JUDGMENT Debi Prasad Sircar, J. 1. In this Revisional Application the petitioner, a personnel of the Army prays for quashing under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. the order of his superior Army authority passed for GOC-in-C, Victor Force Provost Unit directing him to pay maintenance to his wife and child at the rate of 22% of his pay and allowances amounting to Rs. 732/- per month for the wife and Rs. 183/- per month for the child, from the month of March 1996, payable by the last date of each month. 2. The wife of the petitioner filed a case under Section 125 Cr. P.C. against the petitioner before the learned S.D.J.M. Suri for maintenance and accordingly in Misc. Case No. 61/80 of that Court, the learned S.D.J.M., Suri directed the Opposite Party in that case that is, the present petitioner, to pay Rs. 200/- per month to the present O.P. No.1, wife, for her maintenance on and from 31.1.86. The present petitioner, that is, the husband, Is a military personnel while the wife was receiving that maintenance at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month as ordered by the learned S.D.JM., Suri. She filed a petition on 10.2.88 before the GOC-in-C, 33 Mechanised Division, Andhra Pradesh, under which the husband was in service, to issue suitable direction to pay adequate maintenance submitting that a maintenance of Rs. 200/- per month was not at all sufficient for her with the child. Over this petition the Army Authority concerned took action against the present petitioner-husband, directed him to show cause in terms of Section 91(i) of the Army Act, 1930, read with Army Rule 193, and, after proceeding with the matter as per law as the Army Authority found proper, directed the husband-petitioner on 9.3.96 to pay maintenance as above taking into consideration and including the amount of Rs. 200/- as ordered by the learned S.D.J.M., Suri as stated above. The petitioner-husband challenges that order of the Army Authority and prays for quashing it............it interferes with the judicial order passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Suri as above. The Army Authorities as impleaded in this revisional application and the wife contest this case. The Army Authority produces copies of some documents of the proceeding before them under Section 91(i) of the Army Act under which the impugned order was passed. 3. On behalf of the petitioner-husband Md. The Army Authorities as impleaded in this revisional application and the wife contest this case. The Army Authority produces copies of some documents of the proceeding before them under Section 91(i) of the Army Act under which the impugned order was passed. 3. On behalf of the petitioner-husband Md. Qudrat E Kabir argues that there having a judicial order passed for maintenance by the learned S.D.J.M., Suri under Section 125 Cr. P.C. on her own prays, if the wife required any enhancement she was to move the very same Court for alteration in allowances. When there is a lawful procedure before the competent Court of law it was quite illegal on the part of the wife to move the Army Authority for such revision and it was also illegal for the Army Authority to make interference with the judicial proceeding. The order of the Army Authority cannot override the order or the Magistrate or to interfere with it as desired by the petitioner. Hence, the order of the Army Authority as impugned in this case is quite illegal and must be quashed by this Court. Section 91(i) of the Army Act does not provide for any power to the Army Authority to override the judicial pronouncement. Under Articles 225, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the Army Authority and to quash the proceeding before them. The learned Advocate for the petitioner-husband refers to the ruling reported in L.V. Veeri Chettiar & another vs. Sales Tax Officer, Bombay, AIR 1971 Madras 155; Damomal Kausomal Raisinghani vs. Union of India & other, AIR 1967 Bombay 355; Chaitanya Charan Das vs. State of West Bengal & other, AIR 1995 Cal 336 and Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat & another vs. Union of India & other, 1989 (1) CRN 369. 4. On behalf of the Army Authorities O.P. Nos. 1 to 5, Mr. Talukdar argues that Article 227 of the Constitution will not be appropriate in this case and it does not provide for any action to set aside the order passed by the Army Tribunal in the judicial proceeding adopted by them as per the provision of the Army Act, which, again is equally the law of land binding the Army men and is a special legislation for such Army men. He further argues that the impugned order was passed from Bangalore where the petitioner used to work for gains and as such this order cannot be questioned in this High Court, as the jurisdiction of this High Court does not extend beyond the geographical area of this State. An order, further, under Section 91(i) of the Army Act is not an order under the Code of Criminal Procedure and as such Section 482 of the Code, as the section itself shows, does not apply to this case. As to the merit of the case Mr. Talukdar argues that this order of the Army Authority bas no bearing on the order of the learned S.D.J.M. and in no way interferes with or overrides it. The Army Act provides for a special forum• for matters concerning Army personnel, and among other things. It provides for maintenance in case of dependents of Army men. The impugned order was passed after giving due consideration to the order of the learned S.D.J.M., Suri as pleaded by the petitioner Parallel to the procedure provided under Section 127 Cr. P.C. the Army Act provides another procedure as embodied in Section 91(i) of the Act read with Rule 193 of the Army Rule as a legislation specially enforceable to Army men and wife had her right to move the Army Authority for consideration of the question of maintenance of her and their child afresh adopting forum parallel to the general forum. It did not offend the ordinary law or the judicial order by such general forum. As such the proceeding and the order impugned before the Army was undoubtedly an independent act, quite lawful as the special law overrides general law of the land. It is an order passed lawfully, by lawful authority without offending natural Justice. Accordingly this order cannot be quashed. 5. I have given anxious consideration to the facts of the case and the arguments of the learned Advocates for both the parties. The impugned order was passed by the Army Authority at Mukhyalaya, Uttari Kaman that is Head Quarters, Northern Command, C/o 56, APO, Bangalore on 9.12.95 (Annexure 'D' to the petition). This order was passed by the Army Authority by judicial proceeding as is permitted under Army Act and provided in Section 91(i) of the Act. Mr. The impugned order was passed by the Army Authority at Mukhyalaya, Uttari Kaman that is Head Quarters, Northern Command, C/o 56, APO, Bangalore on 9.12.95 (Annexure 'D' to the petition). This order was passed by the Army Authority by judicial proceeding as is permitted under Army Act and provided in Section 91(i) of the Act. Mr. Talukdar rightly argues that Article 227 of the Constitution while conferring the power of the High Court of Superintendence over all the Courts and Tribunal, restricts that authority in the turn that the power of Superintendence will be applicable to the Courts and Tribunal through the territory in relation to which the High Court exercises its jurisdiction. The order having been passed at Bangalore, it is clear that the Tribunal passing the impugned order acted from outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and as such I agree that the impugned order cannot be challenged in this Court and may be challenged before the High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which this order was passed. The rulings cited by the learned advocate for the petitioner as reported in AIR 1967 Bombay 355 head note 'B', AIR 1977 Mad 155 head note 'B' are respectfully distinguished as those do not coincide with this case as to the facts and circumstances. The rulings reported in 1989(1) CHN 369 and that in AIR 1995 Cal 336 , are also respectfully distinguished on the same ground. No part of the impugned order affected the petitioner in any way on any part of this land within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and cannot be questioned in this Court. 6. The Army Authority moved by the O.P. No.1 under Section 91(i) of the Army Act passed the impugned order through a Tribunal constituting under the law relating to the Arm Forces and under sub-article (4) and Article 227 the power of this High Court of Superintendence over that Tribunal is denied. As such, the revisional application is not maintainable in this Court. 7. I further hold that the Section 91(i) of the Army Act provides for a procedure parallel to the Section 127 Cr. P.C. The O.P. No.1, wife obtained the order from the learned S.D.J.M., Suri as we find from Ext. A, and was receiving maintenance as per that order. As such, the revisional application is not maintainable in this Court. 7. I further hold that the Section 91(i) of the Army Act provides for a procedure parallel to the Section 127 Cr. P.C. The O.P. No.1, wife obtained the order from the learned S.D.J.M., Suri as we find from Ext. A, and was receiving maintenance as per that order. As the Army Act provided for a parallel procedure specially for the Army personnel, as embodied in Section 91(i) of the Army Act read with Rule 193 of the Army Rules. The O.P. No.1 was, therefore, free to move the Army Authority for her maintenance. It was, in fact, an independent prayer before lawful authority parallel to Court and in no way supersedes, interferes or sets aside the order of the learned S.D.J.M., Suri as pleaded by the petitioner. She was receiving maintenance for two years and continued to receive the amount. As she found that the maintenance was not sufficient, she could move, before the Magistrate surely, but all there was a parallel forum special for the Army personnel, she was free to take recourse to that authority a fresh petition over a fresh cause. In fact, Section 91(i) of the Army Act is a law peculiar to the Army men and runs parallel to the provision of Sections 125 and 127 of the Cr. P.C. The impugned order does not in any way interfere or offend or set at nugatory the order of the learned S.D.J.M., Suri. The wife got a maintenance order. As she found subsequently after passage of two years that the amount was insufficient. There is no law debarring her from taking recourse to that lawful jurisdiction with a new prayer over fresh cause, and unconcerned with the order of the Court. Such a procedure or prayer does not amount in any way to challenge, interfere, amend or override the order passed by the Court of the learned S.D.J.M. according to the general law of the land. It was over an inconvenience accruing anew to the O.P., wife and as the petitioner was an Army personnel she rightly had recourse to that authority by applying for a relief unconcerned with the forum according to the general law of the land. The procedure is homogeneous to the general law of the land. 8. As produced by the O.P. Nos. The procedure is homogeneous to the general law of the land. 8. As produced by the O.P. Nos. 2 to 5 the adjutant which is branch of the Army in October 1994 per A.O. 23/94 observed that all the issue of grant of maintenance allowance under this provision of Army Act arises after detailed examination of the complaint from the wife or from the child or on behalf of the child restraining the competent authority for the same. The power to grant m1intenance under the Army Act are independent of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or for that matter even under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1954 and as a case for maintenance will be processed simultaneously while Court proceedings are in progress. Such Court proceedings do not debar the Army Authorities from processing and granting maintenance allowance to a petitioner subject to the conditions explained herein-below. In fact, in case the matter has already been adjudicated upon under either criminal or civil law and orders are passed, which the individual does not honour, a case for sanctioning maintenance allowance will be initiated as laid down hereunder. In case a wife is already in receipt of maintenance allowance under the provisions of Army Act and the Court order to the same effect is passed the Court order should be given due consideration while dealing with the question of alteration in allowance. In sum, the Court order, at the first instance, must be complied with by the concerned Army personnel. 9. In this case from the Ext. 'D' we find that the Army Authority allowed maintenance at the rate of 22% of the pay and allowance. From order No. 22018/1033/DV-4 dated 2.8.96 (page 16 of the documents filed by the Army Authority with supplementary affidavit) it is found that the order for allowing maintenance at the rate of Rs. 915/- includes the amount of Rs. 200/- granted by the learned S.D.J.M., Suri. 10. In fine, when laws of the land provide for two separate and independent channels for relief to any person, and one channel is peculiar and special to any section of citizen, an aggrieved person may take recourse to either of those to get de sired relief, not by challenging the Court order, but as a fresh cause accruing after passage of time. The provisions of Section 91(i) of the Army Act in no was interferes with the order of the learned S.D.J.M., Suri or with the administration of Justice by the judicial authority concerned. I find no reason to interfere with this order and to quash it. It does not amount to double jeopardy to the petitioner-husband in any way as the order does not impose any punishment as is provided in I.P.C. or Cr. P.C. or the Army Act, as the act of the petitioner cannot be considered to be an offence as per General Clauses Act, 1897. An Act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. The impugned order of the Army Authorities as passed under Section 91(i) of the Army Act does not attract the mischief of res-judicata as well. Accordingly, this revisional application is dismissed.