D. P. S. CHAUHAN, J. ( 1 ) PRESENT petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is on behalf of Smt. Neerabai wife of Jakalu and Kumari Chunasari daughter of Jakalu seeking relief of quashing the order dated 31-12-1988, passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bemetara, order dated 11-7-1989, passed by the Additional Commissioner, Raipur Division, Raipur and the order dated 27-12-1990, passed by the Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh. This petition is accompanied by an affidavit, which is the requirement under the Rules of the Court, but the affidavit so filed is not by the petitioners. It is by one Jokhan Singh who has described himself as father of petitioner No. 1 Smt. Neerabai. This affidavit, as required under the Rules of the Court, is not by the petitioners and it has not been stated that the affidavit filed by Jhokan Singh is founded on any authority under any power of Attorney. The petition is heard as it involves no controversy relating to the facts or the legal proposition founded on controvertial position in regard to the facts. ( 2 ) BOTH the petitioners lived separately from Jakalu on account of strained relationship and family was involved in civil and criminal litigations against each other, which was damaging the tie of the family leading to the strained relationship and with a view to promote cordial relationship and to bring happiness in the family, well wishers and relations by taking lead brought about a settlement by means of an agreement dated 2-5-1981 for bringing to end all the disputes. The agreement dated 2-5-1981 was between Neerabai with Ku. Chunasari on one side and Jakalu and 5 family relations i. e. Bhukhau, Beniram, Vishal, Behattar and Mahendra on the other side, who played a significant role in bringing out the agreement or in bringing all of them to point of agreement and they went even to the extent of giving their lands to Smt. Neerabai and Ku. Chunasari for limited purpose for earning their livelihood conditioning the agreement that Smt. Neerabai will earn her livelihood and her limited interest was to the extent so long she continued to be the wife of Jakalu and so long she survives and the right to earn livelihood was made available to Ku. Chunsari only up to celebration of her marriage. Chunasari for limited purpose for earning their livelihood conditioning the agreement that Smt. Neerabai will earn her livelihood and her limited interest was to the extent so long she continued to be the wife of Jakalu and so long she survives and the right to earn livelihood was made available to Ku. Chunsari only up to celebration of her marriage. ( 3 ) ON the basis of the aforesaid agreement, the present petitioners moved the Tahsildar Bemetara for mutation of their names u/s. 110 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for brevity hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') as Bhooswami over following Khasra numbers :- Khasra No. Area71. 25 acre25/20. 53 acre21. 78 acre25/30. 52 acre312. 10 acre25/10. 18 acre1391. 30 acre1401. 42 acre148/1, 148/2, 148/3, 148/64. 51 acre35/3,0. 68 acre35/40. 44 acre38/21. 30 acre640. 05 acre1290. 76 acre137/20. 28 acre20/70. 75 acrethe case was registered as 31-A/6/87-88. Before the Tahsildar all the 6 persons to the agreement whose land was given to the petitioners by way of maintenance were not made party. Only Jakalu, Bhukhau and Beniram were made parties. The Tahsildar on 12-10-88 passed an order under Sections 109 and 110 of the Code for mutation of names of the applicants i. e. present petitioners as Bhooswami. This order was appealed against u/s. 14 of the Code before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bemetara and the appeal was registered as Appeal No. 12-A/6/87-88 which was allowed vide order dated 31-12-1988 and the order of the Tahsildar for mutation was set aside. Against this order Smt. Neerabai and Ku. Chunasari preferred second appeal against Jakalu, Bhukhau, Beniram, Vishal and Behattar which was registered as Revenue Appeal No. 238/a-6/88-89 and was decided by the Additional Commissioner, Raipur Division, Raipur vide order dated 11th July, 1989. This second appeal was dismissed with the directions that petitioners names may be recorded in the record of rights over Khasra No. 20/7, area 0. 75 decimal belonging to Jakalu. This order of the Additional Commissioner was challenged before the Board of Revenue by the present petitioners by means of Revision No. 232-I/89 which was dismissed by the Board of Revenue on 27th December, 1990. Jakalu did not file any revision against the order of the Additional Commissioner passed in Appeal No. 238/a-6/88-89 directing mutation of the names of the petitioners over his land Khasra No. 20/7, area 0. 75 acre. Jakalu did not file any revision against the order of the Additional Commissioner passed in Appeal No. 238/a-6/88-89 directing mutation of the names of the petitioners over his land Khasra No. 20/7, area 0. 75 acre. ( 4 ) IN the present petition the facts have only peripheral relevance for determination of the legal controversy, which is that 'can the petitioners by virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for brevity hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') be held to hold the property under the agreement as full owner? ( 5 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri A. K. Pandey and the learned State counsel though he represented the formal parties i. e. respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and the learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 5 to 8 were not present. ( 6 ) IT may be noticed that in the writ petition neither all the persons who were party to the agreement were made respondents, nor all the persons who were respondents before the Board of Revenue were made party. ( 7 ) THE facts relevant to the controversy are that the land comprised in Khasra No. 20/7, area 0. 75 acre belonged to Jakalu over which he had Bhoomiswami rights and rest of the land i. e. 15. 32 acres belong to other relations of Jakalu. For the purpose of controversy, it is not necessary to consider the relationship of other persons qua Jakalu or qua the petitioners. For the purpose of determination of controversy it is relevant to extract Section 14 of the Act, which is as :"14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.- (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.- In this sub-section, "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as Stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument orunder a decree or order of a Civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. "sub-section (1) of Sec. 14 of the Act has got a wide amplitude so to cover every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance over which rights of full ownership would be acquired by her and sub-section (2) is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to sub-section (1) as it excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of sub-section (1 ). This provision is brought on the statute book for achieving a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of woman in Hindu society and in this view of the matter it is settled position that such a provision to be construed strictly so to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in sub-section (1 ). ( 8 ) THE only submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the petitioners have acquired rights of full ownership over the property which was given to them by way of maintenance and the Courts below have erred in law in not mutating the names of the petitioners over the property under the agreement given to the petitioners as Bhoomiswami. ( 9 ) SO far as controversy relating to scope of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Act is concerned it is no more res integra. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the case of V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, AIR 1977 SC 1944 . On the respective scope and ambit of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec. 14 of the Act it is most important case. According to this decision sub-section (2) is confined to cases where property is acquired by a Hindu female for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribed a restricted estate in the property. According to this decision sub-section (2) is confined to cases where property is acquired by a Hindu female for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribed a restricted estate in the property. It has also been held that where the property is acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of right of maintenance, inter alia, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2), even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property to her prescribed a restricted estate in the property. In the the present case, so far as the pre-existing right of maintenance is concerned, the petitioners have no pre-existing right against the persons or against the properties, except Jakalu, who is husband of petitioner No. 1 and father of petitioner No. 2. The other case relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners is Nazar Singh v. Jagjit Kaur, AIR 1996 SC 855 : (1996 AIR SCW 229 ). This case also does not help the petitioners. In this case Gurdial Singh and his wife Smt. Harmel Kaur were having strained relationship, on account of which they were living apart. Harmel Kaur filed a petition u/s. 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code (old Code) for grant of maintenance. In those proceedings, a compromise was arrived at between Gurdial Singh and Harmel Kaur whereunder the suit lands were given to Harmel Kaur in lieu of her maintenance subject to the following 8 conditions :-"1. That the possession of the land in dispute was given to Harmel Kaur defendant No. 4. 2 That Harmel Kaur would be entitled to get the land cultivated or to lease it out and to utilize its income for herself, wherever she likes. 3 That she would not sell or mortgage this land. She would however be responsible for the payment of land revenue or any other Govt. Tax from time to time. 4 If during the lifetime of Harmel Kaur, Gurdial Singh gets back the land from her he would pay her Rs. 50/- per month as maintenance. 3 That she would not sell or mortgage this land. She would however be responsible for the payment of land revenue or any other Govt. Tax from time to time. 4 If during the lifetime of Harmel Kaur, Gurdial Singh gets back the land from her he would pay her Rs. 50/- per month as maintenance. 5 If Gurdial Singh died before Harmel Kaur, then, in that case, Harmel Kaur would be entitled to get her share from the said land as a legal heir in accordance with the law. 6 The maintenance allowance of Rs. 25/- per month already being paid to her, shall be stopped. 7 Harmel Kaur shall also be entitledto keep her residence at V. Hemraj in the house belonging to Gurdial Singh. 8 Harmel Kaur also thumb marked this agreement/compromise and agreed that in case the land is taken away back by Gurdial Singh, then she would get Rs. 50/- per month as maintenance from him. "gurdial Singh died and after his death Harmel Kaur executed four sale deeds which were challenged by means of the suit which gave rise to the above decision of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in this case considered the earlier case of V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi (supra ). In this case there was no dispute regarding the fact of pre-existing right of maintenance of wife from her husband and the property was given by way of compromise by her husband in lieu of her maintenance. So far as the position of husband is concerned, he is under an obligation for maintaining his wife and children and as such they have got pre-existing right of maintenance. The words "possessed of" have been constituted by the Supreme Court in a broad sense and widest connotations pointing out that these words mean the state of owning or in one's hands or power. It need not be actual or physical possession and occupation of property by a female, but may be actual or constructive or any other form recognised by law. ( 10 ) IN the case of Jaswant Kaur v. Harpal Singh, (1989) 3 SCC 572 the Court observed :"it is obvious that Section 14 is aimed at removing restrictions or limitations on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner. ( 10 ) IN the case of Jaswant Kaur v. Harpal Singh, (1989) 3 SCC 572 the Court observed :"it is obvious that Section 14 is aimed at removing restrictions or limitations on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner. The property possessed by her so long as her possession is traceable to a lawful origin, that is to say, if she has a vestige of a title. It makes no difference whether the property is acquired by inheritance or device or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever. The explanation expressly refers to property acquired in lieu of maintenance and we do not see what further title the widow is required to establish before she can claim full ownership under Section 14 (1) in respect of property given to her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. The very right to receive maintenance is sufficient title to enable the ripening of possession into full ownership if she is in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of an exception to Section 14 (1) and provides for a situation where property is acquired by a female Hindu under a written instrument or a decree of Court and not where such acquisition is traceable to any antecedent right. "in the case of V. Gulasamma v. Sesha Reddi (supra) the facts were different. The Court held that sub-section (2) of Sec. 14 provides that nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a Civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. ( 11 ) IN the present case the property is acquired by virtue of agreement for the first time and the question for consideration is for seeing the existence of pre-existing right of maintenance. ( 11 ) IN the present case the property is acquired by virtue of agreement for the first time and the question for consideration is for seeing the existence of pre-existing right of maintenance. In the case of Jaswant Kaur (supra) it was said by the Supreme Court that if a female Hindu acquires property under a written instrument or a decree of the Court and where such acquisition is not traceable to any antecedent right then sub-section (2) of Section 14 alone would be attracted and where an antecedent right is traceable, a document in the nature of will is of no consequence and the case will be covered by provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. ( 12 ) LEARNED State counsel relied on a case of K. Satyanarayana v. G. Sithayya, AIR 1987 SC 353 . In this case two sons of Ramamurthy had amicably partitioned their properties in 1909. One of the sons of Ramamurty, viz. Veeraraju died in 1927 leaving behind his widow. As Ramamurty sold certain properties from Veeraraju's share in 1928, the widow raised dispute and mediators brought about a settlement leading to the execution of a Deed of Settlement dated August 18, 1937, whereunder Ramamurty settled certain properties on the widow with life interest and upon her death, those properties were to revert to Ramamurty or his heirs. After the widow's death, the plaintiff who is son of Ramamurty claimed the properties, but the brother of the widow claimed title in himself. The Court found that Settlement Deed is an instrument-contemplated under sub-section (2) and admittedly it created a restricted estate in favour of the widow. Therefore, sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 was held to be not attracted. This case does not lay down any new proposition. It is settled by series of decisions of the Supreme Court. ( 13 ) IN view of above discussion, it is found that holding of the persons in the agreement, other than that of Jakalu, was not given to the petitioners in their pre-existing right to maintenance and as such the petitioners had the limited interest in the property of the persons other than Jakalu guided by the terms and conditions under the agreement. The limited interest was given to the petitioner No. 2 only up to the point she remains unmarried. The limited interest was given to the petitioner No. 2 only up to the point she remains unmarried. ( 14 ) IN view of above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case no order as to cost. Petition dismissed. .