question for considerationis whether the 4th respondent had relinquished her claim permanently. Such consent shall have theapproval of the Educational Officer concerned. The question for considerationis whether the 4th respondent had relinquished her claim permanently. Ourattention has been drawn to Ext. R-4 (a) to the counter affidavit filed by the 4threspondent, which is a letter from, the A.E.O., Kodungallur to the DistrictEducational Officer, Irinjalakuda, The A.E.O. in the said letter Ext. R-4 (a)clearly stated as under: "No teacher had passed Account Test Lower. Nobody except Sl. No. 1 hadeither attained the age of 50 years or had 25 years of service Sl. No. 1 Smt. A.S. Nalini was aged 51 and had 28 years of service. But she had informed onwriting her relinquishment to the post of H.M. In this connection I may statethat not only Smt. A. S. Nalini but all the senior teachers except Smt. K. S.Ushakumari, Sl. No. 4 had expressed their willingness to relinquish the post ofH. M. The petitioner K. S. Ushakumari has informed in writing that she has noobjection in appointing Smt. V. P. Lalitha as H.M., provided if the rule was infavour of her (V. P. Lalitha) and it could not affect her (Ushakumari) futureclaim for the post of H. M." (Underlining by the court.) From the above reproduced communication, it is amply clear that all teachers,except the 4th respondent, had relinquished their claim. It will, therefore, beseen that respondent No. 4 did not relinquish her claim. Relinquishmentenvisaged by the Note to R.44 (1), must be unequivocal, which cannot beinferred from the letter Ext. R-4 (a) by any stretch of imagination. 12. Lastly, counsel for the appellant has submitted before us that civilconsequences flow from the reversion order Ext. P-2 and, therefore, it wasobligatory on the part of the A.E.O. to give an opportunity of being heard to theappellant before passing the reversion order Ext. P-2. The learned SingleJudge dealt with this contention as follows; "Therefore, if a notice is given to the petitioner to explain why orders ofreversion should not be passed against her, no useful purpose will be served,since the facts are not in dispute. Therefore, under the discretionaryjurisdiction exercised by me under Art.226 of the Constitution, I am not inclinedto quash Exhibit P-2 order." 13. It is not disputed that the 4th respondent is senior to the appellant and thatshe acquired requisite qualification in July 1993. On these admitted facts, theA.E.O. passed the reversion order in view of R.45C(2). Therefore, under the discretionaryjurisdiction exercised by me under Art.226 of the Constitution, I am not inclinedto quash Exhibit P-2 order." 13. It is not disputed that the 4th respondent is senior to the appellant and thatshe acquired requisite qualification in July 1993. On these admitted facts, theA.E.O. passed the reversion order in view of R.45C(2). Such fact situationwhich is relevant to invoke R.45C(2), stood admitted. In view of these facts, wesee no good reason to differ from the view, taken by the learned Single Judgein this behalf. 14. Counsel for the appellant, relying on a decision of the Supreme Courtrendered in Civil Appeal No. 503-31 of 1993, (The Manager, C.L.P. Schooland others v. Mary Leena and others) stated before us that the order Ext. P-2reverting the appellant could not be passed simply on the basis of fortuitouscircumstance that the 4th respondent acquired qualification in July 1993before the appellant, who acquired qualification in the year 1995. After acareful perusal of the Judgment, it appears that R.45C(2) of the K.E.R. wasnot considered by the Supreme Court. The effect of R.45C(2) is that as soonas a qualified teacher becomes available, a teacher temporarily appointedshall have to be replaced. This being the statutory rule cannot be whittleddown to save the appointment of the appellant as against the 4th respondent,who is senior and qualified as compared to the appellant. In view of R.45 C(2), the 4th respondent is entitled to be appointed as Headmistress. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed.