M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THE United India Insurance Co. Ltd. has preferred this batch of 38 appeals which is directed against a common judgment dated 31. 3. 1993 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, chitradurga. It is alleged that on 28. 3. 1987 an overcrowded bus driven by one Syed Mustafa met with an accident near the Challakere Toll Gate at about 9. 15 p. m. The bus toppled on its side and many of the passengers sustained injuries. The police registered an offence and made an inventory of the persons who were injured numbering in all 43 passengers. Subsequently, the cases were placed before the Lok Adalat and since the injured persons were poor villagers, a decision was taken by the insurance company which it stated was on humanitarian grounds, not to contest their claims on merits and to pay reasonable compensation in keeping with the injuries sustained by them. All the 43 persons accepted the compensation and the matter ended there. Approximately fifteen months later, an M. V. C. claim was filed before the Tribunal in which there was a delay of 467 days. About two months later, another batch of claim petitions was filed which was followed by two more batches of petitions in all aggregating to 38 cases. The contention in all these cases was common, namely, that the appellants were extremely poor, they were ignorant of the fact that they were entitled to compensation and that, therefore, the delay should be condoned. It is relevant to point out that the insurance company contested the applications for condonation of delay by pointing out that all the persons who claimed to have been injured had already been paid compensation and that there was no ground whatsoever to entertain any applications from the present batch of persons. Despite this position being pointed out, the Tribunal condoned the delay and this is one of the points that has been raised in appeal, namely, that on the special facts and circumstances of this case, the delay ought not to have been condoned. Despite this position being pointed out, the Tribunal condoned the delay and this is one of the points that has been raised in appeal, namely, that on the special facts and circumstances of this case, the delay ought not to have been condoned. ( 2 ) IT is true that judicial forums invariably lean heavily towards a considerate attitude particularly in cases where the litigant would be deprived of a relief on the ground of delay and there are even cases in which the courts have condoned reasonably long delay if it means that a genuinely deserving litigant may be afforded a relief. That is precisely the reason why the aspect of condonation of delay is closely interlinked with the merits of the case which the courts carefully evaluate while deciding whether delay, particularly where it is reasonably long, ought to be condoned or not. The same formula will have to be adopted by the court in the present case for which reason, I propose to consider the second ground raised by the appellant's learned advocate before me, namely, the question as to whether at all the insurance company can be held liable for payment of compensation in excess of the number of passengers that were permitted to be carried in the bus. Appellant's learned advocate has pointed out to me from the record that the insurance policy limits the number of passengers to 38 + 2,. e. , the driver and conductor. His first submission is that if it is demonstrated that the bus was carrying more than 38 passengers, that this itself demonstrates per se negligence on the part of the driver and owner and that it would, therefore, affect their right to claim compensation from the insurance company. It is well settled law that if the party claiming the insurance,. e. , the owner of the vehicle is demonstrated to have grossly breached the law insofar as if a wanton disregard of the law is demonstrated and secondly, if it is also demonstrated that there were limitations to the liability,. It is well settled law that if the party claiming the insurance,. e. , the owner of the vehicle is demonstrated to have grossly breached the law insofar as if a wanton disregard of the law is demonstrated and secondly, if it is also demonstrated that there were limitations to the liability,. e. , where the policy and the conditions of the permit indicate that the number of passengers capable of being carried in that vehicle was only 38 and if in violation of these conditions and in breach of the law as many as 43 additional passengers were carried, the appellant's learned advocate is justified in pointing out to the court that the overloaded conditions themselves could be regarded as having caused the incident and that the incident would therefore be directly and completely attributable to the negligence on the part of the owner and driver. The submission on behalf of the insurance company that in these circumstances no liability can be foisted on the insurance company is a valid one and deserves to be upheld principally on the second ground insofar as if there is flagrant violation of the provisions of law, then the party responsible for the violation would be the one who is liable. Having regard to the rampancy of this class of cases of which the present one is a classic instance insofar as a bus permitted to carry 38 passengers was overloaded to the extent that it was carrying 81 passengers, there is no doubt about the fact that the overloading was obviously the main contributory to the accident. The persons travelling in the bus can hardly be blamed because they are ignorant of the limitations but the two parties who are responsible are the operator of the bus who in order to make money has breached the law and secondly, the law enforcement authorities who have either connived at the situation or have not taken steps to prevent the incident. It will be absolutely essential from the point of view of ensuring safety of the travelling public that the transport authorities in the State of Karnataka strictly comply with the direction from this Court that in case of a public vehicle of any category found carrying persons in excess of the licensed capacity, that it shall entail an immediate suspension of the permit. The authorities shall thereafter investigate into the matter and if the charge is found substantiated, the permit shall be revoked and shall not be reissued in respect of that vehicle or to that owner for at least 2 years thereafter. ( 3 ) THE real point at issue is the question as to whether the insurance company can be held liable to pay compensation to more than 38 passengers and secondly, the question as to whether the present lot of 38 applicants involved who are the respondents to these appeals qualify for compensation. The terms of the policy will have to be strictly construed and irrespective of the fact that the insurance company voluntarily agreed to compensate 43 injured persons before the lok Adalat, its legal liability is confined to 38 passengers and, therefore, it cannot be directed to pay compensation to a single person over and above that limit. ( 4 ) I am satisfied after hearing the appellant's learned advocate and learned advocate Mr. Siddappa who represents the owner that the incident took place near a village and it had created a sensation because as many as 43 persons were injured. The police have also registered an offence and the F.. R. itself indicates the names of the persons who were injured. None of the present lot of 38 persons appears in that list. It is impossible for me to accept that if these persons had in fact been injured that they would not have informed the police and consequently, that their names would not have reflected in the F.. R. This itself conclusively indicates that there is serious doubt as to whether at all the present persons were injured in the incident. ( 5 ) WHAT further worsens the case of the claimants is the fact that they have all stated that since the hospital was crowded, they went to a private doctor and they have produced some certificates which have again not been proved. The claims put forward by them that they were injured and that they spent money for the treatment are extremely doubtful as the evidence in this regard can hardly be accepted. The Tribunal has accepted their evidence on the ground that the insurance company did not seriously dispute in cross-examination their contention that they were travelling in the bus. The claims put forward by them that they were injured and that they spent money for the treatment are extremely doubtful as the evidence in this regard can hardly be accepted. The Tribunal has accepted their evidence on the ground that the insurance company did not seriously dispute in cross-examination their contention that they were travelling in the bus. What needs to be noted is that even assuming that they were travelling in the bus, there is a possibility that they were not injured which is why their names do not appear in the f.. R. Also, the claim of the other injured persons who are from the same village and same area came to be settled sometime thereafter before the Lok Adalat and it is significant that even up to that point of time none of the present claimants came forward with the plea that they are entitled to compensation. The long delay, therefore, is not due to ignorance or accident but it is very clear that these persons decided to take their chance by making an application for compensation and it is well-known that it is not difficult to obtain medical certificates in respect of minor injuries or ailments from private doctors. On an overall consideration of the evidence, therefore, I find that even on merits the claimants have failed to establish that they are entitled to any compensation. This being the position, the Tribunal without having looked into the merits of the case having condoned the delay is also unjustified and that order is set aside. ( 6 ) ON the main issue, as to whether the insurance company is liable to compensate more than 38 passengers even assuming they were able to establish that they were injured in the same incident, the position in law is that the liability was limited to 38 passengers and, therefore, cannot extend beyond that number. The insurance company is perfectly justified in having settled the claims of all the injured persons before the Lok Adalat and once that procedure has been adopted and once the compensation claims of 43 persons have been settled, there is a total legal bar to the entertainment of any more claims. The insurance company is perfectly justified in having settled the claims of all the injured persons before the Lok Adalat and once that procedure has been adopted and once the compensation claims of 43 persons have been settled, there is a total legal bar to the entertainment of any more claims. Under normal circumstances, the liability would have devolved on the owner in respect of these persons, but on special facts and circumstances of this case where I am satisfied that the claims themselves require to be rejected on merits, there can be no question of any liability devolving on the owner in respect of these claims. The order of the tribunal dated 31. 3. 1993 in respect of all these 38 claimants is accordingly set aside and all the claim petitions stand dismissed. If there is any amount deposited by the insurance company in this Court against these claims that is lying undisbursed, the same shall be returned to the appellant along with interest accrued, if any. ( 7 ) THERE is some delay in the presentation of these appeals and appellant's learned advocate has pointed out that there were procedural difficulties since there was a batch of 38 appeals. Having regard to the grounds set out, the delay is condoned and the. As. for condonation of delay are allowed in those of the matters where such orders are necessary. The appellant's learned advocate states that there are a few of the matters that have not been listed along with this group but in which the common order will hold good. He is given the liberty of having those matters placed before this Court for orders provided this is done within the next two weeks. ( 8 ) THIS entire batch of appeals and revisions accordingly succeeds. On the special facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.