Onkar Singh Sharma v. Rajasthan Public Service Commission
1997-04-07
M.G.MUKHERJI, V.K.SINGHAL
body1997
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. - The writ petitioner Onkar Singh Sharma impugns in this present special appeal a judgment dated 7.11.1996 passed by a learned Single Judge of our Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5113 of 1995, whereby his writ application was dismissed. The writ petitioner prayed that he got himself registered as a candidate in the Rajasthan Judicial Service Competitive Examination conducted by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (for short hereinafter to be referred as 'the Commission') and duly appeared in the said examination on 16th and 17th October 1994. The result of the said examination was declared in the month of March 1995 and he was declared to have passed. He was given call to appear for the interview. Such interviews were held between 8th and 23rd May, 1995. His date of interview was fixed on 17.5.1995 but since he was too ill to attend the said interview on that date, he sent an application through his younger brother to the Secretary of the Commission praying for a change of the date of interview. The date of interview was accordingly changed to 22.5.1995 but unfortunately due to his continued illness he could not attend the said interview on 22.5.1995 even. He sent a further application on 22.5.1995 to the Commission through its Secretary accompanied by a medical certificate dated 21.5.1995 but no such further date of interview was granted to him. The Commission declared the result of the said competitive Rajasthan Judicial Service (R.J.S) examination which was published in various newspapers on 24.5.1995. In the newspaper his roll No. was shown in the list of those who have been selected for the said service but towards the end of the publication in the newspaper, it was also shown that his result had been withheld. In the said result which was published in the newspapers the petitioner was shown to have secured 75th position. The petitioner was under the impression that despite his inability to appear before the Interview Board, since he has been selected because of his marks secured in the written examination and since his name was shown also in the list of selected candidates, he was worthy of such selection for the R.J.S. He submitted a representation to the Secretary, Department of Law, Government Secretariat, Jaipur on 28.6.1995 and since as many as six posts were kept vacant, he expected an opportunity of being ultimately selected.
The information also came on him that seven posts were kept vacant as regards the total number of seats to be absorbed by way of selection through the R.J.S. examination. By sending a representation to the Secretary of the Commission on 27.9.1995 he drew his attention to an apparent contradiction of result declared by the Commission insofar as his case was concerned, inasmuch as his name was both in the list of selected candidates and also in the list of such candidates whose results have been withheld. He prayed that his name should be sent to the Government as a selected candidate. He sent another detailed representation on 9.10.1995 to the Secretary of the Commission in which he explained the circumstances under which he could not appear before the Interview Board. His other contention, inter alia, was thus even if he was awarded zero mark in the interview, still then, he secured much high marks in the written examination than the last candidate selected in the general category and that he has every right to be selected. It was further reiterated on his behalf that it was not compulsory for a candidate to face the Interview Board. That apart he was ready and willing to face the Interview Board which may be held at the behest of the Commission. He further made a representation that he has earlier appeared in the RJS competitive examination on three other occasions and the average of marks obtained by him in such interview may be awarded to him. He further prayed in the alternative that the minimum marks secured by a candidate in this interview may be awarded to him. His further contention, inter alia, was that under Rule 19 of the Rajasthan Judicial Services Rules, 1955, there is no requirement for a candidate so as to compulsorily appear before the Interview Board nor there is a requirement of securing minimum marks in the interview. Ultimately he received a mark-sheet on 1.11.1995 wherein he was shown to have secured 175 marks out of 300. For viva voce, full marks were of 35 and even if the petitioner was awarded zero, which was initially awarded to him but subsequently the word 'absent' was inserted, he came within the reckoning for the purpose of selection in the Judicial Services. 2.
For viva voce, full marks were of 35 and even if the petitioner was awarded zero, which was initially awarded to him but subsequently the word 'absent' was inserted, he came within the reckoning for the purpose of selection in the Judicial Services. 2. However, the petitioner came to know later on by way of enquiries made from the office of the Commission that its authorities have decided not to recommend his name, taking him to be 'absent' in the vica voca test. His repeted request for his viva voce test were not acceded to. In the meantime several other categories of the candidates moved the State High Court and/or the Supreme Court and there were certain directions passed by the Suprme Court in the matter of those candidates appearing in the examination. That emboldened the writ petitioner to expect that there would be a separate arrangement for him. But then, ultimately he came to know that no separate arrangement is to be done in this regard that ultimately led to his filing of the writ petition. He prayed, inter alia, that even the total marks as were obtained being 175 out of 335, would make him entitled to a selection since the last candidate selected secured lesser marks than him. In this context he prayed that the action of respondents in withholding his result, be declared as illegal and unconstitutional and the Commission be directed to recommend his name to the State Government for his appointment in the Rajasthan Judicial Services. There was a further prayer that the State Government be directed to provide a suitable appointment to him in the Rajasthan Judicial Services. 3. The Commission contested the writ petition contending, inter alia, that in the advertisement dated 1.7.1994 it was given out that for 113 posts of Munsif & Judicial Magistrates under the provisions of the Rules of 1955, there would be an examination. The petitioner was duly successful in the theoretical examination, he was called for interview on 17.5.1995, he sought a change in the date of interview on the ground of his illness accompanied by a medical certificate and he was asked to appear for the test on 22.5.1995. However, on 22.5.1995 also the petitioner did not appear before the Interview Board. The results were declared on 23.5.1995. No further extension could have been given because the interviews were concluded on 22.5.1995 itself.
However, on 22.5.1995 also the petitioner did not appear before the Interview Board. The results were declared on 23.5.1995. No further extension could have been given because the interviews were concluded on 22.5.1995 itself. Initially the result of petitioner was withheld. However, after examining the whole matter, vide corrigendum dated 31.5.1995 Roll No. 2625 was deleted from the result- sheet and vide amendment in the result dated 9.6.1995 the petitioner was declared unsuccessful. It was reiterated that under the provisions of rule 15 of the Rules of 1955, the syllabus was prescribed and the competitive examination was to be held as per Schedule III of the said Rules. In Schedule III the competitive examination for recruitment to the R.J.S. consists of a written examination in the subjects as mentioned in it and there is a provision for interview to test the general knowledge of the candidate and his fitness for appointment. In the written examination, the knowledge of the candidate is tested in Law Paper as well as efficiency in the language i.e. Hindi and English. While interviewing a candidate the suitability for employment to the judicial service is tested with reference to his record at the school, college and university and his character, personality, address and physique. Questions of general nature are asked to test his general knowledge including the knowledge of current affairs. The marks so awarded in the viva voce are added to the marks obtained in the written examination. Thus, as per the scheme of the Rules of 1955, viva voce/interview is a part and parcel of the entire examination process and also a necessary ingredient in the whole process of selection. Each candidate has to go through the whole process of selection and in absence of any part thereof, a candidate cannot be said to have completed the process of selection so as to declare him successful for appointment even on the basis of high marks obtained by him in any part of the whole process of selection and get into the merit by way of reckoning. 4. It was further submitted by the respondent Public Service Commission that the petitioner did not appear before the Interview Board in spite of his initial request for a change of the date of interview. No further extension could have been given because the interviews were concluded on 22.5.1995 itself and the results were declared on 23.5.1995.
4. It was further submitted by the respondent Public Service Commission that the petitioner did not appear before the Interview Board in spite of his initial request for a change of the date of interview. No further extension could have been given because the interviews were concluded on 22.5.1995 itself and the results were declared on 23.5.1995. After examining the whole matter, the petitioner was declared unsuccessful because he had not completed the whole process of selection. Presumption of taking 'zero' marks in the interview on his being absent, cannot be drawn in the absence of any specific provision under the Rules of 1955. Previous marks obtained by him in the earlier examination have also no relevancy so far as the present examination is concerned. It was not correct on the part of petitioner to contend that the interview was a mere formality. If the rule making authority had provided a particular process of selection for a particular post, the whole process of selection has to be completed by all the candidates in order to get themselves successful. It was admitted that there was an issuance of mark-sheet to the petitioner in which he was rightly marked as 'absent' in the interview. It was further reiterated that directions by the Apex Court in other matters were thoroughly irrelevant and out of the context. The contentions on the basis of which the petitioner prayed for declaring him successful and sought a recommendation by the Commission to the State Government for appointment in the R.J.S. were utterly misconceived. The petitioner not having made out any case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution, it was submitted by the Commission that the writ application was liable to be dismissed. 5. The learned Single Judge who heard and disposed of the writ application, however, held that the scheme underlying the process of selection of a candidate for recruitment to the R.J.S. examination loudly speak out that the viva voce test is an integral and essentially inseparable part of such process. Rule 7 makes the result of a competitive examination conducted by the Public Service Commission as the only source of recruitment to the R.J.S. Rule 14 directs that competitive examination for recruitment to the service should be held at such intervals as the Governor may, in consultation with the Court from time to time, determine.
Rule 7 makes the result of a competitive examination conducted by the Public Service Commission as the only source of recruitment to the R.J.S. Rule 14 directs that competitive examination for recruitment to the service should be held at such intervals as the Governor may, in consultation with the Court from time to time, determine. Rule 15 speaks of the syllabus and the rules relating to the competitive examination. Such syllabus and rules have been incorporated in Schedule III appended to the rules. Rule (B) of Schedule III mandates, inter alia, that the viva voce test shall carry 35% marks and only those candidates who have obtained a minimum of 35% marks in each of the Law papers and 40% in the aggregate in the written test, shall be eligible to be called for interview. The learned Single Judge held that even though it was true that in the rules as per the Schedule, there was no intention that the candidate should have secured a minimum percentage of 35% marks in the interview in order to be finally declared as selected for recruitment but that fact alone does not in any manner minimise the importance and requirement of the viva voca test. The learned Single Judge, however, held that as per first proviso to rule 19, the Public Service Commission was not duty bound to recommend any candidate who failed to obtain a minimum 45% marks in the aggregate, both in the written and oral examinations taken together. The aggregation of marks is to be made as per the mandate contained in the syllabus and the rules relating to the competitive examination, which as per the provisions in the last paragraph clearly provided that the marks awarded in the viva voce test.
The aggregation of marks is to be made as per the mandate contained in the syllabus and the rules relating to the competitive examination, which as per the provisions in the last paragraph clearly provided that the marks awarded in the viva voce test. According to the learned single Judge, after having made the viva voce test as one of the necessary parts of the process of selection in rule 15 read with Schedule III, the rule making authority deemed it fit to reiterate the fact that as per first proviso to rule 19, the Commission was not duty bound to recommend any candidate who failed to obtain the minimum 45% marks in the aggregate, both the written and oral examinations taken together, According to the learned Single Judge the use of word "both" in the language of first proviso to rule 19 clearly exhibited its intention rather its anxiety to ensure that a person to be appointed to R.J.S. not only possesses the requisite qualification and practical knowledge of civil and criminal laws and the procedures thereunder, but also would be suitable for employment to R.J.S. with reference to his record at the school, college and university and his character, personality, address and physique. If the viva voce test is not considered to be the essential part of process of selection for a candidate for the purpose of recruitment to R.J.S, there shall be no opportunity to the examining body to test his personality and address, the importance of which could not be minimised in judging his suitability to discharge the duties of a judicial officer. According to the learned Single Judge it could not be overlooked that he was required to work at the grass- roots level of the State judiciary and, therefore, apart from the written test his overall performance at the oral interview was also very important. A candidate, in order to be successful, has to secure at least 35% marks in each of the two Law papers but 40% aggregate marks of all the four papers as per rule (B) Schedule III, so as to be called for interview but he has also to obtain a minimum 45% marks in aggregate, both of written examination as well as the oral viva voce examination, so as to be finally recommended under rule 19 for the appointment.
The difference of 5% marks between the minimum marks requisite for the eligibility of a candidate for interview and the minimum marks requisite for his selection clearly pointed out the importance of viva voce test in the process of his selection for appointment to the R.J.S. 6. The learned Single Judge referred to the importance of viva voce test in the selection of persons for the purpose of judicial posts in the State judiciary in the case of Madan Lal & others v. State of J&K & others, reported in 1995(3) SCC 486 : 1995(2) SCT 880 (SC). Explaining the proposition laid down in A. Periakuruppan v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 1997(1) SCC 38, which was a case relating to the selection of a student for admission to the MBBS course in the State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court observed:- ".... it is also to be kept in view that while selecting a student for admission in MBBS course what is more important is his performance in the written test and even at the oral interview his past record of performance has its own weight. A student while undertaking study is not required to perform any duty of a public office. But in the case of recruitment to the post of Munsif he is required to work at the grassroots level of State judiciary. For candidates aspiring to be appointed in such a judicial office, apart from the written test, his overall performance at the oral interview is more important." 7. Emphasising the necessity and importance of interview besides written test, in the matter of selection process and choice of candidates for recruitment to public posts the Supreme Court observed in Manjeet Singh v. Employees' State Insurance Corpn., AIR 1990 SC 1104 , as follows:- "... We are of the view that the scheme intended for recruitment should be on the basis of an examination comprising of written test and interview. We agree with submission of Shri Madhav Reddy that interview has its own place in the matter of selection process and the choice of candidates. Once this is recognised, it would be appropriate to require every candidate to pass the interview test and for that purpose there should be a basic limit provided.
We agree with submission of Shri Madhav Reddy that interview has its own place in the matter of selection process and the choice of candidates. Once this is recognised, it would be appropriate to require every candidate to pass the interview test and for that purpose there should be a basic limit provided. In the absence of any prescription of qualifying marks for the interview test the same prescription of 40% as applicable for the written examination seems to be reasonable. That has been the view expressed by one of us (Punchhi, J.) in a decision (Rajesh Sood v. Director General, Employees State Insurance Corpn. decided on August 7, 1985) to which our attention has been drawn. We approve of the view...." 8. The above observations were made by the Supreme Court in the context of direct recruitment of employees under the State Insurance Corporation on the basis of the examination and interview. The advertisement did not prescribe any marks in the interview though for the written examination 40% was prescribed the minimum. Selection was, however, made on the basis of 40% in the interview test and while certain writ petitioners were not selected, a challenge was made by the unsuccessful candidates questioning their rejection contending, inter alia, that in the absence of any prescription to apply the 40% basis in the interview, they should not be required to obtain any minimum marks in the interview. The Supreme Court rejected such a contention. According to the learned Single Judge such observations do substantiate the degree of weightage which is to be given to such interviews as was held in Ramesh Chand Paliwal v. State of Rajasthan, RLW 1990(2) 461. The learned Single Judge accordingly held that interviews were an integral part of the process of selection for recruitment to the R.J.S. and rules 14, 15 and 19 of the Rules of 1955 read with the rules made in Schedule III under rule 15, clearly mandate that for inclusion in the final list of selected candidates to be prepared by the Public Service Commission for recommendation to the State Government for recruitment in the R.J.S. a candidate has necessarily to undergo the process of interview. 9.
9. The learned Single Judge also rejected the contention as made by the writ petitioner that since there was no minimum percentage of marks prescribed in the viva voce test, an absentee from the interview was entitled to be considered in the position of a candidate who appeared in the interview but failed to secure any marks therein or even obtained zero mark and after adding his zero to the marks already obtained by him in the written examination, could secure the required 45% of the total minimum marks so as to get a place in the merit list. The learned Single Judge thought that the provisions made in rule 19 and the rules in Schedule III under rule 15 were clear, specific and admit of no ambiguity. Where the language employed in the relevant statute was clear and unambiguous, there need not be any necessity to read a fiction in interpreting the same. That apart, if the contention of the writ petitioner was accepted, it would lead to anomalous situation. A candidate who does not appear in the interview but who obtains 45% of the total marks of 335 in the written examination only would be placed on a footing better than that of the candidate who appeared both in the written test and the oral examination. This situation is likely to result in doing away with the requirement of holding the interview at all and the functioning of the relevant part of rule 19 and of the rules as embodied in the Schedule III relating to the viva-voce would just be jeopardised and the rules would become redundant and superfluous. Such construction of a statute making the provisions of the rules nugatory and non-fucntional must have to be avoided. Various provisions of the statute are required to be harmoniously construed and interpreted so that the object underlying the same may be achieved. It was further held by the learned Single Judge that just because the petitioner had secured 175 marks in written examination which were more than the marks secured by the last selected candidate, there should not be a discriminatory treatment in favour of the writ petitioner which would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution ignoring the fact of non-appearance in the interview.
Following the ratio as propounded by several decisions of this Court and also of the Supreme Court, the learned Single Judge rejected the contention as sought to be made out by the writ petitioner. When selection process had already been over and the selected candidates have been appointed, a relief to the writ petitioner, whose case, even if a genuine one, should be refused. Hard cases could not be allowed to make bad laws. Holding, inter alia, that the selection process had already been over and the candidates selected have already been appointed to the R.J.S. and that there had been no mala fides or arbitrary exercise of power by the members of the Commission or by the State Government, nor there was any other factor going to the root of the selection, just on account of the continued illness of the petitioner during the interviews due to which he could not come for interview and was thus prevented from the selection, would not justify any interference by the writ Court. Any sympathy to the writ petitioner on that account would open doors for going against the spirit of the relevant rules and would also cause avoidable hardship to the functioning of the Commission as an examining body entrusted with the responsible duty of holding examination for recruitment of candidates. 10. The learned Single Judge sought to distinguish the other case of Mrs. Kalpana Kumbhat v. University of Jodhpur & another, reported in 1981 WLN (UC) 51, where the petitioner could not appear at the practical examination for M.Sc. Zoology Final due to child birth. She claimed for holding of a special examination for her case and the Court found that she had been treated unequally inasmuch as the special examinations were held in past in several cases and that the ban put by the Syndicate resolution failed to fulfil the test of reasonableness and smacked of arbitrariness. But such fact did not exist in the case of writ petitioner. In Amra Ram v. University of Jodhpur, reported in 1984 WLN (UC) 149, the petitioner could not appear in the practical examination for B.E. III year due to accident. Relying upon the ratio of the decision in Mrs. Kalpana Kumbhat's case, holding of special practical examination for him was directed by this Court. But that case was also held to be distinguishable.
Relying upon the ratio of the decision in Mrs. Kalpana Kumbhat's case, holding of special practical examination for him was directed by this Court. But that case was also held to be distinguishable. According to the learned single Judge the ratio decidendi in the two cases should be appreciated in the context of the Supreme Court's observation in the case of Madan Lal (ibid). It ought to be appreciated that whereas a student while undertaking study is not required to perform any duty of a public office, an appointee to the R.J.S. or for that matter to any public office is required to work at grassroots level and, therefore, the oral interview in his case has more importance than that in the case of a student aspiring for admission to some other course. The ratio of the decisions in the earlier two cases was thus distinguished in the present context. In Prakash Chand Agarwal v. State of Bihar, 1982(2) SLJ 392, the appellant appeared both at the written examination and the viva voce test held for recruitment to Bihar Civil Services (Judicial Branch). He secured 416 marks in all. The candidates whose names were shown against serial Nos. 36 and 37, had secured 415 marks each and that at serial No. 38 secured 413 marks. But the name of appellant was not included it the list. In fact a list of 83 candidates was prepared keeping in view the qualifying marks as 38% which was forwarded by the Public Service Commission but subsequently it was changed and another list was forwarded keeping in view the qualifying marks as 40% as per recommendation of the High Court. The Supreme Court held that having fixed 38% as the qualifying marks it was not open to the Commission to exclude the name of such candidates who had secured 38.8% marks in the written examination only because the High Court had earlier recommended that 40% marks should be the qualifying marks. On the face of it, the ratio of this decision does not apply to the present case. In the instant case, the petitioner did not appear for viva voce test. In Narendra Pal Sharma & another v. State of Punjab & Haryana, ......
On the face of it, the ratio of this decision does not apply to the present case. In the instant case, the petitioner did not appear for viva voce test. In Narendra Pal Sharma & another v. State of Punjab & Haryana, ...... (1) SCC 532, the selection of candidates for being recommended for nomination to State Civil Service Class I, on the basis of ACRs, experience and ability test comprising essay writing in State language and English, was to be made. Since separate marks were awarded for ACRs and experience, exclusion of candidates securing 33% or less marks in the ability test for being considered for recommendation was held invalid as similar tests were not conducted in all the departments and the procedure adopted by the Chief Secretary was found arbitrary, illegal and unjust. The Supreme Court ruled that the criteria must be to include for consideration all those who secured marks on all heads and to recommend those who secured highest in aggregate. However, such were not the facts in the present case, and therefore, the ratio of this decision also was not made applicable in the instant case. To sum up, the learned Single Judge held that the interview tests were an integral part of the process of selection of candidates for recruitment of the R.J.S. and in absence of any prescription for securing minimum percentage of the prescribed 35% marks for interview did not do away with the necessity and requirement for holding viva voce test. Since the selection in the present case was not found to be vitiated by any mala fides or by an arbitrary exercise of power by the Commission and since no other factor going to the root of the selection was noticed and there was no case of violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the petitioner was not entitled to any reliefs claimed by him. Since the petitioner did not undergo the entire process of selection for the recruitment to R.J.S the exclusion of his name from the select list prepared by the Commission under Rule 19 and forwarded to the State of Rajasthan, was held justifiable in law. 11. Mr.
Since the petitioner did not undergo the entire process of selection for the recruitment to R.J.S the exclusion of his name from the select list prepared by the Commission under Rule 19 and forwarded to the State of Rajasthan, was held justifiable in law. 11. Mr. Rafiq, the learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner-appellant cited before us the decision in Umesh Chandra Shukla v. Union of India & others, reported in 1985(2) SLJ 412, for the proposition that there was scope for interference by the High Court or the Supreme Court as regards the justification of a test conducted by way of a competitive examination for recruitment to such service in connection with judicial service. That was a case where 2 marks were added in each individual paper as extra marks so as to bring those in zone of consideration for viva voce tests who have obtained high marks in individual papers but were lacking in aggregate. When the validity of such moderation was questioned, it was observed by the Supreme Court that it created distrust in the process of selection and violated the principle of equality and led to arbitrariness. It was held that hard cases cannot be allowed to make bad law. It was held further that, the selection committee had no power to prescribe such marks different from the minimum already prescribed by the rules. But that was not the case here inasmuch as even if no minimum marks were prescribed for the viva voce test and the writ petitioner appellant did not secure such minimum marks he was not eliminated at the threshold not for obtaining the minimum marks but for the mere fact that he did not appear at all for such an interview wherefrom his suitability for the judicial service could not be assessed. 12. In Durgacharan Misra v. State of Orissa & others, AIR 1987 SC 2267 , in the matter of recruitment of Munsifs for the Orissa Judicial Service, there was a prescribed syllabus for written and viva voce tests and there were no minimum qualifying marks prescribed for viva voce test under the rules. The Public Service Commission, however, prescribed minimum qualifying marks for viva voce test and excluded the candidates for not securing such marks which were arbitrarily so prescribed by the Public Service Commission contrary to the rules. It was held that such assignment was grossly illegal.
The Public Service Commission, however, prescribed minimum qualifying marks for viva voce test and excluded the candidates for not securing such marks which were arbitrarily so prescribed by the Public Service Commission contrary to the rules. It was held that such assignment was grossly illegal. It was further observed that the prescribing of minimum marks for viva voce test could not be justified on the ground that it was done on the advice of the sitting Judge of the High Court who was present at the time of the viva voce test. The judge may advise the Commission as to the special qualities required for judicial appointments. His advice may be in regard to the range of subjects in respect of which the viva voce shall be conducted. It may also cover the type and standard of questions to be put to candidates; or the acceptance of the answers given thereof. But the advice of the Judge cannot run counter to the statutory rules inasmuch as the mandate of the rule was that the Commission shall add the marks secured by the candidates at the written and the viva voce tests, no matter what those marks at viva voce test, and on the basis of the aggregate marks in both the tests, the names of candidates have to be arranged in order of merit and that was not so done, the entire selection process was quashed. It was found that the Public Service Commission of its own cannot prescribe additional requirements for selection, either as to eligibility or as to suitability. It must select candidates in accordance with the rules. The decision of the Commission to prescribe minimum marks contrary to the rules would be illegal and without authority. But that decision also did not come into play in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 13. In Dr. Krishna Chandra Sahu & others v. State of Orissa & others, 1995(5) SLR 337 , it was held that as regards the scope of writ jurisdiction over the decision of Selection Committee regarding appointment of selected candidates, the decision of the Selection Committee can only be interfered with on limited grounds if there be an illegality or material irregularity in the constitution of the committee or in its procedure vitiating the selection or on ground of proved mala fides affecting the selection.
In the matter of appointment or selection in the absence of any criteria in the rules or in the absence of a specific authorisation by way of rules in this regard, it was held that the Selection Committee does not even have the inherent jurisdiction to lay down the norms for selection nor such powers can be assumed by necessary implication. The proceedings indicate that since Rule 3 was silent as to the guidelines on the basis of which suitability of the candidate was to be adjudged, the members constituting the Selection Board, by a majority decision, resolved to determine the suitability on the basis of confidential character rolls of the candidates who were already employed as Homoeopathic Medical Officers. It was further observed by the Supreme Court that in order to assess the suitability or real worth of candidate for the post of junior teacher in the college, the basis, namely, the character rolls, adopted by the Selection Board was wholly arbitrary besides being without authority or jurisdiction. However, in the facts of the present case we do not think that the Commission which was vested with the task of selecting the candidates did resort to any arbitrary manner of selection in eliminating the writ petitioner in the selection process because of his not appearing in the viva voce test inasmuch as the Commission rightly held a viva voce test to be an integral part of the selection process where the suitability of the candidate could be adjudged by Interview Board and that opportunity having been so accorded by the Interview Board not being availed of by the petitioner as a candidate for such selection, we do not think that the Public Service Commission can in any manner be held guilty of any arbitrary action or can be said to have taken any discriminatory attitude against the writ petitioner. We do not find any scope for interference as regards the judgment of the learned Single Judge and as such we dismiss the appeal, though without any order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******