JUDGMENT - SAHAI VISHNU, J.:—The appellant aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 7-5-1983 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, in Sessions Case No. 6 of 1983, convicting and sentencing her to undergo imprisonment for life under section 302, Indian Penal Code has come up in appeal before us. 2. Briefly stated the prosecution case runs as follows : The appellant was married to Ramchandra Savaleram Gore P.W. 4, sometimes in the year 1973. Two issues were born to them viz. Sanjay and Manisha. While the appellant was pregnant and was in the 6th month of her pregnancy, when Manisha was to be born, Ramchandra underwent vasectomy. This was approximately in the year 1977-78. Manisha's birth took place in Pimpalgaon where the parents of the appellant resided. The appellant did not return to Ramchandra after Manisha's birth. About 3 years prior to the incident the appellant delivered a third child Sonu, alleged to have been the offspring from the appellant's illicit relationship with Dhanraj Thorat; P.W. 7. The evidence of Ramchandra is that some times in May 1982 the appellant came along with Sonu and her other two children and asked him to keep all of them. Ramchandra kept Sanjay and Manisha but refused to keep Sonu : ostensibly because he felt that he was not his child. On the first of October 1982 Pushpa again came to Ramchandra and asked him to keep Sonu. But Ramchandra and his mother refused to keep Sonu. It appears from the evidence on record that Sonu was proving a thorn in the illicit relationship of the appellant and Dhanraj. It appears that Dhanraj did not want that Sonu should stay with the appellant. It further appears that the appellant having lost her husband (certainly on account of her own volition) did not want to lose Dhanraj. According to the prosecution on 4th October, 1982 at about 7 p.m. she intentionally committed the murder of Sonu by throwing her in a well, in Gat No. 1817/1. 3. It appears that Narsing Chavan P.W. 2 on 5-10-1982 at about 10-10.30 a.m. visited Gat No. 1817/1. He casually peeped inside the well and therein found the corpse of a child floating. The child was a baby, wearing a frock of red and white colour and an underwear. 3. It appears that Narsing Chavan P.W. 2 on 5-10-1982 at about 10-10.30 a.m. visited Gat No. 1817/1. He casually peeped inside the well and therein found the corpse of a child floating. The child was a baby, wearing a frock of red and white colour and an underwear. Consequently, at about 11-11.30 a.m. he informed the police of Yawat Police Station about what he had seen. At about 3.30 or 4 p.m. the police came and the dead body of the child was taken out from the well. It was found to be a female child aged about 3 to 4 years. No external injuries were visible on the child. It appears that on the information sent by Narsing Chavan a case of accidental death was registered by Yawat Police Station. On 6-10-1981 PSI Arjun Baburao Kale of Yawat Police Station took charge of the investigation of the case. On enquiry he learnt that the appellant had been seen with Sonu who was putting on a frock of red colour. This arosed his suspicion and the appellant was taken into custody. On reaching Yawat Police Station PSI Kale recorded FIR on the same day. The FIR is at Exhibit 25. On its basis a case under section 302, Indian Penal Code vide C.R. No. 182 was registered. During the course of investigation PSI Kale interrogated a large number of witnesses, including Narsing, Dhanraj, Trimbakrao, Ramchandra and others. After completing the investigation he submitted the charge-sheet on 12-11-1982. 4. Going backwards, the post mortem examination of the dead body of Sonu was conducted on 6-1-1982 by Dr. Prabhakar, P.W. 3. The doctor found no external injuries on the corpse. On internal examination he found the right lung to be congested; left lung to be stained with blood; peritoneal cavity to contain fluid; and the stomach containing semi-digested food. In the opinion of the doctor, the deceased died before 4 to 6 hours of last meal. The doctor also opined that the deceased died due to asphyxia due to drowning. He stated in the trial Court that the death had taken place about 36 to 70 hours prior to the time of autopsy. 5. The case was committed to the court of Sessions in the usual manner. In the trial Court the appellant was charged under section 302, Indian Penal Code. He stated in the trial Court that the death had taken place about 36 to 70 hours prior to the time of autopsy. 5. The case was committed to the court of Sessions in the usual manner. In the trial Court the appellant was charged under section 302, Indian Penal Code. To the said charge she pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Her defence was that of denial. To substantiate it she neither adduced oral nor documentary evidence. 6. In all during the trial the prosecution examined 11 witnesses. We may straight away mention that there is no eye-witness of the incident and the case hinges purely on circumstantial evidence. During trial the prosecution sought to establish three circumstances and the learned trial Judge held that all of them were established. They are : (a) motive; (b) last seen and (c) extra judicial confession. The learned trial Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner stated above, vide the impugned judgment. 7. We have heard Mrs. Anita Agarwal for the appellant and Mrs. Poornima Kantharia for the respondent. We have perused the statements of the witnesses examined by the prosecution to prove the said circumstances: the material exhibits tendered and proved by the prosecution and the impugned judgment. After giving our anxious consideration to the matter we are satisfied that this is a case wherein the appellant deserves the benefit of doubt. 8. We have already observed earlier that there are no eye-witnesses of the incident and the prosecution case squarely rests on circumstantial evidence. 9. It is well settled that before a conviction can be sustained on circumstantial evidence prosecution has to prove : (a) the various circumstances; (b) that cumulatively all the circumstances unerringly lead to the guilt of the accused; (c) the circumstances established are wholly inconsistent with the inference of innocence of the accused, and (d) that they are incapable of being explained on any other reasonable hypothesis, excepting that of the guilt of accused. 10. We have to examine whether the stringent tests to be borne in mind before sustaining a conviction on circumstantial evidence are satisfied in the instant case. To our judgment, circumstances motive and last seen are firmly established. We however feel that the evidence of extra judicial confession does not inspire belief. 11. 10. We have to examine whether the stringent tests to be borne in mind before sustaining a conviction on circumstantial evidence are satisfied in the instant case. To our judgment, circumstances motive and last seen are firmly established. We however feel that the evidence of extra judicial confession does not inspire belief. 11. We get a insight into the motive of crime after going through the evidence of Ramchandra P.W. 4, the husband of the appellant and Ramdas P.W. 8, the brother of the appellant. Both these witnesses have deposed about the illicit relationship between the appellant and Dhanraj. The evidence of Ramdas is to the effect that he had warned the appellant not to visit Dhanraj's house again. Ramdas, after all the appellant's own brother, would not have falsely deposed against her. We have gone through the cross examination of the said witness and we find that nothing could be elicited therefrom which would militate against his veracity. The evidence of Ramchandra also appears to be trustworthy. It is true that he must have felt ill-disposed towards the appellant at her deserting him but that in our view, was not a circumstance which was strong enough to make him falsely depose about this illicit relationship. This sounds all the more true because as said above Ramdas, the own brother of the appellant also deposed about it. It appears from the evidence on record that Dhanraj with whom the appellant was having illicit relations intimated to her that if their relationship was to continue, then Sonu should not live with her. Having already lost her husband (though of her own volition) it appears that the appellant did not want to lose Dhanraj; consequently to appease him she may have killed Sonu when Ramchandra and his wife refused to keep her. Hence we hold that the circumstance of motive was proved and the trial Judge was justified in accepting the same. 12. We now come to circumstance of last seen. To prove this prosecution examined P.W. 5 Prabhavati Sonawane and P.W. 6 Trimbak Natu. From the evidence of both the witnesses it appears that on Monday, the 3rd October, 1982 some-times late in the afternoon the said two witnesses had seen the appellant with Sonu. As a matter of fact the evidence of Trimbak Natu is that he had seen the appellant with Sonu as late as 6 p.m. on 3-10-1982. From the evidence of both the witnesses it appears that on Monday, the 3rd October, 1982 some-times late in the afternoon the said two witnesses had seen the appellant with Sonu. As a matter of fact the evidence of Trimbak Natu is that he had seen the appellant with Sonu as late as 6 p.m. on 3-10-1982. We have gone through the testimony of the said witnesses and we find that they are wholly independent witnesses. Nothing could be extracted from their cross-examination which could persuade us to hold that they were giving an imaginary account of the incident. We would like to be borne in mind that neither of these witnesses had any animus or axe to grind against the appellant. That being so, they would not have falsely deposed about this circumstance. In our judgment, the learned trial Judge was correct in accepting their testimony. 13. This brings us to the last circumstance and the most lethal one viz. the extra judicial confession made by the appellant to Dhanraj P.W. 7. The evidence of this witness is that on 5-10-1982 some-times in the evening the appellant came to him and on enquiry as to whether she had kept Sonu at Akolner, where the husband and the mother-in-law of the appellant resided, the appellant told him that she had thrown Sonu in the well of Chavan. 14. On the first blush we were charmed by the evidence of Dhanraj P.W. 7; charmed because we felt that since the appellant was having an illicit relationship with him he would be the last person to falsely attribute this extra judicial confession to her. However, the charm disappeared when Mrs. Anita Agarwal, learned Counsel for the appellant pointed out two glaring infirmities in the evidence of this witness; both having been admitted by this witness during cross examination. The first admission of this witness in paragraph 6 is that it is true that the appellant had complained against him to police for beating her. The second is to be found in paragraph 7 wherein the witness admitted that he was kept in the police custody that night or so. Mrs. Agarwal urged that it is extremely improbable that the appellant would have made an extra judicial confession to a person at whose hands she had suffered beating. The second is to be found in paragraph 7 wherein the witness admitted that he was kept in the police custody that night or so. Mrs. Agarwal urged that it is extremely improbable that the appellant would have made an extra judicial confession to a person at whose hands she had suffered beating. She also urged that the circumstance that the appellant was kept throughout the night at the police station shows that initially he was not prepared to state about this trumped up piece of extra judicial confession but the rigours of being detained throughout the night at the police station probably made him to change his mind. We frankly confess that we find merit in the said submissions of Mrs. Agarwal. 15. When the said infirmities in the evidence of Dhanraj are to be evaluated in the background of the fact that extra judicial confession is a weak type of evidence, prudence demands that we should reject it in the instant case. Accordingly we reject this piece of evidence. 16. Mrs. Kantharia, learned Counsel for the respondent vehemently urged that the circumstance of motive and last seen which we have accepted, coupled with the false explanation given by the appellant completes the chain of circumstantial evidence in the instant case. Mrs. Kantharia invited our attention to the answer of the accused/appellant in her statement under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code to question No. 39, wherein the accused stated that when she had gone to Akolner she had left Sonu at Pimpalgaon and Sonu must have wandered and accidentally fell in the well. Mrs. Kantharia urged and with some justification that it is inherently improbable for a mother to leave a three year old daughter alone. She urged that the said explanation given by the appellant is false and consequently an additional circumstance against her. We however find no merit in her submission. 17. The Supreme Court in the oft-quoted case of (Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra)1, reported in A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1622, in paragraphs 150 and 158 has held that the circumstance of false explanation can only be pressed into service by prosecution, if through cogent evidence it completes the links in circumstantial evidence. In the said paragraphs it is observed that false explanation cannot be taken into consideration for completing the chain. We are in respectful agreement with the said observations of Their Lordships. In the said paragraphs it is observed that false explanation cannot be taken into consideration for completing the chain. We are in respectful agreement with the said observations of Their Lordships. The result is that the circumstance of false explanation in this case cannot be taken into consideration as an incriminating circumstance against the appellant because motive and last seen are not sufficient to complete the chain of circumstantial evidence. 18. In our judgment the circumstance of motive and last seen may arouse the strongest suspicion against the appellant or show that the prosecution case may be true. But Gajendragadkar, J. as he then was, in the oft-quoted case, reported in A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 637, (Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab)2 has held that suspicion howsoever strong cannot take place of proof. In the said decision His Lordship has also held that between "may be true" and "must be true" a long distance has to be travelled and the whole of it has to be travelled by the prosecution by adducing cogent and unimpeachable evidence. In our judgment, on the twin circumstances of motive and last seen the said distance cannot be said to have been covered. 19. Pursuant to the above discussion we find that the prosecution has failed to adduce clinching circumstantial evidence which conclusively and unerringly points to the guilt of the appellant. As a logical corollary of our finding the appellant has to be given the benefit of doubt and acquitted. 20. In the result this appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 302, Indian Penal Code is set aside. She is given the benefit of doubt and acquitted for the said offence. She is on bail. She need not surrender. Her bail bonds stand cancelled and sureties discharged. Before parting with this judgment we would be failing in our duty if we do not put on record our appreciation for the learned Counsel for the parties for the enormous assistance which they have rendered us in the disposal of this appeal. Appeal allowed.