V. Dutta Gyani, C.J. (Acting)— This writ appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 4.9.95 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Rule No. 1453 of 1990, thereby dismissing the petition mainly on the ground that it involved disputed questions of fact and there had been inordinate delay in filing of the petition. 2. Few basic facts leading to the presentation of the petition and the filing of this appeal may now be noted. The writ petitioner appellant is an Engineer (Mechanical) and he is engaged in manufacturing and steel fabrication, steel towers, steel bridge, steel furnitures, steel leath, milling works, steel rolling shutter, window frames, collapsible gates and other agricultural appliances. The respondent Mr. Ashok Kumar filed a petition against the appellant before the Executive Magistrate, under section 133 CrPC. By order dated 11.9.95, the Magistrate passed the following exparte order: "And whereas I am satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding under section 133 CrPC. Now, therefore, I Shri G. Chakravarty, Executive Magistrate, Gauhati in exercise of the power conferred under section 133 CrPC, I direct the second party to remove the said obnoxion material immediately or to show cause to why this should not be removed. Inform O/C Paltan Bazar PS for necessary action." 3. Being armed with the aforesaid order and in the garb of removing obnoxious material lying in the premises, the police broke open the lock, reportedly handed over possession of the house, shed or structure to party No. 1 on 16.9.95. Being informed, he visited his factory in the morning only to find out ensemble, it was being demolished. He objected to its demolition but he was chased by Ashok Kumar Rai and his relations and associates. He lodged a complaint before the Judicial Magistrate but it also met with dismissal for want of evidence. It may be noted that the Sub-Inspector of Police who overacted was put under suspension, as can be seen from the report dated 26th April, 1986 submitted by the Additional Superintendent of Police (Head Quarter City), Guwahati to the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup, Aimexure 12. This report is reproduced below as incidentally it also helps in marshalling of facts : "With reference to your Memo cited above, I am directed to inform you that the petition of Shri Lakshman Krishnan was enquired into by the Deputy Superintendent of Police; Panbazar Division. This report is reproduced below as incidentally it also helps in marshalling of facts : "With reference to your Memo cited above, I am directed to inform you that the petition of Shri Lakshman Krishnan was enquired into by the Deputy Superintendent of Police; Panbazar Division. The case in brief is that one Ashok Rai of Ulubari instituted a case in the Court of Shri GC Chakraborty, Executive Magistrate, Gauhati claiming himself to be the owner of the plot of land at Ulubari measuring 1 bigha and 1 katha approx covered by Annual Patta No.54 and Dag No.221 (new) and KP 228, Dag Ko345 and 350 of Village New Town Ulubari having Assam Type house. He also complained that one Ramdhari Koiri was a tenant in one of him Assam Type quarter measuring about 65' x 19' who-abandoned the said quarter 15 years ago. The said Rai alleged that some abnoxious materials and explosive i.e. methelated spirit terpentive oil and other solutions were kept inside the house coming out abnoxious smell and as such He prayed for an order under section 133 CrPC for removal of the said materials. On 11.9.85 the Magistrate passed an order exparte directing the petitioner to remove the said abnoxious materials immediately or to show cause as to why the same should not be removed. The next date was fixed on 13.9.85. As the petitioner did not turn up on 13.9.85 the Magistrate directed police to remove the abnoxious materials from zimma. Accordingly the O/C, Paltanbazar PS detailed SI Khagen Das to execute the order of the Magistrate who then broke open the lock of the factory, handed over the possession of the house to Shri Ashok Rai and kept the machinery in zimma of Shri Ajit Sen, Proprietor Riat Automobiles after removing from the factory. On 17.9.85 the petitioner Lakshman Krishnan filed a petition stating that police has executed the order under section 133 CrPC wrongly. As this the Magistrate directed the O/C, Paltanbazar PS to submit a report. He further ordered that the machineries of the 2nd party (petitioner) need not be disturbed. The Magistrate fixed 20.9.95 for hearing. The SI submitted* report to the Magistrate on 28.9.85 to the effect that he had carried out and execute as per prayer of Shri Ashok Rai (1st party) to the Magistrate. He further ordered that the machineries of the 2nd party (petitioner) need not be disturbed. The Magistrate fixed 20.9.95 for hearing. The SI submitted* report to the Magistrate on 28.9.85 to the effect that he had carried out and execute as per prayer of Shri Ashok Rai (1st party) to the Magistrate. The SI Khagen Das was therefore asked to submit his explanation for executing the order of the Magistrate wrongly by handing over the possession of the house to Shri Ashok Rai and then removing machineries from it and keeping in zimma of a 3rd party. The Superintendent of Police City, Gauhati on perusal of the explanation was not satisfied. Hence he ordered suspension of SI Khagen Das. The SI is now under suspension. The original petition is returned herewith." 4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents strenuously urged that the petition involve highly disputed questions of facts and title, and was therefore rightly dismissed. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, maintained that even on face of the disputed questions of fact, stfll there are some fundamental issues involved in the petition, which should have been gone into in the garb of order passed under section 133 CrPC. The police in collusion with the private parties has illegally dispossessed the appellant. This aspect of the matter, vis-a-vis, the scope of section 133 CrPC has nothing to do with the disputed questions of fact. He also urged that the belatedness of a petition, is no ground to throw it away after admission and lapses more than 5 years. So far as the question of delay in concerned, there is no statutory time limit prescribed for filing of a writ petition, although ordinarily the provisions of the Limitation Act provide guidance but no hard and fast rule can be laid down in this behalf. It is significant to note that Civil Rule 1453 of 1990 filed on 10.8.90 was dismissed more than 5 years thereafter on 4.9.95 on the ground of inordinate delay' Delay and latches is a matter of procedure and it does not provide with a weapon in the hand of the adversary or the opposite party to seek dismissal of a petition on this ground. If at all it is put, it must be raised at the earliest stage of motion or admission. If at all it is put, it must be raised at the earliest stage of motion or admission. In this view of the matter, so far as it relates to dismissal of the petition, on the ground of inordinate delay, cannot be sustained. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted a list of authorities, namely: (1) AIR 1960 SC 1368 (2) AIR 1992 SC1780 (3) AIR 1992 SC 1018 (4) 1994 Suppl (2) SCC 108 and (5) 1994 Suppl (3) SCC 79. 7. We proceed on the assumption that the petition does involve highly contentious facts and disputed questions of possession and title but we are not going into all these disputed questions. The hosts of authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, are not, therefore, necessarily required to be gone into as we are strictly confining ourselves to the scope of section 133 CrPC, we proceed to decided this appeal. 8. A mere glance in the impugned order passed by the learned Civil Judge would show that the learned Judge has not adverted to this question as to what is the scope of section 133 CrPC ? This question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Ram Autar & others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1794 and the Apex Court held as follows : "It is difficult to see how the first clause can have any application. Unlawful obstruction if any, is certainly not caused by the people who carry on the trade of auctioning. If the obstruction caused by keeping the carts on the road can be considered to be unlawful obstruction within the meaning of this clause - about which we express no opinion - action can be taken against the persons causing such obstruction. The obvious difficulty in the way of that might be that the person who bring the carts are not the same from day to day. But whether or not any action is possible under section 133 against the persons bringing the carts we are unable to agree that merely because the appellants carry on auctioning in connection with which the carts are brought, they can be considered to have caused the obstruction. In our opinion, the appellants cannot be considered to be the persons causing obstruction. In our opinion, the appellants cannot be considered to be the persons causing obstruction. Turning now to the next clause, the question arises how the conduct of this auctioning trade is injurious to the health or physical confort of the community. Undoubtedly, some amount of noise and perhaps a great deal of noise is caused when the auction is soins on." 9. An elaborate order has already been passed by a Division Bench of this Court on 6.8.92, which speaks for itself, making the following directions : "In these circumstances, we issue a direction to the Executive Magistrate, Gauhati (EAC), 6th respondent, the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup Dist, Gauhati, 7th respondent, the Superintendent of Police, Guwahati City, Guwahati, 11th respondent, Sub Inspector of Police, Paltanbazar Police Station and 13th respondent Ashok Kumar Rai to put the petitioner back in possession of the building and the machinery. These respondents will do so within two weeks from today and report compliance to this Court. This order of course is subject to further onlirs of this Court and the final disposal of this writ petition." 10. On 27.8.92 another order modifying the earlier order dated 6.8.92 was passed with the following directions : "In the result we dispose of the application for modification of the order dated 6.8.92 and issue modified directions as follows : (1) We issue a direction to the Executive Magistrate, Gauhati (EAC), 6th respondent, the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup District, Gauhati, 7th respondent, the Superintendent of Police, Guwahati City, Guwahati, 11th respondent, Sub Inspector of Police, Paltan Bazar Police Station and the sureties respondents 16 and 17 if they are dead, their legal representatives to put the machinery in the possession of the writ petitioner. (2) Since the building is no longer in existence relief the petitioner is entitled to will be decided in the writ petition. (3) The respondents who desire to oppose the writ petition may file counter affidavit within three weeks from today furnishing copies to the petitioner and the petitioner may file reply affidavit within two weeks thereof. The case will be listed for hearing in the appropriate Bench in the 1st week of November, 1992." 11. (3) The respondents who desire to oppose the writ petition may file counter affidavit within three weeks from today furnishing copies to the petitioner and the petitioner may file reply affidavit within two weeks thereof. The case will be listed for hearing in the appropriate Bench in the 1st week of November, 1992." 11. So far as the mode and manner of execution of the order passed by the Executive Magistrate is concerned, it is more or less in the same terms as the report submitted by Additional Superintendent of Police to the Deputy Commissioner, as reproduced above. There is no doubt about the fact that in passing and in implementation of the order under section 13 CrPC, both the Magistrate as well as the implementing authorities have far exceeded and overstepped their jurisdiction as is evident from the report submitted by the Additional Superintendent of Police and the interim orders passed on 6.8.92 and 27.8.92 by this Court. On the plain language of sub-section (1) of section 133 CrPC, it would be clear that it is not every Executive Magistrate who is conferred with the power, it is only a District Magistrate or a Sub Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf by the State Govt can take action making an order thereof. Both the learned Govt Advocate as well as the learned counsel for the respondents were given repeated opportunities to show any such notification or order passed by the State Govt empowering the concerned Magistrate Shri Chakravarty to exercise power under section 133 CrPC, no such order, specially empowering Shri Chakravarty, or notification, despite repeated opportunities granted to both of them, was brought to our notice. Although the point was raised at the appellate stage, being essentially and purely a question of law going to the root of the matter touching the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, it was entertained and it must be said that there is no proof of Shri Chakravarty being an Executive Magistrate 'specially empowered in this behalf by the State Govt'. Therefore, the whole action collapses to the ground as one. without jurisdiction. Even on facts, by interim orders made, the action substantially quashed. The interim orders dated 6.8.92 as modified by order dated 27.8.92 are confirmed. This appeal deserves to be allowed to the extent indicated above. The disputed questions of title are left out from reconsideration. Therefore, the whole action collapses to the ground as one. without jurisdiction. Even on facts, by interim orders made, the action substantially quashed. The interim orders dated 6.8.92 as modified by order dated 27.8.92 are confirmed. This appeal deserves to be allowed to the extent indicated above. The disputed questions of title are left out from reconsideration. The respondents are directed to restore possession of the land in question on which the factory was standing, wherefrom the obnoxious material was taken out by the police. The police shall handover possession to the appellant within a week and report compliance to the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court. The impugned order as passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside and the appeal allowed to the extent indicated above.