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1997 DIGILAW 484 (RAJ)

Padam Chand v. State of Rajasthan

1997-04-09

M.A.A.KHAN

body1997
JUDGMENT 1. - On 6.11.88 the Food Inspector purchased sample "Burfi" from the petitioner. On examination by the Public Analyst the sample "Burfi" was found adulterated. On 27.11.1990 the Food Inspector filed a complaint against the petitioner in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alwar who took cognizance of the offence u /Secs. 7/ 16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (the Act) and summoned the petitioner as accused thereunder. The petitioner put in appearance in Court on 17.4.1992 and in exercise of his right a /Sec. 13(2) requested the Court on 29.4.82 to send the second sample to the Director Central Food Laboratory for reanalysis. The second sample was sent on or about 30.11.92 but the Director reported that the same was decomposed and hence not tit for analysis. On 30.1.1993 the Public Prosecutor requested the Court to send the third sample of "Burfi" for examination by the Director. The learned Magistrate accepted the prayer of the Prosecutor on 30.3.1993 and his order was upheld on 28.9.93 by this Court in S.K. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 523/93 Padam Chand v. State of Rajasthan . The learned Magistrate had directed the petitioner to deposit the prescribed fees of the Director but the petitioner declined on 29.6.93 to deposit such fees. On 25.2.95, however, he expressed his readiness to deposit the prescribed fees and on 2.6.95 the third sample was sent to the Director. The Director declared the third sample also as decomposed. On receipt of the certificate of the Director the petitioner requested the learned Magistrate to drop the proceedings as there was no evidence of adulteration of "Burfi" in the case. By his impugned order dated 9.5.96 the learned Magistrate declined to accept his prayer. Hence this petition under section 482, Cr.P.C. 2. Mr. K.N. Srimal, the learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that in view of the scheme of the Act, and particularly Section 13(2) thereunder, the impugned order of the learned Magistrate was incorrect in law. In this behalf reliance was placed on Delhi High Court decision in M/s. Markfed Refined Oil and Allied Industries (Punjab) and Ann v. State (Delhi. Administration) Delhi, All India Prevention of Food Adulteration Journal 1-1987 page 59 , this Courts decision on Ratan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, RCC Sept. 1992 page 467 , and Supreme Court decision in Chetumal v. State of M.P., AIR 1981 SC 1387 . Administration) Delhi, All India Prevention of Food Adulteration Journal 1-1987 page 59 , this Courts decision on Ratan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, RCC Sept. 1992 page 467 , and Supreme Court decision in Chetumal v. State of M.P., AIR 1981 SC 1387 . Though the learned Counsel for the State respondent supported the impugned order yet, I find much force in Mr. Srimal's arguments. 3. It needs no emphasis that Section 13(2) gives very valuable right to an accused to get the report of the Public Analyst on adulteration of the food article, sold by him to the Food Inspector, superseded by calling for the certificate of the Director. Since as per provisions contained in Section 13(3) the certificate of the Director is to supersede the report of the Public Analyst and in the presence of his certificate neither the accused nor the Food Inspector/ Prosecutor can fall back upon the report of the Public Analyst, the exercise of the right under section 13(2) is undoubtedly risky for the accused. Once an accused has exposed himself to such a risk, his right to get the benefit of Director's report, which makes conclusive evidence on the point of adulteration of the food stuff, is required to be appreciated in right perspective. 4. In Ratan Lal's case (supra) Tibrewal, J. of this Court had examined the question of the liability of the accused to pay the amount of fees of analysis chargeable by the Central Food Laboratory and on making a study of the amendment brought about by Section 10 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Act, 1976 (No. 34 of 1976) in Section 13 of the Act held that amended Section 13(2) overrides Rule 6(4) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1954, prescribing charge of Directors fees of Rs. 40/- from the accused, and therefore payment of such fees by the accused was no longer necessary for exercise of the right under section 13(2) by the accused. I fully subscribe to this view of my learned Brother and hold that payment of Directors prescribed fee being no longer the liability and responsibility of the accused, no fault, committed in sending the sample late or with delay of the Director, can be attributed to the accused. 5. I fully subscribe to this view of my learned Brother and hold that payment of Directors prescribed fee being no longer the liability and responsibility of the accused, no fault, committed in sending the sample late or with delay of the Director, can be attributed to the accused. 5. In M/s. Mark fed Refined Oil's case (supra), Kochar, J. of Delhi High Court (now a learned Judge of this Court) held that an accused should not be deprived of the benefit under section 13(2) of the Act where the sample has got deteriorated and become unfit for analysis by the Director for no fault of the accused. I respectfully agree with my learned Brother in that behalf. 6. In the case of Chetumal (supra) the Director had reported that-the "spedmen impression seal" sent to him did not tally with the seal of the container in which the sample oil was sent to him. The Trial Court had, however, relied upon the report of the Public Analyst and convicted the accused. Setting aside the conviction the Apex Court held in para 2 of the report as under : 2. It is clear that the conviction cannot stand. Under Section 13(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the report of the Public Analyst stood superseded by the certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. Having been so superseded, the report of the Public Analyst Court not, therefore, be relied upon to base a conviction. The certificate of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory having been excluded from consideration because of the tampering of the seals, there was really no evidence before the Court on the basis of which the appellant could be convicted. The Court could not fall back on the report of the Public Analyst as it had been superseded. The only method of challenging the report of the Public Analyst was by the having sample tested by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. In the present case, the appellant was deprived of the opportunity to which he was entitled for no fault of his. It was not, therefore, open to the Court to fall back upon the report of the Public Analyst to convict the appellant. The appeal is allowed the conviction and sentence are set aside. 7. In the present case, the appellant was deprived of the opportunity to which he was entitled for no fault of his. It was not, therefore, open to the Court to fall back upon the report of the Public Analyst to convict the appellant. The appeal is allowed the conviction and sentence are set aside. 7. It is thus clear that since the certificate of the Director supersedes the report of the Public Analyst and if the Director has been unable to examine the sample of the food stuff, sent to him, due to the same having become deteriorated and thus not fit for his analysis and no fault in that behalf is attributable to the accused, the Magistrate cannot fall back to the report of the Public Analyst for the conviction of the accused under sections 7/16 of the Act. 8. In the instant case the petitioner was made to pay Director's fees twice - once when he exercised his right under section 13(2) and again when the Public Prosecutor requested the learned Magistrate to send the third sample for examination by the Director. Both the times the Director reported that the samples "Burfi" had deteriorated and were unfit for analysis. The certificates issued by the Director superseded Public Analyst's report under section 13(3) of the Act. In view of the facts that though the sample was taken on 6.11.88 yet the complaint was filed as late as on 27.11.90, though the petitioner applied under section 13(2) on 29.4.92 yet the second sample was sent to the Director on or about 30.11.92 and though the Director had reported on 19.1.93 that the sample sent to him was found deteriorated and unfit for analysis yet the third sample was sent to him as late as on 2.6.95 and there being no legal liability and responsibility of the petitioner to pay Director's fees, no fault in getting the samples deteriorated can be found with the petitioner. Since Director's successive certificates superseded the report of the Public Analyst, there remains no evidence on the point of adulteration of the sample Burfis sold by the petitioner to the Food Inspector. Since Director's successive certificates superseded the report of the Public Analyst, there remains no evidence on the point of adulteration of the sample Burfis sold by the petitioner to the Food Inspector. That being the legal position in this case, continuation of these criminal proceedings against the petitioner simply amounts to abuse of the process of the Court of the learned Magistrate and in order to secure the ends of justice, such abuse of the process of Magistrate's Court is required to be done away with and brought to an end. The proceedings against the petitioner in the Court of the learned Magistrate are required to be quashed and dropped.In the result, the impugned order is set aside and the proceedings of this case against the petitioner are quashed and directed to be dropped. The petition is allowed.Petition allowed. *******