Judgment :- K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. The petitioners in these Original Petitions are the President and Vice President of the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. Trivandrum, the 3rd respondent, hereinafter referred to as the Bank. They were elected as members of Board of Directors held on 2.3.1996 for a term of 3 years. Exhibits, are referred to in this judgment as marked in O.P. 14313/97, unless specifically referred otherwise. 2. The petitioners have approached this Court seeking a declaration that R.44(4), 44(5) and 44(6) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules (hereinafter referred to as the rules ) introduced as per Ext. P2 notification dated 9th June, 1997 as inoperative. They also seek a declaration that they are not disqualified to continue as members of the Board of Directors of the Bank under R.44(4). They also challenge Ext. P1 and Ext. P5. 3. After the election to the Board of Directors of the Bank, the second respondent initiated action to supersede the Board of Directors by issuing a show cause notice dated 22.10.1996 on the basis of the allegations in the matter of appointment of Assistants in the Bank. An order of super session was really passed on 17.12.96. This was challenged in O.P. 267/97. The super session was stayed by this Court. The second respondent took the matter in Writ Appeal. A Division Bench of this Court heard the Original Petition itself and allowed it, quashing the order of supersession as per judgment dated 6.8.97. 4. Two days after, on 8.8.97, the petitioners were served with another show cause notice, Ext. P1. A reading thereof will disclose that there was a case against the petitioners before the Kerala Public Mens Corruption (Investigations and Enquiries Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission). That case was also with reference to the alleged irregularities in the matter of appointment of Assistants in the service of the Bank. Ext. P1. A reading thereof will disclose that there was a case against the petitioners before the Kerala Public Mens Corruption (Investigations and Enquiries Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission). That case was also with reference to the alleged irregularities in the matter of appointment of Assistants in the service of the Bank. Ext. P1 disclosed that the Commission had found primafacie case against the President, Vice President and Managing Director and Secretary of the Bank and therefore, in terms of R.44(4) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 the petitioners were 'disqualified to continue as a member of the Board of Directors of the said Bank.' They were required to show cause why they should not be declared to be disqualified under sub-r.(4) of R.44 of the said rules to continue as a member of the Board of Directors of the Bank. The sub rule referred to in the show cause notice was introduced as per Ext. P2 notification. The petitioners submitted their reply and the first respondent issued proceedings dated 21.8.97, Ext. P5 declaring that the petitioner in O.P. 14313/97 shall 'cease to be the President and member of the Board of Directors' of the Bank with effect from 16.10.96, the date of the order of the Commission finding prima facie case against him. Similar one was passed in respect of the petitioner in O.P. 15110/97 as per order dated 4.9.97 produced along with a memo filed on 9.9.97 by the Govt. Pleader in that case. That order declares that, that petitioner shall cease to be the Vice President and a member of the Board of Directors of the Bank with effect from the same date. It is in the above circumstances, the petitioners have approached this Court with these Original Petitions challenging the relevant rules and the said notices and orders and seeking a declaration that they are not disqualified to continue as a member of the Board of Directors of the Bank. 5. I will deal, first, with the challenge against sub rules (4), (5) and (6) of R.44 of the Rules as per Ext. P2. R.44 deals with disqualification of membership of committee, which means members of Board of Directors. Sub-r.(1) enumerates several disqualifications which makes ineligible a member of the society for being elected or appointed as a member of the committee. P2. R.44 deals with disqualification of membership of committee, which means members of Board of Directors. Sub-r.(1) enumerates several disqualifications which makes ineligible a member of the society for being elected or appointed as a member of the committee. Sub-r.(2) provides that a member of the committee, if later becomes disqualified under any of the items mentioned in sub-r.(1) for election or appointment, shall also become disqualified to continue as a member of the committee. 11 also provides that the elected member will also be disqualified to continue as a member in case he ceases to be a member of the society itself or if it has been found that he had been disqualified for being elected even on the date of election. Procedure for disqualifying a member of the committee is provided in sub-r.(3). It is in addition to these provisions contained in the said three sub rules to R.44, that sub-rr. (4), (5) and (6) are introduced by Ext. P2 notification. Sub-r.(4) is to ensure that a person against whom the Commission had made a report regarding its finding that there is primafacie case against him, shall he deemed to have been disqualified to be or for continuing as President, Vice President, Treasurer, Secretary or Manager or any such office bearer of the society. It is only proper that, when such office bearers are found primafacie guilty of allegations of corruption by the Commission which is specifically constituted for enquiry into corruption of public men like them, such persons shall keep away from the affairs of the society. That cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational. Sub-r.(5) ensures an opportunity to be given to such person before being disqualified and sub-r.(6) ensures that such person shall be restored to their position in case the Commission finally finds in its report that allegations against them have not been substantiated. These provisions are well within the rule making power of the Government and are introduced in continuation of the disqualification for membership in the committee provided for in R.44. It is true that a preliminary finding against a member of the society does not make him ineligible for being elected or appointed as a member of the committee. Sub-clause (iii) to clause 6 in sub-r.(1) of R.44 introduced by Ext. P2 is in respect of final findings. It is true that a preliminary finding against a member of the society does not make him ineligible for being elected or appointed as a member of the committee. Sub-clause (iii) to clause 6 in sub-r.(1) of R.44 introduced by Ext. P2 is in respect of final findings. That does not mean that a member of the committee already elected or appointed shall be continued in the committee even if there is primafacie finding of guilt in corruption case against him. There is no illegality in providing for additional disqualifications for continuing as a member of the committee in addition to those which makes a member of the society ineligible for being elected or appointed as a member of the committee. So, the contention of the petitioner that R.44(4) is against the content of R.44 cannot be accepted. The Commission enquires into the complaints of corruption against the public men who include office bearers of the Society like President and Vice President. When prima facie guilt is found against such office bearers, it is only appropriate to provide that such person shall be kept away from the position until the final report comes. If the final report is in their favour, they can be restored to their position as provided in sub-r.(6) to R.44. So, the disqualification provided in sub-r.4 of R.44 is only temporary, pending final decision by the Commission. Merely because such a situation is not envisaged in the Kerala Public Mens Corruption (Investigation & Inquiries) Act, 1987, it does not preclude Govt. from providing a statutory rule that regard in the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules to keep away, for the time being, a person against whom primafacie allegations of corruption have been found against, from the position as an office bearer of the Society. The contention to the contra raised by the petitioner is therefore, not sustainable. Sub-r.(5) is only a safety clause introduced to ensure an opportunity being given to such person who will be disqualified for the reason of prima facie finding by the Commission and sub-r.(6) is to ensure restoration of the position in case the Commission finds finally that complaints against him have not been substantiated. There is no arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the said sub rules. Therefore, I am of the view that the challenge against the said sub rules shall fail. 6. There is no arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the said sub rules. Therefore, I am of the view that the challenge against the said sub rules shall fail. 6. R.44(1), as already mentioned above, provides instance of disqualification whereby a member of the society will not be eligible to contest for election or appointment as member of a committee of a Co-operative Society. By introducing item (iii) to clause (c) of R.44(1), finding of guilt by the Commission 'after a detailed investigation' is made a disqualification for contesting for election or for appointment. But primafacie finding of guilt by the Commission is not made a disqualification. Therefore, a person against whom a primafacie finding was rendered by the Commission can contest the election as it is not a disqualification cither in terms of S.28 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act or R.44(1) of the Rules. Sub-r.(2) of R.44 provides that a person who becomes disqualified by any of the reasons mentioned in sub-r.(1) after he being elected to the Committee or who ceases to be a member of the Society shall cease to hold his office as a member of the committee. Obviously primafacie finding of a case against a person will not come within the purview of sub-r.(2) as it does not find a place in sub-r.(1) of R.44. Sub-r.(3) deals with the procedure for declaring that one shall cease to be a member of the committee on the basis of the disqualification mentioned in sub-r.(2). 7. As already mentioned above sub-r.(4) was introduced by Ext. P2 notification to the effect that if the Commission, after preliminary investigation against a person, has made a report regarding its finding that there is a prima facie case against him, such person shall be deemed to have been disqualified to be or for continuing as "the President, Vice President, Chairman, Vice Chairman, Treasurer, Secretary or Manager or any such office bearers by whatever name he is designated". Thus, sub-r.(4) deals with a disqualification to be or for continuing as an office bearer with a designated position such as President, Vice President, Chairman, Vice Chairman, Treasurer, Secretary or Manager or in any other name. Therefore the disqualification provided in sub-r.(4) of R.44 is in respect of office bearers specifically designated as such. The Government Pleader contends that "any such office bearers" mentioned in sub-r.(4) will include a member of the committee also. Therefore the disqualification provided in sub-r.(4) of R.44 is in respect of office bearers specifically designated as such. The Government Pleader contends that "any such office bearers" mentioned in sub-r.(4) will include a member of the committee also. This contention of the Government Pleader cannot be accepted because the words "any such office bearers' are succeeded by the words ^ by whatever name he is designated'. Thus such office bearers shall be with a designated position. A mere membership is not a designated position. 'Any such office bearers by whatever name he is designated' is in continuation of the enumerated positions like President, Vice President, Chairman, Vice Chairman, Treasurer, Secretary or Manager. If the rule making authority had intended disqualification of members of the committee also, necessarily it would have simply provided that 'such persons shall be deemed to have been disqualified to be or continuing as the member of the committee' as is employed by the rule making authority in sub-r.(2) of R.44, because if a person is disqualified from being a member of the committee naturally he will become disqualified to be an office bearer of the committee also. The rule making authority did not thus provide that a person against whom a preliminary finding has been made by the Commission shall be deemed to have been disqualified to be or for continuing as member of the committee. So, it did not intend such a position or situation. Instead the rule making authority envisaged disqualification only for office bearers like President, Vice President, Chairman, Vice Chairman, Treasurer, Secretary or Manager or any such office bearer by whatever name he is designated. Such disqualification will not. extend to disable continuance of a person as member of the committee. 8. The aforesaid contention of the Government Pleader cannot be accepted for another reason also. Statute being an edit of legislation shall always be expressed in clear and unambiguous language. Where the words are clear and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, the Court cannot take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. This task is not so easy as the language is often misunderstood. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. This task is not so easy as the language is often misunderstood. The Supreme Court has held in the decision in the Institute of C.A. of India v. M/s. Price Waterhouse & Ann (JT 1997 (6) 607 SC ) that: "Where, therefore, the "language" is clear, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language used. What is to be borne in mind is as to what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said. A construction which requires, for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words, has to be avoided unless it is covered by the rule of exception, including that of necessity." Viewing the rule in that angle, as already mentioned above, the disqualification of a member of the committee provided for in sub-r.(2) of R.44 will certainly help the court in interpreting the true meaning of the words "any such office bearers by whatever name he is designated" appearing in sub-r.(4) as introduced by Ext. P2. Thus, whatever disqualification is mentioned in respect of the entire members of the committee which include office bearers like President, Vice President, etc., and other members without any such office, the rule making authority has clearly employed the words "a member of the committee shall cease to hold his office." When the rule making authority did not use such an expression in sub-r.(4), it is clear that the rule making authority did not intended to include all the members of the committee, as is included in sub-r.(2). Within the purview of sub-r.(4) as introduced by Ext. P2 amendment. That is why the rule making authority employed restricted words "President, Vice President, Chairman, Vice Chairman, Treasurer, Secretary or Manager or any such office bearers by whatever name". So, by reason of sub-r.(4) only an office bearer of the society alone can be disqualified. A mere member of the committee cannot be disqualified under sub-r.(4). 9. On yet another reason also, the contention of the Government Pleader that sub-r.(4) takes in even an ordinary member of the committee cannot be accepted. So, by reason of sub-r.(4) only an office bearer of the society alone can be disqualified. A mere member of the committee cannot be disqualified under sub-r.(4). 9. On yet another reason also, the contention of the Government Pleader that sub-r.(4) takes in even an ordinary member of the committee cannot be accepted. The well known rule of ejusdem generis signifies a principle of construction whereby words in a statute which are otherwise wide, but are associated in the text with more limited words are, by implication, given a restricted operation and are limited to matters of the same class or genus as preceding them. When a list or string is followed by wider or sweeping up words, then the implications of the proceeding words will certainly limit the scope of such succeeding wider expression. The Supreme Court in A/A. Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and An r.(AIR 1989 SC 1019) made it clear that: "The principle underlying his approach to statutory construction is that the subsequent general words were only intended to guard against some accidental omission in the objects of the kind mentioned earlier and were not intended to extend to objects of a wholly different kind." In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Pvt. ltd. & Ors. (1991 (2) SC 637) the Supreme Court held as follows: "It is a settled rule of interpretation that statutory provisions should be construed in a manner which sub serves the purpose of the enactment and does not defeat it and that no part thereof is rendered surplus or otiose". The disqualification mentioned in sub-r.(2) of R.44 covers the entire members of the committee. But when sub-r.(4) is introduced by Ext. P2, it was specifically mentioned that disqualification is for continuing as "The President, Vice President, Chairman, Vice Chairman, Treasurer, Secretary or Manager or any such office bearers by whatever name". So, the intention behind sub-r.(4) is that the disqualification mentioned therein shall cover only such other office bearers specifically mentioned therein and such other office bearers by whatever name they may be designated. So the term office bearers will necessarily include only person with some designation in the same class as the enumerated list in sub-r.(4). So, the intention behind sub-r.(4) is that the disqualification mentioned therein shall cover only such other office bearers specifically mentioned therein and such other office bearers by whatever name they may be designated. So the term office bearers will necessarily include only person with some designation in the same class as the enumerated list in sub-r.(4). In other words the term "office bearers' mentioned in sub-r.(4) will cover only those members of the committee who are having some office like the one specifically mentioned in the said rule or belonging to such class. Thus, I am of the view that sub-r.(4) will not disqualify a person" to be or for continuing' as member of the committee of a society. In other words by pressing sub-r.(4) into service, a person cannot be disqualified from continuing as a member of the Board of Director of a Co-operative Society. 10. Next, I will deal with the challenge against Ext. P1 and Ext. P5. Ext. P1 is a show cause notice issued to the petitioners in terms of sub r.(5) of R.44 of the Rules. The said sub-rule provides that if any person becomes disqualified by reason of the primafacie finding of the Commission, the Registrar may by an order in writing declare that he shall cease to be such office bearer and that before passing such an order, the Registrar shall give such person an opportunity of being heard. The petitioners are President and Vice President of the Bank. Therefore, they are office bearers. If there is primafacie finding of guilt against them, by the Commission, necessarily they will face disqualification from continuing as such office bearer in terms of sub-r.(4) of R.44. Ext. P1 show cause notice calls upon the petitioners to show cause why they should not be declared to he disqualified under sub-r.(4) of R.44 "to continue as a member of the Board of Directors of the Bank". I have already found that the disqualification mentioned in sub-r.(4) will not extend to disqualify a member of the committee without any designated office bearership and that by reason of sub-r.(4) a member of the committee shall not be disqualified from continuing so. The petitioners submitted their explanation. By Ext. P5 the Registrar had declared that the petitioner in O.P. 14313/ 97 "shall cease to be the President and a member of the Board of Directors" of the Bank. The petitioners submitted their explanation. By Ext. P5 the Registrar had declared that the petitioner in O.P. 14313/ 97 "shall cease to be the President and a member of the Board of Directors" of the Bank. So also as per the order dated 4.9.97 produced by the Government Pleader along with a memo dated 9.9.97, the Registrar had declared that the petitioner in O.P. 15110/ 97 "shall cease to be the President and a member of the Board of Directors" of the Bank. The office bearer including the President and Vice President can he disqualified under sub-r.(4) of R.44 only after affording an opportunity to be heard in that regard to the incumbents concerned. Ext. P1 show cause notice does not call upon the petitioners to explain why they shall not be disqualified from continuing as the President and Vice President of the Bank, as the case may be. It is without that, they are disqualified from continuing as President or Vice President as per the said order. As already mentioned above Ext. P1 is a show cause notice to explain why they shall not be disqualified from continuing as member of the Board of Directors.1 have already found that a person cannot be disqualified from being continuing as a member of the committee in terms of sub r.(4). Therefore, Ext. P1 show cause notice is illegal. If there is a prima facie finding against the petitioners by the Commission, they can be disqualified from continuing as the President or Vice President. They have been disqualified from continuing as President or Vice President as per Ext. P5 and the order dated 4.9.97 as mentioned above. Before doing so, no notice has been given specifically calling upon them to show cause why they shall not he disqualified to be such office bearers. Ext. P1 does not satisfy that statutory requirement. The Registrar cannot escape from that mandate. The conclusion may be certain or not different. In a case of simple application of the principles of natural justice, perhaps that may be a futile exercise. But when the statute prescribe a manner to do a particular thing, it shall be in that fashion alone. Otherwise it will be negation of rule of law. Moreover a statutory requirement cannot be diluted. It is mandatory under sub-r.(5) to afford such an opportunity. By Ext. But when the statute prescribe a manner to do a particular thing, it shall be in that fashion alone. Otherwise it will be negation of rule of law. Moreover a statutory requirement cannot be diluted. It is mandatory under sub-r.(5) to afford such an opportunity. By Ext. P5 they are disqualified from being continuing as' a President or Vice President, thus, without affording an opportunity as contemplated by sub-r.(5). Therefore, Ext. P5 and the order dated 4.9.97 produced by the Govt. Pleader along with memo dated 9.9.97 in respect of the petitioner in O.P. 15110/97 cannot be sustained. The Original Petitions are thus allowed to the above extent; but it shall not stand in the way of the Registrar in taking appropriate proceedings against the petitioner after affording opportunity to them in terms of sub-r.(4) and (5) of the R.44 to disqualify them from as office bearers.