JUDGMENT (1.) R. R. K. Trivedi, J. In this writ petition, counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the parties. Learned Counsel for the parties have agreed that this writ petition may he decided finally at this stage. (2.) DURING the relevant period, petitioner Akhlaq Ahmad Khan was serving as Executive Engineer (Electrical and Mechanical) in Public Works Department of State of Uttar Pradesh. State of Uttar Pradesh by its order dated 26th June, 1992, Annexure-7 to the writ petition, retired petitioner compulsorily from the aforesaid post, aggrieved by which, this writ petition has been filed. Petitioner's case, in brief, is that he was appointed as Assistant Engineer. He joined this post on 17th December, 1963. On account of his sincere and honest discharge of duty, he was promoted as Executive Engineer on 22nd July, 1973. Later on, he was confirmed as Assistant Engineer by respondent No. 1 on 8th May, 1981. In the year 1988 petitioner was posted at Agra from where he was transferred to Azamgarh where he joined on 4th August, 1988. However, his family remained at Agra as his wife was heart patient and was getting medical treatment at Agra. The children of petitioner were also studying at Agra. Petitioner was compelled to proceed on leave and he remained on leave for a period of three months six days during different periods. It is stated that the leave was duly sanctioned by the authorities. From Azamgarh petitioner was transferred to Varanasi where he joined on 18th July, 1989 and has also shifted his family as better medical facilities were available at Varanasi. (3.) IT is further stated that Sri AC. Asthana was Superintending Engineer of 44 Circle, Public Works Department, Varanasi. Sri Asthana, who was immediate superior officer of the petitioner, proceeded on medical leave on 16th November, 1989. While on leave Sri Asthana was compulsorily retired on 14th December, 1989. Order of compulsory retirement was challenged in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 74 of 1990 filed in Lucknow Bench of this Court. The writ petition was allowed on 17th January, 1990. However, Sri Asthana was not allowed to join as Superintending Engineer at Varanasi. He remained attached to the office of Chief Engineer. Later on he was posted at Lucknow on 8th December, 1990. Writ Petition No. 74 of 1990 filed in Lucknow Bench of this Court. The writ petition was allowed on 17th January, 1990. However, Sri Asthana was not allowed to join as Superintending Engineer at Varanasi. He remained attached to the office of Chief Engineer. Later on he was posted at Lucknow on 8th December, 1990. IT is stated that Sri Asthana while proceeding on leave had recommended the name of Shri R. B. Mittal to officiate as Superintending Engineer during his absence. However, his recommendation was not accepted and petitioner was asked to officiate and discharge functions of Superintending Engineer alongwith his duties as Executive Engineer, by order dated 20th November, 1989. Petitioner officiated as Superintending Engineer from 14th December, 1989 to 8th December, 1990. During this period, petitioner was awarded good service entires. However petitioner was communicated an adverse entry given to him vide letter dated 4th July, 1991. This entry was with regard to the period 1st April, 1989 to 31st March, 1990. Petitioner submitted his representation against adverse entry on 20th February, 1992. IT has been submitted that though Superintending Engineer, Sri AC. Asthana had given adverse entry, Chief Engineer and Engineer-in-Chief had given good entry. Bad entry was also given to petitioner during period 4-8-88 to 31-3-89. A representation against this period was also filed. The representations were how ever, rejected by the State Government on 28th April, 1992 on which date the screening committee scrutinised the service record of the petitioner had recommended him for being compulsorily retired. Acting on the basis of the recommendation of the screening committee, impugned order of compulsory retirement has been passed. (4.) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the screening committee has illegally taken into account the adverse entry awarded to petitioner in the year 1982-83 while, as held by apex court, the entires of five previous years only could have been taken into account. It has also been submitted that the adverse entry was awarded by Sri A. C. Asthana on account of malice and annoyance as petitioner was asked to officiate as Superintending Engineer during the absence of Sri Asthana which, was against his wishes. The representation of the petitioner was illegally rejected. It has also been submitted that the adverse entry was awarded by Sri A. C. Asthana on account of malice and annoyance as petitioner was asked to officiate as Superintending Engineer during the absence of Sri Asthana which, was against his wishes. The representation of the petitioner was illegally rejected. It is further submitted that if the adverse entries of 1982-83 and 1989-90 are ignored for the aforesaid reason, the impugned order of compulsory retirement against petitioner is based on solitary entry and as held by apex court compulsory retirement could not have been ordered on the basis of the single entry. It is submitted that the petitioner's service record all along has been very good and the compulsory retirement cannot be termed in public interest in the facts and circumstances of the case and the impugned order suffers from manifest illegality. It has also been submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that as counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged and the case is ripe for hearing, it will not be proper at this stage to relegate petitioner to avail alternative remedy before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal. LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on following cases: (1) V. Villaswamy v. Inspector General of Police, Tamil Nadu, Madras and another, AIR1982. SC 82. (2) Brij Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR1987. SC 948, (3) 5. Ramchandra Raju v. State of Orissa, AIR 1995, SC 111; and (4) Sri Dilawar Singh Paul v. State of U. P. and others, (1997) 1 ESC 324 (All). (D. B.). Learned standing Counsel, on the other hand, submitted that the impugned order retiring petitioner compulsorily has been passed in public interest. The petitioner has failed to establish that the impugned order suffers from any mala fide or arbitrariness. All relevant documents have been considered by the screening committee before recommending to the State to retire petitioner. It has also been submitted that the screening committee, has not committed any illegality in considering the ad verse entries awarded to the petitioner in the years 1982-83 and 1989-90. Petitioner's representations against adverse entries were considered by the State and were rejected on 28th April, 1992 on merits which was not challenged before any court and the order has become final. Petitioner's representations against adverse entries were considered by the State and were rejected on 28th April, 1992 on merits which was not challenged before any court and the order has become final. It is also submitted that it is incorrect to allege that the impugned order is based on a single adverse entry awarded to petitioner. It has also been submitted that the petitioner has equally, efficacious, alternative remedy before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal and this writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. Learned standing Counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the apex court in case of Bakunth Nath Das and another v. Chief District Medical Officer, Ban Pada and another, (1992) 2 UPLBEC 816 ; State of U. P. and another v. Labh Chand, (1993) 2 UPLBEC, 1219 and U. P. Jal Nigam and another v. Nareshwar Sahai Mathur and another, (1995)1 SCC, 21. (5.) WE have considered the rival sub missions of the learned Counsel for the par ties. Before coming to the merits of the case, it would be appropriate here to firstly deal with the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy which is undisputedly available to petitioner before U. P. Public Services Tribunal. (6.) LEARNED standing Counsel has placed reliance in case of U. P. Jal Nigam and another (supra) and State of U. P. and another (supra) in support of his submission that the petition should be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, has placed reliance in case of V. Villaswamy (supra). The legal position with regard to the availability of the alternative remedy as a bar to file a writ petition, has now been settled by the apex court in a recent judgment consisting of seven Hon'ble Judges in case of L. Chandra Kumar v. The Union of India and others, JT 1997 (3) SC 589. In paragraph 95 of the aforesaid judgment, it has been held as under: "before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. In paragraph 95 of the aforesaid judgment, it has been held as under: "before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the concerned High Court may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the arrears of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of Statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal. "In view of the aforesaid legal position now declared by the apex court, in our considered opinion, this writ petition directly challenging the impugned order in this Court is not legally maintainable. The Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976, here-in-after referred to as Act", provides for the constitution of the Tribunals to adjudicate the disputes in respect of the matters relating to employment or of public servant of the State. The Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976, here-in-after referred to as Act", provides for the constitution of the Tribunals to adjudicate the disputes in respect of the matters relating to employment or of public servant of the State. Thus it is also like a tribunal constituted under the Act passed by the appropriate legislature providing adjudication or trial by the tribunal of any dispute under Article 323-B of the Constitution. The Act received the assent of the President on April 30, 1976. Thus the legal position explained by the apex court in case of L. Chandra Kumar is applicable to this case also and this writ petition is not legally maintainable. As clear from the judgment of the apex court which is now law for the land under Article 141 of the Constitution, it is not open to any litigant to directly approach the High Court except in case where the vires of the legislation under which the Tribunal has been constituted, has been challenged. In the present case the vires of the Act has not been challenged therefore in such circumstances, the writ petition filed by the petitioner directly approaching this Court against order of the compulsory retirement is not legally maintainable. As we are dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy available to the petitioner before the Tribunal, it will not be proper for us to deal with other arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties with regard to the legality of the impugned order of compulsory requirement. (7.) FOR the reasons stated above, this writ petition is dismissed on the ground o alternative remedy leaving it open u petitioner to challenge the order before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .