Judgment A. K. Ganguly, J. 1. This matter was heard at length at the admission stage and is disposed of by the following order: 2. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the order of the Cane commissioner, Bihar the second respondent in respect of grant of a khandsari licence in favour of the third respondent under Sec.16 of the bihar Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1981 (hereinafter called the said Act ). 3. The petitioner has asserted that it is a registered Sugai Company under the Companies Act, 1956 situated at riga P. O. P. S. Riga, District-Sitamarhi, this fact is not disputed. 4. The third respondent filed, an application before the second respondent for grant of Khandsari licence for the reserved area of Righa Sugar Mill, which according to the petitioner is an area reserved for operation of Sugar mills of the petitioner. As such the petitioner filed objection before the second respondent on 1st August, 1994, and thereafter the petitioner appeared subsequently in connection with the said objection proceeding before the second respondent on several dates as mentioned in para-4 of the writ petition, and according to the information of the petitioner no final order was passed. 5. Petitioners case is that in january, 1997 petitioner came to know for the first time that a licence has been granted in favour of the third respondent by the authorities concerned without considering the objection raised by the petitioner, and as such the petitioner applied for a certified copy of the order immediately after the order granting licence was made available to the petitioner, the petitioner challenged the same before this Court. 6. The main ground of challenge of the said order, which is the impugned order at Annexure-1 is that the second respondent, the Cane Commissioner, while passing the said order must act in a quasi judicial capacity and thus acting in a quasi judicial proceeding, the Cane commissioner must act independently like a quasi judicial authority in accordance with law as contained in Sec.16 of the Act. 7. In the writ petition it has been alleged that while passing the impugned order purporting to grant licence in favour of third respondent, the second respondent instead of deciding the question independently referred the matter to the Secretary, of the Department and the Secretary made a reference to the minister concerned about this matter. 7. In the writ petition it has been alleged that while passing the impugned order purporting to grant licence in favour of third respondent, the second respondent instead of deciding the question independently referred the matter to the Secretary, of the Department and the Secretary made a reference to the minister concerned about this matter. The contention of the petitioner is that instead of acting as a quasi judicial authority, second respondent has abdicated his power in favour of an extraneous agency, and thus the exercise of power by the Cane Commissioner is vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the records. 8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1 and 2 has fairly admitted that there are errors in the impugned order. His only objection is that the order is an appealable one, and without filing an appeal this writ petition is not maintainable. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner while answering the said objection, in my view rightly contended that the appellate authority under Sec.20 of the Act, is the Departmental secretary. In the instant case, the said secretary has participated in the process of granting licence. Learned counsel for the second respondent could not dispute this position that in the process of granting licence the Secretary of the department has actually participated. 10. It is well settled that the presence of alternative remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of a writ Court. It merely acts as a self imposed restrain on the exercise of power. But from the facts of this case, it is clear that the appellate authority has himself participated in the process of granting licence. So an appeal to that authority against the grant of licence would be an empty ritual. 11. In that view of the matter and in the peculiar facts of this case this court holds that this writ petition is maintainable. Learned counsel for the third respondent, has however, tried to justify the order on merits. Since, this court is convinced that as a quasi judicial authority the second respondent has failed to discharge its statutory power under Sec.16 of the Act, in the matter of the grant of licence to third respondent, this Court cannot uphold the impugned order at Annexure-1. 12. Since, this court is convinced that as a quasi judicial authority the second respondent has failed to discharge its statutory power under Sec.16 of the Act, in the matter of the grant of licence to third respondent, this Court cannot uphold the impugned order at Annexure-1. 12. That a proceeding" before the cane Commissioner is a quasi judicial one, is well settled by the Apex Court in the case of Purtabpur Company Ltd. v, cane Commissioner of Bihar and Ors. reported in A. I. R.1970 S. C. page 1896. In the said judgment in Purtabpur Co. (supra) the Supreme Court has also came to the conclusion that when the cane Commissioner acts under the dictates of an outside agency, the action of cane Commissioner also becomes infirm and liable to be set aside. In the instant case, it is clear that the Cane commissioner abdicated and surrendered his power in favour of some outside authority, and actually the order granting licence to the third respondent is not the order of the Cane Commissioner but that of the outside agency in his favour as the second respondent surrendered his discretion. 13. In that view of the matter, this court is of the opinion that exercise of discretion by the Cane Commissioner is irregular and perverse, and any order arising out by such exercise of discretion is bound to be quashed. 14. This Court accordingly quashes the impugned order at Annexure-1. This writ petition thus succeeds. The impugned order at Annexure-1 is quashed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition Allowed.