JUDGMENT 1. - All these matters relate to the Arbitration proceedings between M/s. Verma Construction Company (for short the Company) and the Union of India (for short the UOI) therefore they are being disposed of by a common order. 2. In Revision No. 275/96 the Company has assailed the order dated August 3, 1995 whereby the learned court below extended the time for arbitration proceedings under section 28 of the Arbitration Act (for short the Act). 3. In appeal No. 290/1995, the order dated August 3, 1995 has been assailed whereby the Company's application under Section.8 and 20 of the Act was dismissed. 4. In Revision No. 1322 of 1995 the Order dated August 3, 1995 has.been assailed whereby Company's application under Section 8 and 11 of the Act was rejected.BACK GROUND FACTS 5. A few relevant background facts leading to these proceedings deserve to be noted at the outset. The Company entered into an agreement with the U.O.I. for broad gauge doubling project Km. 746/15-16 to 757/11-12 in between bridge No. 34 and Talawali Rly. Station at Nagda Ramganjmandi on June 9, 1981. This work was sanctioned to the Company on June, 1983 by Deputy Chief Engineer (Survey and Construction) Western Railway, Bombay. According to this sanction the work of doubling broad gauge in between bridge No. 34 and Talawali Rly. Station at Nagda Ramganj Mandi was to be done. The contract obtained the provisions for arbitration and therefore the company moved an application under section 8 and 20 of the Act before the Court below on October 9, 1984 and submitted seven claims. After several legal proceedings at different stages, Arbitrators Shri S.L. Jain and R.N. Vakil were appointed on April 10, 1990 to settle the dispute and claims submitted by the Company. 6. The company moved an application on Sept. 12, 1990 to appoint Shri K. Bokre in place of Shri R.M. Vakil. The company earlier also filed an application on August 24, 1990 with regard to conduct of the Arbitrators. During the pendency of the said application the U.O.I. moved for extension of time of. the term of the arbitrators. The court vide its order dated October 5, 1.994 extended .the time up to Feb. 4, 1995. 7. The company earlier also filed an application on August 24, 1990 with regard to conduct of the Arbitrators. During the pendency of the said application the U.O.I. moved for extension of time of. the term of the arbitrators. The court vide its order dated October 5, 1.994 extended .the time up to Feb. 4, 1995. 7. The company moved another application under section 8 and 11 of the Act before the Court expressing serious concern about the misconduct of the arbitrators and requested the court to appoint independent and impartial arbitrators to settle all the disputes referred to earlier arbitrator and also the disputes and claims arising subsequently. The UOI contested the application stating in the reply that the company was delaying the proceedings. 8. The Court vide' its order dated August 3, 1995 rejected the application of the company holding that the company did not appear and file its claim before the arbitrators appointed earlier and did not co-operate with the proceedings therefore it was not just and reasonable to reappoint the arbitrators. The court also imposed costs of Rs. 1000/- while rejecting the application. Against this order the company filed revision No. 1322 of 1995. 9. In appeal No. 790 of 1995 the company averred that Executive Engineer Survey and Construction II Western Region Kota Junction, sent a confidential report to its Headquarters stating that company is indulging the litigation and is in the habit of filing suits and getting the stay orders and is not working therefore the Company may not be treated as a reliable contractor on the basis of the report the Chief Engineer did not renew the Company's registration for contractor of category Class W. This caused heavy damage to the company and the company was deprived of getting works despite its offer of tenders were lowest. The company filed writ petition and this court directed that the company be treated as `A class Contractor. The UOI treated the company as such vide order dated Nov. 27, 1992. Since the company suffered heavy damages on account of UOI's action, new claims were accrued to the company. The said new claims were numbered as 8 to 17 and were filed by the company with an application for reference to the arbitrators. The UOI treated the company as such vide order dated Nov. 27, 1992. Since the company suffered heavy damages on account of UOI's action, new claims were accrued to the company. The said new claims were numbered as 8 to 17 and were filed by the company with an application for reference to the arbitrators. The company prayed that the Claims No. 8 to 17 were necessary to be referred to the arbitrators as those claims were based on subsequent events. The application was filed under Section 8 and 20 of the Act. The court rejected the application vide order dated August 3, 1995 holding that the cause of action arose in the year 1982 and thereafter there had been no subsequent event for appointing the arbitrators, the court further held that the company did not participate in the proceedings before the arbitrators appointed earlier therefore the company did not come with clean hands. The court imposed cost of Rs. 1000/- upon the company. Against this order the Company filed appeal No.-790/95. 10. In revision No. 275/96 the order dated August 3, 1995 of the Court has been assailed whereby the application filed under Section 28 of the Act for extending time for arbitration proceedings, by the UOI, was allowed. The UOI moved the application stating therein that Company was not taking part in the arbitration proceedings before the arbitrators, and was not allowing the said proceedings to be completed therefore the time limit of the arbitration proceedings b:, extended for another four months. The company did not file reply to the application. The court passed the impugned order observing that the company had no objection in extension of time therefore time was extended to another four months.RIVAL CONTENTIONS 11. Mr. Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the company vigorously canvassed that work job itself was sanctioned on August 25, 1983,therefore the order of the court below which says that cause of action arose in the year 1982 is perverse and beyond the facts. The cause of action arose after Nov. Mr. Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the company vigorously canvassed that work job itself was sanctioned on August 25, 1983,therefore the order of the court below which says that cause of action arose in the year 1982 is perverse and beyond the facts. The cause of action arose after Nov. 22, 1984 when the confidential report was sent by the Executive Engineer Survey and Construction H. The UOI had a malice against the company as is evident from the letter dated October 24, 1985 of the Additional Chief Engineer Church Gate Bombay which reads that the case against the UOI it not withdrawn the offer of the company cannot be considered. The observations of the court below that claims were not based on subsequent events and that company did not participate in the proceedings before the arbitrators are bad and beyond the facts. The observations are based on surmises and conjectures and the court did not pass speaking orders. 12. Mr. Kuhad, learned counsel further contended that the right to appoint arbitrators which was available to UOI lapsed automatically. Despite appointing the arbitrators for 5 times and UOI could not get the proceedings completed in a period of 12 years. The company filed its claim on April 30, 1990. The arbitrators issued notice giving only one day's time. The arbitrators did not warn the UOI for causing delay. Time limit of four months expired on August 9, 1990 and the UOI deliberately in order to delay the matter applied for extension of time on Sept. 12, 1990. This delay cannot be attributed to the company. The court below passed the orders overlooking the documents and without framing point of determination in a slip short manner. 13. Learned counsel placed reliance on the following authorities : (i) State of West Bengal v. National Builders, (1994) 1 SCC 235 . (ii) Major Inder Singh Rekhi v. D.D.A., (1988) 2 SCC 3381. (iii) U.O.I and another v. M/s. L.K. Ahuja & Co., (1988) 3 SCC 76 . (iv) M/s. Allied Agencies v. U.O.I., 1992(2) WLC (Raj.) 235. (v) Kali Charan Sharma v. The State of U.P., (AIR 1985 Delhi 389). (vi) D.D.A. v. M/s. Alkarama, (AIR 1985 Delhi 132). (vii) The Baranagore Jute Factory v. M/s. Hulas Chand, ( AIR 1958 Cal. 490 ). (viii) Sethi Kirori Mal v. U.O.I, (AIR 1964 Calcutta 545). (iv) M/s. Allied Agencies v. U.O.I., 1992(2) WLC (Raj.) 235. (v) Kali Charan Sharma v. The State of U.P., (AIR 1985 Delhi 389). (vi) D.D.A. v. M/s. Alkarama, (AIR 1985 Delhi 132). (vii) The Baranagore Jute Factory v. M/s. Hulas Chand, ( AIR 1958 Cal. 490 ). (viii) Sethi Kirori Mal v. U.O.I, (AIR 1964 Calcutta 545). (ix) Priyabrata Bose v. Phani Bhushan Ghose, (AIR 1937 Cal. 523) (x) Shah Construction Co. v. Municipal Corporation, (AIR 1985 Delhi 358). 14. Mr. Naresh Sharma, learned counsel for the UOI, on the other -hand, supported the impugned orders and vociforcely cited the following decisions (i) U.O.I. v. M/s. Morun Construction Co., ( AIR 1995 SC 1927 ) (ii) K.V. George v. Secretary, 1990(1) Arb.L.R. 551. (iii) Virji v. UOI, [1994(2) WLC (Raj.) 1351. (iv) State of Gujrat v. Sheth Construction Co., 1990(1) Arb.L.R. 387. (v) U.O.I. v. M/s. Prabhat Kumar and another, ( AIR 1994 SC 649 ). (vi) Bhupendra Singh Brindra v. UOI, [1995 DNJ (SC) 374]. (vii) M/s. Vijay Singh Amar Singh & Co. v. Hindustan Zinc Ltd., ( AIR 1992 Raj. 82 ). (viii) Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Mastan Rao, [ 1994 (1) Arb.L.R. 177 ]. (ix) S. Rajan v. State of Kerala, (JT 1992(4) SC 312). . 15. I have given my anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions and carefully perused the various judicial pronouncements cited before me. 16. In State of West Bengal's case (supra) it was pronounced by the Supreme Court that where arbitrator refuses to act the court has jurisdiction to appoint next arbitrator under section 13(1)(b) of the Act. The Supreme Court defined the words "refused to act" as under: "Refused to act in legal sense means trial to do something which one is obliged to do under law. If an arbitrator refused or informs the parties his inability to act it would be express refusal. And even the courts cannot force him to arbitrate. Refusal to act may be inferred as well. On what facts such inference can be raised cannot be laid down with certainty. There can be no fixed principle for it. Where an arbitrator has failed to discharge his obligation so as to give rise to an inference that he has refused to act it shall have to be decided by the court on facts and circumstances each case. On what facts such inference can be raised cannot be laid down with certainty. There can be no fixed principle for it. Where an arbitrator has failed to discharge his obligation so as to give rise to an inference that he has refused to act it shall have to be decided by the court on facts and circumstances each case. But such an inference should not be readily raised. The courts primary concern should be to uphold the arbitration. But only the court is satisfied that the arbitrator has refused to discharge his obligation then it has statutory duty to intervene and act in accordance with section 8(1)(b) of that Act." 17. Maj. Inder Singh Rekhi v. D.D.A. (supra) was the case wherein the Apex Court observed that the period of three years prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will start from the date when the right to apply accrued. Where the final bills had not been prepared and the assertion of the claim was made on Feb. 28, 1983 and there was nonpayment, the cause of action arose from the date, i.e. Feb., 1983. 18. U.O.I. v. M/s. L.K. Ahuja & Co . (supra) was the case wherein the Apex Court indicated that "In order to be a valid claim for reference under section 20, it is necessary that there should be an arbitration agreement and secondly difference must arise to which the agreement in question applied and thirdly, that must be within time as stipulated in section 20 of the Act..... on completion of the work, right to get payment would normally arise but on settlement of the final bill, the right to get further payment gets weakened but the claim subsists and whether it does subsists is a matter which is arbitration. 19. M/s. Allied Agencies & Co. (supra) was the case where this court laid down that "whether the claim to be made n reference to arbitration is based or not. is a question to be decided by the Arbitrator and not by court in an application under section 20, because there is a distinction between claim being barred under 'the Limitation Act and right to apply under section 20 as section 20 is the only machinery for referring the disputes to arbitration." 20. is a question to be decided by the Arbitrator and not by court in an application under section 20, because there is a distinction between claim being barred under 'the Limitation Act and right to apply under section 20 as section 20 is the only machinery for referring the disputes to arbitration." 20. D.D.A. v. M/s. Alkarma (supra) was the case wherein Delhi High Court propounded thus: "The provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 which would apply if the request for referring more disputes to arbitration is made after the making of the award. Once an award has been made, a party cannot be permitted to raise more disputes which he/it could and ought to have raised earlier. Where, however, an award has not been made, it is open to a claimant to ask for more disputes to be referred to arbitration provided the arbitration proceedings are not yet over. In such an event, if the authority competent to appoint an arbitrator and to refer the disputes, rails to do so, the court has the jurisdiction to order the filing of the arbitration agreement and to direct the competent authority under arbitration clause to refer the dispute to arbitration." 21. Shah Construction Co. v. Municipal Corporation (supra) was the case wherein the Delhi High Court held that "It is not the law that all disputes in relation to one contract must be disposed of in one reference. Failure to raise a dispute in the first reference does not debar a party from raising it to be adjudicated in a subsequent reference even though the cause of action for the same subsisted at the time of the first reference. 22. Kalicharan Sharma v. State of U.P. (supra) was the case wherein, Delhi High Court indicated that "The delay of two years on the part of the arbitrators to enter upon the reference is palpably and obviously a gross neglect in that regard, and he has failed to use all reasonable dispatch in entering upon and proceeding with the arbitration proceedings and thereby he is liable to be removed as arbitrator under section 11(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940." 23. Seth Kerorimal v. U.O.I. (supra) was the case wherein the Calcutta High Court observed thus : "It is not the law that all disputes in relations to one contract must be disposed of in one reference. Seth Kerorimal v. U.O.I. (supra) was the case wherein the Calcutta High Court observed thus : "It is not the law that all disputes in relations to one contract must be disposed of in one reference. Failure to raise any such dispute in one reference does not debar a party from raising other disputes to be adjusted in a subsequent reference. Provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC do not apply to arbitration proceedings." 24. The Baranagore Jute Factory Co. v. M/s. Hulas Chand (supra) was the case wherein the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court indicated that "where the words of the agreement are wide enough to cover all disputes concerning the relevant transaction on contract, there can obviously be successive references under its authority regarding different disputes and even in a case where a fresh dispute arises as to the import or effect of the award made on a reference of the original dispute, a second reference regarding that dispute can be made." 25. Priyabrata Bose v. Phani Bhushan Ghose (supra) was the case wherein Calcutta High Court observed that refusal by arbitrator to act further till payment of his fees in advance, amounts to refusal to act on his part within the meaning of section 8 of the Arbitration Act, and a new arbitrator can be appointed in his place. 26. In U.O.I. v. M/s. Prabhat Kumar (supra) it was propounded by the Supreme Court that where the arbitrator ceases to be arbitrator on his retirement from Government service, extension of time in such a case was not proper. 27. In Bhupendra Singh Bindra v. U.O.I. (supra) it was held by the Supreme Court that the court has no powers to revoke/remove the arbitrator appointed by the parties. 28. In M/s. Vijay Singh v. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. (supra) it was laid down by this court that clause in the arbitration agreement regarding reference of dispute to a sole arbitrator to be appointed by company and who may even be an employee of the company. If willful acceptance of the said clause is given by the contractor he is estopped from revising plea regarding validity of clause and appointment of arbitrator. The clause is neither unconscionable nor void as it is neither against law nor against any policy. 29. In Govt. If willful acceptance of the said clause is given by the contractor he is estopped from revising plea regarding validity of clause and appointment of arbitrator. The clause is neither unconscionable nor void as it is neither against law nor against any policy. 29. In Govt. of A.P. v. K. Mastan Rao (supra) it was laid down by the Supreme Court that where the agreement expressly provides reference of disputes to three arbitrators, the matter cannot be referred to a single arbitrator even if the three arbitrators delay the decision. 30. In S. Rajan v. State of Kerala (supra) it was held by the Supreme Court that period of three years provided in Article 137 of the Limitation Act runs from the date when right to apply accrues. The Supreme Court observe thus : "Reading Article 137 and sub-section (1) of Section 20 together, it must be said that-the right to apply accrues when the difference arises or differences arise as the case may be, between the parties, it is thus a question of fact to be determined in each case having regard to the facts of that case." 31. In U.O.I. v. Momin Construction Co . (supra), it was observed by the Supreme Court thus: "The right to apply under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, therefore, arose to the respondents before 11th August 1965. The application under section 20 was made by them much after the expiry of three years therefrom. The application under section 20 was therefore, plainly barred by time." 32. In K.V. George v. Secretary (supra) it was laid down by the Supreme Court that "The contract was terminated on 26.4.1980 and as such all the issues arising out of termination of the contract ought to have been referred to arbitration in the first claim petition. The second claim was therefore, barred by constructive res judicata. 33. In Virji v. U.O.I. (supra) this court observed that where application under Section 20 was filed long after period prescribed under Article 137 of Limitation Act, the application was barred by limitation. 34. In State of Gujarat v. Sheth Construction Co . (supra) D.B. of Gujrat High Court held thus, "If the parties have not complied with the conditions of the agreement or condition precedent for referring the matter to be arbitrator is absent, then the dispute cannot be referred to the arbitrator. 34. In State of Gujarat v. Sheth Construction Co . (supra) D.B. of Gujrat High Court held thus, "If the parties have not complied with the conditions of the agreement or condition precedent for referring the matter to be arbitrator is absent, then the dispute cannot be referred to the arbitrator. In some cases of undue hardship to the parties the court has jurisdiction to extend the time fixed by the parties in the interest of justice on certain terms under Section 37(4) of the Act."PRINCIPLES DEDUCED 35. The principles that, emerge from the aforementioned authorities can be summarised as under : (i) Where the arbitrator has failed to discharge his obligation so as to give rise to the inference that he has refused to act is a question of fact and it shall have to be decided by the court on facts and circumstances of each case. But such an inference should not be readily raised. The court's primary concern should be to uphold the arbitration. (ii) Once the court is satisfied that arbitrator has refused to discharge his obligation then it has statutory duty to intervene and act in accordance with section 8(I)(b) of the Act. (iii) The provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963 are applicable to arbitration proceedings. The period of three years prescribed in the said article shall start when right to apply accrued when right is accrued' is a question of fact to be determined by the court looking to the facts and circumstance of each case. (iv) whether the claim is barred or not is a question which is to be decided by the arbitrator and not by the court. (v) The provisions contained in order 2, Rule 2 CPC, would not apply to the arbitration proceedings before making of the award. (vi) Failure to raise a dispute in the first reference does not debar a party from a raising it to be adjudicated in a subsequent reference even though the cause of action for the same subsisted at the time of the first reference. (vii) Where the words of arbitration agreement are wide enough to cover all disputes concerning the relevant transaction or contract, there can be successive reference. (viii) Where the arbitrator ceased to be arbitrator on his retirement from Government service, extension of time in such a case was not proper. (vii) Where the words of arbitration agreement are wide enough to cover all disputes concerning the relevant transaction or contract, there can be successive reference. (viii) Where the arbitrator ceased to be arbitrator on his retirement from Government service, extension of time in such a case was not proper. (ix) Court can not interpose and interdict the appointment of an arbitrator, whom the parties have chosen under the terms of the contract unless legal misconduct of the arbitrator, fraud, disqualification etc. is pleaded or proved. (x) In the interest of justice, in some cases of undue hardship to the parties, the court has jurisdiction to extend the time fixed by the parties on certain terms. (Emphasis supplied)CONCLUSION 36. I will first examine the aspect regarding extension of time by the arbitrator under section 28 of the Act. There is. a close resemblance between the provisions of section 28 and section 37(4). But under section 28 time can be enlarged for making the award and under section 37(4) court can extend time for giving notice for appointing an arbitrator. Section 28 comes in to play when stage of making award reaches while section 37(4) can be invoked even before moving the court for appointing an arbitrator.Section 28(1) of the Act is very wide and confers full discretion on court to enlarge time for making award. There is absolutely no restriction in this section as to on those grounds extension would be granted. There is no limitation on the court to grant extension of time suo moto or on the application or move of any party or person. A look at the order passed by the learned court below indicate that the counsel for the company expressed before the court that he had no objection regarding extension of time of arbitration. No reply to the application under section 28 of the Act, was filed by the company. Now in the revision petition before me it has been asserted that the company never conceded before the. court below nor stated in any manner that it has no objection in extension of time. The contention of the court below incorrectly incorporated the company's concession cannot he accepted in view of the presumption available under section 114 illustration (e) of the Evidence Act. court below nor stated in any manner that it has no objection in extension of time. The contention of the court below incorrectly incorporated the company's concession cannot he accepted in view of the presumption available under section 114 illustration (e) of the Evidence Act. It is to be presumed that the counsel for the company did not raise objection, and conceded before the court below regarding extension of time of arbitration. 37. This brings me to other two applications field by the company under section 8 read with 20 and section 8 with 11 of the Act. The company moved application under section 8 read with 20 praying therein that claims No. 8 to 17 appended in Annexure A were necessary to be referred to arbitration as they were based on subsequent events. The learned court below dismissed the application on the ground that cause of action arose in the year 1982 and thereafter there was no subsequent event for appointing the arbitrators. Earlier also the arbitrators were appointed but the company did not file its claim before them. The application was dismissed with the observations that company did not appear with clear hands. 38. No doubt that provides of Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963 are applicable to arbitration proceedings but in order to ascertain on which date the right to apply accrued, it was incumbent upon the court to examine the facts of the case in detail. As state above that failure to raise a dispute in the first reference does not debar a party from raising it to be adjudicated in a subsequent reference even though the cause of action for the same subsisted at the time of first reference. It is evident from the perusal of impugned order that the learned court below did not apply its judicial mind towards the facts and law. In three paras of the order the court discussed the rival contentions, in fourth para authorities cited on behalf of the parties have been referred and in para 5 the learned court made judicial observations in fifteen lines only. Neither the arguments of the parties have been discussed nor the authorities cited by the parties have been appreciated. I am of the view that the reasons are required to be recorded in support of the decision since valuable right of the parties are involved. Neither the arguments of the parties have been discussed nor the authorities cited by the parties have been appreciated. I am of the view that the reasons are required to be recorded in support of the decision since valuable right of the parties are involved. In absence of the reasons it is very difficult to adjudge as to how the judicial mind was applied to the dispute and how the court arrived at the decision. 39. In dismissing the application under section 11 read with section 8 of the Act, the learned court below discussed in detail the rival contentions in three years of the order. In fourth para, the authorities cited by the parties have been appreciated and in the last para the learned Judge dismissed the application only in eleven lines. The learned Judge observed that as in earlier arbitration proceedings the company did not cooperate and failed to file claim, there was no justification in appointing arbitrators again. The court below failed to adjudicate the question of fact as to whether the arbitrators were failed to discharge the obligation so as to give rise to the inference that they have refused to act. Unless the speaking order is passed by the court below, it is not easy for this court to arrive at the definite finding in respect of the legality and correctness of the said order. 40. It was necessary for the learned court below to discuss the facts and law in detail and to decide the following questions: (i) Whether subsequent reference sought by the company arose out of the contract or was related to other tenders of the company ? (ii) On which date right to apply accrued to the company ? (iii) Whether failure to raise a dispute in the first reference does not debar company from raising it to be adjudicated in a subsequent reference even though the cause of action for the same subsisted at the time of first reference ? (iv) In the facts and circumstances of the case, whether the subsequent reference sought by company was barred by limitation ? (v) Did the company cooperate arbitrators and file claim before them ? (vi) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the arbitrators failed to discharge the obligation so as to give rise to the reference that they have refused to act ? (v) Did the company cooperate arbitrators and file claim before them ? (vi) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the arbitrators failed to discharge the obligation so as to give rise to the reference that they have refused to act ? (vii) Whether authorities cited by the parties in support of their respective contentions are applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case ? (viii) What is the relevancy of the decisions passed by this Court in writ petition and special appeal filed by the company ? (ix) What reliefs should be granted to the parties ? 41. In view of the above discussions, I have no hesitation to observe that no jurisdictional error has been committed by the court below in extending time for arbitration proceedings under section 28 of the Act. Therefore S.B. Civil Revision No. 275 of 1996 fails and is hereby dismissed. 42. As the court below dismissed the applications under section 8/20 and 8/11 of the Act mechanically and without application of judicial mind. I am of the view that orders of dismissal of said applications are not sustainable therefore I allow S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 790 of 1995 and S.B. Civil Revision No. 1322 of 1995 and set aside the impugned orders dated August 3, 1995. The cases are remitted to the court below with the direction to decide the application afresh after proper discussion of law and facts with reference to the questions framed in para 40 of this judgment. It is expected from the court below to adjudicate the said application within one month from the date of receipt of this order. The parties are directed to appear before the Court below on April 21, 1997. Costs easy.Misc. Appeal No. 790/1995 and Civil Revision No. 1322/1995 Allowed - Impugned Order Set Aside - Case Remanded. *******