JUDGMENT K. K. USHA, J. – These tax revision cases at the instance of the Revenue, arise out of a common order passed by the Kerala Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Additional Bench, Kottayam, in Tribunal Appeal Nos. 218 of 1992, 257 to 265 of 1992. T.A. No. 218 of 1992 was in respect of final assessment under the provisions of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for the assessment year 1986-87. The other appeals related to provisional assessment for the months April, 1990 to December, 1990. 2. Two common questions arise in the above cases : (1) Whether the compounded rubber manufactured by the assessee-company is a finished rubber product so as to avail concessional rate of tax on rubber purchased for its production as per notification S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 ? (2) Whether S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is clarificatory in nature having retrospective application ? Additional issue raised in T.R.C. No. 41 of 1995 is, whether the sale of the items empty drums, old newspaper, gunny bags, etc., are to be taxed at the general rate or at the rates given against each item in the Schedule to the Kerala Sales Tax Act, 1963 ? 3. Assessments for the years 1981-82 to 1985-86 under the Act were completed treating compounded rubber manufactured by the assessee in its factory at Kottayam as finished rubber product entitled to avail of the concession rate under Notification S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. For the assessment year 1986-87, return was filed by the assessee claiming concessional rate of 3 per cent tax on the purchase turnover of rubber which was used for the manufacture of tread rubber and compounded rubber. Assessing authority rejected the claim holding that compounded rubber is not a finished rubber product, that tread rubber being mixture of synthetic rubber and natural rubber, it is not a rubber product and therefore purchase of rubber for manufacture of compounded rubber and tread rubber will not be entitled to the concessional rate of 3 per cent tax under S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. Assessing authority further found that the turnover of cloth bags was liable to tax under section 5A of the Act. Assessing authority further found that the turnover of cloth bags was liable to tax under section 5A of the Act. Further, the assessing authority rejected the claim of the assessee that used drums, brass valves, empty gunnies, etc., were sold by the assessee as scrap items and therefore the turnover in respect of the above was liable to be taxed at the general rate of 5 per cent. According to the assessing authority, the turnover in respect of the above items are to be taxed at the rates given against each item in the Schedule to the Act. The assessment order for the year 1986-87 was issued on March 12, 1991 and the provisional assessment orders for the months of April, 1990 to November, 1990 were dated March 6, 1991. 4. Appeals filed by the assessee were dismissed by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax, affirming the view taken by the assessing authority under order dated March 3, 1992 for the assessment year 1986-87 and by order dated March 9, 1993 in the case of provisional assessments. Aggrieved by the orders passed by the first appellate authority, the assessee filed second appeals before the Kerala Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that compounded rubber manufactured by the assessee is, by itself, a finished rubber product and a marketable commodity, even though, a raw material for the manufacture of tyres, etc. It also took the view that S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 dated November 2, 1990 by which compounded rubber was taken out of the purview of S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 dated April 1, 1981 was not declaratory in nature and has no retrospective effect, which would justify denial of the benefit of concessional rate of tax granted under S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 to the assessee for the assessment period covered by the appeals except as regards the provisional assessment for the period after November 2, 1990. Tribunal also took the view that even though the tread rubber is a product of the mixture of synthetic rubber and natural rubber, the predominant and essential ingredient of tread rubber being raw rubber, it is a finished rubber product which would come under the provisions of S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. Tribunal also took the view that even though the tread rubber is a product of the mixture of synthetic rubber and natural rubber, the predominant and essential ingredient of tread rubber being raw rubber, it is a finished rubber product which would come under the provisions of S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. According to the Tribunal, the sale of the articles like used drums, brass valves, empty gunnies, etc., which were not of any use to the appellant and were sold in a lot inviting quotations are to be treated only as scrap materials. The sales turnover of such materials can be taxed only at the rate applicable to scrap. The claim of the assessee that the purchase turnover of cloth bags was exempted from purchase tax under section 5A was rejected by the Tribunal. 5. We will first consider the common question arising in all the tax revision cases, namely, whether compounded rubber is a finished rubber product for the purpose of claiming concessional rate of tax as per Notification S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 and whether S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is clarificatory in nature having retrospective effect from the date of S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. 6. S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 reads as follows : "In exercise of the powers conferred by section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (15 of 1963), the Government of Kerala, having considered it necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby make a reduction in the rate of tax payable under the said Act on the purchase of rubber by manufacturers of finished rubber products within the State for use of such rubber by such manufacturers in the manufacture of finished rubber products within the State from five per cent to three per cent. This notification shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of April, 1981. Explanatory note. - (This is not a part of the notification but is intended to indicated the general purpose) In the budget speech for 1981-82, the honourable Minister for Finance announced that the concessional rate of tax for raw rubber purchased by large and medium industries for manufacture of any finished product within the State will be allowed on a par with similar concession granted to tyre manufacturing units as also small-scale rubber industrial units. The notification is intended to achieve the above object." S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 was amended by S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990, which reads as follows : "In exercise of the powers conferred by section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (15 of 1963), the Government of Kerala, having considered it necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby make the following amendment to the notification issued under G.O. Ms. No. 46/81/TD dated the 2nd June, 1981 published as S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 in the Kerala Gazette, Extraordinary No. 422 dated the 2nd June, 1981, namely :- AMENDMENT. - In the said notification the following explanation shall be added at the end of the 1st para, namely :- Explanation. - finished rubber product for the purpose of the notification shall mean any goods manufactured, utilising rubber in any form coming under entry 161 of the First Schedule to the Act as one of the raw materials and includes tread rubber coming under entry 200 of the First Schedule of the Act, but shall not include any form of rubber taxable at the point of last purchase in the State of which are subjected to processing by mixing with chemicals, gas, fumigation or any other similar process to make any compound of rubber. This notification shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of April, 1989 subject to the condition that taxes if any remitted by any dealer shall not be refunded. Explanatory note. - (This does not form part of the notification, but is intended for indicate its general purport.) Government as per notification issued in S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981, referred to above, has reduced the rate of tax payable on the purchase of rubber by manufacturers of finished rubber products within the State for use of such rubber by such manufacturers in the manufacture of finished rubber products within the State to three per cent. Government therefore consider that an explanation for 'finished rubber product' is necessary to remove the ambiguity. The notification is intended to achieve the above object." 7. Learned Advocate-General who appeared on behalf of the Revenue, put forward two contentions in support of the view taken by the assessing authority that the assessee is not entitled to concessional rate of tax in respect of raw rubber purchased by it for manufacturing compounded rubber. The notification is intended to achieve the above object." 7. Learned Advocate-General who appeared on behalf of the Revenue, put forward two contentions in support of the view taken by the assessing authority that the assessee is not entitled to concessional rate of tax in respect of raw rubber purchased by it for manufacturing compounded rubber. Firstly, it is contended that compounded rubber is not a finished rubber product and therefore purchase or rubber for the purpose of manufacture of compounded rubber, will not get the benefit of concessional rate of tax under S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. Secondly, it is contended that S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is clarificatory in nature and the clarification given therein that rubber purchased for the purpose of making compounded rubber will not come within the purview of S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981, has retrospective effect from the date on which S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 came into force. 8. In support of the contention that compounded rubber is not a finished rubber product, learned Advocate-General referred to several materials including meaning of the term in dictionaries as also certificate issued by experts, technical books where the process is referred and dealt with and also judicial pronouncements. We will presently deal with those materials placed before the Tribunal as well as this Court by the Revenue. 9. The word "compound" in the glossery of terms used in Rubber Industry, published by Bureau of Indian Standards under the heading "Compound" is referred as "an intimate mixture of rubber(s) with all the ingredients necessary for the finished article". In the glossery of terms relating to rubber and rubber technology published by American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, it is described as "an intimate mixture of polymer(s) with all the ingredients necessary for the finished article". In Encyclopaedia Americana, at page 833 where the process of compounding has been dealt with, it is stated that both natural rubber and synthetic rubber are compounded with nearly half their weight in carbon black together with small amounts of stearic acid, zinc oxide, an oil softener, sulphur, an accelerator, and an antioxidant. In World Book Encyclopaedia, page 435, the process of compounding is described as, "adding carefully measured amounts of various ingredients to plasticized rubber and to latex. The compounding 'recipe' helps to control the elasticity, strength, and other properties of the final product. In World Book Encyclopaedia, page 435, the process of compounding is described as, "adding carefully measured amounts of various ingredients to plasticized rubber and to latex. The compounding 'recipe' helps to control the elasticity, strength, and other properties of the final product. The chief ingredients used in compounding dry rubber are, (1) sulphur, (2) accelerators, (3) pigments, (4) antioxidants, (5) reclaimed rubber and (6) filters." In Encyclopaedia Britannica, at page 1180, compounding is referred as a process of blending rubbers in prescribed proportions and adding chemicals in accordance with a "formula", or Schedule. By referring to the process of compounding and the ingredients requiring therein as dealt with in Wanderbill Rubber Handbook, edited by S. S. Rogers and the book Rubber Technology and Manufacture, edited by C. M. Blow, it was contended by the learned Advocated-General that the compounded rubber can be treated only as a raw material for production of other articles in rubber. In a letter from the Assistant Director (Rubber), Office of the Director, Common Facility Service Centre, Changanacherry dated January 28, 1991, it is stated that generally, compounded rubber will contain masticated rubber, rubber chemicals like zinc oxide, stearic acid, fillers like clay carbon black, vulcanizing agents like sulphur, etc., and therefore, it is different from masticated rubber. It is further state that compounded rubber is not a finished product and it requires further processing (shaping and/or vulcanization) to become the finished product. In a communication addressed by the Deputy Director, Chemistry/Rubber Technology Division to M/s. General Rubbers, P. John Zachariah Buildings, Kottayam-1, dated January 18, 1985, it is stated that a rubber compound which does not contain any of the essential ingredients like sulphur and accelerator is not an end-product in itself. It can only be considered as a master-batch for making some end-products through further processing. 10. It is relevant to point out that these materials had been made available before the Tribunal by the Revenue. According to the learned Advocate-General, interpretation given by certain judicial pronouncements to the term "finished product" and analogous terms are relevant for deciding the question whether compounded rubber is finished product or not. 10. It is relevant to point out that these materials had been made available before the Tribunal by the Revenue. According to the learned Advocate-General, interpretation given by certain judicial pronouncements to the term "finished product" and analogous terms are relevant for deciding the question whether compounded rubber is finished product or not. In this context, learned Advocate-General relied on the following decision : "Sundari Rubber Works v. State of Tripura [1991] 81 STC 200 (Gauhati), Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [1987] 64 STC 42 (SC); [1986] 162 ITR 846 (SC) and Bhor Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay [1989] 73 STC 145 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 1153 ". In Shorter Oxford Dictionary as well as in Webster's, meaning of the term "finished" is given as - "to bring to an end; to go through last stage of" and "to perfect finally or in detail". 11. It was also contended by the learned Advocate-General Sri M. K. Damodaran that no reliance should have been made by the Tribunal on the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Cellulose Products of India Ltd. [1991] 192 ITR 155, since, in that decision, the apex Court took the view that cellulose pulp was a finished product on the basis of an admission made by the assessee that cellulose pulp even by itself was a finished marketable commodity. It was further submitted that later decision of the this Court in Padinjarekara Agencies Ltd. v. State of Kerala [1995] 99 STC 371; (1996) KLJ (TC) 243, cannot also be relied on against the Revenue. In the above case, centrifuged latex was found commercially a different product from raw rubber latex coming within the term of finished product under section 5(7) of the Act, since, there was evidence in the case that centrifuged latex was packed in drums and sold in the market directly as such. 12. Learned Advocate-General further contended that even if for arguments sake, it is conceded that as per S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981, rubber purchased for manufacture of compounded rubber was also leviable only lesser rate of tax, after the clarification issued under S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990, the position is completely changed. 12. Learned Advocate-General further contended that even if for arguments sake, it is conceded that as per S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981, rubber purchased for manufacture of compounded rubber was also leviable only lesser rate of tax, after the clarification issued under S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990, the position is completely changed. According to the Revenue, S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is clarificatory in nature and therefore, it will have retrospective effect from first day of April, 1981, namely, the date on which S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 came into force. In support of the above contention, reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Ceakay Rubber Industries v. State of Kerala [1994] 92 STC 382. In the above case, the question whether the assessee was entitled to concessional rate of 3 per cent on the purchase or rubber effected by it for manufacture of tread rubber, came up for consideration. This Court took the view that Tribunal has committed an error in holding that concessional rate cannot be allowed, if raw rubber purchased is used for manufacture of synthetic rubber product. This Court took the view that if rubber was utilised as one of the materials for the rubber products - whether the end-product is a synthetic rubber product or purely a rubber product - the assessee would be entitled to a concessional rate of 3 per cent in view of the language in S.R.O. No. 585 of 1980. After entering the above finding, learned Judges observed as follows : "Even on the basis that S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 applies to the instant case, it is evident that the assessees, a manufacturer, who purchased rubber and manufactured finished rubber products within the State, is entitled to the concessional rate provided by S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. The assessee is a manufacturer of finished rubber products, as clarified by S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990. The assessee utilises the raw rubber purchased for the manufacture of tread rubber. The explanation to S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 makes the position clear. The explanation was by way of amendment to S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. The explanatory note refers to the ambiguity in the earlier notification (S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981), which necessitated the explanation to be inserted by way of amendment by S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990. The explanation to S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 makes the position clear. The explanation was by way of amendment to S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. The explanatory note refers to the ambiguity in the earlier notification (S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981), which necessitated the explanation to be inserted by way of amendment by S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990. In view of the explanation which was introduced by way of amendment in S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 for the removal of ambiguity in S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981, it is evident that the raw rubber purchased by the assessee was used in the manufacture of tread rubber, a finished product produced within the State. The raw rubber was purchased for use of such rubber by the assessee-manufacturer in the manufacture of finished rubber products within the State. So, even on the basis that it is S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 that applies to the instant case, the assessee will be entitled to the concessional rate of 3 per cent, in view of the subsequent clarification made in S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990. We hold accordingly." It is the above quoted portion of the judgment that is relied on by the learned Advocate-General in support of his contention that this Court has already taken the view that S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is clarificatory in nature and it will have retrospective effect. Reliance was also placed on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sri Jagannath Steel Corporation [1992] 84 STC 234 to contend that in the case of amendments which are explanatory, clarificatory or declaratory in nature, the provision should be construed retrospectively. According to learned Advocate-General, decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in M. M. Nagalingam Nadar Sons v. State of Kerala [1993] 91 STC 61, where it has been held that Government has no power to issue a notification under section 10(3) of the Sales Tax Act with retrospective effect, has no application in this case, since the effect of S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is not cancellation of any concession granted under S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981, but only clarification of its applicability to certain transactions. 13. 13. The assessee would contend that compounded rubber manufactured by it is a finished product and therefore, in respect of purchase of rubber for the manufacture of compounded rubber, the assessee is entitled to claim concessional rate of tax as granted under S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. According to the assessee, a finding of the Tribunal that compounded rubber manufactured by the assessee is a finished product, is a finding on fact. Therefore, this Court will not interfere with the above finding in exercise of the revisional power under section 41 of the Act. A revision is maintainable under the above section only on the ground that Appellate Tribunal has either decided wrongly or failed to decide any question of law. According to the assessee, since the question whether compounded rubber manufactured by the assessee is a finished product or not, is not a question of law, but only a question of fact, the decision of the Appellate Tribunal is final and this Court will not take a different view unless the Revenue is successful in showing that the decision of the Tribunal is perverse or entered on no material. 14. According to the assessee, the approach of the Tribunal in accepting the commercial view on the nature of "compounded rubber" in preference to the scientific view is perfectly justified in the light of judicial pronouncements. On this aspect, the learned Senior Counsel Sri F. S. Nariman, who appeared for the assessee placed reliance on the following decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court : United Offset Process Private Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay [1989] 74 STC 81, Indian Cable Company Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta [1995] 97 STC 307; AIR 1995 SC 64 , South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1968 SC 922 , Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd. [1996] 87 ELT 12, Purewal Associates Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise [1996] 87 ELT 321 and Brooke Bond India Limited v. State of Kerala [1992] 84 STC 334. 15. In order to prove that the trade has understood the term "compounded rubber" as a finished product, the assessee has relied on number of documents. It had produced affidavits from suppliers and purchasers of compounded rubber before the assessing authority, along with its reply to the pre-assessment notice dated March 2, 1991. 15. In order to prove that the trade has understood the term "compounded rubber" as a finished product, the assessee has relied on number of documents. It had produced affidavits from suppliers and purchasers of compounded rubber before the assessing authority, along with its reply to the pre-assessment notice dated March 2, 1991. These affidavits are available in the paper book filed by the assessee before the Tribunal from pages 100 to 107. The first affidavit is from Sri Abraham Philip, a manufacturer of compounded rubber. He has state that compounded rubber has a good market and it is sold as a finished product. The manufacturing process of compounded rubber is a complete process in itself and it does not require any further manufacturing process for its sale. According to him, compounded rubber is manufactured, sold as such on large scale in foreign countries and it has a ready market and diverse use. In India also, there is growing market for compounded rubber as a finished product. Mrs. Mary Scaria who is a registered dealer under the Act and is carrying on trade and business in rubber products, has sworn to an affidavit to the effect that she had been purchasing compounded rubber from the market regularly. Compounded rubber has an established market and it is a finished rubber product which is sold and purchased by dealers trading in that product. She has also state that compounded rubber is accepted in trade and commerce as a finished product and is having a market. Seller collects sales tax on compounded rubber purchased by her. Sri Jacob Mathew, who is also a dealer registered under the Act has filed and affidavit to the same effect. The 14th affidavit is from Smt. T. A. Pathu Shamshudeen, who is a registered dealer under the Act carrying on business of manufacture and sale of tread rubber and compounded rubber. She has also stated that she had been selling compounded rubber collecting sales tax and that compounded rubber has a market as a finished product. Yet another document relied on by the assessee before the assessing authority as well as the appellate authority is advertisement in rubber journals in foreign countries. Page 108 of the paper book contains a photo copy of the classified advertisement in European Rubber Journal. It contains an advertisement in respect of rubber compound among other rubber products. Yet another document relied on by the assessee before the assessing authority as well as the appellate authority is advertisement in rubber journals in foreign countries. Page 108 of the paper book contains a photo copy of the classified advertisement in European Rubber Journal. It contains an advertisement in respect of rubber compound among other rubber products. Similar advertisement in the journal Elastomerics of April, 1988 and Rubber World, December, 1987 are seen at pages 109 and 110 of the paper book. 16. An objection was sought to be raised by the Revenue against the Tribunal relying on the documents produced by the assessee to substantiate its contention. It is alleged that these documents were produced at the second appeal stage without complying with the conditions stipulated in Regulation No. 48 of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal Regulations and that no opportunity was given to the Revenue to cross-examine all those who had filed counter-affidavits. We find no merit in this objection for two reasons. Firstly, it is seen that these affidavits and copies of advertisements in journals had been produced by the assessee before the assessing authority itself along with its reply to the pre-assessment notice for the year 1986-87. The assessing authority could have summoned those who had filed the affidavits for cross-examination, if it so wanted. Secondly, the order of the Tribunal dated July 12, 1993 would show that when appellant's petitions dated July 9, 1993 praying for acceptance of certain documents as additional evidence in the appeal were considered, the prayer was not opposed by the Revenue, After elaborate consideration, the petitions were allowed by the Tribunal. Under these circumstances, the Revenue cannot raise a contention on the basis of non-compliance with regulation 48 by the assessee. It is also brought to our notice that the Tribunal has not relied on any of the documents which were produced before it by the assessee for the assessee for the first time to support its finding that compounded rubber is a finished product. 17. We find merit in the contention raised by the assessee that how the trade has understood compounded rubber, is the relevant test to enter a finding whether it is a finished product or not. 17. We find merit in the contention raised by the assessee that how the trade has understood compounded rubber, is the relevant test to enter a finding whether it is a finished product or not. The above contention is bases on the general principle that while interpreting items in statutes like the Sales Tax Acts, resort should be had, not to the scientific or technical meaning of such terms but to their popular meaning or the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them, that is to say, to their commercial sense. In Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Indore v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh [1967] 19 STC 469 (SC), by applying the above principle, the Supreme Court took the view that both the merchant dealing in coal and a consumer who wanted to purchase it would regard coal in its geological sense but in the sense as ordinarily understood and would include "charcoal" in the term "coal". In His Majesty The King v. Planters Nut and Chocolate Company Ltd. 1951 CLR (Ex) 122, while considering the question as to what constitutes a fruit or vegetable within the meaning of Excise Tax Act, the Exchequer Court of Canada took the view that what is important is the meaning given to the word ordinarily in matters of commerce in Canada and not what would be a botanist's conception of the subject-matter. 18. In [1989] 74 STC 81 (SC) (United Offset Process Private Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay), the question considered was whether colour scanner chromograph can be treated as "other printing machinery" for the purpose of levy of customs duty or whether it has to be treated as equipment used in photographic and cinematographic laboratories, liable for a different tariff rate. There was no definition of the term in the Customs Tariff Act or the notification. Supreme Court took the view that if definition of a particular expression is not given, it must be understood in the sense how that expression is used every day by those who use or deal with goods. Resort should not be taken to the scientific and technical meaning of the particular item. Supreme Court took the view that if definition of a particular expression is not given, it must be understood in the sense how that expression is used every day by those who use or deal with goods. Resort should not be taken to the scientific and technical meaning of the particular item. Since there was no definite finding by the Tribunal regarding the popular meaning of the term, the matter was remanded for consideration by the Tribunal to find out how those goods were dealt with by the people who deal in them. 19. Similar view was taken regarding interpretation of an item or entry in the excise tariff Schedule in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta [1995] 97 STC 307 (SC); AIR 1995 SC 64 also. In South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1968 SC 922 , the question which arose was whether gas generated by the units where sugar is manufactured by carbonisation process and which emanates from lime kiln was kiln gas or carbon dioxide coming under item 14-H in the First Schedule under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. It was found as a fact that gas so generated was carbon dioxide to the extent of 27 per cent to 36.5 per cent. Supreme Court took the view that kiln gas was neither carbon dioxide nor compressed carbon dioxide known as such to the commercial community and therefore cannot attract item 14-H in the First Schedule. The very same principle was applied by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd. [1996] 87 ELT 12. The question which arose was whether nylon twine can be considered as nylon yarn so as to be covered by item 18 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 as it stood prior to the amendment of 1977. While coming to the conclusion that nylon twine is a kind of nylon yarn, Supreme Court observed as follows : "We do not think it is necessary, especially in this batch of cases, to refer in detail to the decisions cited by the Revenue or the text-books and the literature of the Indian Standards Institutions and the Manual published by the Food and Agriculture Organisation, United Nations, as to what is meant by 'twine', 'yarn', 'netting twine' etc., referred by the High Court. In this case, clinching evidence is afforded to demonstrate that trade and industry which deals with the goods, consider 'nylon twice' as a kind of 'nylon yarn'." In Purewal Associates Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise (1996) 87 ELT 321 , Supreme Court found fault with the Revenue in not producing evidence to show that the articles in question, namely, lid screw, barrel axle screw, bridge screw and dial key screw are only known as "screws" in the trade parlance so that they would come under item 52 of the Schedule. Supreme Court took the view that the Tribunal having rightly taken note of the test laid down by the Supreme Court in several decisions that while interpreting the entries in the Schedule, they must be construed as understood in common parlance and words used by Legislature must be given their popular sense, namely, that sense people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it, failed to pursue the same test in the light of the evidence tendered by the appellants before the Tribunal right from the beginning. Ultimately, following the meaning given by the trade, it was held that the abovementioned articles cannot be treated as screw coming under item 52 of the tariff item, but it will fall under tariff item 68. In Brook Bond India Limited v. State of Kerala [1992] 84 STC 334, this Court had to consider the question whether instant coffee, namely, a blend of coffee and chicory in the ratio 70 : 30 sold under the brand name Bru is a drink or beverage coming under entry 33 or it is taxable as coffee under entry 21. While taking the view that in commercial sense, Bru is a form of coffee, even though it is composition of 70 per cent coffee and 30 per cent chicory, therefore coming to entry 21 from 16th September, 1980 to 31st March, 1983, it was observed that if certain words are used in a statute which are capable of being construed in a popular sense, such words should not be construed according to the strict or technical meaning of the language contained in them, but have to be construed in its popular sense. 20. Revenue has not placed before us any judicial authority taking a view contrary to the principle laid down in the abovementioned cases. 21. 20. Revenue has not placed before us any judicial authority taking a view contrary to the principle laid down in the abovementioned cases. 21. It is further contended by the assessee that the very wording of S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 imports the notion of exigibility to excise duty. The concessional rate of tax was announced for rubber purchased for manufacture of any finished product. The provisions contained under section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 would show that levy of excise duty is on all excisable goods which are produced or manufactured in India. Excisable goods are goods specified in the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 as being subject to a duty of excise. The word "manufacture" is defined under section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, as including any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product and which is specified in relation to any goods in the section or chapter notes of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 as amounting to manufacture. Thus, for the above purpose, manufacture means 'to bring into existence a new substance". Marketability is also an essential ingredient. Referring to the definitions, the Supreme Court has held in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 791 that to become "goods" an article must be something which can ordinarily come to the market to be bought and sold. Similar view was taken in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta [1995] 97 STC 307 (SC); AIR 1995 SC 64 Also. In that case, since there was no finding that the PVC compound (granules) was a marketable product as understood in law, the matter was remitted to the Appellate Tribunal for fresh consideration. 22. Compounded rubber is exigible to excise duty. The certificate issued by the Superintendent of Central Excise, Kottayam Range-I dated March 9, 1987 produced by the assessee before the assessing authority which is available at page 99 of the paper book filed before the Tribunal, would show that the compounded rubber is classified under chapter sub-heading 4005.00 by the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986). The certificate issued by the Superintendent of Central Excise, Kottayam Range-I dated March 9, 1987 produced by the assessee before the assessing authority which is available at page 99 of the paper book filed before the Tribunal, would show that the compounded rubber is classified under chapter sub-heading 4005.00 by the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986). The contention raised is that inclusion of compounded rubber as an item under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 would go to show that compounded rubber is a new substance which was brought into existence by a manufacturing process. 23. The assessee would further contend that merely because some other products are manufactured utilising compounded rubber like tyres it would not make compounded rubber any the less a finished product. In support of the above contention, reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Cellulose Products of India Ltd. [1991] 193 ITR 155 where the contention of the assessee that even though cellulose pulp constituted raw material for manufacture of carboxymethyl-cellulose (CMC), it was, even by itself, a finished marketable commodity, was accepted. In that case, one of the objects of the company, as evidenced by memorandum of association, was manufacture of cellulose pulp. It was submitted by the assessee in the present case that its memorandum of association contains the following clauses which would take in manufacture of compounded rubber also : "(1) To carry on the business of rubber manufacture of all description and with all kinds of rubber, natural, synthetic or reclaim. (2) To produce, manufacture, purchase, refine, prepare, process, blend, mix, pack, import, export, sell and generally to deal in rubber products......and in connection therewith to acquire, erect, construct, establish, operate and maintain factories, workshops and other works". 24. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Indian Vegetable Products Ltd. v. Union of India [1980] ELT 704. The question that arose was whether merely because vegetable tallow is put to further use of manufacture of soaps, etc., would it permit exemption from duty for the reason that it is an unfinished product. The learned Judge examined the connotation of the word "finished" and held that a finished article comes into existence when it acquires distinguishable identity. The question that arose was whether merely because vegetable tallow is put to further use of manufacture of soaps, etc., would it permit exemption from duty for the reason that it is an unfinished product. The learned Judge examined the connotation of the word "finished" and held that a finished article comes into existence when it acquires distinguishable identity. By process of hydrogenation, an item of vegetable tallow comes into existence and it can be identified as vegetable tallow thereafter. The manufacturing process is then completed. Merely because the vegetable tallow is used further for manufacture of soaps, etc., it would not make vegetable tallow an unfinished goods. Relying on this decision, the learned counsel for the assessee contended that even if compounded rubber is used for manufacture of tyre, etc., the compounded rubber will not lose its character as a finished rubber product. 25. In Narne Tulaman Manufacturers Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad [1989] 73 STC 81 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 79 , while considering the contention put forward by the assessee-company that it cannot be treated as manufacturer of weigh-bridge since it is engaged in assembling three components of which only one part was manufactured by it which is dutiable, the Supreme Court took the view that when parts and the end-product were separate dutiable, both were taxable. It would show that if one of the components acquires a separate identity after undergoing manufacturing process, it would not lose that character, even if it is used as a component in the manufacture of another product. By applying the same principle, it can be taken that if compounded rubber has a separate identity in the market, it will not lose the character of a finished product merely for the reason it is used for the purpose of manufacture of tyre, etc. 26. On the question whether S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is declaratory in nature and whether it has retrospective effect from April 1, 1981, it was submitted on behalf of the assessee that a mere reading of S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 would make it clear that it is not declaratory in nature and it cannot be given retrospective effect from April 1, 1981, S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 itself provides that the notification shall be deemed to have come into force on the first day of April, 1989. Since the notification was intended to be brought into force only from April 1, 1989, it negatives the theory of the intention to make it clarificatory. Therefore, whether the notification is in the nature of clarification or not, the executive intention has been made clear that it shall not disturb the position before April 1, 1989. Learned counsel for the assessee pointed out that the authorities who are operating the provisions had also understood the notification in the above manner all these years and had acted openly on that basis till the assessment order dated March 12, 1991 was passed. He contended that the best material to understand the object sought to be achieved by the notification is the wording of the notification itself. In support of the above contention, reliance was placed on two decisions of the Supreme Court : Desh Bandhu Gupta and Co. v. Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd. AIR 1979 SC 1049 and Keshavji Ravji and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1990] 183 ITR 1 (SC); AIR 1991 SC 1806 . In the first of the above two decisions, Supreme Court considered the relevance of a document which came into existence almost simultaneously with the issuance of the notification which came up for interpretation. In the latter case, while considering the scope of an "explanation", Supreme Court observed that, generally speaking, an explanation is intended to explain the meaning of certain phrases and expressions contained in a statutory provision. Depending on its language, an explanation might supply or take away something from the contents of a provision. The express prospective operation and effectuation of an explanation might, perhaps, be factor necessarily detracting from any evincement of the intent on the part of the Legislature that the explanation was intended more as a legislative-exposition or clarification of the existing law than as a change in the law as it then obtained. It is further contended that the explanation introduced under S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is really in the nature of a proviso as was held by a Full Bench of this Court in Krishna Iyer v. State of Kerala [1962] 13 STC 838. While considering an explanation added by a notification under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (11 of 1125 ME) it was observed that the mere styling of a provision as an Explanation is not decisive of its character. While considering an explanation added by a notification under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (11 of 1125 ME) it was observed that the mere styling of a provision as an Explanation is not decisive of its character. An explanation should only explain or clarify. If it excepts, excludes or restricts, it is not an explanation, but a proviso, and should be considered as operative only from the date of its introduction. 27. In M. M. Nagalingam Nadar Sons v. State of Kerala [1993] 91 STC 61, a learned single Judge of this Court considered the power of the Government to issue notification with retrospective effect under section 10(1) and 10(3) of the Act. Learned Judge found that a notification under sub-section (3) cancelling or varying a notification issued under sub-section (1) cannot be given retrospective effect. The above decision is relied on by the assessee to contend that S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 which has the effect of cancelling the benefit granted under S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 cannot be given retrospective effect even from April 1, 1989. 28. It is contended that if S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is given retrospective effect, it would lead to serious adverse consequences on the assessee. Even if the notification can be taken as a clarification, it cannot be given retrospective effect, if retrospectivity would lead to serious adverse consequences on the assessee. Reliance was placed by the assessee on a decision of the Supreme Court in Collector of Customs, Bombay v. East Punjab Traders (1997) 89 ELT 11 . In the above case, a question arose as to whether change which was brought in entry (vi) in column 4 of appendix 17 of the 1984-85 import-export policy document referring to lining and inter-lining materials of width not exceeding 87 1/2 cms. and excluding nylon taffeta coated fabrics (10 per cent) can be treated as clarificatory in nature and applied as such to entry (vi) in column 4 of appendix 17 of the Import-Export Policy for 1982-83 so that, that entry must also be read as limiting the width of the inter-lining materials of 87 1/2 cms. and excluding nylon taffeta coated fabrics (10 per cent) can be treated as clarificatory in nature and applied as such to entry (vi) in column 4 of appendix 17 of the Import-Export Policy for 1982-83 so that, that entry must also be read as limiting the width of the inter-lining materials of 87 1/2 cms. It was held that the consequences of this interpretation would lead to certain penal liabilities and therefore it cannot be given any retrospective effect because those who have already imported the material prior to the amendment would be visited with unforeseen consequences and would become liable to penal action. Similarly, according to the assessee herein, it will have to face penal consequences such as for filing false returns, etc., if S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is given retrospective effect. 29. Learned Advocate-General would submit that the decision of this Court in Krishna Iyer v. State of Kerala [1962] 13 STC 838 has no application to the facts of the present case, because, compounded rubber was never included in the 1981 notification and therefore there was no question of the benefit being withdrawn in respect of compounded rubber under S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990. Since by mistake such benefit was being granted in certain cases, Government thought it necessary to clarify the position by issuing S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990. Such notification even though termed as amendment, can be treated only as a clarification. It is also contended that the decision in Keshavji Ravji and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1990] 183 ITR 1 (SC); AIR 1991 SC 1806 is of no help to the assessee, since the facts in the present case are entirely different. Apart from the above the learned Advocate-General pointed out that the question whether explanation 1 to section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act, introduced in the year 1984, has retrospective effect or not was not finally decided by the Supreme Court as unnecessary in view of its decision on another point in the case. 30. As mentioned earlier, the Tribunal has entered a finding that compounded rubber manufactured by the assessee is a finished rubber product. 30. As mentioned earlier, the Tribunal has entered a finding that compounded rubber manufactured by the assessee is a finished rubber product. Before we enter upon a discussion on the different contention raised by the Revenue and the assessee in support of their respective claims it is necessary to examine the scope of the jurisdiction to be exercised by this Court under section 41 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. Sub-section (1) of section 41 reads as follows : "Any officer empowered by the Government in this behalf or any other person who objects to an order passed by Appellate Tribunal under sub-section (4) or sub-section (7) of section 39 may, within ninety days from the date on which a copy of such order is served on him in the manner prescribed, prefer a petition to the High Court on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal has either decided erroneously or failed to decide any question of law." The scope of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under the above provision had been considered by this Court in Siva Traders v. State of Kerala [1993] 89 STC 186 and Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Archana Jewellery [1993] 89 STC 27. The view taken is that this Court can revise an order of the Appellate Tribunal under section 41 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act only of it decides erroneously or fails to decide a question of law. Appellate Tribunal is the final fact-finding authority. If a finding of fact is entered by the Appellate Tribunal, by ignoring relevant facts, or by adverting to irrelevant facts or factors, or by assuming facts or circumstances which have no existence or if the finding is arrived at by posing a wrong question or failing to pose the proper question or in any manner the finding is unfair, perverse or arbitrary or irrational, this Court can interfere with the said finding in exercise of its revisional powers. With the above principle in the background we will proceed to consider the rival contentions raised by the parties on the question whether compounded rubber is a finished rubber product. 31. The learned Advocate-General has referred to standard technical books where the process of compounding of rubber has been dealt with and also the views expressed by technically qualified persons in this particular area. 31. The learned Advocate-General has referred to standard technical books where the process of compounding of rubber has been dealt with and also the views expressed by technically qualified persons in this particular area. We have referred to these materials in the earlier portion of this judgment. The learned Advocate-General contended that the materials thus relied on by the Revenue would show that the compounded rubber is not an end-product. It is only an intermediate product, which is ultimately utilised for the purpose of manufacturing tyres, tubes, etc. But it has to be noted that no material has been produced by the Revenue to show as to how compounded rubber has been understood by the trade. 32. The learned Advocate-General found fault with the Tribunal in relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Cellulose Products of India Ltd. [1991] 192 ITR 155 in support of its conclusion. But on a close reading of the judgment it can be seen that there is no merit in the contention raised by the learned Advocate-General that the decision was based on an admission made by the assessee therein. What has been admitted by the assessee therein was that cellulose pulp is a finished marketable commodity. But for that reason alone it cannot be held that the Tribunal has erred in relying on the decision in support of the assessee's case. In the abovementioned case the assessee-company was granted an industrial licence by the Central Government for the manufacture of sodium carboxy-methyl-cellulose. The assessee began production of cellulose pulp from March 18, 1961, in its plant and started producing C.M.C. from June 15, 1961. Cellulose pulp was meant to be use as raw material for manufacture of CMC. In the abovementioned case the assessee-company was granted an industrial licence by the Central Government for the manufacture of sodium carboxy-methyl-cellulose. The assessee began production of cellulose pulp from March 18, 1961, in its plant and started producing C.M.C. from June 15, 1961. Cellulose pulp was meant to be use as raw material for manufacture of CMC. The Appellate Tribunal found that the production of cellulose pulp was not a trial production and that the cellulose pulp manufactured by the assessee during the month of March, 1961, was a finished product and a marketable commodity and, on this view, held that the respondent having begun production or manufacture of a finished product which was capable of being sold in the market in the year of account relevant to the assessment year 1961-62, the last year in which it was entitled to get relief under section 84 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as a new industrial undertaking, was the assessment year 1965-66 and its claim for relief for the assessment year 1966-67 was not maintainable. The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the Tribunal. Therefore, this decision would certainly support the case of the assessee in the present case that even though compounded rubber is used in manufacture of tyres, etc., if it has a market of its own, it is a finished product. Production of compound rubber would come within the objects given under the memorandum of association of the assessee-company. 33. In Sundari Rubber Works v. State of Tripura [1991] 81 STC 200, a decision relied on by the Revenue, the Gauhati High Court took the view that masticated rubber continues as a rubber even after undergoing the process of masticating and it cannot be treated as a rubber product. According to the learned Advocate-General, the analogy is directly applicable to compounded rubber also. We find it difficult to accept the above contention. Apart from the fact that process involved in producing masticated rubber and compounded rubber are entirely different, we find that before the Gauhati High Court no material had been produced as to the commercial view on the term "masticated rubber". No evidence was adduced before their Lordships to show that masticated rubber was understood as a finished product by the trade and that it has a market of its own. No evidence was adduced before their Lordships to show that masticated rubber was understood as a finished product by the trade and that it has a market of its own. Therefore, we are of the view that the above decision is of no help to the Revenue in the present case. 34. Empire Industries Limited v. Union of India [1987] 64 STC 42; [1986] 162 ITR 846 is a decision of the Supreme Court relied on by the learned Advocate-General. In the above case the Supreme Court took the view that the process of bleaching, dyeing and printing, etymologically means manufacturing process. There is an elaborate discussion on the term "manufacture" used in section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1994, as amended by the Central Excises and Salt and Additional Duties of Excise (Amendment) Act, 1980. The learned Advocate-General would submit that the principles accepted in the above decision was that by a manufacturing process a new substance known to the market should be brought into being. If that test is applied in the present case, according to the learned Advocate-General, it cannot be contended that a commercial new product is obtained when compounded rubber is produced. The above decision can be of any help to the Revenue only if it is found that compounded rubber has no separate market of its own. What came up for consideration in Bhor Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay [1989] 73 STC 145 (SC); AIR 1989 SC 1153 was whether crude PVC film used for leather lamination, etc., can be treated as goods produced exigible to excise duty. The Supreme Court held that it is not excisable goods for the reason that it has no identity in the market. Therefore, if the assessee in the present case can establish that compounded rubber has a market for itself, the abovementioned decision also will not support the Revenue. 35. Decision of the Supreme Court in Ujagar Prints v. Union of India [1989] 74 STC 401 (SC); [1989] 179 ITR 317, can be safely taken as authority for the position that opinion of persons engaged in the trade is relevant factor to be taken into account in deciding the question as to whether compounded rubber is a finished rubber product. 36. 36. In K. P. Varghese v. Income-tax Officer, Ernakulam AIR 1981 SC 1922 , the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the relevance the speech of the Finance Minister in the Legislature in interpreting the amendment to section 52(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It was observed that "the speech made by the mover of the Bill explaining the reason for the introduction of the bill can certainly be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object and purpose for which the legislation is enacted. This is in accordance with the recent trend in juristic thought not only in Western countries but also in India that interpretation of a status being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible". 37. In the paper book, filed by the Revenue before this Court, a copy of budget speech of the Minister for Finance in respect of the budget for the period 1981-82 is produced. In para 58 of the above speech reference is made to the sales tax concessions proposed to be given for the purchase and utilisation of raw rubber within the State. It reads as follows : "We are the major producers of rubber within the country, with a near monopoly on the supply of this vital raw material. Therefore, it has been our consistent policy to ensure through appropriate tax rates and concessions, the utilisation of the raw rubber produced by us within the State itself for the manufacture of the value added products so that the generation of profits and employment may take place in this State itself. With this end in view, initially we had reduced the sales tax on the raw rubber purchased for the manufacture of tyres within the State to 3 per cent. In my last Budget I had extended the same concessional rate of 3 per cent to the purchase of raw rubber by the small-scale sector for all productive purposes. The net result of the above measures has been to leave out from the range of these concessions, only a small area, namely, the purchase of raw rubber by the large and medium industries for purposes other than the manufacture of tyres. The net result of the above measures has been to leave out from the range of these concessions, only a small area, namely, the purchase of raw rubber by the large and medium industries for purposes other than the manufacture of tyres. To complete our objective of ensuring that the rubber produced by us is converted into value added products within our State itself, it is now proposed to extend the concessional rate of 3 per cent sales tax to raw rubber purchased by large and medium industries for the manufacture of any finished product within the State. The net result will be that the concessional sales tax rate of 3 per cent on the purchase of raw rubber will be available to all manufacturers, whether they be in the large, medium or small-scale sectors, as long as the manufacture of the finished product takes place within the State." The above would show that the intention was to give appropriate sale tax concession so that the raw rubber produced in the State would be used for manufacture of value-added products in this State itself so that it would in turn generate more employment opportunities in the State. Initially the benefit was given on raw rubber purchased for the manufacture of tyres and thereafter it was extended for all productive purposes in the small-scale sector. The notification which was issued in the year 1981 was intended to extend such concession of sales tax to raw rubber purchased by large and medium industries for the manufacture of any finished product within the State and not limited to manufacture of tyres. It is in this light we have to understand the effect of S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. Taking into consideration the object, namely, encouragement of productive activities within the State utilising the raw rubber produced in the State the term "finished rubber product" cannot be given a narrow interpretation. 38. We have already referred to the different materials relied on by the assessee to show that the trade has understood compounded rubber as a finished product. It has relied on affidavits filed by purchasers and sellers of compounded rubber and advertisements in journals to show that compounded rubber as such has market in the commercial world. 38. We have already referred to the different materials relied on by the assessee to show that the trade has understood compounded rubber as a finished product. It has relied on affidavits filed by purchasers and sellers of compounded rubber and advertisements in journals to show that compounded rubber as such has market in the commercial world. It has also relied on a certificate issued by the Superintendent of Central Excise, dated March 9, 1987 to show that compounded rubber is an excisable goods. The Revenue does not dispute the fact that compounded rubber is included in the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 as an item exigible to excise duty. We find merit in the contention raised by the assessee that exigibility to excise duty is an indication to the effect that compounded rubber is a marketable product as such and therefore a finished product. If an article can satisfy the requirements of section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act read with the definition of the term "manufacture" under section 2(f), the article has to be taken as brought into existence as a new substance. Marketability of the article is also an essential ingredient. Decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 791 and in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta [1995] 97 STC 307; AIR 1995 SC 64 are authorities to the above proposition. Therefore, the fact that compounded rubber is treated as an excisable goods would certainly help the assessee to contend that compounded rubber is a finished product. While the assessee has produced certain materials to show that compounded rubber is known to the trade as a marketable finished product, the materials relied on by the Revenue can at the most show that compounded rubber is an intermediary product. But as held by the Supreme Court in Narne Tulaman Manufacturers Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad [1989] 73 STC 81; AIR 1989 SC 79 and the decision of the Bombay High Court in Indian Vegetable Products Ltd. v. Union of India 1980 ELT 704 even an intermediary product can be a finished product if it has got its own distinct market. The Tribunal was satisfied with the evidence adduced by the assessee in support of its contention that compounded rubber has its own distinct market. The Tribunal was satisfied with the evidence adduced by the assessee in support of its contention that compounded rubber has its own distinct market. It is not for this Court to interfere with the above finding of the Tribunal which cannot be condemned as one based on no material. If that be so, by applying the test laid down by the Supreme Court in United Offset Process Private Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay [1989] 74 STC 81, South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1968 SC 922 , Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta [1995] 97 STC 307; AIR 1995 SC 64 , Purewal Associates Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise [1996] 87 ELT 321 (SC) and the decision of this Court in Brooke Bond India Limited v. State of Kerala [1992] 84 STC 334 (Ker) compounded rubber can be treated as a finished product. As mentioned earlier, the assessing authorities were also treating compounded rubber as a finished product for the purpose of S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 till pre-assessment notice was issued to the assessee on February 2, 1991 in respect of the assessment years involved in these revisions. This is also a circumstance which would go in favour of the assessee. 39. Taking into consideration the contentions raised by both sides, materials produced by them and the relevant provisions of law we are not persuaded to interfere with the finding entered by the Tribunal that compounded rubber is a finished product coming within the purview of S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. The next question that has to be considered is whether S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 has changed the above position for the relevant assessment years. 40. After considering the rival contentions on the nature of S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990, we are inclined to affirm the finding of the Tribunal that it amounts to an amendment to S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 and not a clarification. We are also of the view that the amendment brought under S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 can have only prospective effect from the date of the notification, namely, November 2, 1990. We are also of the view that the amendment brought under S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 can have only prospective effect from the date of the notification, namely, November 2, 1990. We do not find any merit in the contention raised by the Revenue that this Court has already taken a view in Ceakay Rubber Industries v. State of Kerala [1994] 92 STC 382 that S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is clarificatory in nature and it takes effect from the date of S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. The issue which came up for consideration in the abovementioned decision was whether the assessee was entitled to concessional rate of tax for raw rubber purchased by it which was used for manufacture of tread rubber with reference to S.R.O. No. 585 of 1980. Tread rubber is a product of mixture of rubber and synthetic rubber. Since raw rubber was one of the raw materials for manufacturing of tread rubber, this Court took the view that raw rubber purchased by the assessee for manufacturing tread rubber is entitled to concessional rate of tax as per S.R.O. No. 585 of 1980. This Court disagreed with the view taken by the Tribunal that raw rubber used in the manufacture of synthetic rubber product will not get the benefit of concessional rate of tax. In the above case, this Court has not held that S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is clarificatory in nature and it will take effect from the date of S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. On the other hand, the quoted portion of the above judgment would clearly show that this Court has taken the view that explanation in S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 was by way of amendment to S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. It is again observed that the explanation was introduced by way of an amendment in S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 for removal of ambiguity in S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. Therefore, we are of the view that the question whether S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is clarificatory in nature and whether it takes effect from the date of S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 are questions still open for consideration by this Court. 41. Therefore, we are of the view that the question whether S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is clarificatory in nature and whether it takes effect from the date of S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981 are questions still open for consideration by this Court. 41. As correctly contended by learned for the assessee, the language used in the Notification S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 itself is the best aid to find out whether the notification is clarificatory in nature or whether it will amount to an amendment to the provisions contained under S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. The notification states that which will come into effect only from April 1, 1989. The above provision itself is an answer to the contention of the Revenue that it is clarificatory in nature and it takes effect from the date of S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. The language of the explanation contained in the notification would clearly show that it intended to take away the benefit of concessional rate of tax in respect of purchase of rubber utilised for making compounded rubber. Such an explanation as was held by the Supreme Court in Keshavji Ravji and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1990] 183 ITR 1; AIR 1991 SC 1806 and by this Court in Krishna Iyer v. State of Kerala [1962] 13 STC 838 [FB] has to be treated as a proviso having the effect of an amendment to S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. If that be so, the next question to be considered is whether retrospective effect can be given to the amendment in S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 even with effect from April 1, 1989 as provided under the notification. Since we have already taken the view that the effect of the explanation in S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 is taking away the benefit of concessional rate of tax in respect of rubber purchased for manufacturing compounded rubber, the notification has to be taken as one issued in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-section (3) of section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. We are in full agreement with the view taken by the learned single Judge in M. M. Nagalingam Nadar Sons v. State of Kerala [1993] 91 STC 61 (Ker) that Government has no power under section 10(3) of the Act to issue a notification with retrospective effect. We are in full agreement with the view taken by the learned single Judge in M. M. Nagalingam Nadar Sons v. State of Kerala [1993] 91 STC 61 (Ker) that Government has no power under section 10(3) of the Act to issue a notification with retrospective effect. If that be so, S.R.O. No. 1516 of 1990 can take effect only from November 2, 1990. 42. The additional question to be considered in T.R.C. No. 41 of 1995 relates to the rate of tax applicable to old newspapers, gunny bags, etc. The assessee claimed that butyl rubber, banbury tailings, brass valves, empty drums and gunnies which were accumulated in its factory where compounded rubber is produced and which are of no use to the assessee were sold as scrap items in a lot inviting quotations. Therefore, the turnover in respect of the above sale has to be assessed at the rate applicable to scrap. The assessing authority as well as the first appellate authority rejected the claim. The assessing authority took the view that these items can have independent use by the purchaser and therefore they are to be taxed at the rate specified against each item. The first appellate authority without assigning any reason upheld the view taken by the assessing authority. The Tribunal took the view that the intention of the seller as well as the buyer in all these cases was to sell or buy the condemned article and therefore what was sold was scrap. Reliance was placed by the Tribunal on two decisions, namely, State of Madras v. Raman & Co. [1974] 33 STC 1 (Mad.) and Prabhat Rolling Metal Works v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in Karnataka [1988] 69 STC 359 (Kar). In the first of the above two cases, the assessee who was a dealer in scrap iron, purchased condemned railway coaches sold in auction by the railway department and also components of Nissen huts from the Director of Supplies and Disposal, Madras, which was also sold in auction. The assessee later dismantled the railway coaches and Nissen huts and sold the resultant timber and iron materials in bulk. A Bench of the Madras High Court took the view that no doubt the sales by the railway and the Director of Supplies and Disposals are not sales of scrap iron as such. The assessee later dismantled the railway coaches and Nissen huts and sold the resultant timber and iron materials in bulk. A Bench of the Madras High Court took the view that no doubt the sales by the railway and the Director of Supplies and Disposals are not sales of scrap iron as such. But the intention of the sellers and buyers can easily be taken to sell or buy condemned coaches and condemned Nissen huts only for the purpose of acquiring the property in the old materials contained in those condemned articles. The court therefore held that the assessee has to be treated as second seller of scrap. In the second case, a Bench of the Karnataka High Court took the view that old aluminium vessels purchased by the assessee and used in the manufacture of new aluminium vessels has to be treated as purchase of scrap. 43. Learned Advocate-General contended that the Tribunal has erred in not accepting the contention raised by the Revenue. The assessee would submit that invoice in respect of these items were issued as scrap and the Tribunal was fully justified in its finding that they were sold as scrap. After taking into consideration the nature of the articles and the manner in which they were sold, the Tribunal has entered a finding that both the seller and buyer treated them as condemned articles and not as articles which could be put to use again. We do not find any reason to take a different view on such a finding on fact. If that be so, direction given by the Tribunal to levy tax at the rates application to scrap is only to be upheld. 44. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that there is no reason to interfere with the findings of the Tribunal in the common order under challenge in these tax revision cases. Since the Tribunal had found that concessional rate of tax is applicable only till November, 1990, T.R.C. Nos. 44 and 48 of 1995 relating to the months of November and December, 1990 do not survive. All the other tax revision cases are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.