JUDGMENT C.K. Prasad, J. 1. This is defendant's second appeal Under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff-respondent filed suit for eviction of the tenant on the ground that tenant has acquired vacant possession of accommodation suitable for his residence, the accommodation in question requires to be reconstructed, which is not possible without the eviction of the tenant and the landlord requires the suit premises for its bona fide need which are grounds for eviction Under Section 12(1)(i)(g) and (e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) respectively. Civil Judge, Class II, Bilaspur by judgment and decree dated 22-8-1994 passed in Civil Suit No. 127-A of 1994 decreed the suit after recording the finding in favour of the plaintiff on all counts. Tenant preferred appeal against the aforesaid judgment and decree. Sixth Additional District Judge, Bilaspur by judgment and decree dated 27-9-1996 passed in Civil Appeal No. 18-A of 1996 maintained the decree of the trial Court on the grounds enumerated Under Section 12 (1)(i) of the Act, but reversed the finding of the trial Court in relation to the other two grounds. Aggrieved by the same defendant has preferred this appeal Under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by order dated 7-1-1997 the appeal was admitted for hearing on the following substantial question of law : "Whether the appellant is liable to be evicted Under Section 12(1)(i) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 merely because his wife and children are residing in the newly constructed house?" 2. Shri Trivedi appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the plaintiff having not pleaded that the accommodation acquired by the tenant is suitable for his residence, condition of Section 12(1)(i) of the Act is not satisfied and accordingly the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are fit to be reversed. Section 12(1)(i) of the Act reads as follows: "12. Restriction on eviction of tenant. - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: (a).................... (b).................... (c).................... (d).................... (e).................... (f).................... (g).................... (h).................... Restriction on eviction of tenant. - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: (a).................... (b).................... (c).................... (d).................... (e).................... (f).................... (g).................... (h).................... (i) That the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, built, acquired vacant possession of, or, been allotted an accommodation suitable for his residence." A plain reading of Section 12(1)(i) of the Act makes it clear that acquisition of vacant possession by the tenant of an accommodation suitable for his residence is one of the grounds for eviction and before a decree of eviction can be passed, the requirement of the aforesaid section has to be fulfilled. 3. Tenant has been defined Under Section 2(i) of the Act which reads as follows:- "2(i) "tenant" means a person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any accommodation is, or but for a contract express or implied, would be payable for any accommodation and includes any person occupying the accommodation as a sub-tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy whether before or after the commencement of this Act; but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made." Shri Trivedi counsel for the appellant submits that as the wife of the tenant is not covered by definition of tenant aforesaid, purchase by the wife cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of considering the ground of eviction contemplated Under Section 12(1)(i) of the Act. In support of the aforesaid submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Sachhidanand Garg v. Govindlalji Maharaj, 1982 MPLJ 129 . My attention has been drawn to the following passage from the said Judgment: "The word 'tenant' is defined in the Act itself. In support of the aforesaid submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Sachhidanand Garg v. Govindlalji Maharaj, 1982 MPLJ 129 . My attention has been drawn to the following passage from the said Judgment: "The word 'tenant' is defined in the Act itself. The definition given by the Act is as under: "tenant" means a person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any accommodation is, or, but for a contract express or implied, would be payable for any accommodation and includes any person occupying the accommodation as a sub-tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy whether before or after the commencement of this Act; but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made. If this definition of "tenant" is taken into consideration, then, the wife of the tenant is not covered under the definition. Therefore, unless it is proved that the tenant himself has purchased the house which is suitable for his residence, a ground Under Section 12(1)(i) of the Act is not made out." Yet another decision on which the learned counsel has placed reliance is the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of B.R. Mehta v. Atma Devi, AIR 1987 SC 2220 , and my attention has been drawn to the following passage: "There is no law according to which husband and wife could be deemed to be one person. Therefore, the correct position must be that if a wife or a husband acquires a property and the other spouse if he/she is the tenant, has a legal right by virtue of such acquisition or allotment of premises would disentitle or attract the provisions of Clause (h) of Section 14(1), otherwise the whole purpose would be defeated. In other words if for all practical and real sense the tenant, acquired, built or was allotted another residence then his need for the old tenanted residence goes and the tenant loses his right to retain his tenanted premises. In other words if for all practical and real sense the tenant, acquired, built or was allotted another residence then his need for the old tenanted residence goes and the tenant loses his right to retain his tenanted premises. That is the rationale behind the scheme." A reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court closely, there is no difficulty in holding that as a general proposition of law acquisition of accommodation by the wife, in all circumstances, would not amount to acquisition by the husband tenant. Similarly it cannot be said that acquisition of accommodation by the wife in no circumstance can be considered as acquisition of the tenant-husband. In my opinion, the same will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In the case of Prem Chand v. Sher Singh, 1981 D.R.J. 287 (SC); the purchase of the accommodation by the wife was considered acquisition by the tenant for the purpose of eviction. 4. In my opinion, in case the accommodation acquired by the wife is not available to the tenant-husband for any bona fide reason, the same may not be considered as accommodation being available to the husband-tenant. However, in case, the same is available for the husband tenant, notwithstanding the fact that the house was acquired by the wife from her own earning or from the earnings of the husband, the same shall be deemed to be acquisition by the tenant husband for the purpose of consideration of the ground of eviction. However, in the present case, on fact, it has been held that the story put forth by the tenant that the house which has been constructed and in which his wife and children are living was purchased by them is an imaginary story. The Courts below have come to the said conclusion on the ground that the defendant did not produce the sale deed by which the land was purchased although he was in custody of better evidence. Thus, the substantial question of law framed is answered against the tenant appellant. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that as the landlord has not stated in the plaint that the accommodation acquired by the tenant is "suitable for his residence" the requirement of Section 12(1)(i) of the Act has not been fulfilled. Thus, the substantial question of law framed is answered against the tenant appellant. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that as the landlord has not stated in the plaint that the accommodation acquired by the tenant is "suitable for his residence" the requirement of Section 12(1)(i) of the Act has not been fulfilled. In this connection learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to paragraph 3 of the plaint which on translation means that defendant has constructed a new house by the side of the suit accommodation and has started living in the same. Accordingly he has no need of the suit accommodation. PW 2 Suresh Pathak has stated in his evidence that the house constructed by the tenant is suitable for the residence of all the family members. No evidence has been led on behalf of the defendant to demonstrate that the constructed house is in any way not suitable for them. Therefore, according to the pleading of the landlord the tenant had constructed the house and does not require the suit accommodation and according to the evidence of PW 2 Suresh Pathak the same is sufficient for their residence. In my considered opinion, landlord is not required to plead those words i.e. "suitable for his residence" in the plaint and in case the pleading fulfils the requirement of Section 12(1)(i) of the Act, the decree for eviction can be passed. Here in the present case, as stated earlier, the pleading of the landlord that after the construction of the house plaintiff does not require the suit premises and evidence that new house constructed is sufficient for his residence and that of his family members clearly fulfil the requirement of Section 12(1)(i) of the Act. Thus, I do not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. 6. In the result, I do not find any merit in this appeal and it is dismissed accordingly; However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.