JUDGMENT - A.V. SAVANT, J.:---Heard all the learned Counsel -Shri Gupte for petitioner; Smt. Tahilramani, Asstt. Public Prosecutor for the State and Shri H.V. Mehta for respondent No. 7. 2.This is a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the order of detention dated 29th May, 1985, passed against the petitioner-detenu Ghanshyam Raj Narayan Dubey by the Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay in exercise of his powers under sub-section (1) of section 2 the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug-offenders Act, 1981 (for short "M.P.D.A." Act). The Commissioner of Police was satisfied with regard to the said detenu that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it was necessary to make an order directing that the detenu be detained under the M.P.D.A. Act. The order of detention has not yet been executed for reasons which we will indicate below and, hence this is a petition at the pre-detention stage, prior to the service of the order on the detenu. 3.The grounds of detention set out the activities of the detenu as a 'slumlord' within the meaning of Clause (f) of section 2 of the M.P.D.A. Act, 1981. There is reference to his having unauthorisedly constructed 15 chawls on a private land, belonging to one Anwar Haji Ali Mohamed Aghotwala and others situated at Survey No. 232 and City Survey Nos. 1804 and 1864, Pragati Nagar, Deep Narayan Dube Road, Dahisar (East), Bombay. The grounds of detention allege that the detenu had grabbed these lands unauthorisedly and constructed chawls known as Ghanshyam Dubey chawls unauthorisedly. There are 238 rooms in the said chawls and on the basis of the in camera statements of 5 persons, the activities of the detenu as a slumlord have been set out in the grounds of detention. The substance of these five in-camera statements is that needy persons in search of accommodation in the said chawls are called upon to pay huge amount known as "pagdi" in this city (illegal premium) and in the event of a needy person refusing to pay, he is threatened with dire consequences. The substance of these five in-camera statements is that needy persons in search of accommodation in the said chawls are called upon to pay huge amount known as "pagdi" in this city (illegal premium) and in the event of a needy person refusing to pay, he is threatened with dire consequences. On the basis of the five specific instances, satisfaction is recorded that the detenu is a slumlord and that he was causing harm, alarm and danger and a feeling of insecurity amongst the section of public of the locality and in the area of Pragati Nagar, Deep Narayan Dubey Road, Dahisar (East) within the jurisdiction of Dahisar Police Station in Greater Bombay. The detenu's activities are, therefore, stated to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the aforesaid locality and area within the meaning of Clause (a)(i) of section 2 of the M.P.D.A. Act. 4.As stated earlier, the order of detention has been issued on 29th May, 1985. On 29th June, 1985, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 8389 of 1985, not in this Court, but in the Allahabad High Court praying for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to arrest and detain him. By an ad-interim order passed on 20th July, 1985, the Allahabad High Court stayed the arrest of the petitioner and called upon the respondents to file a reply. Affidavit-in-reply was accordingly filed in Allahabad High Court in July, 1985. 5.In the year 1987, the State of Maharashtra filed a Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 25 of 1987 in the Hon'ble Apex Court. On 23rd March, 1989, the Apex Court issued notice and granted ex-parte stay of further proceedings in Allahabad High Court. On 15th July, 1994, however, the Apex Court came to the conclusion that it was not a fit case for transfer and hence dismissed the transfer petition and interim stay of further proceedings, granted earlier, was vacated. 6.On 9th April, 1997 the Allahabad High Court dismissed the writ petition after refusing to grant adjournment observing that the matter was pending for admission for the last 12 years. On 9th April, 1997 when the motion for adjournment was refused, Counsel for the detenu did not press the petition for want of instructions and it was accordingly dismissed. 6.On 9th April, 1997 the Allahabad High Court dismissed the writ petition after refusing to grant adjournment observing that the matter was pending for admission for the last 12 years. On 9th April, 1997 when the motion for adjournment was refused, Counsel for the detenu did not press the petition for want of instructions and it was accordingly dismissed. When a motion was made for recalling the order dated 9th April, 1997 dismissing the petition as above, the Allahabad High Court framed two questions for its consideration, viz. "(i) Whether this Court had got territorial jurisdiction to quash the impugned order of detention of the petitioner and grant appropriate reliefs as claimed for by him; (ii) Whether it is a fit case in which this Court should resort to its inherent powers to restore back the aforementioned writ petition." The Allahabad High Court took the view that it lacked territorial jurisdiction to quash the impugned order of detention since the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Bombay High Court. In arriving at the said conclusion, the learned Judges referred to the Apex Court decision deprecating the tendency developed in one High Court to assume jurisdiction on the sole ground that the petitioner resided or carried on business from a registered office in that State. These observations are to be found in para 11 of the order passed on 29th April, 1997. In the result, the Allahabad High Court answered both the questions in the negative but observed that it would be open to the petitioner to move either the Maharashtra Government or Bombay High Court for redressal of his grievance provided he made out a valid ground in support thereof. With these observations, the motion for recall of the order dated 9th April, 1997 was rejected by the Allahabad High Court on 29th April, 1997. 7.In the meanwhile, the petitioner had approached the Apex Court by way of a substantive petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. On 24th January, 1995 the Apex Court dismissed the petition as in- fructuous. 8.Against the orders passed by Allahabad High Court on 9th April, 1997 and 27th April, 1997 dismissing his Writ Petition, the detenu had filed two S.L. Ps. in the Apex Court. On 24th January, 1995 the Apex Court dismissed the petition as in- fructuous. 8.Against the orders passed by Allahabad High Court on 9th April, 1997 and 27th April, 1997 dismissing his Writ Petition, the detenu had filed two S.L. Ps. in the Apex Court. It appears from the copy of the order at pages 172/173 of the compilation that the detenu had filed a second petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The two S.L.Ps. and the second petition under Article 32 were dismissed as withdrawn on 9th May, 1997. It was stated by the petitioner's Counsel in the Apex Court that, if so advised, the detenu would approach the High Court for appropriate relief. However, in the order passed by the Apex Court on 9th May, 1997 no such liberty has been granted to the detenu. 9.Be that as it may; on 25th July, 1997 this petition has been filed in this Court, though the order of detention has not yet been served on the detenu who had earlier obtained the stay from the Allahabad High Court which was operative for nearly 12 years. Pursuant to the affidavit in reply filed in Allahabad High Court, the detenu has been furnished with a copy of the order of detention and the grounds of detention which are sought to be challenged in this petition filed prior to the execution of the order of detention. 10.Before, we could hear the petition on merits, the learned A.P.P. appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 5 has raised a preliminary objection by filing the affidavit of Shri R.H. Mendonca, the present Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay. The preliminary objection that, this petition at the predetention stage is wholly misconceived and is untenable since it does not fall under any of the five exceptions carved out by the Apex Court in (Additional Secretary to the Government of India and others v. Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and another)1, J.T. 1991(1) S.C. 549. Our attention has also been invited to two decisions of this Court, where, following the ratio of the decision in Alka Gadia's case, this Court refused to entertain the petition at the pre-detention stage. Our attention has also been invited to two decisions of this Court, where, following the ratio of the decision in Alka Gadia's case, this Court refused to entertain the petition at the pre-detention stage. One such order passed on 2nd July, 1996 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 648 of 1996 has been confirmed by the Apex Court, in the sense that petition for special leave to appeal (Criminal) No. 1825 of 1996 against the judgment and order passed by this Court on 2nd July 1996 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 648 of 1996 has been dismissed on 30th July, 1996. Relying upon the said decisions the learned Asstt. Public Prosecutor contends that this is not a case where either (i) the impugned order is not passed under the M.P.D.A. Act, under which is purported to have been passed; or (ii) the order is sought to be executed against a wrong person; (iii) the order of detention has been passed for a wrong purpose, or (iv) the order is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds or (v) the authority which passed the order had no authority to pass the order. In the facts and circumstances before us it is urged that, none out of the five exceptions carved out by the Apex Court in Alka Gadia's case can be pressed into service to justify entertaining this petition at the pre-detention stage. 11.In reply to the preliminary objection, Shri Gupte, the learned Counsel for the detenu urged that this case squarely falls under either the third or the fourth exception mentioned above namely that the order is passed for a wrong purpose (exception iii) or that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds (exception iv) carved out by the Apex Court. Counsel invited our attention to the factual details set out in the grounds of detention and to some of the proceedings pending in the City Civil Court, Bombay between various persons such as the landlord, tenants and licensees in respect of some of the properties of the detenu. Since, we are dealing with the petition at the pre-detention stage, we do not think it proper to express our opinion on the validity of the order of detention. Since, we are dealing with the petition at the pre-detention stage, we do not think it proper to express our opinion on the validity of the order of detention. Suffice it to say that the grounds of detention categorically record the subjective satisfaction that the petitioner had unauthorisedly obtained possession of certain lands which he had grabbed and had unauthorisedly constructed 15 chawls thereon known as Ghanshyam Dubey Chawls. These chawls consisted of 238 tenements/rooms and reliance has been placed on 5 in-camera statements of persons who are alleged to have been exploited by the slumlord viz, the detenu. There is a reference to the criminal intimidation practised against the said five persons with reference to compelling them to pay the illegal premium (pagdi) for getting rooms in the said chawls. It is in the light of these facts that the detaining authority has recorded its subjective satisfaction that the detenu was a slumlord and was causing harm, alarm and danger and a feeling of insecurity amongst the section of public of the locality and in the area of Pragati Nagar, Deep Narayan Dubey Road, Dahisar within the jurisdiction of Dahisar Police Station, Greater Bombay. It is, therefore, concluded that the detenu's activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the aforesaid localities. 12.Section 2 of the M.P.D.A., Act, defines in Clause (a)(i) as to what is meant by "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order". Clause (f) of section 2 defines a "slumlord" and Clause (g) defines "unauthorised structure". It is, in the light of these statutory provisions, that the order of detention seems to have been passed. 13.While considering the preliminary objection, we must bear in mind the distinction between the existence of power under Article 226 in the High Court and its exercise. In Alka Gadia's case, the Apex Court, was dealing with the appeal filed by the Additional Secretary to the Govt. of India against the order passed by this Court at a pre-detention stage. 13.While considering the preliminary objection, we must bear in mind the distinction between the existence of power under Article 226 in the High Court and its exercise. In Alka Gadia's case, the Apex Court, was dealing with the appeal filed by the Additional Secretary to the Govt. of India against the order passed by this Court at a pre-detention stage. The Apex Court dealt with the self imposed restrictions and limitations on the powers of the High Court under Article 226 and of the Apex Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, in para 12 of the judgment at pages 555 and 556; discussed the law on the subject and then concluded in para 30 at pages 565 and 566 that there was a difference between the existence of the powers and its exercise. The powers under Article 226 and 32 are wide and untrammelled by any extraneous restrictions and can reach any executive order resulting in civil or criminal consequence. However, the courts have, over the years, evolved certain self restraints for exercising these powers. This has been done in the interests of the administration of justice and for better and more efficient and informed exercise of the said powers. This jurisdiction, by its very nature, has to be used sparingly and in circumstances where no other efficacious remedy is available. To permit a detenu to challenge the order of detention in a given case even before it is executed would, perhaps, frustrate the very purpose of the order and of the law under which it is made. Though the courts have powers to entertain a grievance against the order of detention prior to its execution, the Apex Court has clearly spelt out the limited category of cases where such exercise was permissible. In this view of the matter, the appeal filed by the Additional Secretary to the Govt. of India was allowed and the order passed by this Court was set aside. In Alka Gadia's case the order of detention was passed on 13th December, 1985 and the Apex Court judgment was delivered on 20th December, 1990. 14.In (N.K. Bapna v. Union of India and others)2, 1992(3) Supreme Court Cases 512, the Court was dealing with the order of detention passed on 1st January, 1992 under section 3(1) of COFEPOSA. In Alka Gadia's case the order of detention was passed on 13th December, 1985 and the Apex Court judgment was delivered on 20th December, 1990. 14.In (N.K. Bapna v. Union of India and others)2, 1992(3) Supreme Court Cases 512, the Court was dealing with the order of detention passed on 1st January, 1992 under section 3(1) of COFEPOSA. In para 4 of the judgment at page 516 of the report, the Court reiterated its earlier observations in Alka Gadia's case and the five exceptional categories in which a petition at the pre-detention state could be entertained. Finally, the Apex Court upheld the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition though, for different reasons, and the special leave petition was dismissed. 15.In (Subhash Muljimal Gandhi v. L. Himingliana and another)3, 1994 A.I.R. S.C.W. 4975, the Court was dealing with the order of detention issued on 23rd August, 1990 under section 3(1) of COFEPOSA. In para 8 of the judgment, at pages 4997-98 of the report, the Court reiterated the ratio laid down in Alka Gadia's case. In para 13 at page 4980, the Court dealt with the grievance of the order not being executed since 1990 though the Apex Court was hearing the petitioner on 26th August, 1994. The Court referred to the circumstances resulting in delay in execution of the order and rejected the detenu's contention based on delay and dismissed the appeal. 16.In (Administration of the National Capital of Delhi, Raj Niwas, Delhi v. Prem Singh)4, 1996 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 54, the order of detention was issued as far back as on 28th August, 1982 under the COFEPOSA. The Delhi High Court had entertained the petition at the pre-detention stage and by its judgment and order dated 16th February, 1993 allowed the petition before the grounds of detention were served on the detenu. The Apex Court reiterated the law laid down in Alka Gadia's case, expressed surprise at the High Court order, referred to Article 141 of the Constitution and set aside the order passed by the Delhi High Court. 17.As far as this Court is concerned, in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1459 of 1990 of Sayed Toher Bawamiya, a Division Bench headed by Smt. Sujata Manohar, J., (as she then was) was dealing with an order of detention issued on 29th June, 1984 under COFEPOSA. The petition was disposed of on 17th July, 1991. 17.As far as this Court is concerned, in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1459 of 1990 of Sayed Toher Bawamiya, a Division Bench headed by Smt. Sujata Manohar, J., (as she then was) was dealing with an order of detention issued on 29th June, 1984 under COFEPOSA. The petition was disposed of on 17th July, 1991. Relying upon the ratio in Alka Gadia's case, this Court refused to entertain the petition at the pre-detention stage. Though the petition was admitted, it was dismissed at the final hearing. 18.In Criminal Writ Petition No. 648 of 1996 of (Gauri Shankar Jakhalia v. Joint Secretary, Department of Revenue others)5, decided on 2nd July, 1996 by a Bench to which one of us (Savant, J.,) is a party, relying upon the ratio of the decision in Alka Gadia's case and two other cases (supra), namely (i) Subhash Muljimal Gandhi v. L. Himingliana and another and (ii) Administration of the National Capital of Delhi v. Prem Singh, this Court refused to entertain the petition at the pre-detention stage. Against the order passed by this Court, S.L.P. No. 1825 of 1996 preferred by Gauri Shankar Jakhalia's case has been dismissed by the Apex Court on 30th July, 1996. 19.In the light of the above legal position, let us consider the contention of Shri Gupte that the present case is covered by either the third or fourth exception carved out by the Apex Court in Alka Gadia's case. As stated earlier, the third exception is that the order of detention has been passed for a wrong purpose and the fourth exception is that the order is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds. In support of his contention that the order of detention has been passed for a wrong purpose, Counsel invited our attention to the proceedings pending in the City Civil Court, Bombay between the landlord, tenants and licensees in respect of some of the properties of the detenu. Assuming that to be so, that does not militate against the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority. If his conduct in the facts of the case disclose that he is a slumlord and that he is causing harm, alarm, danger and a feeling of unsecurity amongst the section of public of the locality and in the area of Pragati Nagar, Deep Narayan Dubey Road, Dahisar (East) an order of detention can be made. If his conduct in the facts of the case disclose that he is a slumlord and that he is causing harm, alarm, danger and a feeling of unsecurity amongst the section of public of the locality and in the area of Pragati Nagar, Deep Narayan Dubey Road, Dahisar (East) an order of detention can be made. The mere fact that proceedings are pending between the detenu on the one hand and either his landlord or his licensee on the other, does not justify his resorting to criminal intimidation and extortion from needy persons who approach him for a room in the chawls unauthorisedly constructed by him on the land unauthorisedly grabbed by him. We have perused the affidavit filed by the Commissioner of police for the limited purpose of considering the contention that the order has been passed for a wrong purpose and it is not possible for us to accept the said contention. 20.On the alternate contention of Shri Gupte that the order has been passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds, firstly, we must bear in mind that the detaining authority has recorded its subjective satisfaction based on five in-camera statements of persons who were threatened by the detenu. The five concrete instances have been cited in the grounds of detention. We are not impressed by the submission that there is anything vague or extraneous or irrelevant in the details of the five instances set out in the grounds of detention. We must also bear in mind that section 5-A of the M.P.D.A. Act clearly provides that where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds. We must also bear in mind that section 5-A of the M.P.D.A. Act clearly provides that where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds. It is further provided in sub-section (a) of section 5-A that such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are - (i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) not relevant, (iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or (v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not, therefore, possible to hold that the State Government or an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3 making such order would have been satisfied as provided in section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds, and made the order of detention. We must make it clear that since a specific contention has been raised, we are expressing this view for the limited purpose of holding that the detenue's case does not fall under either exception (iii) or (iv) carved out by the Apex Court in Alka's Gadia's case. 21.In this view of the matter, we uphold the preliminary objection raised by Smt. Tahilramani that, in the facts of the present case, the petition is not maintainable at the pre-detention stage. The petition is accordingly summarily rejected on the ground that it is not maintainable at the pre-detention stage. We, however, make it clear that this order will not come in the way of the detenue filing a substantive petition for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus after the order of detention is served on him and nothing said in this order will come in the way of such a substantive petition being heard on merits. 22.At this stage, Shri Gupte prays for stay of execution of the order of detention for a period of two weeks from today. There was no ad-interim order granted by this Court in this petition. Moreover, we have followed the ratio of the Apex Court decision on the point and, hence, we see no reason whatsoever to accede to the said request. Hence, prayer is rejected. Petition dismissed. ****